- Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00070 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–7, and 9–21 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2 and 8 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted art did not meet their construed limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL A. Petitioner explains the applicable level of skill in the art as follows: As of June 24, 2010, a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would be a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, as well as two years of industry experience and who would have had a working knowledge of software security analysis, and dynamic malware analysis. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 8 (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See Ex. 2031 ¶¶ 15–16. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’872 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We begin with the claim language in view of the Specification, which weighs heavily against Patent Owner’s position that we should rewrite “computer system” as narrowly referring to a “computing device.” PO Resp. 24. As Petitioner notes, the ’872 patent’s Specification uses “computer system” to refer to a wide range of equipment, from a component of a computing device, to a whole computing device, to a collection of computing devices. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:5–8, 11:15–18, 16:50–55). In one example, the Specification refers to “one or more other computer systems (e.g., protected network devices 136).” Ex. 1001, 18:52–53. Thus, the Specification lists “protected network devices 136” as only an example of “other computer systems,” demonstrating that “computer systems” refers to things other than protected network devices. Although Patent Owner may be correct that this passage more than a single computing device,” we find that other disclosures in the ’872 patent do. Specifically, the Specification uses the language “distributed computer system” when referring to numerous components, including “protected network devices” and an “IDS/IPS system.” Ex. 1001, 3:26–28; Reply 10. In addition to showing that a “computer system” is not limited to a single computing device, this conveys that a “computer system” according to the ’872 patent can include an IDS/IPS.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on our review of the complete record, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to be more persuasive. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument and evidence that capturing detailed information like Goel’s activity sources, activity targets, and association was recognized as enhancing threat analysis. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79); see PO Resp. 55–59; Sur-Reply 15–17. Additionally, contrary to Patent Owner’s suggestion, we find that the Petition does not propose incorporating Goel’s kernel hooks into Capalik’s system. See Pet. 41–46. Patent Owner contends that the Petition’s reference to modifying Capalik by “adding lines of code” suggests implementing the code disclosed in Goel include kernel hooks. Id. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s assertion otherwise, this is an unpersuasive bodily incorporation argument, as the Petition never says an ordinarily skilled artisan would have used the exact lines of code from Goel in Capalik. Rather, the Petition says that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had sufficient skill to implement straightforward code modifications to identify activity sources, targets, and associations: a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that modifying Capalik’s system (e.g., Linux-based) to additionally monitor, identify, and store each individual activity of an attack including “activity sources, activity targets, and associations” would have required straightforward modifications to programs/code instructions, which would have been well-within the skillset of a [person of ordinary skill in the art]. Pet. 46. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not explain how an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Capalik without using kernel hooks. Sur-Reply 17. But Patent Owner does not cite any evidence to counter Dr. Jakobsson’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had the skill to apply Goel’s general teaching of identifying sources, targets, and associations to Capalik’s system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 182. On the whole, the evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position that the combination would have required substantially increased detection risk. Moreover, even if the combination would have somewhat increased detection risk, Petitioner persuades us that an ordinarily skilled artisan still would have had reason to combine the references teachings. Patent Owner’s allegations of increased detection risk do not negate the undisputed evidence that the combination would have provided the advantage of improved threat analysis. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175–182). Ultimately, Patent Owner’s that activity logging be undetectable.” PO Resp. 56 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 6). This exaggerates Capalik’s disclosure. Although the cited paragraph suggests that certain systems unfortunately may be detectable by some users, it does not convey that it is a requirement for the system to be categorically undetectable. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 6.8 In sum, Petitioner persuades us by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have been obvious to modify Capalik “to identify and store unauthorized activities including the activity source, activity target, and association of each activity.” Pet. 41–46; PO Resp. 55–59; Reply 20–22; Sur-Reply 15–17.” slip op. at 47
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner fails to sufficiently show a nexus between any of its objective indicia evidence and the claimed invention. See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists”). A showing of sufficient nexus is required to establish that the evidence relied upon traces its basis to a novel element in the claim, not to something in the prior art. Institut Pasteur & Universite Pierre Et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Objective evidence that results from something that is not “both claimed and novel in the claim” lacks a nexus to the merits of the invention. In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). Thus, establishing nexus involves a showing that novel elements in the claim, not prior-art elements, account for the objective evidence of nonobviousness. Id. As discussed above, Petitioner shows that Capalik teaches all limitations of claim 1. Petitioner persuades us that none of claim 1’s elements individually nor any combination thereof is novel over Capalik’s disclosure. Accordingly, claim 1 is not novel over Capalik, which disproves Patent Owner’s assertion of nexus. PO Resp. 73–76. Moreover, even if claim 1 were novel, Patent Owner otherwise fails to show nexus for its commercial success, praise, or copying assertions. Patent Owner’s evidence does not show that Petitioner’s commercial product embodies claim 1. For example, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “failed to analyze any meaningful detail regarding” how the Falcon Platform allegedly meets limitation 1(d). Reply 28–29. In particular, Patent Owner has not sufficiently addressed limitation 1(d) with the following argument: “1[D] The Falcon Platform transmitted to other computer systems” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 9,954,872 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,954,872 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-01570 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–19 not shown unpatentable: Wang did not anticipate claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not render claims 11–19 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent is self-explanatory and would have been recognized by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. “Petitioner submits that no special constructions are required” because “the claim terms appear understandable in the context of the disclosure provided by the specification of the ’690 Patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Patent Owner “agrees that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 10. After reviewing the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any claim term to resolve any controversy in the proceeding. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Wang by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. / Accelight Technologies, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–19 not unpatentable: Wang did not establish anticipation of claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not establish obviousness of claims 11–19.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“challenge set forth in the Petition by citing the background of the ’690 patent and Dr. Willner’s deposition testimony and characterizing the same as “admissions” of Patent Owner in Petitioner’s Reply, such “evidence” did not form the basis of Appellant’s original position set forth in the Petition.6 Petitioner’s arguments that all of the components recited in claim 11 “were known in the prior art” or that Dr. Willner admitted the same are unpersuasive at least because the Petition did not set forth this position. Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments during the oral hearing, the Petition does not present challenges based on “Applicant Admitted Prior Art.” See generally Pet.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,788,690 - Thermaltake Technology Co., Ltd. / Thermaltake Inc. v. Chien-Hao ChenAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable; substitute claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable, and the Revised Motion to Amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“our Institution Decision comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’336 patent and the prior art of record. Inst. Dec. 15. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill discussed in our Institution Decision. C.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chemicals Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Accordingly, Patent Owner applies a different definition of “side,” in claim 1’s recitation of “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body,” to that definition used to understand “side[s] of the body,” discussed above. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s dictionary definition of “side,” including “an area next to something” applies to “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at the top of the body.” See id. at 8–9.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Hasegawa, and Huang teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 3, and that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine those teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 136– 140; Ex. 1008, 8:4–15, 3:20–29. Accordingly, we determine that claim 3 would have been obvious over Lai and Huang, or Lai, Hasegawa, and Huang. F.” slip op. at 50
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“c) Conclusion We conclude that Patent Owner's Revised Motion to Amend adds new” slip op. at 90
Patent outcomesUS 10,690,336 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,690,336 - Apple Inc. v. S.M.R Innovations Ltd And Y.M.R Tech LtdAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01048 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5–8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the four stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not contend that the differences between the parties’ formulations would affect our patentability analysis. PO Resp. 2–4. Petitioner does not dispute that Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Ginter, who has a bachelor’s degree and years of experience in wireless communication, qualifies as a POSITA. Tr. 43; Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 5–10. Petitioner also concedes that its challenges do not hinge on which formulation we accept. Tr. 43. We agree that our decision would be the same regardless of the differences between the formulations. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed formulation, which is supported by declaration testimony and generally consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’648 patent and the prior art of record. Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 21–25; Exs. 1001, 1004–1009.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. Although claim 1 recites step 1b before step 1d, method steps are not ordinarily construed to require a specific order of performance unless the claims or Specification directly or implicitly require that specific order. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, nothing in the express claim language precludes performing step 1d before step 1b. The claim does not expressly recite signaling the device(s) previously “identified as available.” Nor does the claim otherwise specify that step 1b must precede step 1d. For example, the claim does not contain temporal terms like “then,” “next,” or “further.” Although Patent Owner points out that a term of step 1d (i.e., “the” one more available devices) derives antecedent basis from step 1b, this alone does not require performing step 1b before step 1d. PO Resp. 5, 10; Sur-reply 11. Rather, we agree with Petitioner that step 1d’s reliance on step 1b for antecedent basis only serves to clarify that the steps refer to the same device(s), not to determine the performance order. Reply 4, 5. We also agree with Petitioner that claim 1 inconsistently employs antecedent basis for other claim elements, which undermines Patent Owner’s argument that step 1d’s antecedent basis establishes a specific order. Reply 7 (referring to the recited “media content,” “the media content,” and “a media content”).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. Petitioner met its burden to show that the combination would have been obvious. Zhang teaches a cellular phone (which logically receives cellular calls) and routing media to audio devices on its network. Ex. 1004, 3:25–29. Missing in Zhang is an explicit teaching that its cellular calls (as opposed to other media) are routed. Pasanen explicitly teaches routing cellular calls to networked audio devices. Ex. 1006; 4:20–37. Taken together, routing Zhang’s cellular calls across its network would have been obvious to a POSITA. Patent Owner’s argument that Zhang-Fillebrown’s 802.11 or HomeRF network do not support routing cellular calls discounts Zhang’s teaching that “its network can be built on top of many different kinds of communication media” including but not limited to 802.11 and HomeRF, as well as the “optional HomeRF features” Petitioner claims would sufficient to implement the claimed functionality. Ex. 1001, 4:46–50; Reply 20–22 (citing Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 13–15); Sur-reply 3–6 (arguing that HomeRF’s isochronous mode and DECT protocol are optional and would not have been necessary to practice Zhang’s subject matter). And though Zhang does not discuss transcoding or specific HomeRF features/protocols, which Patent Owner argues are necessary for routing cellular calls across Zhang’s 802.11 or HomeRF network, we agree with Petitioner that the ’648 patent also provides scant technical details as to how its system routes cellular calls over its local network, suggesting that such was well known at the time. Reply 17 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001 7:9–25).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,547,648 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,547,648 - Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 10,379,301 - Everstar Merchandise Co., Ltd. v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · PGR2019-00056 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Remand
Claims 2–7, 9–19, 21–25, 27, 30, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious; Petitioner did not prove claims 8, 20, 26, 28, 29, and 32 unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan,” concluding “[n]othing more is required to establish a motivation to combine.” Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4. The Federal Circuit observed that “Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1,” and accordingly, “reverse[d] the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate[d] the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent,” remanding to us for further proceedings. Id. at 4–5. With those instructions in mind, we review the Petitioner’s allegations regarding claims 2–33.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“F. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the First Final Written Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least two years of experience in the design of decorative lighting, or (2) at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and a basic familiarity with circuits used in decorative lighting.” Paper 40, 12. We see no reason to depart from that earlier determination.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties agree that we do not need to construe any claim terms. Pet. 8–9; PO Resp. 16–17. We likewise agree. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner did not dispute that the combined teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner, however, did dispute Petitioner’s proposed reasons for combining Kumada and Debladis ’120, and argues that Debladis ’120 is not analogous art. PO Resp. 36–61. The Federal Circuit stated that substantial evidence only supports the conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120. The factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan. Nothing more is required to establish a motivation to combine. Given that Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1, we reverse the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent. Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4 (internal citations omitted). The Federal Circuit further noted Patent Owner’s secondary considerations arguments as to claim 1 and stated [t]he cited evidence consists only of a temporal connection between the introduction of Willis’s invention and the UL 588 standards, and deposition testimony of a single witness who seemingly disclaimed any connection between the two. This is not sufficient to rescue a claim as to secondary considerations. Id. at 4, n. 5 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that claim 1 would have been obvious over Kumada and Debladis ’120. 6. Analysis of Independent Claim 33” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,222,037 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,222,037 - CQV Co., Ltd. v. Merck Patent GmbHNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · PGR2021-00054 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · PGR · Remand
Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable because Sample C was not proven publicly available as prior art, and the original decision found the remaining grounds insufficient.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s evidence in Kuntz (Ex. 1026), the Annual Report (Ex. 1028), Masuko (Ex. 1029), and Pfaff (Ex. 1034) is insufficient to show that Xirallic® Sample C was available to the public before the effective filing date of the ’861 patent. Petitioner has not asserted, nor do we find, that any of these documents refer to or describe the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. See Final Dec. 26. Kuntz, the Annual Report, Masuko, and Pfaff may support a finding that the Xirallic® line of products was available to the public, but these documents do not support a finding that the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was available to the public. We also agree with Patent Owner that the Technical Data Sheets (Exs. 1005–1010), Certificates of Analysis (Exs. 1011–1017), and Material Safety Data Sheet (Ex. 1025) are insufficient to show that Xirallic® Sample C was available to the public. Petitioner has not asserted, nor do we find, that any of these documents refer to or describe the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. See Final Dec. 26–27. Regardless of how the Technical Data Sheets were used in the Opposition against the European counterpart of the ’861 patent (Exs. 1040, 1041) and during the prosecution of the application from which the ’861 patent issued (Ex. 1003, 102–104), the Technical Data Sheets do not refer to or describe the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. Moreover, as noted by Patent Owner, the Technical Data Sheets (Exs. 1005–1010) indicate that they are “preliminary” and Petitioner has not provided any evidence that the Technical Data Sheets were ever issued to the public, as opposed to just issued internally. See PO Resp. 18–19. We also find persuasive Patent Owner’s argument that the Technical Data Sheets are preliminary because other, later-dated technical data sheets (Exs. 2012, 2013) lack the “preliminary” label and list characteristics that are different from those in Exhibits 1005–1010. See PO Resp. 19 (comparing, e.g., Ex. 1009 and Ex. 2013; Ex. 1005 and Ex. 2012). The Technical Data Sheets may support a finding that the Xirallic® products they describe existed as of the dates on the documents, but they do not support a finding that the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was available to the public.” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther
“witnesses. See Elbit Systems of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., 620 F. App’x 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 (1982)). We have reviewed the witness testimony in the record and, more particularly, Mr. Choi’s deposition answers regarding Petitioner’s purchase of the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C came. We find that Mr. Choi’s responses cast doubt on the credibility of his declaration testimony, namely with regard to the public availability of Sample C. Mr. Choi represented that he was involved in the purchase of the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken. Ex. 2011, 48:1–23. Mr. Choi stated that he instructed Petitioner’s marketing team manager to buy the sample from a distributor of Patent Owner’s products located in Europe. Id. at 48:24–49:4. Mr. Choi stated that he has evidence of the transaction, but refused to reveal the name of the company from which Petitioner purportedly purchased the lot of Xirallic® (id. at 49:5–50:3) and refused to produce an email in his possession that would corroborate his testimony regarding Petitioner’s acquisition of the product (id. at 50:8–16, 51:10–23). Mr. Choi represented that he does not remember how much Petitioner paid for Sample B. Id. at 56:4–5. Mr. Choi admitted that the entity from which Petitioner acquired the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken is “not currently a Merck distributor” (Ex. 2011, 50:4–7) and was not “a Merck distributor at the time” that “samples B and C were purchased” (id. at 51:25–52:2). According to Mr. Choi, the company is a “former distributor” of Patent Owner’s products. Id. at 52:3–6. Mr. Choi did not know, according to his testimony, when that unnamed entity first obtained the lot of Xirallic® (id. at 52:7–10) and he stated that he did not have personal knowledge of how the entity obtained the lot of Xirallic® (id. at 52:12–19). Instead, Mr. Choi assumed the entity was “able to obtain the sample through the routine course or process” the entity uses “to take samples or get samples.” Id. at 52:12–19. Mr. Choi believed the sample of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was sealed when Petitioner received it because samples from dealers are sealed, and he remembered observing that the package was from a dealer. Id. at 52:24– 54:25. However, Mr. Choi admitted that he did not obtain a technical data sheet or certificate of analysis for the lot of Xirallic® from which Samples B and C were taken. Id. at 59:6–11. Mr. Choi also answered questions regarding Petitioner’s purchase of Samples D and H. Ex. 2011, 62:20–66:8, 67:7–9, 73:12–13, 73:17–22. Similar to his testimony regarding Samples B and C, Mr. Choi admitted withholding an email regarding the purchase of the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample D was taken. Id. at 62:20–63:9. Mr. Choi also admitted that he did not know how Akzo USA or Axalta obtained the Xirallic® the companies sold to him, and admitted that Akzo USA was not a distributor of Patent Owner’s products at the time Petitioner purchased the product. Id. at 63:10–66:8, 73:17–22. Mr. Choi also admitted that Petitioner did not pay Akzo USA for the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample D was taken, and did not pay Axalta for the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample H was taken. Id. at 67:7–9, 73:12–13. Although Petitioner presents declaration testimony from Mr. Choi representing that he purchased the lot of Xirallic® from which Samples B and C were taken in October 2011 (Ex. 1004 ¶ 16), Mr. Choi’s declaration testimony lacks corroborating evidence, and his deposition testimony does not support that the product was available to the public, as we found in our Final Written Decision. See Final Dec. 27–28. Notably, Petitioner produced corroborating evidence for Mr. Choi’s acquisition of Samples A, H, and I. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 13 (citing Ex. 1047), 18 (citing Exs. 1024, 1025). However, Mr. Choi withheld similar evidence for the Xirallic® lots from which Samples B, C, and D were taken. See Ex. 2011, 50:8–16, 51:10–23, 62:20– 63:9; Final Dec. 28. As Patent Owner argues, there is “no information to determine when a contract was established, that there was consideration for the exchange, that the product was available to be delivered when the alleged transaction took place, or even when the product was delivered. Choi has no memory of what was paid for the product.” Sur-Reply 24–25; see also PO Resp. 13–14; PO Br. Rem. 2–4.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the evidence discussed above, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Sample C was available to the public. Regardless of whether a company avoids wasting shelf life of its products (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 15–16), there is no persuasive evidence in the record showing that the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken was released from quality control and then made available to the public by Patent Owner. Mr. Choi’s testimony shows that Petitioner obtained the lot of Xirallic® from which Sample C was taken in an atypical manner (i.e., not from Patent Owner or one of Patent Owner’s current distributors) (Ex. 2011, 49:5–50:7, 50:8–16, 51:10–23, 51:25–52:6, 52:12– 19), and there is no evidence in the record to show that the lot of Xirallic® was intended for sale, rather than for experimental use only or for some other restricted use. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Sample C qualifies as prior art against the ’861 patent, and we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’861 patent is unpatentable over the grounds relying on Sample C.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 10,647,861 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,647,861 - Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00701 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–14 were obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’138 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–14 of the ’138 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and no claim construction is necessary to find the claims unpatentable.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“a Ph.D. or master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year or four years, respectively, of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 25–29). Petitioner contends that less work experience can be compensated for by a higher level of experience and vice versa. Id. (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25). Petitioner also asserts that the proposed level of skill would be the same under any of the United States, Japanese, or PCT application dates. Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of qualifications for one of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 20. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above, Petitioner relies upon Parkin, and its layers 115 and 175, as the claimed first and second ferromagnetic material layers, respectively. See Pet. 10, 16. Petitioner admits that these layers are 8 In the Petition, Petitioner refers to the lower electrode “ferromagnetic layer 110’ as discussed in Claim 1[a]” in the discussion of limitation 1[d]. Pet. 18. Petitioner’s reference to “layer 110’” appears to be in error because the Petition’s discussion for limitation 1[a] refers to layer 115 of Parkin, as does Dr. Bokor’s testimony related to limitations 1[a] and 1[d]. Pet. 10; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 109, 136. amorphous, but contends that, as Parkin discloses, these layers may be annealed. Id. at 17. Petitioner, however, refers to Parkin’s disclosure that only “a portion of the storage layer 175” is crystallized after annealing. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1062, 18:51–55) (emphasis added). Petitioner also relies upon Parkin’s “thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer” that is crystallized to teach limitation 1[d]. Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1062, 18:55–59; Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 131–132) (emphasis added). Dr. Bokor additionally testifies that it is “Parkin’s ‘thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer’ of CoFeB” that meets the “entirely crystallized” requirement of limitation 1[d]. Ex. 1024 ¶ 132. Parkin, however, states that a thin crystalline ferromagnetic layer is formed, but “the bulk of storage layer 175 remains amorphous.” Ex. 1062, 18:55–60 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to reconcile how its assertions that the first and second ferromagnetic layers, which are mapped to the totality of layers of 115 and 175, meet the limitation that the first and second ferromagnetic layers are each “entirely crystallized” when Petitioner relies only a thin layer, that is, a portion, of the 115 and 175 layers for the teaching that the respective layers are entirely crystallized. Put another way, Petitioner’s mapping is inconsistent: Petitioner relies upon the full depth of certain “layers” of Parkin for the teaching of the ferromagnetic layers, but then only relies upon thin portion of that depth for the assertion that the “layers” are entirely crystallized.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,367,138 - Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01462 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Solus’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–8 because the petition did not adequately show motivation to combine Hanafusa and Dobashi.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz adequately explain why a POSITA looking for ways to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile would look to methods to achieve Dobashi’s RSm values. Dobashi teaches that because RSm “can be adopted as the period of waviness, RSm can also be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface.” Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1, 6:23–26. Dobashi explains that waviness is “an indicator for determining whether the fine pattern forming performance is good or bad,” and “[t]he surface has small waviness and is smooth when RSm is large, and the surface has large waviness Dobashi also teaches that surface roughness Rzjis is used as a low-profile indicator. Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1. Dobashi, therefore, teaches that RSm is an indicator of surface waviness, which Dobashi explains is different than surface roughness. Id. at 2:66– 3:3, 6:23–29. Given these teachings in Dobashi, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz sufficiently explains how or why a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Dobashi’s RSm values to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile. See Pet. 10–12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–52.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,346,014
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.