- Samsara Inc. v. Motive Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00574 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed video overlay and transmission for manual review.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s contentions in this ground do not cure the issues for limitations 1D and 1E. Petitioner’s contentions in this ground involve combining Khan and Ali’s teachings of identifying a horizon line and lane lines with Choe. For example, Petitioner argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have combined known elements according to known methods to yield predictable results” and that “[i]mplementing these known mathematical models in Choe’s calibration system, according to their known functions, would have yielded predictable results.” Pet. 39. Petitioner further argues that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have used a known technique (predictive models) to improve similar devices in the same way” and that “[u]sing predictive models for Choe’s lane and horizon prediction would have also applied a known technique (predictive models) to a known device (a manual annotator device) ready for improvement.” Pet. 40. Petitioner’s proposed combination, therefore, still relies on Choe’s teachings of transmitting an overlaid image to an annotator device. We note that Petitioner asserts that, “[o]nce Khan in view of Ali identifies the horizon and lane lines, it overlays the horizon line and/or lane lines on the video, as shown in the screenshots below.” Pet. 41–42. Although Petitioner mentions Khan and Ali’s teachings with respect to video here, Petitioner does not adequately explain how the teaching of an overlaid video would be combined with Choe’s single image annotator teachings. As discussed above, Choe discloses transmitting a single overlaid image to the annotator” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Thus, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence and argument to explain how the additional teachings of Khan and Ali teach limitations 1D and 1E in combination with Choe. Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–5 by a preponderance of the evidence. F. Obviousness over Choe and Workman (Claims 1–4) Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Choe and Workman. Pet. 47–52; Pet. Reply 26–30. Petitioner asserts that, “if [Patent Owner] alleges that Choe does not explicitly disclose which predictive models it uses or whether it uses predictive models to identify the horizon line, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have searched for references that use predictive models and how such models were used,” which “would have led to Workman, which discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line.” Pet. 47. According to Petitioner, “[u]sing Workman’s predictive model to identify the horizon line would also have merely been combining known elements ([convolutional neural networks (CNNs)] and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way.” Pet. 48–49. Thus, Petitioner relies on Workman to teach a predictive model to identify a horizon line. See Pet. 47–49. Choe with respect to limitations 1D and 1E. Indeed, Workman involves horizon line estimation in single images. See Ex. 1011, 10 (§ 5) (“We introduced Horizon Lines in the Wild (HLW), a new dataset for single image horizon line estimation, to address the limitations of existing horizon line detection datasets.”). Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated unpatentability of claims 1–4 by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner criticizes Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for not requiring “any training or experience in ‘automotive systems,’ precisely what the ’580 [p]atent relates to.” PO Resp. 7. According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a training and/or experience in design of software for camera/sensor systems in the automotive industry.” PO Resp. 8–9 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 35).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We need not construe expressly any claim terms to decide the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
Patent outcomesUS 11,875,580 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,875,580 - Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Razdog Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00308 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claim 1 unpatentable as obvious over Darnell and Kim, and over Dasgupta and Darnell; Judge Moore dissented as to the Dasgupta and Kim ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 35
- Expert testimonyOther
“form of storage or minimal time delay, and Patent Owner concedes as much in this proceeding. See, e.g., Ex. 1082, 125:19–22, 126:3–10; Tr. 41:26– 42:14, 53:20–25. Accordingly, the mere fact that Darnell’s system may aggregate content feeds or content items on a server, merge content, store content, and then deliver content to a user interface, does not preclude it from being done in “real time” as that term would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’654 patent in its entirety.” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 10,334,068 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,334,068 - Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Razdog Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00307 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: the majority finds them obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations, including Darnell and Kim and Dasgupta-based combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“§ 6. This Final Written Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2019). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner, Twitch Interactive, Inc., has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–18 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,729,658 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’658 patent”) are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2019).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“2. “Real Time” – The Parties’ Positions In the preliminary phase of this proceeding, the principal claim term” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“1. Rationale to Combine Darnell and Kim Petitioner contends that “Darnell and Kim address similar problems of” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 9,729,658 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,729,658 - Luxottica Of America, Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
NonePatents in suitUS 11,971,612 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wallen and Berggren because the combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is wholly unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the language of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and the aims of the ’670 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 2:3– 25, 9:32–10:5, 12:51–67, 18:54–19:6, 19:26–42, 20:12–26. Moreover, the cited extrinsic evidence––testimony by Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lomp–– does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is internally inconsistent and also undermined by Dr. Lomp’s inconsistent deposition testimony. See Ex. 1036, 11:6–17, 12:9–12; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 40, 48. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence cited by Petitioner (e.g., Exs. 1037, 1038, 2009) undermines Patent Owner’s position emphasizing the intended recipient devices of SIB1. In summary, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because it is unsupported by the claim language, the ’670 Patent Specification, and the cited extrinsic evidence. with the ordinary and customary meaning which does not include limiting SIB1 to an ordinary legacy SIB and excluding MTC specific SIBs or SIBs intended for MTC devices. In addition, we need not construe explicitly any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017 (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the prior art of record. slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“filing date. As explained above, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that Wallen is not prior art because the ’670 Patent is entitled to the earlier January 20, 2012, filing date of foreign priority application GB1201000. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing a system information block 1, Patent Owner’s arguments do not substantively address how GB1201000 provides written description support for any other limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 43, 57. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in foreign priority application GB1201000, the burden of production did not shift back to Petitioner, and,” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel (PBCH) including a master information block (MIB).” See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 77, 83–84). Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that Wallen does not expressly disclose a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), but relies on Berggren for confirming that the LTE standard specifies that a PBCH carries the MIB. See Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 73–75). According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit Wallen’s MIB using a PBCH as taught by Berggren.” Pet. 43 (citing Pet. 33–38). In particular, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated for Wallen’s LTE system to utilize the LTE standard implementation details taught by Berggren,” and “it would have been predictable and beneficial for Wallen’s user equipment to receive the MIB in the [PBCH], as was standard in LTE.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58), 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, “the combination is nothing more than ‘the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’” Pet. 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Wallen’s broadcast MIB with Berggren’s teachings of using a PBCH for transmitting broadcast MIBs. See Pet. 33–38; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,206,670 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,206,670 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11–22 were not shown unpatentable under any § 103 ground because the prior art did not teach or suggest receiving the claimed resource allocation and multi-level TPC command on one physical channel.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references.]” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“The second and third asserted benefits—reduced complexity and reduced latency—rest on the declaration of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶ 64) rather than on any disclosure of Andersson or Khan. We accord that testimony little weight on this point because it asserts the benefits in conclusory terms without explaining why they would result from inserting a scheduling grant into Andersson’s undefined “other bits,” as distinct from Khan’s separate-slot design.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 14. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’500 Patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner offers a proposed construction for the recited “single physical channel” found in limitation 11.2 and “an accumulation of TPC commands” found in independent claims 12 and 18. PO Resp. 9–17. Petitioner likewise addresses the scope of an accumulation of TPC commands, but Petitioner does not contest directly Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “single physical channel.” Pet. Reply 2–7. We determine, however, that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 9,706,500 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,706,500 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 not unpatentable under four §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed enabled-accumulation indication or single-channel combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 6,334,047 B1, iss. Dec. 25, 2001 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2001/0036238 A1, pub. Nov. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1010) 4 US 2004/0190485 A1, pub. Sept. 30, 2004 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 2004/0077370 A1, pub. Apr. 22, 2004 (Ex. 1008). 6 US 6,600,772 B1, iss. July 29, 2003 (Ex. 1004). 7 US 6,529,741 B1, iss. Mar. 4, 2003 (Ex. 1007). unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references].” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“apparent agreement between the parties: “TPC command accumulation” refers to a process that collects and uses TPC commands from a network device to cumulatively affect transmission power. And having studied the intrinsic record of the ’153 patent, we are in accord. But, we decline to further limit the construction of “TPC command accumulation” in the manner proposed by either party––i.e., (1) each TPC command adjustment must be summed to cumulatively affect transmission power (as proposed by Petitioner) or (2) a TPC command value must be added to an integrator. Although both parties are able to point to disclosures in the ’153 Patent where the TPC command accumulation of an exemplary embodiment is described as using an integrator and/or summing each TPC command adjustment to cumulatively affect a UE’s transmission power (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:15–29, 9:27–42; Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 35–42); Pet. Reply 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:2–6, 7:8–22, 9:28–40)), neither party has demonstrated persuasively that the intrinsic record of the ’153 Patent demonstrates a clear intent to limit “TPC command accumulation” to those particular embodiments.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“A rationale supports obviousness only where the proffered benefit would flow from the specific modification proposed; a benefit that the prior art realizes in a different structural context does not, without more, establish that the same benefit would result from inserting one reference’s element into the other. On this record, the nexus between Khan’s benefits and Petitioner’s “other bits” modification is missing.” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 10,952,153 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,952,153 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co. Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · May 19, 2026 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Throughtek on claims 1–19 after finding it abandoned the contest by failing to file mandatory notices or respond to the show-cause order.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“The Order to Show Cause explained that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” Paper 8, 3. The Order to Show Cause also explained that failure to participate in a proceeding, such as failure to file mandatory notices as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8, may be considered abandonment of the contest and result in adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Id. (citing Cellpak, Inc. v. Mambate USA Inc., IPR2021-00007, Paper 4 at 2 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2021)). The Order to Show Cause gave Patent Owner ten calendar days to show cause why adverse judgment should not be entered against it. Id. Patent Owner did not respond to the Order to Show Cause. More than ten calendar days have elapsed since the date the Order to Show Cause was entered, and Patent Owner has not filed mandatory notices. In view of Patent Owner’s failure to file mandatory notices within the specified time period, we determine that Patent Owner has abandoned the contest. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), we construe Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest as a request for adverse judgment. Under these circumstances, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,727,655 - Google LLC v. Escapex IP LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00337 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103: claims 1–3, 5–6, 13–15, 17–18 over Fuloria and Andler; the remaining claims over combinations adding WO ’100, Bartholomew, Kirk, or Cheung.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar field and three years of professional computer programming experience, including experience with networked media and databases, where additional education can substitute for experience or vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–31). In the Decision on Institution, Inst. 7–8. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed definition “because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’687 [p]atent as well as the asserted prior art.” PO Resp. 4; Tr. 36:4–18. Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’687 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’687 patent and cited prior art, we maintain the previously adopted definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that the term “engagement” in independent claims 1, 11–13, 23, and 24 is defined in the Specification of the ’687 patent and should be interpreted to mean “an indication that a user should be distinguished with respect to the content over another user.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 53–55; Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Patent Owner agrees that the Specification “defines” the term in that manner. PO Resp. 13. The Board did not interpret any terms in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 9. We agree with the parties’ proposed interpretation of “engagement” and apply it for purposes of this Decision, based on the Specification’s disclosure that “[a] user engagement with content refers to an indication that a user should be distinguished with” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“No other terms require express interpretation to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
Patent outcomesUS 10,474,687 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,474,687 - Ledup Manufacturing Group Ltd. v. Seasonal Specialties, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2026 · IPR2024-01258 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–14 are unpatentable; claims 3 and 8 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the Inoue–Smith obviousness rationale was insufficient.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd mixedMixed
“found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) if in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 11
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Petitioner that the fact pattern before us is analogous to Rembrandt. The rationale to combine the teachings of Inoue and Smith provided in the Petition focuses on replacing incandescent bulbs with LEDs, and includes the generic statement that “[t]he numerous record-supported advantages, set forth in Smith provide a clear motivation for use of the teachings of Smith as applied to Inoue, so as to enjoy the advantages set forth in Smith.” Pet. 47. The testimony in Dr. Schubert’s Declaration at pages 99–100 cited in support of Petitioner’s Reply arguments was not cited or otherwise referenced in the Petition. See Pet. 46–55. We find that the Petitioner’s Reply is not responsive to the Institution Decision and is improper because it presents a new rationale to combine the teachings of Inoue and Smith that was not expressed in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23; CTPG § II.I. Petitioner could have presented its rationale to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23; CTPG § II.I. Accordingly, we do not consider Petitioner’s new rationale to combine the teachings of Inoue and Smith presented for the first time in the Reply. Based on the entire record, but not including Petitioner’s new rationale and newly cited support to Smith and Dr. Schubert’s testimony (Exs. 1013, 1017) presented for the first time in the Reply, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sets forth in the Petition sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the circuit of Inoue to include a light source or LED light source with a twinkling or flashing effect in view of Smith’s teachings. See Pet. 46–47, 49–50, 51–53, 55. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of independent claim 9 and dependent claims 3, 5, and 6 would have been obvious over the teachings of Inoue and Smith.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“Based on Petitioner’s citations to Holler, Inoue, and Dr. Schubert’s testimony (Ex. 1013), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to “use the resistive value as taught by Holler in the circuit of Inoue to control the illumination of the light sources so that the other illumination devices in the serial light string will not go dark or change illumination if one of the LEDs fails or becomes disconnected.” Pet. 27; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Based on the entire record and including the reasons explained above in Section II.D.2. addressing anticipation of claim 1 by Inoue, we determine Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 1 and 10 would have been obvious over Inoue and Holler. See Pet. 26–32.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“We observe that, aside from Declaration testimony of Mr. Altamura and accompanying exhibits, Patent Owner does not offer any additional evidence to establish reduction to practice. An inventor’s testimonial assertion of inventive facts requires corroboration by independent evidence. Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The purpose of the corroboration requirement is to prevent fraud, by providing independent confirmation of the inventor’s testimony. Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Without the requirement of independent corroboration, there would be a great temptation to commit perjury and the adverse party would be effectively precluded from a successful rebuttal. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A rule of reason applies to determining whether the inventor’s testimony has been corroborated. See id. at 1195. “The rule of reason, however, does not dispense with the requirement for some evidence of independent corroboration.” Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Accordingly, based on the entire record, we find that Mr. Altamura’s Declaration testimony is uncorroborated. Yu is prior art to the ’252 Patent because Patent Owner is unable to establish actual reduction to practice earlier than the July 31, 2006, filing date of Yu.” slip op. at 51
Patent outcomesUS 11,096,252 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,096,252
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.