- PTAB · May 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00425 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand
The Board denied institution of IPR2025-00425 because it instituted the earlier-considered IPR2025-00424 challenging the same patent.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Request for Director Review. See Paper 35; IPR2025-00424, Paper 35. The request was denied without prejudice and the cases were remanded to the Board to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues.” Paper 41, 4. Following such discovery, we were instructed to “then determine on the full record whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the Petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b), applying the framework set forth in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242– 44 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” Id. A later-issued Order Supplementing Director Review Decision instructed that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging” the ’225 patent. Paper 64, 3. Concurrently herewith, we issue a decision in IPR2025-00424 finding that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that the Petition in that case is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In connection with the ’225 patent, Petitioner filed two petitions requesting inter partes review: the petition in this proceeding (IPR2025- 00425), and the petition in IPR2025-00424. In this proceeding and in IPR2025-00424, Petitioner filed an Explanation regarding the necessity of multiple petitions. Paper 2; IPR2025-00424, Paper 2. Petitioner requested that, “if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00424 . . . before IPR2025-00425.” Paper 2,” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,589,225 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00423 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–4 and 6–29 because it instituted the ranked IPR2025-00422 under the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Paper 34. Birchtech Corp. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Request for Director Review in each case. See Paper 40; IPR2025-00422, Paper 39. The Director denied the request without prejudice in each case and remanded the cases to the Board to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues.” Paper 49, 4. The Director later issued an Order Supplementing Director Review Decision in each case, instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging” the ’430 patent. Paper 72, 3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,668,430 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00278 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company and PacifiCorp’s petition because it had instituted the earlier-filed IPR2025-00274 challenging the same patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“request from Patent Owner for Director Review, finding that Patent Owner introduced “evidence sufficient to put RPI and privity at issue” and remanding with instructions to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues” including “at least materials sufficient to clarify the evidence the Board found to be ‘ambiguous’ and to avoid the need for the Board to ‘speculate as to the nature of the redacted material.’” Paper 57 (Decision on Request for Director Review). The Director instructed that after allowing such discovery, we “should then determine on the full record whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the Petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b), applying the framework set forth in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Concurrently herewith, we issue a decision in IPR2025- 00278 finding that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that its Petition is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00274, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00274, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 . . . before IPR2025-00278.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00274. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00274, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00274. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’114 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 before IPR2025-00278, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,343,114 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00281 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because it had instituted IPR2025-00280 challenging the same patent, consistent with the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00280, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00281, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 . . . before IPR2025-00281.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00280. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00280, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00280. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’517 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 before IPR2025-00281, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,596,517 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-00635 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–14 unpatentable under §103 over Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art; one judge dissented as to claims 8, 9, 12, and 13.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) with respect to the subject matter of the ’698 patent at the time of the priority date, March 11, 2004, would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, or other technical training in product design or equivalent work experience. This person would also possess at least one year of experience in developing and/or evaluating mechanical aspects of fluid systems. I consider myself a person of ordinary skill in the art under this definition. Ex. 1004 ¶ 28. Patent Owner argues: A POSITA in the field to which the ’698 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or research experience in the design or development of toilet products, parts, and accessories. PO Resp. 6. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSITA, as it is consistent with the ’698 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, we see no material difference between the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner and that proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Cameron such that our determinations would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner asserts that, because each of the Flow Limitations relate to water flow through the bowl fill valve, these limitations require adjusting the flow rate of water exiting the flow valve. PO Resp. 15–17 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 97); See also PO Sur-Reply 7. Petitioner responds that “the claim language of the ’698 Patent discusses adjusting the water flow, not specifically the ‘flow rate.’” Pet. Reply 13. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner, and the conclusory testimony of Mr. Jobin (Ex. 2013 ¶ 97), that because the Flow Limitations “relate” to water flow through the bowl fill valve, that this necessarily means that the flow rate must be adjusted. As Petitioner points out, neither the term “flowrate” nor any similar term appears in any of the Flow Limitations. Thus, the plain language of the Flow Limitations requires that, contrary to Patent Owner’s position, the claim limitation should not be restricted to adjustments to “flow rate.”” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that Limitations 8B and 12B are directed to the configuration or structure of the bowl fill valve outlet port. Pet. Reply 2–4. According to Petitioner, because Limitations 8B and 12B do recite an overflow tube, the overflow tube is not separately claimed and is recited solely to define the function of the outlet port on the bowl fill valve. Id. at 3. Petitioner, thus, argues that an overflow tube is not separately claimed as a structural element, and that, to meet Limitations 8B and 12B, it is sufficient to show that the prior art discloses a bowl fill valve with an outlet port that is configured to attach directly to a tube that provides water from the outlet port to an overflow tube. Id. at 4. In contrast, Patent Owner argues that Limitations 8B and 12B separately claim the overflow tube, and that Petitioner must show that the prior art discloses a tube that transfers water from the bowl fill valve outlet port to the toilet tank overflow tube. PO Resp. 10–11; PO Sur-reply 2–3. We disagree with Patent Owner, because claims 8 and 12, on their face, require “bowl fill valve outlet port,” but do not require or recite an “overflow tube” as an element of the claimed “bowl fill valve.” When a structure is claimed as “configured to” perform a particular function, it generally requires a structure that is designed to perform the particular function claimed, i.e., it requires more than the mere capability of performing that function. See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (claim language including the phrase “adapted to” is to be construed consistent with “configured to” language and requires that the structure must be “designed or configured to accomplish the specified objective, not simply that [it] can be made to serve that purpose.”); see also In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The plain language of Limitations 8B and 12B is clearly directed to the configuration of the bowl fill valve outlet port, in that these limitations recite “a bowl fill valve outlet port configured to.”8 The recited function is “attach directly to a tube that provides water from the bowl fill valve outlet port to an overflow tube.” The overflow tube is recited as part of the function in a clause identifying the tube to which the bowl fill valve outlet port is configured to attached — “that provides water from the bowl fill valve outlet port to an overflow tube.” The overflow tube, thus, is recited as part of the function defining the required structure of the bowl fill outlet port and is not separately claimed.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Petitioner’s Contentions Petitioner contends that the combination of Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art teaches all of the limitations of claims 1–14 and provides a mapping showing where each claim limitation is found in the prior art. Pet. 21–59. We have reviewed the Petition’s mapping and determine that the Petition sufficiently shows that each limitation of claims 1–14 is disclosed by the combination of Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art. Further, we have reviewed Petitioner’s rationale for combining the prior art and determine that the Petition sufficiently shows that it would have been obvious to a POSITA to combine Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 10,934,698 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,934,698 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00634 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 8–13, 15, 16, and 19–24 are unpatentable over Brown and Ho, with claims 16 and 19 also relying on the Quick Connection Art; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner proposes that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”)] in the field to which the ’105 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of “integrally molded with” as “molded together as a single structure.” Paper 21, 15.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner responds that: a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the proposed modification, nor does the Petition include any analysis regarding why a POSITA would be motivated to move from a vertical extended portion to a radial extended portion. Indeed, a radial extended portion is directly counter to the stated goals of Brown (e.g., reducing noise caused by turbulence), at least insofar as it introduces another sudden directional change into the fluid flow system. PO Resp. 58–59 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 242).” slip op. at 32
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that the ’105 patent claims were “fully supported as of the filing date of at least the ’606 Application . . . March 11, 2004” because the ’606 Application discloses regulating water flow and a POSITA would know that appropriate devices for regulating water flow includes nonadjustable waterflow restrictors. PO Resp. 63–65; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. The ’606 Application discloses: [W]hen the toilet fill valve 100 is open and water flows from the water inlet 103 to the water outlets 106 and into a toilet tank, an amount of water is also supplied to the bowl fill valve inlet 113 that flows through the bowl fill valve 109 and out the bowl fill valve outlet 116. By virtue of the manual setting of handle 119 of the bowl fill valve 109, the flow of water through the bowl fill valve 109 is regulated. In this manner, the flow of water is regulated so that enough water flows out of the bowl fill valve 109 to fill a toilet bowl without wasting any water down a drain. seen from the passage above, the ’606 Application discloses regulating an amount of water supplied to a toilet bowl using a valve (i.e., a water flow regulator). Ex. 2013 ¶ 288. Further, the ’606 Application states: The bowl fill valve 109 may be, for example, a ball valve, a gate valve, a globe valve, a plug valve, a diaphragm valve, a butterfly valve, a needle valve, a sliding gate, a quick turn valve, a knife valve or any other appropriate type of valve as can be appreciated by those with ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 9,103,105 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,103,105 - Penumbra, Inc. v. Rapidpulse, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01261 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach the claimed predetermined cycle for controlling distal fluid flow.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(1) a person with a B.S. in engineering or an equivalent field, with two-four years of academic or industry experience in aspiration embolectomy and thrombectomy or comparable industry experience who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including a physician, to develop embolectomy or thrombectomy devices; or (2) an interventional neurosurgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in embolectomy or thrombectomy procedures, and who would, where appropriate, work or consult with others, including an engineer, to develop such a medical device. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 48). Petitioner also contends that, “[a] person with less education but more relevant practical experience, or more relevant education but less practical experience, may also meet this standard.” Id. Patent Owner states that for purposes of its PO Response, it “accepts ¶ 44). We adopt Petitioner’s characterization because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’402 patent and the cited prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“specification explicitly includes sensors similar to those in the prior art in support of their argument that the claimed “predetermined cycle” must not exclude the use of such sensors. Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1001, 32:55–33:7, 40:66–41:5, 44:9–29). We reviewed the portions of the specification cited by Petitioner. We agree with Patent Owner that one excerpt discussing sensor use appears to be directed to triggering the predetermined cycle rather than causing timing changes during the cycle itself (Ex. 1001, 32:55–66) (describing use of a pressure sensor to “determine when the vacuum channel 3 is clogged by a thrombus and automatically perform the unclogging procedures described herein”), while another excerpt discusses a sensor that Petitioner that the ’402 patent discusses the use of sensors to “tune” the system and that such “tuning” can be done statically (setting the cycle timing in advance) or dynamically (adjusting the timing during the cycle itself). See Ex. 1001, 48:19–49:50. Overall, we find that these disclosures involving sensors demonstrate that sensors may be used in various ways in different embodiments. However, none of these disclosures explicitly discuss the use of sensors in conjunction with a “pre-determined cycle.” Therefore, we find that the ’402 patent specification’s discussion of “sensors” are not particularly informative as to the appropriate construction of a “predetermined cycle” and do not outweigh the other explicit disclosures of “predetermined cycle” in the patent. We next turn to the other intrinsic evidence discussed by the parties — the prosecution history. As discussed by Patent Owner, in the Notice of Allowance, the Examiner found that Garrison did not teach or suggest a “predetermined cycle” because Garrison’s controller “changed the cycle of opening and closing the valves based on feedback from sensors.” Ex. 1004, 86. We acknowledge that the patent applicant filed subsequent comments during prosecution in which they stated that they “do[] not concede that the Examiner’s characterizations of the terms of the claims and the prior art are correct.” Id. at 29. However, we agree with Patent Owner that the importance of the Examiner’s statement in the Notice of Allowance does not rely on it being an express disclaimer (a standard which it does not meet). PO Sur-reply 8. We also considered Petitioner’s contention that the Examiner’s interpretation of Garrison may have been in error (PO Resp. 16); however, even if this were true, the Examiner’s statement still provides helpful insight into how the Examiner was interpreting the term sensors to change the opening and closing of valves during a cycle was not a “predetermined cycle.” Id. at 86. In sum, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the usage of the term “predetermined cycle” in the ’402 patent specification and prosecution history. Thus, after considering all of the cited evidence, we construe “predetermined cycle” to mean that “the timing of the sequence of valve operations in the cycle is determined beforehand, i.e., fixed, rather than varying based on feedback after operation begins.”” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. Other Terms The parties also provided proposed constructions for the limitations of “[limited/limiting] to a positive amount of exit flow” and “control[ling] fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” See Pet. 15–16; Pet. Reply 1–8; PO Resp. 22–24; PO Sur-Reply 2–6. However, having evaluated the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that construction of these terms is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that neither Petitioner nor Mr. Brown propose any combination of Yang and Mullins that does not include Mullins’s pressure sensor in order “to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Indeed, in addressing the “predetermined cycle” limitation, Mr. Brown contends that Mullins discloses a “cycling controller that ‘varies aspiration pressure according to sensed pressure within the catheter lumen.’” Ex.1005 ¶¶ 131–32 (citing, e.g., Ex.1008, 27:40–28:20 (“[a] novel aspect of this pump system is the incorporation of feedback into the pump algorithm in order to produce more effective pressure cycling”)). This use of a sensor to change pressure during a cycle, is not a “predetermined cycle” under our construction. combinations is its discussion of distal end flow control, not for its sensors.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1035 ¶ 83). However, Petitioner’s obviousness grounds rely on the combination of Yang and Mullins, especially with regard to Mullins’s disclosure of “a controller” in order “to control fluid flow in and out.” As discussed above, Mullins relies on the sensor-feedback approach in order to control flow and we find that Petitioner has not presented persuasive evidence of how the combined disclosures of Yang and Mullins would control flow without using Mullins’s sensor feedback approach. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (error to “consider[] … references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in [them] … that diverge from and teach away from the invention”). Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the combination of Yang and Mullins discloses or renders obvious “a controller configured to open and close the vacuum valve and the vent valve in a predetermined cycle to change a level of vacuum at the distal end of the catheter and to control fluid flow in and out from the distal end of the catheter.” Accordingly, having considered the parties’ respective evidence and arguments, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 of the ’402 patent would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Yang and Mullins.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 11,406,402 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,406,402 - Tommy John, Inc. v. Pakage Apparel, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01163 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–13, 15, and 16 unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the identified combinations of Kitsch, Brocks, and Carrillo.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“21; 4:1:13–22. Accordingly, Kitsch and Brocks have similar goals, with respect to formation of a secure pouch for containing the genitals, for which each reference discloses a distinct technical solution. Thus, a POSITA would have regarded the application of Brocks’ familiar and effective gathering technique to Kitsch’s side panels as a viable approach for improving a supportive pouch, and would have expected such combination of teachings to achieve the structural benefit used in Brocks. See Pet. 25–27 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 68–72). In other words, a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation that the combination of Kitsch and Brocks, as discussed above, would result in what is recited in limitation 1[g].” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 10,834,974 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,834,974 - PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00688 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–18 because this was the second-ranked petition and the Director directed institution of only one petition.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandDecided for patent owner
“Remand, do not institute inter partes review based on the second-ranked petition on this complete record. As stated in the Remand, “Petitioners present ten total grounds challenging the claims of the ’370 patent and thirteen total grounds challenging the claims of the ’218 patent [in IPR2025- 00717 and IPR2025-00718].” Remand 3. The Remand cites to the Board’s Trial Practice Guide, which “explains that ‘one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations’ and ‘multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases.’” Id. (citing Patent Trial and Appeal Board Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”) § II.D.2 (Dec. 12, 2025)). The Remand states: “The TPG further explains that dispute requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.’ TPG § II.D.2.” Id. at 2–3. The Remand determines: “Given that Petitioners had ample room in each petition to present multiple grounds challenging the claims of each patent, this was not a ‘rare’ circumstance that justified the filing of multiple petitions against each patent.” Id. at 3. The Remand explains that “absent exceptional circumstances, in a case where there is a dispute over priority date, the Board should either resolve the priority date issue or institute, at most, the first-ranked petition.” Id. The Director instructed the Board panel “to determine which of the two petitions” to institute. Id. at 4. We interpret the Remand as stating that the Director has determined that only one petition for each patent should have been instituted, and as delegating the discretionary authority to the panel to determine which of the two petitions to institute. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing and in view of Petitioner’s ranking of this Petition as the second-ranked petition, we deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 11
- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Remand, do not institute inter partes review based on the second-ranked petition on this complete record. As stated in the Remand, “Petitioners present ten total grounds challenging the claims of the ’370 patent and thirteen total grounds challenging the claims of the ’218 patent [in IPR2025- 00717 and IPR2025-00718].” Remand 3. The Remand cites to the Board’s Trial Practice Guide, which “explains that ‘one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations’ and ‘multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases.’” Id. (citing Patent Trial and Appeal Board Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”) § II.D.2 (Dec. 12, 2025)). The Remand states: “The TPG further explains that dispute requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.’ TPG § II.D.2.” Id. at 2–3. The Remand determines: “Given that Petitioners had ample room in each petition to present multiple grounds challenging the claims of each patent, this was not a ‘rare’ circumstance that justified the filing of multiple petitions against each patent.” Id. at 3. The Remand explains that “absent exceptional circumstances, in a case where there is a dispute over priority date, the Board should either resolve the priority date issue or institute, at most, the first-ranked petition.” Id. The Director instructed the Board panel “to determine which of the two petitions” to institute. Id. at 4. We interpret the Remand as stating that the Director has determined that only one petition for each patent should have been instituted, and as delegating the discretionary authority to the panel to determine which of the two petitions to institute. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing and in view of Petitioner’s ranking of this Petition as the second-ranked petition, we deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,933,370 - PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00718 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–4 and 6–26 because it instituted the higher-ranked competing petition, IPR2025-00717.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedOther
“The Director granted Director Review, finding that the panel “abused its discretion in granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims” of the ’218 patent. Paper 38 (“Remand Order”), 2. The Director vacated the DI and remanded the case to the Board “to determine which of the two petitions” to institute. Id. at 4.” slip op. at 4
- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In its Explanation regarding the necessity of multiple petitions, Petitioner requests that, “if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00[71]7 (“Vosteen589/Lissianski Petition”) before IPR2025-00[71]8 (“Sjostrom/Baldrey Petition”).” Paper 2, 3. Because we institute trial in IPR2025-00717 (see IPR2025-00717, Paper 41), under the Director’s instruction in the Remand Order, and based on Petitioner’s ranking of the petitions of IPR2025-00717 and IPR2025-00718, we deny institution in this case.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,926,218
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.