- Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00027 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pet.”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 to institute a post-grant review of U.S. Patent No. 11,966,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent”), claims 1–20. We issued an Institution Decision (Paper 12) granting the petitioned review. slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“thereby supporting our conclusion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “affordance” in claim 1 refers to an interactive user interface element.” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Petitioner’s reliance on Low’s” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,966,920 mixedClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish · Electric Power · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,966,920 - Alliance Laundry Systems, LLC v. Payrange LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 19, 2026 · PGR2025-00028 · APJ George R Hoskins · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 8–20 are unpatentable under § 102, § 103, or § 101; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish its limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“1. Legal Standards “Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMixed
“2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1368). Further, an assertion of obviousness “cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); accord In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “conclusory statements” amount to an “insufficient articulation[] of motivation to combine”; “instead, the finding must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation’” (quoting In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002))); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 36
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionMixed
“because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed
“because the “user interface” limitations merely apply the recited abstract idea on a generic mobile device without meaningfully limiting the abstract idea. See 2025 Guidance, at 4–5. For example, these limitations do not reflect an improvement to the functioning of the mobile device (or any other computer device), and instead are “mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on” the mobile device. Id. Indeed, the ’423 patent specification describes only a generic “swipe-to-pay” feature. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:13–33, Figs. 8C, 10A–10D. This supports our conclusion here that the claim 11 limitations do not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1) (“[T]he specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as providing an improvement,” and “it must describe” slip op. at 108
Patent outcomesUS 11,972,423 mixed§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,972,423 - Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 22, 2026 · IPR2024-00796 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Nevo and Avitabile, Young and Estabrook, and Young, Estabrook-1988, and Estabrook-1989.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). On its face, the language “energy transfer signal” does not specify any restrictions on the type of system in which it is utilized, nor its characteristics. In the context of claims 1 and 11, the “energy transfer signal” is the basis on which the “switch” operates, so as to “sub-sample and transfer energy from a first electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Ex. 1001, 50:63–65, 51:56–58. Accordingly, based on the claim language, the term “energy transfer signal” need only be a signal for operating a switch to sub-sample and transfer energy from an electromagnetic signal. That is its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“’686 patent broadly includes knowledge and experience as to RF circuit design. See supra § III.B. Petitioner contends that “Nevo’s transceivers [102a/102b] are for Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11,” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that both protocols “required down-conversion in their receivers to obtain a baseband signal.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:45–50; Ex. 1002 ¶ 118). Nevo’s disclosure would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to look to Avitabile, which provides the circuit level detail for down-converters. See Ex. 1006, Abstract. Avitabile specifically provides circuitry for down-conversion in the s-band frequency range, which is in the range of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 (2.4 GHz). Id. at Abstract, Figs. 6, 7. Accordingly, we determine a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to look to down-converters in the range of frequency needed, and would have been motivated to combine Avitabile’s teachings with those of Nevo, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 55
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
Patent outcomesUS 7,483,686 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,483,686 - PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01444 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent term, entering judgment against claims 1–6.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In addition, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; [and] (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Because Patent Owner has explicitly requested adverse judgment against itself pursuant to Rule 42.73(b), and has disclaimed the entire term of the ’584 patent, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–6 of the ’584 patent.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,547,584 - PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01082 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent term, entering judgment against claims 1–10.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). In addition, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; [and] (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Because Patent Owner has explicitly requested adverse judgment against itself pursuant to Rule 42.73(b), and has disclaimed the entire term of the ’181 patent, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,888,181 - Magic Leap, Inc. v. Percept Technologies Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2023-00495 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand
Claims 1–3 and 12–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Osterhout and, separately, over Mann ’526 and Vaissie.
RulingsRemand decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“March 15, 2013 filing date, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a B.S. degree and a Masters degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Physics, or an equivalent field, as well as one to two years of academic or industry experience in wearable electronic devices or comparable industry experience. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Although the level of skill in the art was addressed in the Preliminary Response and the Decision on Institution (see Prelim. Resp. 27–30; Dec. on Inst. 6–10), Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’113 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“For all of the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed ordinary and customary meaning for “a dynamic eye tracking mechanism in communication with the lens” because it is not supported by the claim language or the ’113 Patent Specification, and is supported only by unsworn attorney argument.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“below, we agree with Petitioner. We find that Osterhout teaches the dynamic eye tracking mechanism is in optical communication with the lens, consistent with its ordinary and customary meaning, because in Osterhout the user’s eye receives optical communication in the form of light transmitted from the translucent lens, and the camera of the dynamic tracking mechanism, in turn, receives optical communication in the form of light from the user’s eye. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 164, 304.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,696,113 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,696,113 - PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00959 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable: claims 1–8 as obvious and claim 9 as anticipated and obvious over the stated prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute the level of [ordinary] skill . . . set forth in the Petition.” PO Resp. 14; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 20–21. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed assessment of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the ’082 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We discuss the scope of the term “specification data” in claim 1 below in Section III.D.3(b)(v) when comparing the claim with Fisher. We construe the term “image processing control data” in claim 1 below in Section III.E.2(e)(i) when comparing the claim with Ohga. Otherwise, based on the arguments and evidence presented, we determine no explicit construction is needed to resolve the parties’ controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Papanikolopoulos’s testimony that Kuwata teaches away from modifying its camera 22 to access an external server (such as Fisher’s Internet-enabled external data source) by stressing advantages of a self-contained camera-printer pair without external dependencies. See PO Resp. 15–16, 26–28 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75, 77); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 61–64. The cited disclosures in Kuwata simply do not discuss any advantages arising from a self-contained camera-printer pair without external dependencies, or any disadvantages arising from connecting camera 22 to an Internet server. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75, 77. The cited disclosures instead tout the advantages arising from a camera manufacturer (rather than an end user photographer) specifying the image output control information CI for a specific camera-printer pairing, to reduce differences between an image as confirmed by the end user on the camera’s display and the image outputted by the printer. See id. That advantage, however, has nothing to do with whether camera 22 may or may not communicate with an Internet server. Indeed, rather than being self-contained as Patent Owner and Dr. Papanikolopoulos would have it, we find Kuwata’s camera 22 includes an I/O port for wired or wireless communication to transmit the camera’s image files GF / 10 to various printers 24 and various personal computers (PCs). See Ex. 1005, Fig. 4, ¶¶ 81, 85; Ex. 1003 ¶ 84; Pet. 14. Thus, Kuwata allows for and does not discourage communication between camera 22 and an Internet server such as Fisher’s external data source. In particular, Kuwata does not detract from the benefits of updating image output control information CI after the camera is manufactured, for example so that the camera can be paired with printers that were not yet on the market when the camera was manufactured. Moreover, Fisher recognizes that “a manufacturer may create various ancillary data files 418, and make the ancillary data files 418 available on a distributed computer network like the Internet for subsequent downloading and utilization by camera device 110.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 42, 55. That teaching in Fisher dovetails with Kuwata’s disclosure concerning camera manufacturers optimizing their cameras with various different printers, supporting Petitioner’s combination. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–89, 102–108.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 7,428,082 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,428,082 - Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00960 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable over Stubler under §§ 102 and 103; claims 2–4 and 9–11 are also unpatentable over Stubler and Wang under § 103.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. generally. Based on our review of the record, we find that Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art); see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction that qualifies the words “similar to the object” with “sufficiently similar to identify the specific object,” based on the disclosures of the ’807 Patent Specification. We acknowledge the ’807 Patent Specification discloses the words “the specific object” in the context of acknowledging or detecting the specific object in the image with the object acknowledgement section and retrieving an image from the database that contains the specific object after keywords are added to the image. See Ex. 1001, 4:18–24, 5:54–6:3, 7:28–31. Similarly, the Specification discloses the term “specific person” in the context of retrieving an image from the database that contains the specific person after keywords are added to the image. See Ex. 1001, 4:48–54. We further acknowledge that the Specification discloses a face image similarity determining section to determine if a face image is similar to a face image stored in the database. Ex. 1001, 4:30–34, 4:40–44, 8:60–67, 9:18–22, 10:19–22, 11:58–67. The Specification further includes a passage, cited by Patent Owner, that discloses “if it is determined that the face image coincides to the face image which is contained previously [in a database] or is very similar to the face image which is contained previously, the information for such a human is proposed so as to expedite the user to confirm.” Ex. 1001, 9:18–22; see PO Resp. 16, 17, 19. Finally, we also acknowledge that the Specification further discloses an example of a database record that includes keywords, such as “Jiro” and “second eldest brother” for a human, and further discloses retrieving items from the database with the keyword “Jiro.” See Ex. 1001, 9:47–54, 10:41–58, Figs. 6, 9. however, do not rise to the level of disclaimer or a disavowal of the full scope of the claim term “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database.” For example, Patent Owner does not direct us to any explicit statements or disclosures in the ’807 patent Specification that indicate a clear intention to limit “similar to the object” to “sufficiently similar to identify the specific object” using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction. See Hill–Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1372; Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367–68; Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906. Therefore, absent disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, we decline to import limitations into “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database,” recited in claim 1, on the basis of the Specification.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Conclusion Based on the record, we do not agree that “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database,” should be construed as “sufficiently similar to identify the specific object of the image previously claims. As demonstrated in the analysis of the prior art below, we need not provide an explicit claim construction for “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database.” Instead, we give the words “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database,” recited in claims 1, 7, and 8, their ordinary and customary meaning, as they would be understood by a person or ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not explicitly construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve any additional disputes between the parties. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Decided for petitioner
“Although “extrinsic evidence may be useful . . . it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” As explained in the previous sections, the intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims and Specification) does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Dr. Papanikolopoulos’ testimony regarding the proposed claim construction is at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves and the Specification and, therefore, Dr. Papanikolopoulos’ testimony cannot supersede the intrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1308.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 7,486,807 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,486,807 - Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00958 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled original claims 1, 2, and 4–6, denied cancellation of claim 3 and substitute claims 7–12, and found substitute claims 7, 8, and 10–12 unpatentable on four obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“proposed assessment of a person of ordinary skill in the art, as a person having a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or related engineering disciplines, and two years of experience in multi-lens camera systems. Paper 6, 8–9. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its briefing. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the subject matter of the ’638 patent. As Patent Owner does not raise an objection, or provide an alternative description, we continue to use the same assessment of a person of ordinary skill in the art that we used in the Institution Decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (in the context of an inter partes review, applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction at that stage of the proceeding. Paper 6, 10. In its briefing, Patent Owner does not address any claim construction issues. In its Opposition to the Revised Motion to Amend, Petitioner does not propose any express claim construction. To the extent that the determination of the meaning of any claim term is necessary, we use its ordinary and customary meaning in this Decision. D. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements” slip op. at 14
- ScopeMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“Section 316(d) does not permit a Patent Owner to cancel or propose substitutes for non-challenged claims. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1). We therefore grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel original claims 1, 2, and 4–6 of the ’638 patent, but do not grant Patent Owner’s request to cancel claim 3, because claim 3 was not challenged by Petitioner.1 E. Proposed Substitute Claims 7–12” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We disagree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s reliance on Yadav (Ex. 1009) is improper because Yadav “was not published until May 16, 2013, more than three years after the priority date of the ’638 patent.” However, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1), a published patent application, such as Yadav, is deemed to be prior art as of its filing date, not its publication date as Patent Owner asserts. See Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 125 F. 4th 1120, 1126–27 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“[U]nder § 102(e)(1), even if a patent application was published after a claimed invention, it may serve as prior art to the invention if the application was filed before the invention.”). Yadov was filed on September 14, 2009 (Ex. 1009, code (22)), before the ’638 patent’s earliest possible priority date of December 25, 2009 (Ex. 1001, code (30)), making it prior art.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,482,638 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,482,638
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