• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco Limited And Willow Innovations, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00554 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 17–19 and 21–33 are unpatentable as obvious under each asserted § 103 ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of workers active in the field. Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–697 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. Moreover, these factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In determining a level of ordinary skill, we also may look to the prior art, which may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no formal claim constructions are necessary for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding. Pet. 3. We agree. Given the lack of dispute on this record, we do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence persuasive and undisputed as to why a person of ordinary skill, a degreed engineer with two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment, would modify Furrer to use a battery as a power source, and have a reasonable degree of confidence that it would work successfully.” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence persuasive and undisputed as to why a person of ordinary skill, a degreed engineer with two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment, would modify Furrer to use a battery as a power source, and have a reasonable degree of confidence that it would work successfully. Concerning the proposed combination of Furrer and Alvarez, Mr. Bauer testifies why a person of ordinary skill would combine Furrer and Alvarez, explaining that: a POSITA6 would have turned to the teachings of Alvarez to implement Furrer’s vacuum pump using a conventional pump controller having a portable, battery-powered pump to not only increase portability and to allow the user to move about when using the device but also to provide improved control for the system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 138. Mr. Bauer also testifies: a POSITA would have recognized that Alvarez advantageously provides details for such a conventional vacuum pump suitable for safely and controllably delivering negative pressure using a “[c]ontroller 115 [that] “houses the power source and drive mechanism for pumping device 100, and also contains hardware for various functions, such as controlling pumping device 100, milk production quantification, and communication with other devices. 6 “POSITA” is a patent law acronym for a “person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 69). Mr. Bauer further explains that Alvarez discloses that a “pump unit2100 [disclosed in Alvarez] preferably include[es] a controller and processor 2104 as well as a motor 2102 for actuating the device.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 115); see also id. ¶¶ 140–142 (providing “second,” “third,” and “fourth” reasons why a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Furrer and Alvarez). Mr. Bauer concludes from his analysis that “a person skilled in the art” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 11,806,454 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,806,454
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 2, 2026 · PGR2025-00021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20 are unpatentable: the Board found the asserted Kim, Kim–Yang, Lee, and Lee–Haller obviousness grounds proved, but not Lee–Park.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9. Based on our review of the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “The plain language of claim element [1.A] recites “wherein the first material layer is disposed over a first portion of the second material layer;” and claim element [1.B] recites “a landing pad disposed over a second portion of the second material layer.” Thus, the plain language of the claim merely recites that the first material layer is disposed over a first potion of the second material layer and the landing pad is disposed over a second portion of the second material layer. The plain language does not define what constitutes the first or second portions of the second material layer or define the first or second portions of the material layer by what is disposed above the layers. We agree with Petitioner that the term “portion” has a straightforward plain and ordinary meaning: a “part” of a larger whole. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1077, 406 (defining “portion” as “a part of a whole”)). The ’838 patent itself repeatedly uses the term “portion” this way. Ex. 1001, 5:40–43 (discussing both “an upper portion” and “lower portion” of a “staircase”), 5:66–6:1 (referencing “a portion of a top surface of a layer”); see also 4:39– 40, 7:15–17, 8:20–33, 8:34–65, 11:60–64, 12:38–59. Thus, we understand that the first and second portions of the second material layer are portions of (i.e., a part of the whole) second material layer. Neither the claims nor the Specification define what can constitute a first portion or a second portion of a second material layer.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner, however, with persuasive supporting testimony from Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 12,010,838 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,010,838
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00220 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–13, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art; a separate ground was not reached because those claims were shown obvious on other grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with electronic displays. Dec. 7–8. The parties’ positions have not changed from those we considered in the Institution Decision, and neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of a particular level of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we apply the same definition in this Decision. Our determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions, however, and we note that our conclusion would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 8

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Paper 47, 1–5. We do not rely on either of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “that Patent Owner fails to adduce evidence showing how the claimed invention satisfied the alleged need for effective outdoor cooling. See Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a proponent of objective evidence of long-felt need must show that “the claimed invention satisfied a long felt need”). Patent Owner states in conclusory fashion that “[d]espite the demand for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having attempted to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn conceived of his invention.” PO Resp. 75. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition, so Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 64

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “objective indicia of nonobviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (instructing that evidence of secondary considerations, when present, must always be considered in determining obviousness). Objective evidence of nonobviousness may include evidence of commercial success, licensing, copying, praise by others, long felt but unresolved need, and” slip op. at 58

  Patent outcomesUS 9,173,322 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,173,322
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00254 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–9, 11–13, 15–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and over Yare.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, we do not discount Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony” slip op. at 33

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim. Petitioner asserts that in the Delaware action , the district court construed “closed loop” as “gas pathway within a display housing containing gas that is essentially isolated from external air.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1026, 1). Petitioner asserts that the district court’s construction is the proper construction, in light of the specification and the prosecution history of the ’740 patent. Id. at 11–12. Petitioner explains: The ’740 patent refers to the gas/air, circulating through a closed loop as the circulating gas/air and also as the “isolated gas.” (Ex. 1001, 9:64–10:3, 10:7–9, 10:56–58, 11:30–12:6 (claims reciting circulating gas/air), 3:30–[39], 3:50–52 (specification referring to gas in the closed loop as “circulating gas” and “isolated gas”), FIG. 1.) Moreover, as noted above, the Applicant distinguished the claims from the Thielemans prior art based on the argument that the closed loop must be separate from and in addition to the open loop. (Ex. [1031], pp. 44-45, 160 (Responses filed on 01/07/2019 and 08/15/2019).) The Court’s “closed loop” construction should apply here, though Applicant notes that this claim construction does not affect the applicability of the prior art in this Petition because the art teaches the separate loops. Id. at 12. Petitioner’s characterization of the prosecution history with respect to the Thielemans reference is inaccurate. Our review of the cited portions of the prosecution history reveals that the Applicants did not argue to the Examiner that the closed loop and the open loop must be isolated from each other and cannot mix. Rather, the Applicants argued that Thielemans discloses having an open loop or a closed loop, not both an open loop and a closed loop. Ex. 1031, 44–45, 160. The Applicants also argued that Thielemans’s closed loop is not “about” and is not “encircling” the electronic image assembly. Id. at 160. The cited prosecution history does not support Petitioner’s assertion. Patent Owner explains that the ITC in the related investigation” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 10,506,740 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,506,740
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00221 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and Larson; the Board found the evidence of obviousness outweighed the evidence of nonobviousness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having begun attempting to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn and Mr. Hubbard conceived of their invention.” PO Resp. 65. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition. Thus, Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s and Mr. Hubbard’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 62

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableObjective indicia outweighedUnpatentable

    “and against obviousness, and weighed the evidence accordingly. The evidence of obviousness outweighs the evidence of nonobviousness. Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Karppanen and Larson.” slip op. at 74

  Patent outcomesUS 11,013,142 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,013,142
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00199 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Na and Kim (claim 1) and Na and Hong (claims 4, 7, and 8); other grounds were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Manufacturing Resources International, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “MRI”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented by Patent Owner in the preliminary record, we determined that the information presented in the Petition established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its unpatentability challenges. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on June 20, 2023, as to all challenged claims and all grounds of unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2055, 2056, and 2058–2061 as being improper new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Exclude Mot. 1–5. We have not relied on any of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “record, we adopted the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in our Decision on Institution: [A] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with electronic displays. Dec. on Inst. 11. The parties’ positions have not changed since the time of institution, and we discern no reason to change the definition. Thus, we apply the same definition. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we note that our analysis would not change if we adopted either party’s proposed definition in toto.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “appear nowhere outside of the claims in the ’595 patent. This fact alone tends to undermine Patent Owner’s suggestion that the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” In addition, Patent Owner’s cited portions of the Specification merely refer to the “posterior surface” as being the surface opposite that on which the LEDs are mounted to which heat from the LEDs is transferred. See Ex. 1001, 4:53–55, 4:57–60. They are inconclusive as to whether the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” Further, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony in support of a “distinct” construction is based on his interpretation of the words “on the” in claim 4’s recited “posterior surface on the rear side of the PCB.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 128. Specifically, he testifies that “[i]f the posterior surface was the rear side of the PCB, the claim would have said so.” Id. He does not cite any support in the Specification of the ’595 patent for his interpretation. See id. Given that his testimony amounts to speculation divorced from the context of the Specification, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. We also have considered Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the rear outermost surface of the PCB is the recited ‘posterior surface.’” Pet. Reply 20 (citing Pet. 83; Ex. 1002 ¶ 243). He cites a passage in the Specification of the ’595 patent that states: “The PCB may comprise a metal core PCB and the posterior surface of the PCB may be metallic so that air within the constricted convection channel may cool the metallic posterior surface (and subsequently the backlight assembly) more easily and efficiently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 243 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:60–65). We accord Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony more weight than Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony given that Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony is rooted in disclosures about metal core PCBs in the ’595 patent. It also gives some credence to the notion that the “posterior surface” and the “rear side” could be one and the same. Based on the record before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,854,595 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,854,595
• Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Abtis Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00283 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board cancelled claim 11 and granted substitute claims 14–16, finding Petitioner had not shown those claims unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “must determine whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4. In that regard, Patent Owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter;” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In this case, Patent Owner’s expert “Dr. Zhou signed the second declaration, stood behind its contents, and was available for cross-examination.” Paper 35, 4. Petitioner does not dispute this statement. Paper 39, 1. Petitioner does not identify any specific undue prejudice caused by Exhibit 2008. For example, Petitioner argues that “the failure to impress upon a witness that a statement is under oath goes to the heart of its reliability as evidence” and that “as the Board has recognized, hearsay is inherently unreliable” without specifying what statement in Exhibit 2008 lacks reliability. Paper 39, 4. Because Petitioner does not provide specific evidence of undue prejudice, we find Petitioner has suffered no such undue prejudice in this case. See Liquidia, 2021 WL 4860773 at *25. We therefore deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of lack of authenticity. With regard to the assertion that Exhibit 2008 is hearsay, Petitioner objects to the exhibit because the testimony is based “on other informal and unpublished documents that are hearsay under FRE 802.” Paper 29, 1. Petitioner does not specify what such “informal and unpublished documents” are. See id. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 expressly states, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on fact or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” The facts or data “need not be deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of hearsay.” slip op. at 50

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Paragraph 59 of the ’503 application describes formula 8-1 but does not support Petitioner’s argument that other unknown formulas may be included in the recited modified heavy chains. Ex. 2003 ¶ 59. Petitioner’s hypothesis that the recited heavy chains may (or may not) encompass unknown formulas is also inapposite to the written description inquiry before us — that is, whether the inventor was in possession of the subject matter recited in claims 14–16 based on the disclosure including formulas 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable

    “These arguments in the Sur-Reply are unpersuasive to show a lack of enablement first and foremost because the arguments do not specifically provide evidence showing that any purported experimentation is undue. See Sur-Reply 2–8 (asserting, but without providing evidence under any specific Wands factors, that the examples and guidance in the specification do not extend to the broad scope of all antibodies); see Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. We again emphasize that the analysis of undue experimentation does not necessarily require every Wands factor to be explicitly addressed but the analysis must be based on “weighing many factual considerations” depending on the nature of the invention and underlying art. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The assertion that the claim scope is broad alone does not suffice to show a lack of enablement based on the record before us. Moreover, as we note supra, Petitioner’s claim scope argument is based on the false premise that the scope of claims 14–16 is as broad as the claim term “antibody” without taking into account all other claim elements. For example, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner’s statement that “[t]he ’675 Patent’s specification discloses the structural modification site, the chemistry used to modify that residue, and working examples demonstrating the modification” (Reply 2), but asserts only that “[t]he disclosure of SSFI that only binds to IgG1 Fc domains (SEQ ID NO:1) is . . . . inconsistent with the expansive scope of the claims.” Sur-Reply 5. Petitioner’s argument that the claims encompass proteins that lack a lysine reside at a 248 position improperly excludes from the claim language the “lysine residue at 248 position . . . [as] determined by the EU numbering system” that claims 14–16 require. As Dr. Zhou testifies, “each proposed lysine residue at position 248 (EU numbering) is covalently modified with a specific attachment with a terminal bio-orthogonal click-chemistry functional group. The specification describes targeted transfer of a chemical functional group to lysine 248” and when claims 14–16 are considered in their entirety, which includes all claim elements, “[a] POSA would understand the claim itself to limit the modified antibodies to those with lysine at position 248.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 47. We also note that Patent Owner states “a POSA would understand that the phrase ‘one or more modified heavy chain’ encompasses antibodies within typical DAR distributions (i.e., fractional numbers) rather than requiring a distinct process for producing antibodies bearing modified heavy chains in exact integers.” Reply 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner states that PepTalk Presentation demonstrates that “a POSA would understand antibody conjugation products to exist as mixtures rather than discrete whole number species” because PepTalk Presentation “presents DAR values as non-integer measurements, i.e. DARs of 1.8 and 1.9 reflecting such distributions.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1007, 28). According to Patent Owner, “preparations having an average DAR of approximately 1.8 (commonly referred to in practice as ‘DAR2’) may reflect typical reaction distributions in which some antibodies contain two modified heavy chains while others contain fewer.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 46). Petitioner does not rebut these statements. See Sur-Reply 2–8. Based on the foregoing, the evidence before us does not show any” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,896,675 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,896,675
• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–29 are unpatentable under each asserted obviousness ground, including Chang and Fang, because Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Additionally, we note that Patent Owner did not cross-examine Mr. Ryan Bauer, who provided a detailed, 169-page expert report providing, on behalf of Petitioner, his opinions about the issues in this proceeding. See Exhibit 1003. Mr. Bauer’s testimonial evidence in this proceeding remains unrebutted.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. Based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that the Examiner construed the term “self- contained, in-bra wearable device” to mean “complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290).14 According to Petitioner, “[Patent Owner] did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner contends that all other terms “should receive their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “(3) 1[a][1] a diaphragm configured to prevent milk from reaching an air pump by forming a seal around its outer edge; Petitioner relies on Fang for the disclosure of a diaphragm, as stated in this clause. Pet. 25–26. Petitioner asserts the proposed combination of elements suggest a breast pump device that would have used a diaphragm pump including first and second diaphragm housing components and an elastic diaphragm, “in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 25. As also asserted by Petitioner, Fang discloses that flexible diaphragm 7 (i.e., a membrane) is configured to prevent milk from reaching the pump. Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 19 (“The elastic diaphragm 7 is used to prevent milk from flowing into the air pump main unit 8.”). Mr. Bauer testifies: The flexible diaphragm [diaphragm 7 in Fang] forms a watertight and airtight seal around its outer edge. In doing so, the diaphragm prevents the passage of milk from reaching the air pump and facilitates generation of negative pressure during operation. Fang also explains that the elastic diaphragm 7 deforms away from the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber, which then creates negative air pressure in the nipple tunnel when a vacuum is created on a pumping chamber.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 11,813,381 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,813,381
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board maintained its finding that claims 2 and 17 are unpatentable under §103 over Diekmann and Ma, and Suzuki and Ma.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Dependent claims 2 and 17 require an electron transport layer (ETL) that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,828,425
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–11, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Dong did not disclose the claimed vertical wordline arrangement, and the proposed 3D NAND combination lacked support for motivation and reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “understanding that the claim term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end, as asserted by Petitioner. Inst. Dec. 17. In other words, the claim terms describing the first and second portions having word lines “from top to bottom” refer to the relative vertical location of the word lines within the memory portions and not to location of the word lines relative to the source or drain. Our construction is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the express language of the independent claims, which states that the second memory portion is formed either above or below the first memory portion. The forming of one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a top and bottom in relation to those portions. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion is on top relative to the first portion. Similarly, claims 1 and 1 and 11, which recite a memory having a second portion formed below a first portion, establish that the second portion is on the bottom relative to the first portion. Thus, the claim language itself establishes the vertical locations of the memory portions relative to each other (e.g., a second memory portion that is above the first portion is on top, relative to the first portion). It follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “In our Decision, we treated the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting, noting that these preambles provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim. Dec. 14–15, 8. Neither party disputes that the preambles of claims 5 and 11 are limiting. See PO Resp. 34–35 (agreeing that the preambles are limiting); see generally Reply 1–6 (not disputing that the preambles are limiting). We maintain our construction of the preambles in this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (discussing pre-AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner, which Patent Owner did not contest. Inst. Dec. 13. Following institution, Patent Owner stated it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9 (citing Khatri Dec. ¶¶ 42–47). Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the ’941 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “We disagree and find that Dong’s Figure 5a does not depict wordlines in a physical vertical orientation, but rather depicts voltage diagrams. We agree with Patent Owner’s argument, supported by persuasive testimony by Dr. Khatri, that a POSITA would have understood that Dong’s voltage charts (e.g., Fig. 5a) simply represent which voltages are applied to which word lines and do not depict the physical orientation of the wordlines. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 171 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 52–54). As Dr. Khatri explains, Dong Figures 5a–5h depict different examples of self-boosting modes showing voltages applied differently to the wordlines and are not intended to depict the physical orientation of these word lines. Ex. 2028 ¶ 171; see also Sur-reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 65, 63–67; Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 177–186). We agree with Dr. Kahtri’s persuasive testimony that a POSITA would understand that Figures 5a–5h are illustrated vertically, but do not represent the actual physical arrangement of the word lines in memory, which are shown to be horizontal in Dong’s Figure 4. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 172 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 45, 47, 87).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,568,941 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,568,941

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.