• Google LLC v. Sandpiper CDN, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00826 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–23 are unpatentable under § 103, including over Glines alone and the additional asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the field of content delivery management or networks,” and that “additional education could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 51–53). Patent Owner provides substantially the same assessment. PO Resp. 16. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’112 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party proposes any express claim construction. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 16. We address the parties’ interpretation of the scope of “causing said hostname to be resolved” in our discussion of Petitioner’s assertions for limitation [1.d]. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree. The Petition states that Glines discloses that the anycast is resolved by an ISP DNS server. Pet. 20. The Petition identifies Glines’s local ISP DNS resolver 18 as the claimed ISP DNS server. Id. The Petitioner further asserts that Glines’s ISP DNS resolver 18 sends the request to the DNS server 38, but states that “Glines’s local DNS resolver, an ISP DNS server, thus causes the hostname . . . to be resolved.” Id. at 21–22. The Petition also drew an analogy with the ’112 patent and the role of local DNS server 70a in the Petition. See Pet. 20–21. Because the Petition and the Reply both identify Glines’s local ISP DNS resolver 18 as causing the hostname to be resolved, Petitioner has not advanced a new theory of unpatentability in its Reply. 6 At oral argument, Patent Owner suggested a narrower claim reading, but admitted that this had not been briefed. Tr. 36:15–38:9, 44:9–16. We do not address this reading because it was not set forth in the briefing. In the briefing, Patent Owner took the broader reading discussed here. See Tr. 41:12–23; PO Sur-reply 7.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 9,021,112 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,021,112
• Apple Inc. v. Ferid AllaniAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00857 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 are unpatentable: claims 24 and 26 over Rossmann and Himmel; claims 1–2, 4–6, 10–23, 25, and 27 over Rossmann, Himmel, King, and Adar; claims 3 and 7–9 over those references and Boyle.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Industries, Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “meaning of “icon” as claimed, including the dependent claims, the specification, the prosecution history, and the extrinsic evidence including expert testimony and dictionary definitions, we determine that the plain meaning of “icon” is readily apparent from the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges.”). We find that the plain meaning of “icon” as claimed encompasses at least “textual elements” because claim 20 recites “the icons comprise textual elements.” See id. (“Other claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.”). We highlight that the additional intrinsic evidence cited by the parties is consistent with the plain meaning. For example, Figures 1 and 2 of the specification show icons comprising textual elements. As another example, during prosecution of the ’058 patent, the Examiner found that the claimed icons were taught by textual hyperlinks. Ex. 1002, 586, 592. In order to overcome the Examiner’s rejection and obtain an allowance (id. at 641–50), applicant subsequently amended the claims to recite “specifically designed,” thus implicitly conceding to the Examiner’s interpretation of icon as encompassing textual hyperlinks. Id. at 625–640; see PO Resp. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1002, 626–27, 645–46) (acknowledging that the Examiner allowed the claims because applicant amended the claims to recite “specifically designed for containing a set of icons.”).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Requiring an element to be "specifically designed" for another element narrows the claim because it requires more than the first element being merely capable of being used with the second element. The term "configured to" is generally construed narrowly to mean "made to" and "designed to" rather than broadly to require merely "capable of". See In re Giannelli, 739 F. 3d 1375, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (the phrase "configured to" requires more than "mere capability." Rather, that term is synonymous with "made to" and "designed to."). However, rather than use "configured to", in order to avoid any confusion as to the narrower scope of the claims as amended, Applicant herein directly and explicitly requires "designed to." In re Giannelli at 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing an obviousness rejection because (1) the claims were properly construed narrowly to mean "designed to" and not broadly to encompass merely "capable of", and (2) the USPTO had not explained the motivation for modifying the prior art to meet the "design to" requirement) See also MPEP 2111.04, citing to In re Giannelli, for the proposition that a claim can be narrowed to require that it be "designed and constructed to be used" in a specific manner (as a rowing machine in the case of In re Giannelli). Logan has not been specifically designed and constructed in the required manner, so it does not cure all deficiencies of the primary reference Iki (which lacks any tree menu structure). Logan describes only "remote web" pages 90, 95 that are merely pages retrieved from Web browsing and stored in a web computer 25. Iki as modified by Logan would result on in a tree menu structure wherein not all levels of the tree included the required selection pages specifically designed for containing the claimed set of icons. Ex. 1002, 626–27 (emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Rossmann to include several advantages expressly taught by Himmel: Himmel’s consumer hot list bookmark set for the benefits of providing a user with a consistent user interface when accessing a website; to simplify navigation for the user by providing an additional navigation aid; to provide more immediate access to commonly used web actions; to reduce the network traffic required to navigate through webpages to arrive at a particular web function; and to reduce usage charges and data usage. Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94–99; Ex. 1004, 2:38–56, 12:24–34, 14:35–44; Ex. 1005, 18:63–65, 20:11–16). Petitioner contends that modifying Rossmann’s Figures 4A through 4G to include Himmel’s consumer hot list bookmark set yields each selection page including both selection icons for navigating to other local pages along with direct access icons such as on sale today to directly navigate to a predetermined web site to perform a common web action. Id. at 23–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–100; Ex. 1004, Figs. 4D–F). Petitioner contends that the selection page of Rossmann as modified by the bookmark set of Himmel teaches a first locally stored page specifically designed to include a direct access icon because the selection page is “used to include” a direct access icon, such as on sale today, and that during use, this selection page is programmed to display the set of direct access icons for selection by the user. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–100); see id. at 21–24. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success because technology for bookmarking websites and web actions was known at the time of invention, modifying Rossmann to utilize known bookmark manager software would have been straight forward, Rossmann already includes hardware and programming instructions to access a web server, and Himmel teaches that known prior art methods utilized both selection and direct access icons on a single page. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–103; Ex. 1004, 2:38–41, 14:21–44; Ex. 1005, Fig. 6A, 21:27–34).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 10,943,058 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,943,058
• SAP America, Inc. v. Cyandia, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01433 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 29, 35, and 36 are unpatentable as obvious over the PCT Publication and Austin-Lane.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like, and/or four or more years of experience in server-based applications” and that “[a]dditional experience may make up for a lack of education and vice versa.” PO Resp. 9. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the challenged patent and prior art, we adopt it and use “skilled artisans” to refer to people with such skill at the time the invention was filed. We do not perceive a substantive distinction between the parties’ definitions, but note that Petitioner’s definition provides more detail about the capabilities of skilled artisans. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “device indicated by the session data” encompasses “determining a notification method based on” session data indicating the current state of the external device, where the current state of the device encompasses an online state as well as an offline state. See Pet. 53–54; Tr. 55:3–10 (The Board: “Are there any other states of an external device other than online or offline?” Patent Owner: “As far as I know, Your Honor, those are the only two[.]”), Tr. 65:24–66:1 (The Board: “When the claim says current state, they mean it’s online or offline?” Petitioner: “Correct.”), Tr. 20:23–21:8. The specification is consistent with the plain language of the claim in disclosing two examples of the claimed “current state,” namely, online and offline. Ex. 1101, 21:1–4. The specification discloses that the notification manager “queries session manager 456 to determine the user’s connectedness.” Id. at 21:6–8. The specification discloses that if the user is “online, notify by, for example, the user’s active session. If offline, notify by, for example, a txt [sic] message, call the user’s landline, call a friend of the user, and the like.” Id. at 21:1–4, 23:28–31.” slip op. at 13

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Goodrich, show written description support for providing a notification to an active external device, Patent Owner has not cited any portion of the 2009 Parent, nor any portion of the testimony of Dr. Goodrich, to show that the 2009 Parent provides written description support for determining a notification method by which to provide an alert to an external device based on the current state of the external device as offline. We highlight that Paragraphs 130 and 131 of the 2011 CIP Application disclose offline notification preferences for determining a notification method by which to provide an alert to an external device based on the current state of the external device as offline. Ex. 1110 ¶¶ 130–131. Specifically, paragraphs 130 and 131 describe that: the notification manager of the eventing and alerting subsystem 452 queries the configuration server 454 for the user's notification preferences and correlates these notification preferences with session manager 456 to determine the best notification method. That is, the notification manager queries the configuration server 454 and determines, for example, that the user has certain online notification preferences and certain offline notification preferences. If online, notify by, for example, the user's active session. If offline, notify by, for example, a txt message. . . . The notification manager of the eventing and alerting subsystem 452 then queries session manager 456 to determine the user's connectedness. Id. That is, if the user’s connectedness, or “current state” of the claimed external device, is offline, and the user’s offline notification preferences are “notify by txt message,” the notification manager will determine that the notification method for the external device having a current state of offline is by txt message. See id. Thus, the 2011 CIP Application describes a notification manager that queries a session manager to determine whether an external device is offline, and if the external device is offline, determines a notification method for providing an alert on the external device based on the current status of the external device as offline and the user’s offline notification preferences. Although we find this written description support for the determining limitation in the 2011 CIP Application, we do not find this written description support in the 2009 Parent.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “As to the “determining a notification method” limitation (1.10), Petitioner asserts that Austin-Lane teaches determining: (1) the user device(s) to send the notification to (e.g., phone, PDA, notebook computer, desktop computer); (2) the communication protocol to use to send the notification, i.e., how to send the notification (e.g., SMTP (for email), SMS (for texts), HTTP (for web browsers)); and (3) the type of alert to provide, i.e., how to present the notification, (e.g., text, an icon, a pop-up window, a video, an email, an audible or tactile alarm), based on the current state of the at least one external device indicated by the session data (“presence information”), which may include whether and on which device(s) the user is online and/or whether and on which applications the user has an active session. Id. at 53 (internal citations omitted) (citing Ex. 1105 ¶¶ 4, 5, 29, 32, 33, 39, 46, 48, 61, 79, Fig. 1). We highlight that paragraph 61 of Austin-Lane discloses that: The type preferences 650 may include preferences for various notification types. . . . [A]uction alert #1 660 defines the following delivery precedence 663: (1) a web browser (if the user is online), (2) an IM client (if the user is online), (3) a mobile phone #1, (4) a PDA, (5) a mobile phone #2, (6) a pager, and (7) an email inbox. Ex. 1105 ¶ 61; see id. ¶¶ 74–77 (Describing that one of several notification methods for delivering an alert to a user’s device is determined based on the current state of the user’s device as online or offline). Thus, Austin-Lane describes determining a notification method by which to provide an alert on an external device based on the current state of the external device as online as well as offline.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,751,948 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,751,948
• BMW Of North America, LLC v. Foras Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01347 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach switching the boot-processor role to a spare processor.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “This reference point prevents . . . factfinders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge obviousness.” Id.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “processor” to the spare processor, we determine that the claim is describing this transfer of identification of “boot processor,” which is required when transferring a boot processor’s functions to a spare because of the “problems [that] arise in attempting to idle (or eject) the boot processor.” Id. at 6:25– 27. This is confirmed by the language of limitation [1d], stating that the switching of the role of boot processor involves “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor.” Thus, the firmware and operating system exchange this information identifying the boot processor, which is described in the specification as a device tree. See, e.g., id. at 13:21–35. The ’302 patent makes clear that accurate identification of which processor is the boot processor remains critical during runtime. See, e.g., id. at 6:25–27. Thus, Patent Owner is correct in requiring the system to have a way to identify the boot processor and to transfer this identification during runtime. However, as made clear in the embodiments described in the ’302 patent discussed above, this identification is for runtime purposes to accommodate runtime problems, not for booting purposes. Although Patent Owner may be correct that a function of the boot processor is to boot the system (PO Sur-reply 5), the problem identified in the ’302 patent is a problem relating to the runtime reassignment of the boot processor identity, to address a runtime need to identify the boot processor. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 11:6–9. Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system” means causing the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree), which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 6:25–41, 11:4–18 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); compare id. at 9:65–11:3 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), with id. at 11:4–43 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); see also 14:66–15:21 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe switching a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “may swap processors that are failing, and perform the necessary bookkeeping to keep the operating system informed as to how to address the processors available, nothing in the Petition persuasively explains whether this generic processor swapping switches the boot processor role. As we explained in our claim construction section, the term “boot processor” is not merely a label of convenience to describe the processor that happened to have earlier booted the system. The role of boot processor is specifically switched to the spare; it is a piece of information tracked by the system. As we explain below, Petitioner does not adequately address the transfer of this information to make the system aware of which processor has the boot processor role. Petitioner asserts that “the BSP flag” of the IA-32 system is used to “determine whether a processor is the boot processor.” Pet. 17–18. Petitioner here is relying on a register used in IA-32 processors to identify whether or not they are the boot processor. This register is used during booting so that only the boot processor boots the system. See, e.g., Ex. 1008, 238–40, 710. This register does not appear to serve any further role, and Petitioner offers no persuasive evidence or argument that the processor register flag is exposed or copied to the operating system or APIC table. Petitioner’s proposed combination does not involve updating this register, nor does Petitioner explain how, even if the register were updated, it would meet the “switching” a “role of boot processor” in limitation [1d].” slip op. at 32

  • ExcludeOther

    “The USPTO has established Rules for objecting to and challenging evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. This process sets various timeframes and permits briefing and curative actions, all of which are designed to crystallize 5 We follow the parties’ convention of citing to the later-added “Page X of Y” pagination rather than the native pagination. the issues and ensure a full and fair opportunity for the parties to be heard. See id. In this instance, Patent Owner’s evidentiary arguments regarding Exhibits 1008 and 1028 are untimely. Accordingly, we will not exclude Exhibits 1008 or 1028 on the basis of their authenticity, admissibility, or for any reason that should have been raised under the proper procedures. See, e.g., PO Resp. 7–8; PO Sur-reply 7–8; see also Pet. Reply 11 (asserting that “Patent Owner has not filed any objection to or a motion to exclude these references”). We consider Petitioner’s citations to these documents in our prior art analysis below. Notwithstanding, as is clear from our patentability analysis below, Exhibits 1008 and 1028 do not serve to demonstrate the unpatentability of any claim.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,624,302 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,624,302
• BMW Of North America, LLC v. Foras Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01346 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 were not shown unpatentable because the prior-art combinations did not establish transfer of the role of boot processor during system runtime.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that: A person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’781 patent would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture, including experience relating to fault tolerant computer architecture, as of the earliest priority date of the ’781 patent—October 25, 2004. If a person did not have a bachelor’s degree, additional relevant and practical experience with fault tolerant computer systems could provide an acceptable substitute. Likewise, further education beyond a bachelor’s degree could compensate for a deficiency in practical experience. See EX2004, Declaration of Nigel A. Jones (“Jones”), ¶ 26. PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner further notes that its position is “similar, but not identical to, Petitioner’s [position]” but that “the analysis [of the claims] is identical for both proposed determinations.” Id. We agree that our analysis would not differ based on choosing one proposed level of skill over the other, but as the losing party, we select Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “logic . . . for transferring, during system runtime, the role of boot processor” means logic that causes the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree) which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 5:39–55, 10:43–67 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); compare id. at 9:37– 10:42 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), with id. at 10:43–11:42 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); see also 15:21–42 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe transferring a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the clear support in the specification for the above interpretation, we see no need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic evidence.”) (citing Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 823 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Extrinsic evidence may not be used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324)). In general, the cited portions of testimony from the declarants from both parties in the briefs do little more than point to the portions of the ’781 patent described above or argue about what a boot processor does during booting. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–8. The specification makes clear that it is focused on the role of boot processor during runtime because of problems encountered during runtime; it is not focused on the boot processor during booting. Ex. 1001, 5:39–55, 10:43–67. Thus, the testimony about what a boot processor does during booting, or that the primary function of the boot processor is to boot, is not particularly pertinent, and does not undo the unambiguous discussion in the ’781 patent.” slip op. at 27

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “whether they are the boot processor or not (Ex. 1008, 238, 710), Petitioner does not explain how such information is exposed to the BIOS or operating system, nor how it is changed during runtime, after its purpose has been fulfilled. In sum, even if Petitioner’s proposed combination swaps the spare processor for the processor that booted the system, Petitioner’s proposed combination does not appear to transfer the role of boot processor to the spare processor. At best, Petitioner’s proposed combination transfers the tasks of one processor to another. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 15 (Fox describing its disclosure as “updat[ing] the ‘active’ processor list” and “[re-]allocat[ing] the threads that were running on the failing processor”), 46 (transferring “processes (instructions, threads, etc.) initially allocated to the failing processor” to the spare processor)). Of the art of record, we are only aware of the ’781 patent transferring a designation of which processor is the boot processor during the swap to a spare processor. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:43– 55, 11:10–12, 16:19–21, 17:51–55; claims 1, 9, 16, 25. In conclusion, we find that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, how the prior art teaches “transferring” a “role of boot processor” as required by limitation 1[c].” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 7,627,781 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,627,781
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Lionra Technologies LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01281 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–10, 12–15, and 17–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson; claim 8 is also unpatentable with Russell.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “been motivated to combine the teachings of Cornett, Paatela, Nelson, and Russell in the way Petitioner proposes and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See supra §§ III.E.2(a)–(b). Hence, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 is unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claim would have been obvious over Cornett, Paatela, Nelson, and Russell.” slip op. at 122

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 7,738,471 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,738,471
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01256 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10–14, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable because Ahn and Chaudhri did not teach or suggest the claimed movement of an object during the gesture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “interface objects and, more specifically, the display of user interfaces on applications, in accordance with contacts on the touch-sensitive surface of a display. Ex. 1001, (54), Abstr. Consistent with the scope of the ’727 patent, we find that the level of skill in the art is reflected in a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces, human-computer interfaces, or equivalents.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Because there is no dispute as to the scope and meaning of these terms, and for consistency with the Decision on Institution, we apply the meaning of the terms “blur” and “distance magnitude” as stated above where applicable. However, we note that our determination does not hinge on the meaning of these terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “it was “known to utilize ‘cues’ to help the user know what gesture to utilize and whether they are correctly performing the gesture (e.g., graphics such as movable images that help the user visualize the correct gesture and how to complete it successfully).” Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 54, 62, 73). This sentence does not cure the deficiency noted above regarding Petitioner’s reliance on Ahn’s graphic shadow moving with a gesture. Chaudhri is relied on for the proposition that, Ahn’s graphic shadow is “[i]ndeed” a movable image known to give a user a visual cue. Id. But no such “cue” is provided in Ahn by the graphical shadow alone, because there is no movement of that object. The Petition does not present argument that a Chaudhri object is the movable object or how any of Chaudhri’s teachings of movable objects would have suggested to modify Ahn “to thereby move” the graphical shadow.” slip op. at 18

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “the theory that Ahn’s graphic shadow moves. Reply 3−4. Petitioner interprets the sentences in Ahn we have analyzed above in conjunction with testimony of Dr. Terveen to argue that temporal descriptions in Ahn make it obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to drag in the right direction while continuing to press the graphic 1800. Id. (citing Exs. 1004 ¶¶ 117−119, Ex. 1023 ¶ 10). The Petition, however, relies on an Ahn disclosing a moving graphic shadow according to the embodiment of Figure 18(a), as described in paragraph 118. Petitioner now changes its theory of how Ahn’s graphic shadow would move according to paragraph 119, i.e., that although the graphic shadow is merely pressed (in the embodiment shown in Figure 18(b)) it would also be dragged while pressed. Reply 3. Not only is this a shift from the theory Petitioner presents in the Petition, it is not persuasive. As Patent Owner argues, and we agree, there is no cogent explanation for modifying the graphic shadow embodiment of Figure 18(b), especially in light of Ahn’s disclosure that the graphic shadow disappears when pressed and the menu list is displayed as emerging. Sur-reply 2−3. In other words, Petitioner’s new argument does not account for Ahn’s teaching that the objective of the graphic shadow is merely to notify the user of the start of the gesture, and once that start of the gesture is detected (the press on the graphic shadow), paragraph 119 informs us that there is no longer a need for the graphic shadow—it disappears from the display. Ex. 1004 ¶ 119. The Petition does not offer any argument for a theory in which the gesture of paragraph 119 (the press, not a touch and drag operation) results in graphic 1800 disappearing, while also moving during the disappearance. We are mindful that “[i]t is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one skilled in the art.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind / Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Consequently, we determine that Petitioner’s argument in Reply belatedly relying on the different embodiment of paragraph 119 is improper new argument, and that even if considered it is not persuasive.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,740,727 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,740,727
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01083 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 101 are unpatentable as obvious over Ahn, Chaudhri, and Hinckley.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art had knowledge that “linear menus are not easy to use on small devices, especially in mobile situations” because “[t]he limited screen space makes it difficult to display a large . . . linear menu while keeping items large enough to be easily selected” (Ex. 1028, 2) and that “[d]istance to and size of the target are important factors that give pie menus the advantage over traditional linear menus” (Ex. 2013, 2). See Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 31–33. Given that Hinckley explicitly describes using its radial menu in a mobile telephone, and given that a person of ordinary skill in the art had knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of Hinckley’s radial menu, we find Dr. Terveen’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Hinckley’s radial menu in Ahn’s mobile device more persuasive that Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony to the contrary, because Dr. Terveen’s testimony is consistent with the teachings of Hinckley and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, whereas Dr. Rosenberg does not reconcile his testimony with Hinckley’s express disclosure of displaying a radial menu on the touch screen of a mobile telephone. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56, 63–67; 1023 ¶¶ 31–33; Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 71–79; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 43, 53, 56; Ex. 2009, 3; Ex. 2010, 2; Ex. 2013, 2. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art had reason to conclude that implementing Hinckley’s radial menu in Ahn’s mobile device with limited screen space yields advantages such as distance to and size of the icons as well as associating a function with a direction that outweigh disadvantages such as having less icons than a linear menu. We find that combining the bezel gestures and associated bezel menu and radial menu of” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. We find that altering Ahn’s device by substituting Hinckley’s bezel gestures and associated bezel and radial menus for Ahn’s technique of displaying menus does no more than yield the predictable results of (a) conserving screen real estate, (b) distinguishing bezel gestures from normal gestures so that the bezel gestures do not interfere with normal gestures and vice versa, (c) providing a novice mode to help a user learn the expert way of accessing the functionality of the bezel and radial menus, and (d) providing a user user as taught by Hinckley. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1, 40, 46, 77–80, 110; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–67.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s contention that several of the icons shown in Ahn’s menus would not benefit from a radial menu because of their assigned locations and functions (PO Resp. 42–51) do not address the Petition’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Hinckley’s bezel menu with icon 1712 that includes radial menu icon 1714 in Ahn’s device. See Pet. 46–55. Even if some icons would not benefit from a radial menu, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that other icons would benefit, such as the icons that display sub-menus when selected, as shown by icon 830 in figure 8C and the answer options icon shown in figure 17 of Ahn as well as icon 1714 shown in figure 17 of Hinckley, and would have therefore provided such icons with a radial menu icon. See Reply 2 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418); see id. at 15–16 (quoting Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). With respect to the specific locations assigned to the bezel menu icons and the radial menu icons, we agree with Petitioner that a manner that improves efficiency and usability, such as locating the radial menu icon away from the end points of the bezel menu as taught by figure 17 of Hinckley.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 10,642,413 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,642,413
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01084 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 8–18, 22–30, and 34–39 are unpatentable as obvious over Shiplacoff and over Shiplacoff combined with Nan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner’s declarant, Loren Terveen, Ph.D., testifies that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner agrees with this definition. PO Resp. 13 (citing Dec. 5). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “according to the Phillips standard.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 1, the “one or more criteria” is satisfied when a “movement parameter” of “the second input” is detected to be “above a movement threshold.” PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 27, the “second one or more criteria” is satisfied when “a duration parameter” of the “second input” is detected to be “above a duration threshold.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [1j] and [1k] requires an operation capable of detecting a second input by a second contact that includes movement across a display in a direction, determining whether the second input meets or does not meet the recited criteria, and triggers performance of each of the corresponding display actions as appropriate. Id. at 15–19. Patent Owner 15. Id. at 21–23. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [27d]–[27f] recited in claim 27 require an operation that enables the device to detect a second input by a second contact that includes movement across the display in a direction, determine whether the second input meets or does not meet the two recited criteria, and trigger performance of each of the recited display actions as appropriate. Id. at 19– 20. Patent Owner contends that for “the second input” recited in limitations [1j] and [1k], “the second input” must be detected in the same operational context. Id. at 23–24. In particular, Patent Owner contends that limitations [1j] and [1k], and similar limitations recited in claims 15 and 27, “require a single, common contact event as the starting point of the claimed logic operations.” Id. at 24; see id. at 25–26. We do not need to determine whether Patent Owner’s proposed constructions are correct, because under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proposed constructions, we find that the prior art would have rendered all challenged claims obvious as discussed below in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Patent Owner’s contention and the supporting testimony of Dr. Madisetti does not address Shiplacoff’s teaching of using a gesture, such as Shiplacoff’s flick gesture, to return to launch screen. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen in finding that Shiplacoff’s disclosure that “returning to the launch screen . . . is performed by performing a gesture” (Ex. 1004 ¶ 99) such as a flicking gesture (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 126, 129; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13) teaches using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. See Pet. 16, 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53, 59; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Reply 7–10. Because Dr. Terveen’s testimony is consistent with and supported by the teachings of Shiplacoff as a whole (in contrast to that of Dr. Madisetti), we credit the testimony of Dr. Terveen in finding that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flick gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flick gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “articulate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Shiplacoff’s flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen. PO Resp. 47–49. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff’s swipe up gesture teaches limitation [1j] by including a movement parameter above a movement threshold. Pet. 17–23. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff teaches that a user can perform another gesture to return to the home screen. Id. at 23. Petitioner contends that when a gesture different from the swipe up gesture is used to return to the home screen, a person of ordinary skill would have used a flicking gesture because the flicking gesture has a different movement parameter than the swipe up gesture, namely, a movement parameter that does not meet the movement threshold. Pet. 23– 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 99–102, 167; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–61). We agree with Petitioner for the reasons given in the Petition and as discussed above. We reiterate that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flicking gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Shiplacoff teaches away from using the flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen because, according to Patent Owner, Shiplacoff already uses the flick gesture to perform scrolling in full screen mode. PO Resp. 49–52 the same gesture in a given mode can be assigned to different functions depending on where, when, and how the gesture is input by the user, as discussed above. Reply 11–12 (discussing Shiplacoff’s teaching of associating the same tap gesture with different functions depending on where the tap occurs), 13–14 (discussing Duarte’s teaching of associating both a drag gesture and a scrolling gesture to the same mode). Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 16–19. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that based on the teachings of Shiplacoff (and, by incorporation, Duarte), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that a flick started in area 102 or near an edge of screen 101 and continuing onto screen 101 would be distinguished from a flick entirely within screen 101 based on location, and would perform a different function. Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 18–19. We also agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that Duarte teaches associating a gesture with one function when a modifier key is not pressed, and associating the same gesture with a different function when the modifier key is pressed, such that a flick performed when the key is not pressed would perform one function such as scrolling and a flick performed when the key is pressed would perform another, such as changing the display mode. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 64; Ex. 1023 ¶ 20). We agree with Petitioner that Shiplacoff does not teach away from using a flicking gesture to change from full screen mode to home screen because it “does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.” Reply 10 (quoting Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at1327).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,649,578 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,649,578
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00518 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 because the prior-art combinations teach limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. As discussed above, the plain meaning of an “image object” read in light of the Specification encompasses data that defines an image, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web. Ex. 1004, 89–90. Therefore, the HTML file of Lemay Web, which specifies attributes including width, height, pause value, and repeat value of the pocket watch image objects, is “capable of being applied to more than one” image object, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch image objects described by Lemay Web. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The Board and Petitioner understood the meaning of “or” in the phrase “one or more objects” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction of style as meaning that “a style . . . can be associated with just one object.” Dec. 22; see Reply 4–5. The Federal Circuit “ultimately conclude[d] that Express Mobile’s proposed construction, with ‘or’ properly interpreted,” means “that the claimed ‘style’ must be capable of being applied to both one and more than one ‘object,’” and “remand[ed] for further proceedings in view of the correct claim construction.” Remand Opinion 13. In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]t may be that under the correct claim construction, the Board finds that Lemay Web teaches the claimed ‘style’; however, that is still an open fact question for the Board to decide in the first instance.” Id. at n.6. Given that the Federal Circuit has ordered the Board to determine whether the prior art teaches the claimed “style” under the proper construction, we find that Petitioner’s arguments on this issue are timely.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.