• Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00042 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doo and Amira; claims 12–19 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted tissue properties were not shown in Amira.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp., No. 2024-1794, 2026 WL 587294 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2026) (“Medivis”) (Paper 40),1 affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, and remanding our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our “determination of no motivation to combine Doo and Amira” and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether claims 1–6 and 11–20 (“the Remanded Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 11,004,271 B2 (“the ’271 patent,” Ex. 1001) are unpatentable in view of Petitioner’s obviousness challenge over Doo and Amira. Medivis, slip op. at 9–10. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We issue this Final Written Decision on Remand pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 144, 318 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 in an inter partes review involving Medivis, Inc. (“Petitioner”) and Novarad Corp. (“Patent Owner”). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the entirety of the record in light of the Federal Circuit’s directives in Medivis, we hold that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1–6, 11, and 20 are unpatentable; however, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 12–19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, except that we excise part of Petitioner’s definition to produce the following modified version: 4 Throughout this decision, we eliminate the parties’ italicization of reference names from quotations without noting “emphasis omitted.” 5 Doo, WO 2015/164402 A1, published October 29, 2015 (Ex. 1008). 6 Excerpt of Amira 5 User’s Guide, title through Chapter 2 (Visual Imaging 2009) (Ex. 1005). engineering, or a related field with several years of experience in the design, development, and study of augmented reality devices and . . . familiarity with conventional medical imaging data and visualization of data for medical procedures . . . . Our edit removes the alternative of “working with a team including someone with such familiarity” because one’s role in a team may be tangential to their personal experience with medical imaging. Regardless, had we adopted Petitioner’s original definition, our decision would not have changed.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the term “3D slices” has no apparent connection to the phrase “direct volume rendering.” Patent Owner’s argument appears to be that DVR “requires an image of the entire anatomical volume that is neither feature-specific nor segmented, [which] would seemingly require that all inner layers be displayed.” Reply 4; see Sur-reply 6–10 (not disputing Petitioner’s characterization). But, as Petitioner notes, the specification directly undermines this by teaching “display [of] a slice of the 3D data instead of a volume of the 3D data.” See Reply 4 n.2 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:34–35). In other words, to the extent DVR would depict an image of the entire anatomical volume, displaying 3D slices “instead of a volume of the 3D data” implies the opposite of DVR. Even if “3D slices” somehow implied DVR, Patent Owner’s position is still untenable. Claim 1 does not recite “3D slices.” Instead, claim 1 recites “3D data” and “inner layers.” Ex. 1001, 18:54–65. Patent Owner fails to clarify the relationship between “slices,” “3D data,” and “layers,” and its expert even admits that slices and layers are two different things. See PO Resp. 13; Ex. 1022, 32:7–16 (agreeing that the words “slice” and “layer” are not “synonyms”), cited in Reply 4. We also agree with Petitioner that dependent claim 3 distinguishes slices and layers by reciting “slices of the projected inner layer.” Reply 4 (quoting Ex. 1001, 19:3–10). Thus, even if 3D slices somehow implied DVR, the language of claim 1 does not support limiting the claim this way.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “The determination of whether a document was publicly accessible “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2018). For instance, courts routinely rely on the Wayback Machine to determine when a reference was first made available to the public. Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 8 F.4th 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“District courts have taken judicial notice of the contents of webpages available through the Wayback Machine ‘as facts that can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’”). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “Medivis cannot rely on additional prior art”—Exhibits 1023 and 1024—“that was submitted after its Petition to carry its burden without leave from the Board.” Sur-reply 4. As Patent Owner did not file a motion to exclude these exhibits, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to disregard them. We also find Petitioner’s Reply argument proper because it directly responds to Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner did not prove the public accessibility of Amira. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d, 919, 925 on issues previously raised.”). Petitioner’s Reply argument appropriately elaborates on the Petition’s contention that Amira was publicly accessible. Patent Owner also does not dispute the substance of Petitioner’s evidence. For example, Patent Owner does not address the substance of Mr. Frank-White’s declaration. We find that this evidence, including Mr. Frank- White’s declaration testimony, persuasively supports the public availability of Amira as of the date shown in the Wayback Machine URL. See Ex. 1024.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,004,271 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,004,271
• Intel Corporation v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00915 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5–16, and 18–30 as obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and MPIref; claims 4 and 17 over those references plus POEref.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Ex. 1163 ¶ 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–3). We credit Dr. Bajaj’s testimony which is unrebutted and supported by the record. We, thus, agree with Dr. Bajaj’s reasoning which is based on Menon. We further agree with Dr. Bajaj’s conclusion that Menon does not teach away from the combination with Trefethen. Id. ¶ 75. Menon’s description of building on and enhancing the teachings of Trefethen—the earlier work of the same research group at Cornell—by adding MEX routines to achieve high-performance parallel computing and extensibility for MATLAB, demonstrates a classic motivation for a POSITA to combine. RS6000 is specifically referenced in Menon-Trefethen and adds operational details of the parallel operating platform that teach a POSITA how to implement the MultiMATLAB system with a reasonable expectation of success. Considering Menon as a whole, these facts are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s teaching away arguments. For these reasons, Patent Owner’s teaching away argument is unavailing. Motivation to Combine Conclusion We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and contentions which we” slip op. at 42

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance” slip op. at 79

  Patent outcomesUS 11,563,621 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,563,621
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 1, 2026 · IPR2023-00220 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–13, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art; a separate ground was not reached because those claims were shown obvious on other grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes associated with electronic displays. Dec. 7–8. The parties’ positions have not changed from those we considered in the Institution Decision, and neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of a particular level of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we apply the same definition in this Decision. Our determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions, however, and we note that our conclusion would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 8

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Paper 47, 1–5. We do not rely on either of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “that Patent Owner fails to adduce evidence showing how the claimed invention satisfied the alleged need for effective outdoor cooling. See Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a proponent of objective evidence of long-felt need must show that “the claimed invention satisfied a long felt need”). Patent Owner states in conclusory fashion that “[d]espite the demand for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having attempted to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn conceived of his invention.” PO Resp. 75. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition, so Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 64

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “objective indicia of nonobviousness (i.e., secondary considerations) may lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims would not have been obvious. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (instructing that evidence of secondary considerations, when present, must always be considered in determining obviousness). Objective evidence of nonobviousness may include evidence of commercial success, licensing, copying, praise by others, long felt but unresolved need, and” slip op. at 58

  Patent outcomesUS 9,173,322 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,173,322
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00254 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–9, 11–13, 15–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and over Yare.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, we do not discount Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony” slip op. at 33

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim. Petitioner asserts that in the Delaware action , the district court construed “closed loop” as “gas pathway within a display housing containing gas that is essentially isolated from external air.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1026, 1). Petitioner asserts that the district court’s construction is the proper construction, in light of the specification and the prosecution history of the ’740 patent. Id. at 11–12. Petitioner explains: The ’740 patent refers to the gas/air, circulating through a closed loop as the circulating gas/air and also as the “isolated gas.” (Ex. 1001, 9:64–10:3, 10:7–9, 10:56–58, 11:30–12:6 (claims reciting circulating gas/air), 3:30–[39], 3:50–52 (specification referring to gas in the closed loop as “circulating gas” and “isolated gas”), FIG. 1.) Moreover, as noted above, the Applicant distinguished the claims from the Thielemans prior art based on the argument that the closed loop must be separate from and in addition to the open loop. (Ex. [1031], pp. 44-45, 160 (Responses filed on 01/07/2019 and 08/15/2019).) The Court’s “closed loop” construction should apply here, though Applicant notes that this claim construction does not affect the applicability of the prior art in this Petition because the art teaches the separate loops. Id. at 12. Petitioner’s characterization of the prosecution history with respect to the Thielemans reference is inaccurate. Our review of the cited portions of the prosecution history reveals that the Applicants did not argue to the Examiner that the closed loop and the open loop must be isolated from each other and cannot mix. Rather, the Applicants argued that Thielemans discloses having an open loop or a closed loop, not both an open loop and a closed loop. Ex. 1031, 44–45, 160. The Applicants also argued that Thielemans’s closed loop is not “about” and is not “encircling” the electronic image assembly. Id. at 160. The cited prosecution history does not support Petitioner’s assertion. Patent Owner explains that the ITC in the related investigation” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 10,506,740 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,506,740
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00221 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Karppanen and Larson; the Board found the evidence of obviousness outweighed the evidence of nonobviousness.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “art. This determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art references. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Further, our obviousness conclusions would be no different even if Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is adopted. B.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “closed loop” The term “closed loop” is recited in each independent claim.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “for outdoor displays, no one (including Samsung, despite having begun attempting to develop outdoor displays at least by 2005) was successful until Mr. Dunn and Mr. Hubbard conceived of their invention.” PO Resp. 65. Patent Owner cites no evidence for this proposition. Thus, Patent Owner’s assertions regarding Mr. Dunn’s and Mr. Hubbard’s invention satisfying the alleged need are based on unsupported attorney argument. Accordingly, “we conclude that the nexus between the claimed invention and the purported long-felt, unmet need is too attenuated to provide a persuasive rationale for nonobviousness.” In re Karpf, 758 F. App’x 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2019).” slip op. at 62

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableObjective indicia outweighedUnpatentable

    “and against obviousness, and weighed the evidence accordingly. The evidence of obviousness outweighs the evidence of nonobviousness. Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Karppanen and Larson.” slip op. at 74

  Patent outcomesUS 11,013,142 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,013,142
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Manufacturing Resources International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2023-00199 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Na and Kim (claim 1) and Na and Hong (claims 4, 7, and 8); other grounds were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Manufacturing Resources International, Inc. (“Patent Owner” or “MRI”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Taking into account the arguments presented by Patent Owner in the preliminary record, we determined that the information presented in the Petition established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its unpatentability challenges. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted this proceeding on June 20, 2023, as to all challenged claims and all grounds of unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 9 (“Dec. on Inst.”).” slip op. at 2

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s Motion to Strike Petitioner moves to strike Exhibits 2055, 2056, and 2058–2061 as being improper new evidence filed by Patent Owner with its Sur-reply in contravention of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Exclude Mot. 1–5. We have not relied on any of these exhibits in rendering this Decision. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Petitioner’s Motion to Strike.” slip op. at 73

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “record, we adopted the following definition of the level of ordinary skill in our Decision on Institution: [A] POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as mechanical engineering, physics, applied physics, product design, or a related field, and would also have had 2–4 years of experience working with electronic displays, including the thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with such displays, or 5–7 years of experience in the field working with electronic displays and would have developed a similar understanding of thermal management, product design issues, and failure modes, associated with electronic displays. Dec. on Inst. 11. The parties’ positions have not changed since the time of institution, and we discern no reason to change the definition. Thus, we apply the same definition. We are satisfied that this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’595 patent and the asserted prior art. Notwithstanding, we note that our analysis would not change if we adopted either party’s proposed definition in toto.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “appear nowhere outside of the claims in the ’595 patent. This fact alone tends to undermine Patent Owner’s suggestion that the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” In addition, Patent Owner’s cited portions of the Specification merely refer to the “posterior surface” as being the surface opposite that on which the LEDs are mounted to which heat from the LEDs is transferred. See Ex. 1001, 4:53–55, 4:57–60. They are inconclusive as to whether the “posterior surface” must be distinct from the “rear side.” Further, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony in support of a “distinct” construction is based on his interpretation of the words “on the” in claim 4’s recited “posterior surface on the rear side of the PCB.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 128. Specifically, he testifies that “[i]f the posterior surface was the rear side of the PCB, the claim would have said so.” Id. He does not cite any support in the Specification of the ’595 patent for his interpretation. See id. Given that his testimony amounts to speculation divorced from the context of the Specification, Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony is entitled to little weight. We also have considered Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony in support of Petitioner’s contention that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the rear outermost surface of the PCB is the recited ‘posterior surface.’” Pet. Reply 20 (citing Pet. 83; Ex. 1002 ¶ 243). He cites a passage in the Specification of the ’595 patent that states: “The PCB may comprise a metal core PCB and the posterior surface of the PCB may be metallic so that air within the constricted convection channel may cool the metallic posterior surface (and subsequently the backlight assembly) more easily and efficiently.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 243 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:60–65). We accord Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony more weight than Mr. Gershowitz’s testimony given that Mr. Smith-Gillespie’s testimony is rooted in disclosures about metal core PCBs in the ’595 patent. It also gives some credence to the notion that the “posterior surface” and the “rear side” could be one and the same. Based on the record before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,854,595 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,854,595
• Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00070 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–7, and 9–21 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2 and 8 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted art did not meet their construed limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. ANALYSIS LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL A. Petitioner explains the applicable level of skill in the art as follows: As of June 24, 2010, a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would be a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, as well as two years of industry experience and who would have had a working knowledge of software security analysis, and dynamic malware analysis. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 8 (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See Ex. 2031 ¶¶ 15–16. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’872 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We begin with the claim language in view of the Specification, which weighs heavily against Patent Owner’s position that we should rewrite “computer system” as narrowly referring to a “computing device.” PO Resp. 24. As Petitioner notes, the ’872 patent’s Specification uses “computer system” to refer to a wide range of equipment, from a component of a computing device, to a whole computing device, to a collection of computing devices. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:5–8, 11:15–18, 16:50–55). In one example, the Specification refers to “one or more other computer systems (e.g., protected network devices 136).” Ex. 1001, 18:52–53. Thus, the Specification lists “protected network devices 136” as only an example of “other computer systems,” demonstrating that “computer systems” refers to things other than protected network devices. Although Patent Owner may be correct that this passage more than a single computing device,” we find that other disclosures in the ’872 patent do. Specifically, the Specification uses the language “distributed computer system” when referring to numerous components, including “protected network devices” and an “IDS/IPS system.” Ex. 1001, 3:26–28; Reply 10. In addition to showing that a “computer system” is not limited to a single computing device, this conveys that a “computer system” according to the ’872 patent can include an IDS/IPS.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the complete record, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to be more persuasive. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument and evidence that capturing detailed information like Goel’s activity sources, activity targets, and association was recognized as enhancing threat analysis. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79); see PO Resp. 55–59; Sur-Reply 15–17. Additionally, contrary to Patent Owner’s suggestion, we find that the Petition does not propose incorporating Goel’s kernel hooks into Capalik’s system. See Pet. 41–46. Patent Owner contends that the Petition’s reference to modifying Capalik by “adding lines of code” suggests implementing the code disclosed in Goel include kernel hooks. Id. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s assertion otherwise, this is an unpersuasive bodily incorporation argument, as the Petition never says an ordinarily skilled artisan would have used the exact lines of code from Goel in Capalik. Rather, the Petition says that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had sufficient skill to implement straightforward code modifications to identify activity sources, targets, and associations: a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that modifying Capalik’s system (e.g., Linux-based) to additionally monitor, identify, and store each individual activity of an attack including “activity sources, activity targets, and associations” would have required straightforward modifications to programs/code instructions, which would have been well-within the skillset of a [person of ordinary skill in the art]. Pet. 46. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not explain how an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Capalik without using kernel hooks. Sur-Reply 17. But Patent Owner does not cite any evidence to counter Dr. Jakobsson’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had the skill to apply Goel’s general teaching of identifying sources, targets, and associations to Capalik’s system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 182. On the whole, the evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position that the combination would have required substantially increased detection risk. Moreover, even if the combination would have somewhat increased detection risk, Petitioner persuades us that an ordinarily skilled artisan still would have had reason to combine the references teachings. Patent Owner’s allegations of increased detection risk do not negate the undisputed evidence that the combination would have provided the advantage of improved threat analysis. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175–182). Ultimately, Patent Owner’s that activity logging be undetectable.” PO Resp. 56 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 6). This exaggerates Capalik’s disclosure. Although the cited paragraph suggests that certain systems unfortunately may be detectable by some users, it does not convey that it is a requirement for the system to be categorically undetectable. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 6.8 In sum, Petitioner persuades us by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have been obvious to modify Capalik “to identify and store unauthorized activities including the activity source, activity target, and association of each activity.” Pet. 41–46; PO Resp. 55–59; Reply 20–22; Sur-Reply 15–17.” slip op. at 47

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner

    “arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner fails to sufficiently show a nexus between any of its objective indicia evidence and the claimed invention. See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists”). A showing of sufficient nexus is required to establish that the evidence relied upon traces its basis to a novel element in the claim, not to something in the prior art. Institut Pasteur & Universite Pierre Et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Objective evidence that results from something that is not “both claimed and novel in the claim” lacks a nexus to the merits of the invention. In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). Thus, establishing nexus involves a showing that novel elements in the claim, not prior-art elements, account for the objective evidence of nonobviousness. Id. As discussed above, Petitioner shows that Capalik teaches all limitations of claim 1. Petitioner persuades us that none of claim 1’s elements individually nor any combination thereof is novel over Capalik’s disclosure. Accordingly, claim 1 is not novel over Capalik, which disproves Patent Owner’s assertion of nexus. PO Resp. 73–76. Moreover, even if claim 1 were novel, Patent Owner otherwise fails to show nexus for its commercial success, praise, or copying assertions. Patent Owner’s evidence does not show that Petitioner’s commercial product embodies claim 1. For example, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “failed to analyze any meaningful detail regarding” how the Falcon Platform allegedly meets limitation 1(d). Reply 28–29. In particular, Patent Owner has not sufficiently addressed limitation 1(d) with the following argument: “1[D] The Falcon Platform transmitted to other computer systems” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 9,954,872 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,954,872
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board maintained its finding that claims 2 and 17 are unpatentable under §103 over Diekmann and Ma, and Suzuki and Ma.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Dependent claims 2 and 17 require an electron transport layer (ETL) that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “that is both n-doped and comprised of 8-hydroxy-quinolinolato-lithium (Liq). The district-court defendant’s first invalidity challenge relied primarily on Clix2, which lacked an n-doped ETL. Paper 48, 2, Paper 50, 3. Thus, the asserted combination required modifying Clix2’s non-doped ETL by adding an n-dopant. Clix2’s missing n-doped ETL appeared to be a focus at trial. See Ex. 2034, 917:1–18, 920:8–14. Here, in contrast, Petitioner proposed a more modest modification to materially different primary references, Suzuki and Diekmann, which both already have n-doped ETLs. See Paper 50, 2–3; Paper 54 8–9. As we explained in our Final Written Decision, because Patent Owner did not contest that Liq acts as an n-dopant in Ma, Petitioner’s combinations were obvious because they merely “substitute one known n-dopant for another to further the same goal of improving ETL conductivity.” Paper 54, 12. That simple-substitution analysis would not be the same when n-doping Clix2’s non-doped ETL. For this reason, we agree with Petitioner that the district-court Clix2-based combination “is a different combination with a materially different motivation-to-combine analysis,” as compared to the Diekmann/Suzuki and Ma combinations that are at issue here. Paper 50, 3.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 11,828,425 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,828,425
• Jumio Corporation v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00109 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine the references and failed to show the claimed different-distance image capture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 11–12. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’910 Patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’910 Patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that these reasons would not have adequately motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine and modify the references in Petitioner’s asserted manner to reach the claimed features. Petitioner’s motivations — “substitution,” “obvious alternative . . . approaches,” “use of a known technique,” and “complimentary” techniques — are all similarly based on swapping or adding techniques for verifying three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17; Pet. Reply 16–17. Those motivations might have been suitable had Tanii described techniques to verify three dimensionality, but Petitioner has not shown that Tanii describes any technique to verify three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17, 25–28. Instead, as discussed above, Tanii describes the existence of the perspective distortion phenomenon and a technique for correcting it. As such, substituting the knowledge that perspective distortion exists and techniques to correct it does not correspond adequately motivate Petitioner’s combination. Put another way, because Tanii does not teach an approach for verifying three-dimensionality, Tanii’s techniques cannot be used as a substitute for approaches that do verify three dimensionality simply because Tanii discloses the concept of perspective distortion.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 13 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Ex. 1005, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Ex. 1005, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject. Zhang also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Petitioner acknowledges as much stating “[a]lthough Zhang does not expressly say that the second image is captured at a second distance different from the distance of the first image, this would have been obvious to a POSITA.” Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1046). Because Zhang does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance, Petitioner once again relies on expert testimony to argue that the multiple images disclosed in Zhang would have been taken at different perspectives resulting from rotating or translating the position of the camera and that taking images at different distances would have enhanced Zhang’s homography-transformation procedure. Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1046). From here Petitioner repeats many of the same arguments it made regarding the parallax approach from Derakhshani, except that these arguments are on even weaker footing because Zhang does not mention taking images by translating the position of the camera, nor even that the multiple images taken should be from different perspectives. Each of these assertions are made solely on the basis of Petitioner’s expert testimony, and as such are not persuasive. Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1046). Petitioner’s argument that Zhang teaches capturing a second image at a second distance simply lacks sufficient support from Zhang’s disclosure.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,874,910 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,874,910
• Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00108 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations lacked adequate motivation to combine and did not teach capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 27–28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 13–14. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’938 patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’938 patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “images are three dimensional—let alone a technique that captures two images at different distances, compares the images for certain differences, and verifies three dimensionality based on those differences, as recited by the claim. Instead, Tanii describes a system that “corrects warp in which the perspective is exaggerated when an image is captured with the user’s face at close range.” Ex. 1007, code (57). In particular, Tanii recognizes the physical phenomenon of perspective distortion (fish-eye distortion) where “[i]f the image of the face of a person or the like is captured from a point that is relatively nearby, an image is obtained in which the perspective appears exaggerated,” i.e., the user image is warped or distorted. Id. ¶ 6; see id. ¶ 48, Fig. 4B. Tanii corrects such warped images by enlarging peripheral areas of the user image. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches: (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 12 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Derakhshani, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, instead, focused specifically on the use of the word “slid” in Derakhshani as indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Derakhshani, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,693,938 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,693,938

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.