- Embody, Inc. / Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. v. Lifenet HealthSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00249 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 4–8 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 4–6 as obvious over Huang2 and Kuo, and claims 7–8 as anticipated by Huang2; claims 2–3 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“(“POSITA”) “would be a Ph.D. student with a minimum of two years of experience in their faculty advisor’s laboratory” and would have an understanding of “electrospinning fibers, including for tissue engineering, tissue engineering techniques, and using/performing FFT analysis.” Pet. 20– 21 (citing Ex. 1003 § II.C7). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal but specifies the set of disciplines within which the Ph.D. would have been earned, namely “bioengineering, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related engineering discipline.” PO Resp. 6. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposal as clarified by Patent Owner regarding the Ph.D. discipline.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“At the outset, we agree with Patent Owner that the Specification purports to define “major peaks” in the following sentence: “The ‘major peaks’ herein refer to peaks higher than the average of the peaks in the result.” Ex. 1001, 13:28–29. We determine that this language satisfies at least two of the criteria set forth in Alnylam. Specifically, the sentence at “refers to” to explain what qualifies as major peaks. That is not the end of the inquiry, however, as we find there is still some ambiguity as to whether the patentee intended to define “major peaks” so as to require so-called “minor peaks” in the claimed invention. See Bell Atlantic, 262 F.3d at 1268 (“[T]he intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term.”). Importantly, the Specification does not treat the existence of minor peaks as prerequisites for the existence of major peaks. Indeed, the Specification does not discuss “minor peaks” at all. See generally Ex. 1001. Likewise, none of the claims of the ’227 patent, whether challenged or unchallenged, recites “minor peaks” or any additional peaks beyond the disputed “major peaks.” Id. at 23:30–24:42. Nor does the Specification include an example of FFT analysis results in which the average of the peaks therein is calculated and those higher than the average are identified as major peaks.8” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMixed
“Petitioner has the better position. Huang2 teaches crosslinking and provides a reason for doing so (stability). In particular, Huang2 states: “To better mimic skin ECM, electrospun collagen fibers have been fabricated, however, the rapid degradation and poor mechanical properties determine that either crosslinking or combination with other materials is necessary to obtain a stable scaffold.” Ex. 1005, 1791 (emphasis added). It is true that, in describing work actually carried out, Huang2 states that blending with PCL was performed and does not mention crosslinking. See id. at 1792 (“Nanofibrous matrices of PCL and Collagen at a weight ratio of 3:1 were fabricated using electrospinning as previously described.”). However, the prior art – here, Huang2 – is not limited to that which it describes having created. See In re Mills, 470 F.2d 649, 651 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (“a reference is not limited to the disclosure of specific working examples”); see also In re Lemelson, 397 F.2d 1006, 1009 (CCPA 1968) (“The use of patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions or to the problems with which they are concerned. They are part of the literature of the art, relevant for all they contain.”); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that a prior art reference is relevant for all that it teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art.”). Huang2 teaches two stabilization methods when using collagen in scaffolds. Huang2 states that one or the other “is necessary to obtain a stable scaffold” (when using collagen), but it does not preclude or teach away from using Patent Owner-cited testimony of Dr. Mikos is not as definitive as Patent Owner suggests; Dr. Mikos’s testimony is that a person of ordinary skill in the art “typically would not have done both.” Ex. 2015 ¶64 (emphasis added). The bottom line is that Huang2 teaches the person of ordinary skill in the art two ways to stabilize scaffolds/matrices comprised of collagen, provides a reason for doing so (stability), and does not teach away from using both. We are persuaded that a “scaffold comprising crosslinked fibers comprising collagen” would have been obvious in view of the cited teachings of Huang2.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Appellant’s citations to either reference. As discussed above, Petitioner’s Ground 1 is premised on a person of ordinary skill in the art altering the native flat sheet structure of Huang2 by rolling it into a jelly-roll structure as taught by Kuo. See Pet. 41 (Beginning its claim 2 arguments with the following: “Claim 1 is obvious for the reasons expressed above in § X.A., supra, which are incorporated herein.”); see also Pet. Reply 17 (“[B]ased on the explicit teaching of Kuo, a POSA would have been motivated to take the electrospun flat scaffold made by the techniques of Huang2, seed it with the desired cells, and roll it to treat a tendon and ligament.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the paragraphs of Kuo that Petitioner cites for disclosing “scaffold sheets,” explicitly describe rolling them into jelly-roll like structures. See Ex. 1018 ¶7 (stating that “the sheet is spirally contacting a scaffold sheet of fibrous material with a cell; and rolling the scaffold sheet in a jelly-roll like manner to form a spirally wound tissue construct”), ¶22 (describing a method comprising “forming a tissue construct by contacting a scaffold sheet of fibrous material with a cell; and rolling the scaffold sheet in a jelly-roll like manner to form a spirally wound tissue construct” and implanting it in a patient). Petitioner fails to argue that that “one or more elongated sheets” recited in claim 2 would encompass the rolled structure of its proposed modification. Nor does Petitioner articulate a claim construction argument that could support such an argument. Petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 2 would have been obvious over Huang2 and Kuo.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 11,318,227 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,318,227 - Embody, Inc. / Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. v. Lifenet HealthAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00248 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 5–12 are unpatentable as anticipated by Huang2; claim 4 is unpatentable as obvious over Huang2 and Kumbar. Lee grounds failed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of “electrospinning fibers, including for tissue engineering, tissue engineering techniques, and using/performing FFT analysis.” Pet. 18– 19 (citing Ex. 1003 § II.C5). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal but specifies the set of disciplines within which the Ph.D. would have been earned, namely “bioengineering, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related engineering discipline.” PO Resp. 5–6. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposal as clarified by Patent Owner regarding the Ph.D. discipline.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“A patentee “may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[A]ny special definition given to a word must be clearly defined in the specification.”), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “[T]he intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term.” Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Among the criteria to consider in whether the patentee acted as a lexicographer to define a claim term include (a) whether the patent specification included the statement in question under a section for marks, (c) whether the sentence uses the term “refer to,” which generally “conveys an intent for [that sentence] to be definitional,” and (d) whether there are other non-limiting terms (e.g., “for example,” or “include”) that contradict a definitional intent. Alnylam Pharms., Inc. v. Moderna, Inc., 138 F.4th 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (alteration in original). At the outset, we agree with Patent Owner that the Specification purports to define “major peaks” in the following sentence: “The ‘major peaks’ herein refer to peaks higher than the average of the peaks in the result.” Ex. 1001, 13:6–7. We determine that this language satisfies at least two of the criteria set forth in Alnylam. Specifically, the sentence at issue sets out “major peaks” in quotation marks, and then uses the term “refers to” to explain what qualifies as major peaks. That is not the end of the inquiry, however, as we find there is still some ambiguity as to whether the patentee intended to define “major peaks” so as to require so-called “minor peaks” in the claimed invention. See Bell Atlantic, 262 F.3d at 1268 (“[T]he intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“As discussed above, we agree with Patent Owner that the sentence it cites from the Specification of the ’223 patent bears sufficient hallmarks of lexicography. However, the Specification nonetheless lacks any indication that so-called “minor peaks” are a necessary component of the claimed invention. “Although it is firmly settled that an applicant may act as a 9 Figure 8B does not contain “major peaks” despite clearly depicting two “peaks higher than the average of the [three or possibly four] peaks in the result” because none of the peaks is a reflection of fiber alignment. 10 After presenting claim construction arguments based on Ayres 2008, Patent Owner confusingly states: “Finally, whether Ayres-2008 supports [Patent Owner’s] construction is irrelevant.” PO Sur-Reply 5 (emphasis added). definition that is contrary to the ordinary meaning of a claim term unless it communicates a deliberate and clear preference for this alternative definition.” Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). There is no indication that the patentee sought to require “minor peaks” within the scope of the claimed invention. Nor are we persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily understand the scope of the term “major peaks” to require non-major peaks. We interpret the Specification’s statement that “‘major peaks’ herein refer to peaks higher than the average of the peaks in the result” (Ex. 1001, 13:6–7) to be teaching a person of ordinary skill in the art how to identify or discern “major peaks,” which indicate a principal axis of alignment, from any non-major peaks, which would be caused by something else. We conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would consider “major peaks” as used in the ’223 patent as referring to peaks that reflect the sole axis or primary axis of fiber alignment. See, e.g., id. at code (54) (“ALIGNED FIBER AND METHOD OF USE THEREOF”), code (57) (“A scaffold comprising an aligned fiber.”), 1:6–7 (“The invention relates to an aligned fiber and method of use thereof.”), 1:11–12 (“The invention relates to a scaffold comprising an aligned fiber.”), 13:16–17 (“Alignment of the fibers in the scaffold may be measured by a fast Fourier transform (FFT) analysis.”). This would certainly include peaks materially higher than the average of the peaks in the result, but it would not be limited to situations involving peaks of different heights or require so-called minor peaks. Based on the totality of the evidence before us, we do not construe the claims to require non-major peaks.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Petitioner argues that, for the aligned sample, a major peak occurs at about 90° as identified by Petitioner’s annotation (red arrow). Pet. 30–31. As support, Petitioner directs us to Huang2’s explicit description of what the peak indicates, namely that “[t]he narrow peak of the normalized intensity values in anisotropic [aligned] matrices (Figure 1C) indicated that PCL/Coll nanofibers aligned along a single axis (Fig. 1B).” Id. at 31 (alterations in original) (quoting Ex. 1005, 1794). Patent Owner disputes that the illustrated peak is a major peak solely based on the lack of any lesser peaks. See PO Resp. 13 (“[T]he height of the sole peak is identical to—not higher than—the average height of the peaks in the result.”). As discussed above, however, we do not construe “major peaks” as requiring the existence of non-major peaks. We find that the illustrated peak in the Aniso plot of the FFT analysis results (Figure 1C) is a major peak within the meaning of the claim. The evidence in support of this finding is overwhelming. First, the term “Aniso” as used in Huang2 refers to fibers “with alignment.” Ex. 1005, 1792. Huang2 describes fabricating such matrices of aligned fibers with electrospinning, the same method used to impart alignment in the ’223 patent. Id. at 1791–92. Huang2 visually confirms that the fibers in fact are aligned via scanning electron microscopy. Id. at Fig. 1B. Further, Huang2 explicitly states that the peak illustrated in the Aniso plot of the FFT analysis results (Figure 1C) is caused by the fact that the “PCL/Coll nanofibers aligned along a single axis (Fig. 1B).” Id. at 1794. This is precisely what electrospinning may yield aligned fibers and images of aligned fibers will yield FFT results with major peaks. Ex. 1001, 2:18–19, 4:46–60, 13:16–26. Additionally, Huang2 itself considers the peak illustrated in the Aniso plot of the FFT analysis to be significant, stating: “In contrast [to the Aniso plot], the lack of a significant peak for the fibers collected on a stationary surface [(i.e., without electrospinning)] demonstrated no preferred fiber orientation in the isotropic matrices” (i.e., the Iso plot). Ex. 1005, 1794. Indeed, the asserted major peak in the Aniso plot shown in Huang2’s Figure 1C is higher than any other data point on the plot. For these reasons, we find the peak to be a major peak.15 Petitioner acknowledges that Figure 1C only reports its results” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,137,223 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · MarkmanPatents in suitUS 10,137,223 - Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 22, 2026 · IPR2024-00796 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Nevo and Avitabile, Young and Estabrook, and Young, Estabrook-1988, and Estabrook-1989.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). On its face, the language “energy transfer signal” does not specify any restrictions on the type of system in which it is utilized, nor its characteristics. In the context of claims 1 and 11, the “energy transfer signal” is the basis on which the “switch” operates, so as to “sub-sample and transfer energy from a first electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Ex. 1001, 50:63–65, 51:56–58. Accordingly, based on the claim language, the term “energy transfer signal” need only be a signal for operating a switch to sub-sample and transfer energy from an electromagnetic signal. That is its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“’686 patent broadly includes knowledge and experience as to RF circuit design. See supra § III.B. Petitioner contends that “Nevo’s transceivers [102a/102b] are for Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11,” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that both protocols “required down-conversion in their receivers to obtain a baseband signal.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:45–50; Ex. 1002 ¶ 118). Nevo’s disclosure would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to look to Avitabile, which provides the circuit level detail for down-converters. See Ex. 1006, Abstract. Avitabile specifically provides circuitry for down-conversion in the s-band frequency range, which is in the range of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 (2.4 GHz). Id. at Abstract, Figs. 6, 7. Accordingly, we determine a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to look to down-converters in the range of frequency needed, and would have been motivated to combine Avitabile’s teachings with those of Nevo, with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 55
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
Patent outcomesUS 7,483,686 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,483,686 - PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Everstar Merchandise Co., Ltd. v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · PGR2019-00056 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Remand
Claims 2–7, 9–19, 21–25, 27, 30, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious; Petitioner did not prove claims 8, 20, 26, 28, 29, and 32 unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan,” concluding “[n]othing more is required to establish a motivation to combine.” Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4. The Federal Circuit observed that “Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1,” and accordingly, “reverse[d] the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate[d] the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent,” remanding to us for further proceedings. Id. at 4–5. With those instructions in mind, we review the Petitioner’s allegations regarding claims 2–33.” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“F. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the First Final Written Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least two years of experience in the design of decorative lighting, or (2) at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and a basic familiarity with circuits used in decorative lighting.” Paper 40, 12. We see no reason to depart from that earlier determination.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties agree that we do not need to construe any claim terms. Pet. 8–9; PO Resp. 16–17. We likewise agree. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner did not dispute that the combined teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner, however, did dispute Petitioner’s proposed reasons for combining Kumada and Debladis ’120, and argues that Debladis ’120 is not analogous art. PO Resp. 36–61. The Federal Circuit stated that substantial evidence only supports the conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120. The factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan. Nothing more is required to establish a motivation to combine. Given that Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1, we reverse the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent. Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4 (internal citations omitted). The Federal Circuit further noted Patent Owner’s secondary considerations arguments as to claim 1 and stated [t]he cited evidence consists only of a temporal connection between the introduction of Willis’s invention and the UL 588 standards, and deposition testimony of a single witness who seemingly disclaimed any connection between the two. This is not sufficient to rescue a claim as to secondary considerations. Id. at 4, n. 5 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that claim 1 would have been obvious over Kumada and Debladis ’120. 6. Analysis of Independent Claim 33” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,222,037 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,222,037 - Texas Instruments Incorprated v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over DeMaw and, separately, over Macnally.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,496,342 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,496,342 - PTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · PGR2025-00043 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR of claims 1–44 on all asserted grounds after finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. A. Real Parties-in-Interest” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would be “someone with a graduate degree in organic chemistry, medicinal chemistry, pharmaceutical chemistry, or a related field, and four to six years of experience in the synthesis, purification, analysis, design, and/or formulation of pharmaceutical compounds and derivatives.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 21; Ex. 1033 ¶ 25). Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have worked with a team of professionals with training in related disciplines, such as pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, formulation, drug discovery and/or drug development as of the date of the claimed inventions.” Id. at 7–8.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner attempts to distinguish the scope of the claims between the related ’334 patent and ’391 patent, where the claims of the ’334 patent recite a “an endoxifen composition encapsulated in an enteric capsule.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Patent Owner contrasts this with the scope of the claims of the ’391 patent and contends that the challenged claims are directed to “the underlying composition itself, where the enteric material is an ingredient of the composition combined with the endoxifen.” Id. To support its contentions, Patent Owner attempts to apply the doctrine of claim differentiation across patents, noting that [t]he related ’334 describes a composition where the enteric requirement is not part of the composition, reciting “[a]n oral formulation comprising an endoxifen composition encapsulated in an enteric capsule.” EX2014, cl.1. In other words, the enteric aspect of the ’334 claims is not part of the composition itself. In contrast, the ’391 requires “[a] composition comprising an endoxifen and an enteric material.”” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“distinguish the preamble language reciting “[a] composition comprising an endoxifen and an enteric material” from Ahmad. Prelim. Resp. 13–16. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s arguments rely on Ahmad’s alleged disclosure of endoxifen encapsulated in enteric-coated capsules. Id. at 14. For example, Patent Owner contends that “every portion of Ahmad relied upon by Petitioner describes a ‘composition containing endoxifen’ that can then be coated with a separate external ‘enteric coating.’” Id. at 15. Patent Owner further contends that these disclosures fail to disclose an enteric material that is a component (with endoxifen) of the composition itself. At most, these disclosures purport to describe (1) a pharmaceutical composition of endoxifen (2) encapsulating the finished composition in a separate external enteric coating. See EX1003, 18:27-29 (“Enteric coating of capsules filled with composition art.”). Prelim. Resp. 15. Patent Owner therefore concludes that “Petitioner identifies no teaching in Ahmad that the enteric material is a component of the endoxifen composition, as claimed.” Id. at 16. Based on our preliminary construction of the term, “[a] composition comprising an endoxifen and an enteric material” discussed above, and, having considered the arguments and evidence presented by the parties at this stage of the proceeding, summarized above, we find that Petitioner has shown it is more likely than not that Ahmad discloses each limitation of claims 1 and 32 for the reasons stated in the Petition, which we adopt for purposes of this Decision. See Pet. 19–25; Ex. 1003, 2:24–40, 3:55–61, 8:47–63, 9:1–20, 11:17–23, 12:14–17, 18:19–29, 19:27–30; Ex. 1033 ¶¶ 54– 64. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claims 1 and 32 are anticipated by Ahmad.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,071,391 - PTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00799 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6, 16, 18, and 21 are anticipated by Liu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 of the challenged claims of the ’151 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“On the current record, we tend to agree with Patent Owner that the issues presented in this proceeding concern Liu’s alleged inherency and the Form I or XRPD limitations recited in the challenged claims, which are obviousness grounds asserted in PGR2023-00043. Prelim. Resp. 35. That said, the parties are invited to address the issue of whether collateral estoppel applies in this proceeding based on the Final Written Decision of PGR2023- 00043 during trial. Regardless of whether collateral estoppel applies, however, we determine for the reasons below that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge that at least 1 of the challenged claims of the ’151 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “all terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 10. Patent Owner does not propose construction of any terms. See generally Prelim. Resp. Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, we determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“H. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would be “someone with a graduate degree in organic chemistry, material science, medicinal chemistry, pharmaceutical chemistry, or a related field, and four to six years of experience in the synthesis, purification, analysis, design, and/or formulation of pharmaceutical compounds and derivatives.” Pet. 9. Petitioner also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have worked with a team of professionals with training in related disciplines, such as pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, formulation, drug discovery Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). To the extent the parties dispute the level of ordinary skill and its impact on the analysis of the challenged claims, we encourage the parties to address this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 11,261,151 - Exotec Product France SAS / Exotec North America Inc. et al. v. Opex CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00850 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–12, 14, and 23–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Raizer and Hangzhou.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Hangzhou’s disclosure of driving its auto-guided trolleys 200 under shelves 100 would improve the operation of Raizer’s system in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Hangzhou’s auto-guided trolleys or operating software into Raizer’s system, is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,472,632 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,472,632 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.