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  • Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
  • PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
  • PTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland and obvious over Nakagawa and over Nakagawa combined with Tanner.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering, materials science, polymer science, or equivalent coursework, at least a year of experience developing paper-based laminates involving the application of polymer coatings to a substrate, and the appropriate industry familiarity with biodegradability standards and degradability techniques [and] . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 50). Clearwater’s definition is uncontested, and we apply that definition here, as it accords with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the problems addressed in the specification of the ’126 patent. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “We have reviewed the cited testimony of Clearwater’s expert, including their calculations for arriving at a coat weight in Nakagawa that falls within the claimed range. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–33. We find that testimony, which is unrebutted, both credible and supported by the evidence of record. Thus, in light of Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the unrebutted testimony of Clearwater’s expert, we are persuaded that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each and every element of claim 1. See Pet. 45–54, 60–64. Clearwater also persuades us that Cleveland discloses the additional subject matter of dependent claims 2, 3, and 11. See Pet. 64–66. Thus, we determine that Clearwater demonstrates that claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. F. Ground 3—Obviousness Over Nakagawa and Tanner” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Inst. Dec. 4 n.5. We were persuaded by Clearwater’s proof that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (Ex. 1005) and that the provisional provides written description support for at least claim 1 of Cleveland. See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1006, 2–6, 9). We were also persuaded by Clearwater’s showing that the provisional provides written support for the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland. Id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–9). We are still persuaded by Clearwater’s showing. Thus, we see no reason to disturb our earlier finding that Cleveland is prior art to the ’126 patent.” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “protectant layers has “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2.” As noted by Clearwater, Cleveland discloses a total coat weight for layers 14 and 16 as falling within the claimed range. Pet. 32–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 32). In particular, Cleveland discloses that “the coextruded layer of copolyester (irrespective of which side of the substrate the layer is disposed) is of a total coat weight of between about 10 and about 40 lb/3000 ft2 in any combination of between about 80/20 to 20/80 parts by weight of Ecoflex to Biomax,” of which “a total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 is preferred.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 32. As disclosed, Cleveland’s total coat weight range of 10–40 lb/3000 ft2 falls almost entirely within the claimed range, and the preferred total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 falls squarely within the claimed range. Thus, Cleveland satisfies claim elements [1.3.2] and [1.5.2]. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art.”) (citation omitted). As such, we find that Clearwater adequately demonstrates that Cleveland discloses all the elements of claim 1. 4. Dependent Claims” slip op. at 12

    Patent outcomesUS 8,637,126 unpatentable
    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 8,637,126
  • Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Sep 21, 2026 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

    Claims 1–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst because the combination teaches the claim limitations and has motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “On February 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating the Second Final Decision as to all challenged claims and remanding for further proceedings. Netflix II, 7. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the claim construction the 6 The First Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42), where we granted-in-part, denied-in-part, and dismissed-in-part that Motion. See 1st Final Dec. 28–37. Our determinations on that Motion were a part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. As the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the First Final Written Decision, we determine our conclusions with respect to that Motion remain undisturbed. Federal Circuit adopted. Id. The Federal Circuit issued its mandate on March 23, 2026.” slip op. at 4

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in video streaming and media security or . . . a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in video streaming and media security.” Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–67). Patent Owner does not refute Petitioner’s assessment and appears to apply such a level of skill in its arguments against combining Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst to teach or suggest the elements of the challenged claims. See generally PO Resp. As such, we continue to adopt and apply Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision. See Inst. Dec. 6; 1st Final Dec. 6; 2nd Final Dec. 10.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “In response, we conclude that the most natural reading of limitation [l] results from examination of the entire limitation: “locating encryption information that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.” Ex. 1001, 27:54–57. The “within” most naturally connotes where the encrypted portions of frames of video occur, as opposed to determining where the encryption information may be located. Patent Owner’s interpretation is not wrong, i.e., the limitation could be read as Patent Owner suggests, leading to a narrower construction, but we are not persuaded that the construction of limitation [l] must be so limited, on the basis of the words themselves. We continue to reject Patent Owner’s interpretation that limitation [l] requires locating encryption information within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. See Inst. Dec. 27–30; 1st Final Dec. 8. Although it is apparent that encryption information can be found within the requested portions, we are not persuaded that the claim language or ’588 Patent implicitly or explicitly requires such a relationship. Likewise, although embodiments disclosed in the Specification of the ’588 Patent are consistent with Patent Owner’s more restrictive construction, the Specification also is consistent with the more grammatically correct construction as well. Thus, we construe limitation [l] as requiring that the encrypted portions of frames of video be within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, but we do not construe limitation [l] as requiring that the encryption information be within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We are persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix I, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17–19, 69–70). We agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41–15:60). We determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 30

    Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,225,588
  • PTAB · Sep 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00673 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of the asserted references, including Shin and Aoyama and Shimomura and Iwase.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther

      “1 SoundClear also filed a Contingent Motion to Amend that proposed to replace originally challenged claim 5 of the ’675 patent with proposed substitute claim 8. Paper 21. We, however, granted SoundClear’s request to withdraw its Contingent Motion to Amend and, as a result, the Contingent Motion to Amend will no longer be considered in this proceeding. Paper 30.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed

      “combination because (1) configuring Shin’s processor 120 accordingly “would have been trivial, involving straightforward changes to enhance the processor’s approach to simplifying and abbreviating its output”; and (2) this approach was well-known as evidenced by Ha’s disclosure of replacing “team meeting” and “date” with “schedules” based on the user’s environment.6 Id. at 27–28 (first quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 97, then quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 98) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102; Ex. 1011, Fig. 7).” slip op. at 33

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “4. Dr. Stern’s Testimony is Reliable In its Patent Owner Response, SoundClear contends that “Dr. Stern’s” slip op. at 125

    Patent outcomesUS 11,244,675 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,244,675
  • PTAB · Sep 2, 2026 · PGR2025-00021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20 are unpatentable: the Board found the asserted Kim, Kim–Yang, Lee, and Lee–Haller obviousness grounds proved, but not Lee–Park.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “(e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9. Based on our review of the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “The plain language of claim element [1.A] recites “wherein the first material layer is disposed over a first portion of the second material layer;” and claim element [1.B] recites “a landing pad disposed over a second portion of the second material layer.” Thus, the plain language of the claim merely recites that the first material layer is disposed over a first potion of the second material layer and the landing pad is disposed over a second portion of the second material layer. The plain language does not define what constitutes the first or second portions of the second material layer or define the first or second portions of the material layer by what is disposed above the layers. We agree with Petitioner that the term “portion” has a straightforward plain and ordinary meaning: a “part” of a larger whole. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1077, 406 (defining “portion” as “a part of a whole”)). The ’838 patent itself repeatedly uses the term “portion” this way. Ex. 1001, 5:40–43 (discussing both “an upper portion” and “lower portion” of a “staircase”), 5:66–6:1 (referencing “a portion of a top surface of a layer”); see also 4:39– 40, 7:15–17, 8:20–33, 8:34–65, 11:60–64, 12:38–59. Thus, we understand that the first and second portions of the second material layer are portions of (i.e., a part of the whole) second material layer. Neither the claims nor the Specification define what can constitute a first portion or a second portion of a second material layer.” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Patent Owner, however, with persuasive supporting testimony from Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60

    Patent outcomesUS 12,010,838 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 12,010,838
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00565 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Amazon showed they are anticipated by Shin; the Board did not reach Amazon’s contingent obviousness ground over Shin.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenOther

      “Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of claims 1–5 of the ’337 patent. For the reasons we identify below, we hold that Amazon has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that these claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelOther

      “2. Level of Skill in the Art In determining whether an invention would have been obvious, we” slip op. at 18

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, “all of the elements and limitations of the” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 11,069,337 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,069,337
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-01570 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

    The majority held claims 1–19 not shown unpatentable: Wang did not anticipate claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not render claims 11–19 obvious.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Patent is self-explanatory and would have been recognized by a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 10. “Petitioner submits that no special constructions are required” because “the claim terms appear understandable in the context of the disclosure provided by the specification of the ’690 Patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Patent Owner “agrees that the claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 10. After reviewing the arguments and evidence before us, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any claim term to resolve any controversy in the proceeding. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently establishes that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Wang by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12

    Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,788,690
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2026 · IPR2025-00437 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

    The majority held claims 1–19 not unpatentable: Wang did not establish anticipation of claims 1–10, and Wang with Xiong did not establish obviousness of claims 11–19.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Wang discloses that “the isolator 100 is bonded to the substrate by means of an adhesive” in which “[t]he adhesive is not only used to fix the isolator 100 to the substrate, but also fills a gap between the isolator 100 and the substrate to improve the installation accuracy of the isolator 100.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Petitioner does not explain how filling in a gap between the isolator 100 and a substrate necessarily results in “each of the plurality of optical isolators [being] disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other,” as recited in claim 1. The cited portion in paragraph 43 references Figures 5 and 6, which depict Embodiment 1 of Wang and are reproduced below. Figures 5 and 6 of Wang depict isolators 100, base 311, and baffles 312. Although paragraph 44 of Wang states that “[t]he substrate includes a base 311, and baffles 312 and isolators 100 sequentially disposed on the base 311,” Petitioner does not sufficiently persuade us how Wang’s disclosure “sequentially disposed” isolators necessarily discloses that the isolators are “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” as recited in independent claim 1. Ex. 1006 ¶ 44. Although the cited portion in Figure 6 of Wang apparently shows a possibly parallel arrangement of Petitioner cites to Dr. Kirk’s Declaration, but Dr. Kirk does not opine on why cited portions of Wang necessarily disclose or depict the claimed “disposed substantially in parallel relative to each other” requirement. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 74; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 41, 43, Figs. 6, 8, 10. At best, Dr. Kirk testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Wang anticipates Claim 1.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 75. Also relevant to our analysis is that this is an anticipation ground and Petitioner is required to show that the reference discloses not only the elements of the claimed invention, but also discloses those elements as arranged in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although our Institution Decision concluded that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to its anticipation challenge to independent claim 1 applying Wang (Inst. Dec. 6), at this stage of the proceeding we are required to evaluate Petitioner’s challenges under a higher standard, the preponderance of evidence standard. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “challenge set forth in the Petition by citing the background of the ’690 patent and Dr. Willner’s deposition testimony and characterizing the same as “admissions” of Patent Owner in Petitioner’s Reply, such “evidence” did not form the basis of Appellant’s original position set forth in the Petition.6 Petitioner’s arguments that all of the components recited in claim 11 “were known in the prior art” or that Dr. Willner admitted the same are unpersuasive at least because the Petition did not set forth this position. Contrary to Petitioner’s arguments during the oral hearing, the Petition does not present challenges based on “Applicant Admitted Prior Art.” See generally Pet.” slip op. at 23

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “field of the ’690 Patent would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study and (2) at least two years of experience with optical data communications or a comparable field of work.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that “[i]ndividuals having different educational backgrounds and supplemental experience might still be of ordinary skill in the art if such experience compensates for any deficiencies in education relative to the criteria stated above” and “[i]n some cases, additional education might be an acceptable substitute for some experience, or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art. See e.g., PO Resp. 9. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the disclosures of the ’690 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

    Patent outcomesUS 10,788,690 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,788,690
  • PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–11, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Dong did not disclose the claimed vertical wordline arrangement, and the proposed 3D NAND combination lacked support for motivation and reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “understanding that the claim term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end, as asserted by Petitioner. Inst. Dec. 17. In other words, the claim terms describing the first and second portions having word lines “from top to bottom” refer to the relative vertical location of the word lines within the memory portions and not to location of the word lines relative to the source or drain. Our construction is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the express language of the independent claims, which states that the second memory portion is formed either above or below the first memory portion. The forming of one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a top and bottom in relation to those portions. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion is on top relative to the first portion. Similarly, claims 1 and 1 and 11, which recite a memory having a second portion formed below a first portion, establish that the second portion is on the bottom relative to the first portion. Thus, the claim language itself establishes the vertical locations of the memory portions relative to each other (e.g., a second memory portion that is above the first portion is on top, relative to the first portion). It follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “In our Decision, we treated the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting, noting that these preambles provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim. Dec. 14–15, 8. Neither party disputes that the preambles of claims 5 and 11 are limiting. See PO Resp. 34–35 (agreeing that the preambles are limiting); see generally Reply 1–6 (not disputing that the preambles are limiting). We maintain our construction of the preambles in this Decision.” slip op. at 11

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (discussing pre-AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner, which Patent Owner did not contest. Inst. Dec. 13. Following institution, Patent Owner stated it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9 (citing Khatri Dec. ¶¶ 42–47). Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the ’941 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther

      “We disagree and find that Dong’s Figure 5a does not depict wordlines in a physical vertical orientation, but rather depicts voltage diagrams. We agree with Patent Owner’s argument, supported by persuasive testimony by Dr. Khatri, that a POSITA would have understood that Dong’s voltage charts (e.g., Fig. 5a) simply represent which voltages are applied to which word lines and do not depict the physical orientation of the wordlines. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 171 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 52–54). As Dr. Khatri explains, Dong Figures 5a–5h depict different examples of self-boosting modes showing voltages applied differently to the wordlines and are not intended to depict the physical orientation of these word lines. Ex. 2028 ¶ 171; see also Sur-reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 65, 63–67; Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 177–186). We agree with Dr. Kahtri’s persuasive testimony that a POSITA would understand that Figures 5a–5h are illustrated vertically, but do not represent the actual physical arrangement of the word lines in memory, which are shown to be horizontal in Dong’s Figure 4. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 172 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 45, 47, 87).” slip op. at 24

    Patent outcomesUS 11,568,941 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,568,941
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