- Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00545 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Neiss or Neiss and Hirasago; claims 7 and 16 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, mechanical engineering (including automotive engineering), civil engineering (transportation systems), physics, or a related field, and at least four years of experience (or the academic equivalent) in the field of transportation systems.” Pet. 2–3. Petitioner contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–19, 24–26; Ex. 1004). Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. We find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s interpretation of column 13, lines 40–44 of the ’161 patent to mean that a route may not have both an ending position or an intermediate position, but will have at least one of these positions. See PO Resp. 21. Patent Owner interprets “typically” in “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions” to apply to either “an ending position” or “any intermediate positions” (that is, an intermediate destination) but not to both. We see no grammatical reason to limit “typically” in this manner. Rather, the plain meaning of the quoted sentence suggests that, although not typical, a route may not contain an ending position, be that a final position or an intermediate position.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 or its dependent claims 3 and 6–9 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper. Petitioner relies on the same contentions regarding the identical language recited in independent claim 10 (see Pet. 93), and so, for the same reasons, has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 10 or its dependent claims 12, 13, and 15–18 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper.” slip op. at 36
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds.” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 8,972,161 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,972,161 - PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 10–12, 22–25, 28, 30, 32, and 33 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on March 28, 2025. Paper 7. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 20, 2025. Paper 9. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because, as pointed out by Petitioner, claim 1 does not recite limitations directed to the resolution of the source data of a frame that is to be combined “to provide an image having a relatively high resolution.” We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that claims should not be read to encompass prior art distinguished in the specification based on Patent Owner’s citations to the Background passages of the ’180 Patent. The cited passages disclose foveal image sensors for acquiring both a wide and narrow field of view and having smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region, resulting in sensors that have a high resolution only in the narrow field of view. Consistent with Petitioner’s observation (see Prelim. Reply 2–3), this cited passage at best distinguishes prior art foveal sensors with smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region. See Ex. 1001, 2:10–24. Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the prosecution history. Patent Owner does not direct us to persuasive absent any statements by the Applicant regarding that applied prior art, amounts to prosecution history disclaimer. Aside from declining to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction, for the purpose of institution we need not explicitly construe “combine data of a frame from at least one of the plurality of channels to provide an image having relatively high resolution,” as recited in claim 1. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. 3. Other claim terms and phrases Petitioner also proposes a construction for “data of a frame,” recited in claim 1. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not specifically address this claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. 23–30. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe “data of a frame” or any other claim term or phrase. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner proposes a similar level of skill in the art as Petitioner, namely, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 80). person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,916,180 - Tesla, Inc. v. The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy (Intellectual Ventures II LLC)Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00341 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Tesla had not shown a reasonable likelihood that claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Having considered the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Reply, and the Sur-reply, as well as the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 10, 11, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’743 patent. We accordingly do not institute inter partes review. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the areas of networking and distributed computing that are pertinent to the ’743 patent,” would “have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately 2-3 years of professional experience relating to distributed computing,” and that a “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex.1003, ¶¶ 32-34). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. B.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“of “event,” in which Petitioner argued that the term should be broad enough to include “processing radar sensor data, performing radar tracking initialization and refinement, and distributing radar tracking information to other modules,” and Patent Owner argued that the specification uses the term as “as an umbrella term to cover various types of ‘internal event and performance data’ such as ‘application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.’” Reply 1; Sur-reply 2. We agree with Patent Owner that that claimed “events” must concern “application statuses, states, performance, and internally detected errors.” See Ex. 1001, 7:44–45. The patent explains that function group 2 collects that type of information from applications using an API and then “correlate[es], combin[es], and reformat[s] [the] application data into higherlevel metrics (composite events) for use by displays or other Resource Management components.” Id. at 7:52–54. The middleware described and claimed in the ’743 is concerned with how applications are performing, not what they doing.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“This claim limitation, however, also requires “event correlation capabilities.” For that, Petitioner asserts that “Welch’s metrics calculation component (part of the ‘second function group’) provides ‘event correlation capabilities’ because the QoS management software “implementation includes the following capabilities: . . . (2) track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1003, 4). This, we find, mischaracterizes Welch’s disclosure, because Welch’s metrics calculation component does not perform the identified “correlation.” The language quoted by Petitioner comes from the experimental results section of Welch, which describes how the implementation of the NSWC HiPer-D testbed, the system that was used test Welch’s QoS middleware, included “track correlation and filtering algorithms.” Ex. 1005, 4. Welch is not explaining that the middleware correlates the QoS system level events that Petitioner has identified as the claimed “events,” but, instead, that the NSWC HiPer-D system that was used to test the middleware included the ability to correlate radar data in a shipboard anti-air-warfare system.6 The correlating mentioned in Welch occurs at the application level, not in the middleware.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,181,743 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, and 6–11 based on the asserted obviousness grounds over Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady, with or without Bertozzi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. The specification broadly states that the invention is “for assisting a motor vehicle guidance on the basis of image data” and raises “maneuvering trucks toward docking stations” as a “particular” application. E.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–8. Similarly, it refers to a docking station for trucks as a “typical destination” used only “for example.” Id. at 3:43–44. Patent Owner does not point to anything in the prosecution history that would inform the construction of “potential destination.” The intrinsic record does not support Patent Owner’s narrow construction. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we do not construe “potential destination” as limited to a fixed location. No other aspect of the construction affects our determination whether to institute.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have been motivated to use Huttenlocher’s pattern-matching technique as part of Broggi’s vehicle-detection method because Broggi suggests using a “traditional pattern matching technique.” Pet. 16–17. Further, Petitioner reasons, the combination would result in “improved vehicle detection and efficient use of processing resources.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1006, 23; Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). For the claimed storing step, Petitioner relies additionally on Brady. Id. at 54–56. Brady discloses a visual vehicle-tracking system that keeps “a vehicle log 102 of all vehicles currently within the scene, including vehicles’ associated track histories, inertial history 104 of the scene . . . and potential future track positions.” Ex. 1007, 11:21–26. Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have had reason to use Brady’s teachings as asserted because “Broggi omits implementation details how the associated data is processed and stored” and because the combination “would improve Broggi’s platooning through accurate and consistent tracking of the preceding vehicle positions used in the associated vehicle path determinations, thereby improving the user experience during platooning.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:21–25; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted
“Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Broggi as relating to platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Prelim. Resp. 21–38. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner proposed construction for “potential destination.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed potential destinations should be limited to fixed locations. See supra at 7–8 (§ II.B.1). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Although Patent Owner asserts that Broggi also does not calculate an “optimized path” as claimed (Prelim. Resp. 29–33), that argument similarly depends on a construction for “potential destination” that is limited to fixed locations. See id. at 31 (arguing that the “car taught in Broggi cannot calculate an ‘optimized path’” because it “has absolutely no knowledge of the destination for the platoon”), 32 (“[I]n Broggi, the ARGO does not calculate a path to a destination because it doesn’t have any knowledge regarding the destination of the preceding car.”). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because, as discussed, the challenged claims do not require an optimized path to a fixed location, but instead read on an optimized path to a transitory location, such as the location of Broggi’s preceding vehicle at a given time. We agree with Petitioner that Broggi teaches an optimized path because it generates steering commands that lead toward the preceding vehicle and because those commands consider the steered vehicle’s capabilities. See Pet. 34–35. Additionally, Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Huttenlocher as failing to disclose the claimed “mathematical tree structure.” Prelim. Resp. 38–62. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “mathematical tree structure.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed mathematical tree structure is limited to a single tree. See supra at 8–10 (§ II.B.2). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Huttenlocher’s tree structure. Patent Owner does not otherwise challenger Petitioner’s contentions based on Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and evidence, and conclude on the present record that Petitioner is likely to prevail with the unpatentability of claims 6–8 and 11. D. OBVIOUSNESS OVER BROGGI, HUTTENLOCHER, BRADY, AND BERTOZZI” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,805 - Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Newstrom’s database was not shown to be remote.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Dr. Morellas’s proposed definition or proffer a definition of its own. See generally PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2007 ¶ 43 (setting forth a substantially similar definition as Dr. Morellas). We find Dr. Morellas’s unopposed definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that claim 1 requires that a route from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination must be known. See PO Resp. 7. Initially, claim 1 does not recite “destination.” Instead, claim 1 recites only “determining a segment of a vehicle route.” Ex. 1001, 27:44 (emphasis added). Nor does the ’399 patent specification require the interpretation proffered by Patent Owner. Notably, the ’399 patent discloses that the power management device may rely on historical route information to optimize the energy used to travel each segment of a route. Ex. 1001, 17:39–43, 17:64–67. Such reliance on historical data beneficially reduces the amount of required computing power. Id. at 18:5–9. Under this approach, “the location of the vehicle is periodically determined” and “used to determine[] a historical segment corresponding to the current location.” Id. at 18:30–33 (emphasis added). If the vehicle has moved into a new route segment, the historical data is queried to determine the most efficient speed to travel for the current segment. Id. at 18:39–56. Thus, the ’399 patent explicitly discloses calculating and applying power to a vehicle based on the route segment in which the vehicle is currently traveling. See id. at 18:64–67 (“The flowchart shown in FIG. 5 illustrates a continuous process, in which the power management device can determine a probable optimal speed as the current segment changes (e.g., as the vehicle moves).”), Fig. 5. Furthermore, the ’399 patent explains that “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions.” Id. at 14:6–10 (emphasis added). Notably, the ’399 patent sometimes refers to the “entire route,” indicating that use of “route” in the claims does not necessarily mean the entire route. Indeed, the ’399 patent explains that, “[i]n some variations, the entire route (or the entire predicted route) may be divided up into N segments” and “[i]n some variations, probable optimal speeds may be identified for the entire route.” Ex. 1001, 14:38–39, 19:1–2 (emphases added). This strongly suggests that, in some other variations, the entire route is not divided into segments and optimal speeds are not identified for the entire route, further indicating that the recited “route” is not the entire path the vehicle will take. Therefore, we find that the ’399 patent contemplates routes that, although not typical, do not include an ending position. Moreover, to the extent a destination is required, the ’399 patent discloses that the destination can be derived based on the vehicle’s location or driving history, and there can be multiple “likely destinations” and the system can “continuously infer the vehicle’s destination” and the probable destination “may constantly change to revise the destination” while the vehicle is traveling along the route. Ex. 1001, 12:16–59. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, neither the claim language nor the specification of the ’399 patent requires the route be predetermined or extend from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki. Pet. 4–62. In support of its showing, Petitioner relies upon the Morellas Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record and determine that, for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–12, 15, 16, 19, and 20 would have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki and that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of these references.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“limiting, Hongo and Niki support Petitioner’s contentions. We determine that Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning as to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Hongo and Niki. See, e.g., Pet. 21–23 (arguing that the modification “would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success” and “Niki’s teachings and/or suggestions improve vehicle control in the Hongo vehicle”).” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,882,399 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,882,399 - Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00499 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–16 as obvious over Kudo-325 and Kudo-066, and claim 17 as obvious over those references and Tryon.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Thus, for all of the above reasons, we decline to construe “data, regarding multiple route segments” to require the data include information regarding the route the vehicle traveled between the starting and end points of the route segment. Rather, this is but one example of the type of data included within the scope of the claim. We further make final our preliminary finding that the claim explicitly allows for data, regarding a route segment to be stored in the memory at “different points in time along a route segment.” We determine that no other terms need to be construed. See Realtime” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“regarding route segments because it does not identify “what occurred—or what path the vehicle traveled—between the different nodes in Kudo 325’s transition state data.” PO Resp. 9. However, we have rejected herein Patent Owner’s implicit claim construction argument that such additional information is required. Though the exact the path traveled between a starting and end point is data regarding a route segment, the starting and end points are also data regarding a route segment. As acknowledged by Patent Owner, Kudo 325’s transition state data includes the starting and end points of route segments, as well as “a list of (or pointers to) all other nodes to which the vehicle previously traveled from that node.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 93). After our review of the evidence and arguments, summarized above, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination teaches or suggests “data, regarding multiple route segments,” and “data, regarding multiple sequences of route segments” as required by claim 1. d) Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Kudo- 325 and Kudo-066 teaches or suggests claims 1, 15 and 16.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“be motivated to implement Kudo-325’s historical accumulation database at the server. Pet. 73, 68, 70. Petitioner argues that Kudo-325 teaches that “a part of the functions that a car navigation system has may be provided in a server on a network.” Id. at 68 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 75). Petitioner further argues that doing so would beneficially allow remotely stored historical data to be accessible to multiple vehicles. Id. at 70 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 203). Petitioner argues that housing this information at the server is a known technique and would yield predictable results. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 204). Petitioner argues that Kudo-325 teaches storing sensor data samples including historical data at the historical accumulation database. Pet. 73–74 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 75, 78, 87–88, 90–92, 94, 96, Fig. 3; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 218–220). Petitioner further argues that “a POSITA would have understood data in the history accumulation database (historical data) to be provided to the car navigation system (present said historical data to said device) to enable generation of transition state information.” Id. at 74 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 221).” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 10,829,002 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,829,002 - PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Tesla showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Wallen and Berggren.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on April 7, 2025. Paper 6. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 27, 2025. Paper 8. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 9.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“establishes sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the combined teachings of Wallen and Berggren teach or suggest all of the limitations recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,206,670 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 on all four asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent, and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties’ dispute on this issue turns on claim construction. Petitioner’s approach requires we read “accumulation” as updating transmission power for each received TPC command. That is consistent with some aspects of the ’153 patent’s description. See Ex. 1001, 9:29–42 (“[S]tep is the magnitude of the amount added to an accumulator upon receipt of each TPC command. . . . [T]he transmit power PTx(k) may be updated each time a new TPC command is received.”). Patent Owner’s approach requires only that TPC commands cumulatively affect transmission power. That also appears consistent with the ’153 patent’s description. See id. at 9:35–36 (“The transmit power PTx(k) may be updated for every frame period.”). Based on those disclosures, it appears that the Specification supports Patent Owner’s broader construction. We need not resolve the “accumulation” claim-construction dispute at this stage, because Petitioner’s Zeira-based ground justifies institution, as discussed below. The parties should address the proper construction for “TPC command accumulation” in the instituted trial.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that the present record shows Andersson’s and Khan’s approaches couldn’t or wouldn’t be combined in the manner Petitioner asserts. Although shared-channel applications may have motivated Khan’s approach, it seems that scheduling grants applicable to a particular UE could be transmitted to that UE along with Andersson’s TPC commands. Thus, Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s prior-art combination on the present record. The additional record developed through trial may ultimately support Patent Owner on this point, but at present, this argument does not justify denial of institution. Patent Owner additionally takes issue with Petitioner’s asserted benefits such as “allowing for a larger number of active wireless units,” reducing complexity, and reducing latency. Prelim. Resp. 38 (quoting Pet. 26–27). Those disputes raise potential factual issues that are best resolved through trial.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,952,153 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 11–22 based on the Petition’s asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner submits that the asserted combination is unworkable and that skilled artisans would not have made it because Andersson’s DPCCH is a dedicated channel sent to a single UE, whereas Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants are sent using a shared channel—“a channel that is shared by the UEs attached to a particular base station.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Because Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants “are intended for different UEs that share the channel,” unlike Andersson’s TPC commands in a dedicated channel, Patent Owner asserts, “the two frame structures cannot be combined in the manner Petitioner suggests.” Id. at 20–21. Although Andersson describes “other bits” in its data structure, Patent Owner asserts that those “would necessarily be intended for the UE that the DPCCH is dedicated for” and would not work for Khan’s scheduling grants. Id.” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,706,500 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00218 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Kim and Vayanos combination did not show that each individual bit indicates a separate time interval, as required by claims 1–12.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“limitation 1.2 because it is more consistent with the claim language and the specification of the ’416 patent. The language “each of the plurality of bits” clearly individualizes the “plurality of bits” and the language “indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels” clearly ascribes to each individual bit the function of identifying a time interval that is separate from the time interval(s) that the other individual bit(s) identify. Petitioner’s claim constriction argument largely ignores the words used in limitation 1.2. Petitioner fails to provide anything to explain how or why the plain meaning of “each” and “respective” in the context of limitation 1.2 could be understood by a skilled artisan to connote something other than the plurality of bits individually identifying a separate and distinct time interval (i.e., a “one-to-one correspondence”). Petitioner similarly does not identify anything from the specification of the ’416 patent that would support deviating from the plain meaning of limitation 1.2. And Petitioner’s reliance on 3M Innovative Properties appears to miss the mark. Pet. Reply 7. In that case, the Federal Circuit held that, when a claim term has an “ascertainable definition in the body of the claim,” their “cases do not support prescribing a more particularized meaning unless a narrower construction is required by the specification or prosecution history.” 3M Innovative Properties Co., 725 F.3d at 1329. Here, however, Patent Owner is not attempting to import a more particularized meaning into limitation 1.2, but to demonstrate that the ’416 specification is consistent with the ascertainable definition of “each” and “respective” within the context of limitation 1.2. In particular, Patent Owner highlights that the ’416 specification describes the resource allocation technique as using an indicator bit, within a plurality of indicator bits, that has a one-to-one correspondence to a specific time window established for a Forward Access Channel (FACH). See Ex. 1001, 13:63–14:25, 14:44–53, Figs. 7, 9; PO Resp. 11–14, 19–20; PO Sur-reply 2–3; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 36–40, 49. And we agree that the ’416 specification informs, and is consistent with, the plain reading of limitation 1.2. See Ex. 1001, 13:63–14:25, 14:44–53, Figs. 7, 9. Therefore, we determine that the plain and ordinary meaning of limitation 1.2 requires all the plurality of bits to individually identify a separate and distinct time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“PICH, which is communicated to Kim’s receiver, has a plurality of bits, the evidence fails to demonstrate sufficiently that each of those bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels, as limitation 1.2 recites. As Patent Owner correctly argues, the Vayanos paging indicators use multiple bits to indicate information about a single time interval in a frame, rather having several bits that individually identify a separate and distinct time interval. PO Resp. 39–41 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 67, 74–75). Vayanos teaches that “[t]he number of paging indicators (Np) in each PICH frame is configurable by the system and can take on a value of 18, 36, 72 or 144,” and that “[e]ach paging indicator is sent in 288/Np consecutive bits in the PICH frame, where 288/Np can take on a value of 16, 8, 4 or 2.” Ex. 1006, 3:26–34. As a result, if there are 18 (Np = 18) paging indicators, 288/NP = 288/18 = 16 (meaning that each paging indicator is 16 bits long), if there are 36 (Np = 36) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/36 = 8 (meaning that each paging indicator is 8 bits long), if there are 72 (Np=72) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/72= 4 (meaning that each paging indicator is 4 bits long), and if there are 144 (Np=144) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/144 = 2 (meaning that each paging indicator is 2 bits long). Ex. 2001 ¶ 66. Each paging indicator (singular) taught by Vayanos includes multiple bits––each paging indicator (singular) has either 16, 8, 4 or 2 bits–– and Vayanos does not disclose or suggest a paging indicator that indicates a time interval with only a single bit. Id. And Petitioner does not cite Kim to show the number of bits used to indicate a time interval; only to show that a UE would receive broadcast information with paging information including paging indicators that identify a time interval in which physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. See Pet. 40–49. Even accepting that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses a UE receiving a paging indicator that is indicative of a time interval in which a Paging Channel PCH may be found or indicative of whether a frame will include a signaling channel (e.g., PCH) at a specific TTI within that frame, the combination does not disclose or suggest using a paging indicator that is a single bit indicating either of those time intervals. On the contrary, as noted above, Vayanos teaches that all paging indicators consist of multiple bits and, thus, the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses a UE that only receives and uses a plurality of bits to indicate a time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This is insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will be able to establish that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses or suggests receiving a plurality of bits wherein the individual bits each identify a separate and distinct time interval. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses or suggests the subject matter limitation 1.2 recites. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Vayanos disclose or suggest broadcast information that includes a plurality of bits, wherein each of the plurality of bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1 and 7 (in the asserted Grounds 1 and 2) and, as a result, the same deficiency extends through to all of the dependent claims challenged in all of the grounds.4” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Vayanos disclose or suggest broadcast information that includes a plurality of bits, wherein each of the plurality of bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1 and 7 (in the asserted Grounds 1 and 2) and, as a result, the same deficiency extends through to all of the dependent claims challenged in all of the grounds.4 IV. CONCLUSION Based on the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’416 patent challenged in the Petition. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,136,416
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.