- Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - Altria Client Services LLC v. Yiwu Jingangke Trading Co., Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 1, 2026 · PGR2026-00035 · APJ Robert L Kinder · PGR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner for abandoning the contest and canceled the sole challenged claim.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Pursuant to our rules, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4). Our prior order warned that a failure to respond would be construed as an abandonment of the contest under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), and that entry of judgment adverse to Patent Owner and cancellation of the challenged claim may follow. Show Cause Order, 2. Because Patent Owner did not respond by the September 15, 2026, deadline and has not entered an appearance in this proceeding, we determine that Patent Owner has abandoned the contest. Under these circumstances, we enter judgment adverse to the Patent Owner and cancel the challenged design claim.” slip op. at 2
None - Clearwater Paper Corporation v. Graphic Packaging International LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland and obvious over Nakagawa and over Nakagawa combined with Tanner.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering, materials science, polymer science, or equivalent coursework, at least a year of experience developing paper-based laminates involving the application of polymer coatings to a substrate, and the appropriate industry familiarity with biodegradability standards and degradability techniques [and] . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 50). Clearwater’s definition is uncontested, and we apply that definition here, as it accords with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the problems addressed in the specification of the ’126 patent. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We have reviewed the cited testimony of Clearwater’s expert, including their calculations for arriving at a coat weight in Nakagawa that falls within the claimed range. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–33. We find that testimony, which is unrebutted, both credible and supported by the evidence of record. Thus, in light of Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the unrebutted testimony of Clearwater’s expert, we are persuaded that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each and every element of claim 1. See Pet. 45–54, 60–64. Clearwater also persuades us that Cleveland discloses the additional subject matter of dependent claims 2, 3, and 11. See Pet. 64–66. Thus, we determine that Clearwater demonstrates that claims 1–3 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. F. Ground 3—Obviousness Over Nakagawa and Tanner” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Inst. Dec. 4 n.5. We were persuaded by Clearwater’s proof that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (Ex. 1005) and that the provisional provides written description support for at least claim 1 of Cleveland. See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1006, 2–6, 9). We were also persuaded by Clearwater’s showing that the provisional provides written support for the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland. Id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006, 1–9). We are still persuaded by Clearwater’s showing. Thus, we see no reason to disturb our earlier finding that Cleveland is prior art to the ’126 patent.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“protectant layers has “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2.” As noted by Clearwater, Cleveland discloses a total coat weight for layers 14 and 16 as falling within the claimed range. Pet. 32–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 32). In particular, Cleveland discloses that “the coextruded layer of copolyester (irrespective of which side of the substrate the layer is disposed) is of a total coat weight of between about 10 and about 40 lb/3000 ft2 in any combination of between about 80/20 to 20/80 parts by weight of Ecoflex to Biomax,” of which “a total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 is preferred.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 32. As disclosed, Cleveland’s total coat weight range of 10–40 lb/3000 ft2 falls almost entirely within the claimed range, and the preferred total coat weight of 25 lb/3000 ft2 falls squarely within the claimed range. Thus, Cleveland satisfies claim elements [1.3.2] and [1.5.2]. See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[W]hen, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is anticipated if one of them is in the prior art.”) (citation omitted). As such, we find that Clearwater adequately demonstrates that Cleveland discloses all the elements of claim 1. 4. Dependent Claims” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,637,126 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 2, 2026 · PGR2025-00021 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–7, and 12–20 are unpatentable: the Board found the asserted Kim, Kim–Yang, Lee, and Lee–Haller obviousness grounds proved, but not Lee–Park.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further contends that a “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9. Based on our review of the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“The plain language of claim element [1.A] recites “wherein the first material layer is disposed over a first portion of the second material layer;” and claim element [1.B] recites “a landing pad disposed over a second portion of the second material layer.” Thus, the plain language of the claim merely recites that the first material layer is disposed over a first potion of the second material layer and the landing pad is disposed over a second portion of the second material layer. The plain language does not define what constitutes the first or second portions of the second material layer or define the first or second portions of the material layer by what is disposed above the layers. We agree with Petitioner that the term “portion” has a straightforward plain and ordinary meaning: a “part” of a larger whole. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1077, 406 (defining “portion” as “a part of a whole”)). The ’838 patent itself repeatedly uses the term “portion” this way. Ex. 1001, 5:40–43 (discussing both “an upper portion” and “lower portion” of a “staircase”), 5:66–6:1 (referencing “a portion of a top surface of a layer”); see also 4:39– 40, 7:15–17, 8:20–33, 8:34–65, 11:60–64, 12:38–59. Thus, we understand that the first and second portions of the second material layer are portions of (i.e., a part of the whole) second material layer. Neither the claims nor the Specification define what can constitute a first portion or a second portion of a second material layer.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner, however, with persuasive supporting testimony from Dr. Giapis, argues Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lee requires a POSITA to (1) start with an oxide-based insulating layer 22 as shown in Figure 5B of Lee, (2) introduce an oxidant gas into the adjacent openings, and (3) oxidize a surface that is already oxide-based to form a curved surface. PO Resp. 78–81. Patent Owner provides credible evidence supporting its argument that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make these changes to Lee, as they are technically infeasible. Id. at 79 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 191–208). Dr. Giapis credibly explains that in Park’s process, an oxygen gas would be used to oxidize the silicon nitride or polysilicon, but “introducing such an oxidant into the openings of Lee’s structure above will not promote further oxidation to the existing oxide the relevant region . . . so nothing remains to be oxidized.” Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 192–193. We credit Dr. Giapis testimony that “[i]t is not possible to further oxidize a solid oxide material with oxygen gas as in Park. That is why Park’s thermal oxidation process is performed on silicon nitride or polysilicon, which are not oxides to begin with but they can be oxidized to form silicon dioxide.” Id. ¶ 193 (citing Ex. 2028 (Plummer) at 345–350). According to Dr. Giapis, a POSITA would have understood this and not expected the combination of Lee and Park to achieve any change in shape or any rounding in Lee’s Figure 5B. Ex. 2019 ¶ 193.” slip op. at 60
Patent outcomesUS 12,010,838 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 12,010,838 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00190 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–11, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Dong did not disclose the claimed vertical wordline arrangement, and the proposed 3D NAND combination lacked support for motivation and reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“understanding that the claim term “from bottom to top” refers to the vertical arrangement of word lines in the memory portions from bottom to top and not from source end to drain end, as asserted by Petitioner. Inst. Dec. 17. In other words, the claim terms describing the first and second portions having word lines “from top to bottom” refer to the relative vertical location of the word lines within the memory portions and not to location of the word lines relative to the source or drain. Our construction is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the express language of the independent claims, which states that the second memory portion is formed either above or below the first memory portion. The forming of one memory portion above or below another portion establishes a top and bottom in relation to those portions. For example, claim 5 is directed to a “program method of memory” that requires a second portion formed above the first portion. A second memory portion that is formed above a first memory portion is on top relative to the first portion. Similarly, claims 1 and 1 and 11, which recite a memory having a second portion formed below a first portion, establish that the second portion is on the bottom relative to the first portion. Thus, the claim language itself establishes the vertical locations of the memory portions relative to each other (e.g., a second memory portion that is above the first portion is on top, relative to the first portion). It follows that claim terms referring to the top and bottom of word lines within the memory portions also refer to relative vertical locations of the word lines within the memory portions. Thus, we understand the plain and ordinary meaning of claim” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“In our Decision, we treated the preambles of claims 5 and 11 as limiting, noting that these preambles provide antecedent basis for the word line limitations recited in the body of their respective claim. Dec. 14–15, 8. Neither party disputes that the preambles of claims 5 and 11 are limiting. See PO Resp. 34–35 (agreeing that the preambles are limiting); see generally Reply 1–6 (not disputing that the preambles are limiting). We maintain our construction of the preambles in this Decision.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we consider the level of ordinary skill at the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (discussing pre-AIA obviousness). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND memory devices (including issues relating to the operation, e.g., programming, of said devices), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience). Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 40–42). Petitioner also asserts that a POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about NAND memory’s structure and fabrication, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner, which Patent Owner did not contest. Inst. Dec. 13. Following institution, Patent Owner stated it does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. PO Resp. 9 (citing Khatri Dec. ¶¶ 42–47). Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the ’941 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther
“We disagree and find that Dong’s Figure 5a does not depict wordlines in a physical vertical orientation, but rather depicts voltage diagrams. We agree with Patent Owner’s argument, supported by persuasive testimony by Dr. Khatri, that a POSITA would have understood that Dong’s voltage charts (e.g., Fig. 5a) simply represent which voltages are applied to which word lines and do not depict the physical orientation of the wordlines. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 171 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 20; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 52–54). As Dr. Khatri explains, Dong Figures 5a–5h depict different examples of self-boosting modes showing voltages applied differently to the wordlines and are not intended to depict the physical orientation of these word lines. Ex. 2028 ¶ 171; see also Sur-reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 47, 65, 63–67; Ex. 2028 ¶¶ 177–186). We agree with Dr. Kahtri’s persuasive testimony that a POSITA would understand that Figures 5a–5h are illustrated vertically, but do not represent the actual physical arrangement of the word lines in memory, which are shown to be horizontal in Dong’s Figure 4. See, e.g., Ex. 2028 ¶ 172 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 45, 47, 87).” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,568,941 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,568,941 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00228 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9–18 as obvious over Kim; claims 1–18 over Kim and Fang; claims 1–15 over Han and Fang; and claims 17–18 over Han, Fang, and Chen.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. PO Resp. 7–8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’276 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Campbell has a Ph.D. in physics, supplying the advanced degree that Petitioner’s definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art accepts as a replacement for some experience. Ex. 2006 ¶ 2. Dr. Campbell has significant experience in semiconductor technology, including in process technologies for submicron CMOS, years of research in semiconductor processing, materials, and device structures, and authored “[t]he leading textbook on semiconductor technology.” Id. ¶¶ 2–4. Dr. Campbell qualifies as a person of ordinary skill in the art under the parties’ agreed definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner proposed that the terms “exposing portions” and “etching the exposed portions” require two different steps performed in that order. PO Resp. 7–10. Petitioner does not contest this characterization. Pet. Reply 1– 2. Patent Owner also proposes that this requires the exposure step not to perform any etching of the newly exposed layer. PO Resp. 10–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:2–5, 10:15–17 (stating that the etch-stop layer “protects the underlying structure until all the VIA openings 640 are formed” and that it “[t]he essence of an etch-stop layer dictates that contact-hole etching stops or slows down upon contact, i.e., exposing without penetrating it.” Pet. Reply 11. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“described in earlier embodiments would not be consistent with Kim’s statement that previously described elements are “omitted” in the Figures 17A to 22B section “for concise description.” As admitted by Patent Owner, it would be a “reasonable inference” that materials described in a first embodiment for a particular hypothetical layer L would also be used for that layer L in later embodiments absent an express statement to the contrary “because you have just omitted that sort of duplicative description.” Tr. 37:9–38:12. Kim’s Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4–15 embodiments. Thus, it would similarly be a “reasonable inference” that aspects of the stack structure would be understood to apply to the same stack in the embodiments of Figures 17A–22B, which rely upon, in unaltered form, the earlier-described elements of the stack. stack on bottom, they “replace” and “exclude” any prior description of a gate-stack-on-top. PO Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 40–41; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 185–187 (describing the etch-stop layer as covering the sacrificial layers only at their end portions)). However, as admitted by Patent Owner, all of Kim’s Figures show only a gate-stack-on-bottom structure. Tr. 41:6–7 (“For the first embodiment, it is true that figures show the gate stack on bottom.”). The fact that Kim’s Figures 17A–22B, which add etch-stop and barrier layers to the gate stack, are shown only as gate stack on bottom is merely consistent with the uniform use of gate-stack-on-bottom in Kim’s Figures, which show the layer-by-layer construction of its device. Like Figures 4–15, Figures 17A–22B exemplify rather than limit the description of the previously described memory stack, and do not exclude the gate-stack-onbottom description of the memory stack. Kim can be used for all it realistically teaches, including descriptions in its disclosure that are not represented by specific Figures. See In re Chapman, 357 F.2d 418, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (stating that a reference “is not limited to the disclosures in its specific illustrative examples.”). Accordingly, the record supports Petitioner’s assertion that Kim’s teaching of a gate-stack-on-top alternative for the memory stack would be understood by a POSITA as a memory stack option applicable to its other embodiments having that same memory stack.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 11,101,276 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,101,276 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00191 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; Petitioner did not show claims 6, 9, 10, 13–18, and 20 unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at the critical time “would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶34–38). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, how it is manufactured, and its component parts.” Id. Patent Owner does 5 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 100; PO. Resp. circuit design. PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2021 ¶ 35). Neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Campbell considers the obviousness of the claims to turn on the precise definition of the level or ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 2021 ¶ 35. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’322 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any express claim construction. Pet. 27 (stating claims should receive their “plain and ordinary meaning”); PO Resp. 10 (stating that Petitioner’s challenges fail “under any reasonable construction”). In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We determine that such a configuration would be neither inoperable nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“nor significantly undesirable. Dr. Campbell testified that he does not argue that this configuration would be inoperable. Ex. 1106, 74:12–17; Ex. 2021 ¶60. Dr. Lee testifies that this configuration is “consistent with Nishikawa[123]’s Figure 14B.” Ex. 1105 ¶ 13. Dr. Lee further testifies that this configuration would not necessarily require a larger footprint, but instead, “could simply replace the trenches, abutting the device edge.” Id. Dr. Campbell testified that if the circular TAC replaced the rectangular trench, “I don’t know what it would be or exactly where it would be,” and therefore, “I can’t say what the size of the red circle would have to be.” Ex. 1106, 83:19–84:3. Therefore, the record does not support finding a circular TAC to have a larger footprint. Absent a larger footprint, there is no evidence that the end-connected TAC would be undesirable.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 11,581,322 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,581,322 - Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00175 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish that Usui’s interconnect structure or Yu’s metal gate stacks satisfy the construed “electrode stack” limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design,” and “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In the Institution Decision, we adopted the assessment offered by Petitioner. Dec. 6–7. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’562 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“comprises the recited metals and has the recited thickness, which forms an electrical contact for use on a semiconductor device generally or a group III- V semiconductor in particular. This is consistent with our determination that “electrode stack” is a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device We disagree with Patent Owner that “electrode stack” as used in the challenged claims should be limited to the specific electrodes shown in the embodiments described in the Specification. See PO Resp. 4–9. Although the Specification describes embodiments using source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes as electrical contacts, we see no reason to construe the term “electrode stack” itself to be limited to these components as Patent Owner proposes. Claims 1 and 13 expressly recite that electrode stacks comprise the claimed “electrical contact,” without expressly including or precluding any specific type of electrode. Ex. 1001, 5:54–63, 6:37–47. The Federal Circuit advises that the Specification “is not a substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language. ‘Specifications teach. Claims claim.’” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). The Specification does teach electrical contacts that include source, drain, and Schottky gate electrodes, but claims 1 and 13 are directed to electrical contacts that are not expressly so limited. Patent Owner’s proposed construction would effectively rewrite the claim by adding limitations, which we decline to do under the guise of claim construction. See id. (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the claim term “electrode stack” to mean “a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.”” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Piner testifies, with evidentiary support, that interconnects (such as Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure) and electrical contacts (such as that claimed in the ’562 patent) are not the same thing. See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 63–70. For example, Dr. Piner explains: In other words, not all metals in a semiconductor device have the same purpose and could not be said to be interchangeable. By August 2009 it was well known to a POSA how to discern if a metal component in a transistor is an interconnect or serves as an electrical contact such as a gate contact or ohmic contact, based on the structure and functionality of the metal component. For example, interconnects are made up of metal strips and are deposited on insulators. EX-1011 (Mishra) at 216. Interconnects are low resistance conductors that can carry very high current densities. Id., 216, 217. Unlike Schottky contacts and ohmic contacts, interconnects do not provide non-linear IV response like Schottky contacts nor inject electrons and holes into semiconductors like ohmic contacts. Id., 218. As many of the references cited by Dr. Zhao illustrate, electrical contacts had their own highly complex design challenges. EX-1008 (Pearton), 41-59 (Pages 53-71 of 383) (discussing electrical contacts); EX-1017 (Kramer), 11-126 (Pages 18-130 of 151) (same). And while Dr. Zhao cites these as supporting a POSA’s knowledge of an electrical contact, none of these references describe electrical contacts as interconnects. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Piner further testifies that Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure is an interconnect, and not an electrical contact, because “Usui states that ‘[t]he structures fabricated by the process of the present invention are especially useful for forming electrical connections or wiring such as between active and/or passive devices of an integrated circuit structure.’” Id. ¶ 148 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:11–14) (alteration in original); see also id. ¶¶ 150– 151 (Dr. Piner testifying that Usui’s interconnect metallization structure is not an “electrode stack” under a broad definition of electrode). Dr. Piner’s testimony in this regard rebuts Petitioner’s and Dr. Zhao’s conclusory assertions to the contrary.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device.” Thus, Petitioner must show that Usui’s layers 13–15, 18, and 19 provide a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. After reviewing the complete trial record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has done so. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Zhao to support its contention that the identified layers in Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure form an “electrode stack including a plurality of metal layers and a capping layer formed over said plurality of metal layers” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Zhao, however, provide adequate explanation or evidence as to why Usui’s interconnect metallurgy structure forms an “electrode stack,” i.e., a conductor that provides a path for current entering or leaving a medium such as a semiconductor device. Dr. Zhao’s testimony merely repeats the disclosures in Usui and concludes, without further technical detail, explanation, or reference to objective evidence, that Usui’s Figure 8 discloses an electrode stack. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 89–91. Dr. Zhao’s testimony sets forth Petitioner’s conclusory assertions as though they are facts, rather than setting forth facts and evidence in support of those assertions. Compare id. with Pet. 11–12. Absent underlying facts or evidence to support Dr. Zhao’s opinion, the cited testimony “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential).” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,686,562 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,686,562 - Luxottica Of America, Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
NonePatents in suitUS 11,971,612 - Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00094 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted obviousness ground because Petitioner failed to establish the proposed modifications and combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, and because it appears to be consistent with the ’003 patent and the asserted prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes construing any claim terms. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 1–76. In addition, as discussed below, we are able to determine the outcome of this proceeding without expressly construing any terms. Thus, we do not construe any terms for the purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“challenged claim. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–419. On the other hand, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418; accord In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, a petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, a petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the prior art references. In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In determining whether there would have been a motivation to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention, it is insufficient to simply conclude the combination would have been obvious without identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art would have made the combination.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In arguing for the obviousness of claim 1 over the combination of Bonn and Mizuta, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bonn to perform high-frequency signal amplification. Pet. 19–25. In particular, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify the circuit of Figure 1 [of Bonn] and use Figure 7’s structure for high frequency signal amplification in place of mixer 40,” followed by additional modifications to the circuit of Figure 1. Id. at 22–25. These additional modifications include removing LO port 55, removing FET 20 (along with voltage source 80, capacitors 16, 26, and 34, resistor 18, and inductors 22 and 24), removing capacitor 34 and shorting gate structure 324 to ground, and removing resistors 46 and 48 and shorting terminal 51 to ground. Id. According to Petitioner, the motivation for these modifications was that “Bonn . . . teaches using its dual gate structures for signal amplification without signal mixing.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:26–37). On the record developed at trial, we disagree. Bonn does, as Petitioner argues, teach that “the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored to provide superior performance over the prior art dual gate FET structures in high frequency signal mixing as well as other applications such as high frequency signal amplification.” Ex. 1006, 11:33–37. But the tailoring that Bonn refers to relates to changes to the structure of the field-effect transistor itself, not to the circuitry surrounding that transistor. Id. (teaching that the reason that “the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored” is that “the parameters such as gate width, dopant concentration, and channel depth, under each gate of the dual gate FET are individually adjusted for optimum performance”). Thus, although Bonn might have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to have made changes to the dual-gate FET itself, we are not persuaded that it would have motivated the additional changes to the circuit of Bonn’s Figure 1.” slip op. at 11
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Mishra’s Figure 5 is a second gate in favor of a new position. Petitioner’s new argument is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to connect the field plate of Mishra’s Figure 5 to the source instead of the gate, converting the field plate into a second gate. Compare Pet. 83 (equating “drain side gate” with “field plate 66, Figure 5”), 86–88 (identifying field plate 66 as a “second gate”), with Reply 21–22 (identifying only the embodiment of Mishra’s Figure 10 as a source-connected field plate), 22–23 (arguing that Mishra teaches that the Figure 5 embodiment “could be arranged as ‘a single transistor with a dual gate structure’”). Although “the introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in inter partes review trial proceedings,” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. LP v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the shifting of arguments is not, Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Petitioner’s change of arguments here is inappropriate. Moreover, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s inappropriate new argument, we would conclude that Petitioner does not support the argument with sufficient evidence. “Whether [an obviousness ground] is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.” In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner’s new argument relies on a person of ordinary skill in the art modifying the Figure 5 embodiment of Mishra to connect the field plate to the source rather than the gate. Reply 21–24. Petitioner does not, however, show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to make this modification or a reasonable expectation that this combination would be successful. Id. Petitioner argues instead that “[n]o ‘reason’ is needed.” Id. at 24. Thus, Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Mishra and Ren.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,264,003 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,264,003
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.