- Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 5 is unpatentable over Gao-2 and over Gao-2 with Goubet; claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–8 were not shown unpatentable on any ground, and substitute claim 17 was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; PO Resp. 5–6. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited 11 This refers to the recitation in clauses 1F and 5F that the “diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber.” discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 3 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s opinion that the prior art does not render the claims obvious is premised on an interpretation of certain claim limitations that are inconsistent with both parties’ constructions” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“referring to the same direction as the separation of the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” (vertically in both Figure 6 of the challenged patent and Figure 1 of Goubet), we turn back now to Petitioner’s discussion of clause 1F, which includes the limitation at issue. There, Petitioner does not discuss why the “diffusion assembly” is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” but instead, Petitioner discusses why a component of the “diffusion assembly”—the “atomizer assembly”—is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber”: Pet. 39. In the end, we need not assess whether the “atomizer assembly” identified by Petitioner is “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” under the proper construction of that term (which, again, we need not and do not determine here) because the “disposed between” limitation does not involve the “atomizer assembly.” Instead, we find that, by failing to address why the identified “diffusion assembly” is “disposed between” the identified “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” Petitioner has failed to provide persuasive evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation. Pet. 38–39 (discussing the claim language “said diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber” but only discussing the location of the “atomizer assembly”); see 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review . . . , the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). For the reasons above, we find, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,092,918 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,092,918 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–9 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet; proposed substitute claim 21 is denied as indefinite.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“The record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration, as asserted in Petitioner’s overall argument. See Pet. Reply 1–2. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited general discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 2 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s declaration is premised on understandings of claim scope that are inconsistent with the constructions advanced by both of the parties” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read the cited portions of Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also Pet. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1046, 112:4–12, 113:13–20, 115:15–18). Next, we turn to each of the four specific claim terms that Petitioner highlights in its further arguments.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 5. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Florida Litigation a Joint Claim Construction statement that included stipulated claim constructions and disputed claim constructions for terms in the challenged patent as well as the ’449 patent and the ’918 patent. See Ex. 1018, Exhibit A (Stipulated Claim Constructions), Exhibit B (Disputed Claim Constructions). The parties stipulated to the construction of the terms “fluid dispersion” and “baffle” as recited in the challenged claim. See id., Exhibit A.10 10 When staying the Florida Litigation, the District Court cancelled the scheduled claim construction hearing. See ECF No. 67 (April 8, 2025) (granting joint motion to stay); ECF No. 68 (April 8, 2025) (cancelling the The stipulated construction of “fluid dispersion” merely restates the express definition of “fluid dispersion” from the challenged patent (although the definition is not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 3:8–20. Similarly, the stipulated construction of “baffle” essentially parrots one sentence in the challenged patent (again, not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 7:57–59. To the extent necessary, we determine that the complete record supports the parties’ stipulated constructions of “fluid dispersion” and “baffle,” and we apply those constructions below.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 9,527,094 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 9,527,094 - PTAB · May 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00425 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand
The Board denied institution of IPR2025-00425 because it instituted the earlier-considered IPR2025-00424 challenging the same patent.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Request for Director Review. See Paper 35; IPR2025-00424, Paper 35. The request was denied without prejudice and the cases were remanded to the Board to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues.” Paper 41, 4. Following such discovery, we were instructed to “then determine on the full record whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the Petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b), applying the framework set forth in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242– 44 (Fed. Cir. 2018).” Id. A later-issued Order Supplementing Director Review Decision instructed that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging” the ’225 patent. Paper 64, 3. Concurrently herewith, we issue a decision in IPR2025-00424 finding that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that the Petition in that case is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In connection with the ’225 patent, Petitioner filed two petitions requesting inter partes review: the petition in this proceeding (IPR2025- 00425), and the petition in IPR2025-00424. In this proceeding and in IPR2025-00424, Petitioner filed an Explanation regarding the necessity of multiple petitions. Paper 2; IPR2025-00424, Paper 2. Petitioner requested that, “if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00424 . . . before IPR2025-00425.” Paper 2,” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,589,225 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00423 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–4 and 6–29 because it instituted the ranked IPR2025-00422 under the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“Paper 34. Birchtech Corp. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Request for Director Review in each case. See Paper 40; IPR2025-00422, Paper 39. The Director denied the request without prejudice in each case and remanded the cases to the Board to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues.” Paper 49, 4. The Director later issued an Order Supplementing Director Review Decision in each case, instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging” the ’430 patent. Paper 72, 3.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,668,430 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00278 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company and PacifiCorp’s petition because it had instituted the earlier-filed IPR2025-00274 challenging the same patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“request from Patent Owner for Director Review, finding that Patent Owner introduced “evidence sufficient to put RPI and privity at issue” and remanding with instructions to “allow discovery, narrowly tailored to resolve the RPI and privity issues” including “at least materials sufficient to clarify the evidence the Board found to be ‘ambiguous’ and to avoid the need for the Board to ‘speculate as to the nature of the redacted material.’” Paper 57 (Decision on Request for Director Review). The Director instructed that after allowing such discovery, we “should then determine on the full record whether Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the Petitions are not time-barred under § 315(b), applying the framework set forth in Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Concurrently herewith, we issue a decision in IPR2025- 00278 finding that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating that its Petition is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 2
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00274, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00274, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 . . . before IPR2025-00278.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00274. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00274, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00274. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’114 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00274 before IPR2025-00278, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,343,114 - Berkshire Hathaway Energy Company / Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00281 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because it had instituted IPR2025-00280 challenging the same patent, consistent with the Director’s instruction to maintain at most one IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Review Decision instructing that “if the Board determines that Petitioners met their burden to identify all RPIs in the Petitions, then the Board should maintain at most one IPR challenging each of the ’114 patent, the ’517 patent, the ’430 patent, and the ’225 patent.” Paper 79, 3. Together with its Petition in this proceeding and the proceeding in IPR2025-00280, Petitioner filed an Explanation Regarding the Necessity of Multiple Petitions. Paper 2 (“Explanation”); IPR2025-00281, Paper 2. In the Explanation, Petitioner “request[s] that, if the Board uses its discretion to institute the Petitions, the Board consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 . . . before IPR2025-00281.” Explanation, 3. Further to Petitioner’s request, we first considered the merits of IPR2025-00280. For the reasons discussed in our concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00280, we institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition in IPR2025-00280. Further to the Director’s instruction that we “maintain at most one IPR challenging . . . the ’517 patent,” and the Petitioner’s request that we consider the merits of IPR2025-00280 before IPR2025-00281, we deny institution of the Petition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,596,517 - Therabody, Inc. v. Hyperice IP Subco, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 11, 2026 · PGR2025-00013 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–16 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted prior art did not establish the claimed quick-connect system during reciprocation, and Clark was not analogous art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The prior art may reflect the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“During oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it would not object to the Board adopting the construction that Petitioner proposes in the district court litigation. JUDGE MARSCHALL: I think the Petitioner wouldn’t object if we adopted the construction that Petitioner proposed in the district court, especially the “designed to” construction, correct? MR. BERG: No. We wouldn’t object to that. And we think that our Petition is on all fours with that construction. Tr. 81:12–16. As Petitioner does not object to adopting its construction from the district court litigation, we construe claim element 1[e] in accordance with Petitioner’s construction from the district court litigation.” slip op. at 11
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable
“The invention, a reciprocating massage device, is in a predictable field, namely the electro-mechanical arts. Also, there is no evidence that the recited quick-connect system is complex, even considering Patent Owner’s alleged understanding of it. Rather, Dr. Pratt testifies that many different types of connectors, whether they require alignment or not, were known. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54–58. Given the predictability of the electro-mechanical arts and lack of complexity of the recited quick-connect system, a low level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement. See RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Given the predictability of electro-mechanical inventions such as the one at issue here, and the lack of complexity of the particular claim limitation at issue—i.e., reciting the length of a heating member—‘a lower level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement than for unpredictable arts.’” (quoting Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). In view of the low level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the Specification’s example of a quick-connect system configured to secure the massaging head as the piston reciprocates fails to provide sufficient written description support for the “quick-connect system” recited in independent claims 1 and 18.” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Specification provides guidance as to what amount of deviation from a perfect cylinder is still “substantially cylindrical.” The Specification describes: Quick-connect system 600 includes a piston 602 that has a hollow-end bore 608 for receiving the shaft 621 of a massaging head 620. Located within the bore 608 of piston 602 is a cylindrical seat 604. Cylindrical seat 604 retains a magnet 606. Magnet 606 is illustrated with its north pole located flush with the seat and facing toward the opening in bore 608. Massaging head 620 includes a shaft 621 having a cylindrical pocket 622 at the distal end. Located within the cylindrical pocket 622 is a magnet 624. Magnet 624 is positioned so that its south pole is located at the distal end of shaft 621. Accordingly, when the shaft 621 of massaging head 620 is slid into opening in bore 608, the magnets 606 and 624 are attracted to one another and magnetically hold massaging head 620 firmly in place. Ex. 1001, 6:57–7:3. In view of the description of quick-connect system 600, the Specification sets forth a standard for ascertaining whether the bore and the seat located within the bore are “substantially cylindrical.” To wit, the bore and the seat within the bore are “substantially cylindrical” when the massaging head and magnet are respectively received therein so that the magnet in the seat and the magnet in the pocket of the massaging head can magnetically hold the massaging head firmly in place. Furthermore, Dr. Pratt testifies that “[m]agnetic connectors comprise a magnet on at least one of the two objects to be joined. These types of connectors are ubiquitous even today for driving threaded fasteners.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 56. Dr. Pratt also testifies that a POSITA would understand how to take into account certain variances, like runout. Ex. 2033, 25:3–17. Dr. Pratt’s testimony shows that magnetic connectors are well known and that a POSITA would be able to determine whether the bore and the seat within the bore were “substantially cylindrical” for a secure connection of the massaging head. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the claim term “substantially cylindrical” recited in claims 13–16 fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, the shapes of the bore and the structure within the bore. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of claims 13–16 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 11,938,082 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,938,082 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteomed LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00189 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
Claim 16 is unpatentable because Slater anticipates it.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“undisputed limitations of claim 16 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claim 16 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claim 16. Pet. 28–30; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 106. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 28–30. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claim 16.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,529,608 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,529,608 - Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc v. Osteomed LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2021-01452 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 6, 8, 9, 13, and 19 are unpatentable; claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable over Slater or Slater and Weaver.
RulingsRemand decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed by our previous decision addressing claim 8 of the ’085 patent, and the court’s analysis in Stryker, we conclude that Slater does not anticipate claims 2–5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 of the ’716 patent because Slater deliberately describes a variable angle hole that lacks a single predetermined angle—that is, Slater describes a transfixation screw hole that does not have a central axis defining the trajectory.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“In its Petition, Petitioner contends that Weaver discloses the limitations in claim 6 and that it would have been obvious to add Weaver’s features to Slater’s plate to provide a more secure fixation between the screws and the plate. Pet. 36–39; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 188–196. Specifically, Petitioner contends that configuring Slater’s transfixation screw hole (claim 6) or at least one of Slater’s attachment points (claim 8) as a threaded screw hole to lockably engage the head of a locking screw would have been an obvious design choice “because locking screws ‘provide a high resistance to shear or torsional forces’ and reduce the incidence of screw loosening.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1009, 1:57–58); Ex. 1009, 1:46–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 191– 196. Petitioner otherwise relies on its anticipation analysis for claim 1 discussed above. Pet. 36.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,763,716
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