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  • PTAB · Oct 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00685 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Wei and Liu, and over Leanna, Wei, and Liu.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “appears to be generally consistent with the level of skill presented in the cited prior art. See generally, e.g., Exs. 1005–1008; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, as at institution, we reject the portion of Petitioner’s proposed definition that includes having “access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience,” as not reflecting the individual level of skill of a given skilled artisan. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted); but see Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labys., S.A., 930 F.3d 1325, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (no clear error in determination that “a person of ordinary skill . . . ‘would be on a team with an engineer or scientist . . . .’”). Consequently, we find the person of ordinary skill in the art was a person who had a Ph.D. in immunology, molecular biology, cellular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar experience, and had at least five years of experience with antibodies and antibody engineering.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner submits that no term of the Challenged Claims requires construction to resolve the challenges in this Petition.” Pet. 32. We did not construe any terms in our Institution Decision. See DI 6–7. Patent Owner presents no express positions on claim construction. See generally Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, no terms of the challenged claims require construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. D. slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “2 G. Wei et al., US 2015/0071923 Al, pub. March 12, 2015. Ex. 1005 (“Wei”). 3 J. Liu, CN 103772504 A, pub. May 7, 2014. Ex. 1007. The Liu reference is published in Simplified Chinese and Petitioner filed a certified English translation, to which we refer herein. See Ex. 1008 (“Liu”). Patent Owner does not contest the accuracy of the translation. See generally Resp. 4 M.R. Leanna & C.L. Becker, WO 2014/152199 A1, pub. Sept. 25, 2014. Ex. 1006 (“Leanna”). 5 Based on our review of each deposition transcript in view of the record as a whole, although each witness appears competent, we are left with the impression that Dr. Bournazos’s testimony is somewhat more credible than Dr. Atanackovic’s. This conclusion is based, inter alia, on each witness’s ability to recall the relevant record and respond to questions on evidentiary and technical issues.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “We find that combining Liu’s BA03 antibody with Wei’s ADC platform would have been desirable, predictable, and routine for the ordinarily skilled artisan based on the facts that: (1) cetuximab was a wellknown and well-studied, U.S. regulatory approved, anti-EGFR antibody that would have served as a starting point for new cancer therapies; (2) humanization of therapeutic antibodies is generally desired (and “[e]very antibody can be humanized” and it is advantageous according to Patent Owner’s counsel); (3) BA03 was a well-known humanized version of cetuximab that had several known advantages over cetuximab in addition to lower immunogenicity from humanization; and (4) Wei taught a similar cetuximab-derived antibody, and a humanized cetuximab-derived antibody, each provided in an ADC with a well-known and validated off-the-shelf linker-drug platform, i.e., vc-MMAE, that exhibited a strong anti-tumor response. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:57–2:32, 2:50–3:1, 5:6–53, 18:3–33, 19:26– 29; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 14, 38, 42–43, 45–53, 56–73, 84–92, 109–117, 178–189, 202–271; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9–10, 229–232, 434, 437, 476, 491–506, 664–675, 685, 688, 715, 732, 1103, 1092–1141; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 3–6, 60, 74, 141–160; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 7–8, 38, 50, 57 (confirming our understandings regarding the claimed antibody and linker-drug payload); Ex. 2023, 173, 300; see also Resp. 1, 5–6, 23 (Patent Owner made the “choice” to use the prior-art-known BA03 antibody, and known-candidate cytotoxic payload MMAE); Hr’g Tr. 34:20–23, 36:6–38:20, 47:16–50:16 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s argument). When Liu’s BA03 antibody is provided in an ADC with a vc- MMAE or a Mc-vcPAB-MMAE platform (and used as cancer therapy as the references instruct) the invention of the challenged claims is achieved.” slip op. at 52

    Patent outcomesUS 10,792,370 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,792,370
  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · PGR2025-00023 · APJ Per Curiam · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as anticipated by the ’629 publication; the claims are not entitled to the 2013 priority date.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “We find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSITA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining that “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSITA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSITA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 22; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the trial record, we find a POSITA with respect to the claims of the ’109 patent would have had a two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSITA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Neither party proposes an express construction of any claim term. See Pet. 22–23 (not proposing any constructions); PO Resp. 23 (“Patent Owner agrees that the terms can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.”). However, Patent Owner states that some of Petitioner’s arguments implicitly construe claim 1 in an erroneous manner. PO Resp. 23–28. “For example, Petitioner argues that ‘an adequate written description would have to either disclose representative examples of the possible working cascades of various proteins or some accurate structural feature of the claimed proteins that allow them to function in the claimed assay as a whole.’” Id. at 23 (quoting Pet. 35). Patent Owner argues that, contrary to what Petitioner’s argument allegedly implies, “Claim 1 is directed to a method for producing an endotoxin assay agent” and does not require the use – Owner that claim 1 does not require the use of endotoxin assay agent. However, the claimed endotoxin assay agent must be capable of performing the assay, as counsel for Patent Owner acknowledged. Tr. 83:5–9.” slip op. at 10

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “In this case, to show that the claims of the ’109 patent are unpatentable for lack of written description, Petitioner would have needed to show that the specification as filed (i.e., the ’420 application) fails to reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the July 3, 2023, filing date. Petitioner did not. Pet. 23–24. Nor does Petitioner’s declarant offer testimony that could support such a showing. See Ex. 1003 ¶50 (“I have been asked to provide my opinions as to the state of the art in this field for purposes of determining what the inventors disclosed as their invention as of December 10, 2013.”), ¶51 (“Whenever I offer an opinion in this declaration about the knowledge of a POSA, the manner in which a POSA would have understood the claims of the ’109 patent or its description, the manner in have been led to do based on the prior art, I am referencing the December 10, 2013 timeframe.”). In our Institution Decision, we stated: Although the ’420 application is essentially identical to the ’767 application, the person of ordinary skill in 2013 is not the same as in 2023. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he [written description] test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” (emphasis added)). Thus, the information presented in the Petition, which is limited to the perspective of a 2013 POSITA, does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable for lack of written description. Inst. Dec. 12 (alterations in original). During trial, Petitioner did not present any further arguments in support of Ground 1. See generally Pet. Reply. Petitioner has failed to prove that claims 1–9 are unpatentable for failing to meet the written description requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 12

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot shown unpatentable

      “Although the evidence before us shows that, in 2013, a POSITA knew how to recombinantly express genes in expression systems such as CHO or HEK-293 cell lines, the evidence shows that this was true only for genes whose genetic sequences were known or readily available. See, e.g., Ex. 1069, 34:11–22 (“Q. Okay. So you would agree that the creation of the recombinant protein requires the underlying sequence of, as you said, the original animal? A. Of course.”) Because it is undisputed that, in 2013, the genetic sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C was unknown, or least not publicly available, Falko-Gunter does not support a finding of adequate written description here. See, e.g., Tr. 48:18–19 (“Patent Owner agrees that there had not been, as of 2013, the full length cDNA sequence for Limulus polyphemus Factor C published.”).” slip op. at 23

    Patent outcomesUS 11,959,109 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 11,959,109
  • PTAB · Sep 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00440 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claim 21 is unpatentable as obvious over Mizumura with either the ’498 PCT or McClymont; the Revised Contingent Motion to Amend proposing claim 22 is denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “overlap to a significant degree, i.e., a person with a Ph.D. in a discipline related to biological sciences and having had at least two years of work experience. However, the parties’ proposals differ slightly in the specific subjects in which a POSA would have had a doctoral degree, and whether the person’s work experience must have been directly related to horseshoe crab Factor C. As an initial matter, we find that a rigid requirement as to the subject of a POSA’s doctoral degree (e.g., biochemical engineering, enzymology), or experience working specifically with horseshoe crab proteins, is not consistent with the evidence of record. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 20:23–21:2 (Dr. Schaefer testifying that the fact the “name of [his] Ph.D. is immunology . . . does not change the fact that the core of [his] thesis training was really in molecular biology”), 22:3–15 (explaining “the fact that the production of proteins recombinantly is mostly species agnostic”); Ex. 1069, 45:20–47:17 (Dr. Morris testifying that whether a person is a POSA depends on the person’s “experience, [ ] publications,” and work done for the Ph.D. rather than the name of the Ph.D. program). We also find that evidence of record supports Petitioner’s assertion that, for purposes of defining a POSA, “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” See, e.g., Pet. 19; Ex. 1065, 99:14–100:3. with respect to the claims of the ’318 patent would have had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related discipline, and about two years of experience with cloning genes, expressing cloned genes as proteins, and/or characterizing such cloned genes and proteins, with more education being able to substitute for experience, and vice versa. A POSA may also have collaborated with others, including those with specific experience in utilizing or assessing horseshoe crab Factor C for endotoxin detection and quantitation.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction The parties agree that “the terms in claim 21 can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning for purposes of this proceeding” without further construction. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 11. Because express claim construction is not needed to resolve the issues in this case, we need not, and do not, construe expressly any claim term for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “Carrying Out the Invention section, that “[t]he Factor C of the present invention is a Factor C derived from a horseshoe crab,” and states later in the same section that “[e]xamples of the horseshoe crab include . . . Limulus polyphemus.” Ex. 1006, 40. However, none of the remaining portions of ’767 application cited by Patent Owner relate directly to L. polyphemus; instead, the remaining portions of ’767 application cited by Patent Owner are directed to other species, in particular the Japanese horseshoe crab T. tridentatus. Further, Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Schaefer, conceded that the ’767 application does not contain Factor C sequence information for L. polyphemus. See, e.g., Ex. 1067, 44:25–45:23. Although “[n]o length requirement exists for a disclosure to adequately describe an invention,” Falko-Gunter, 448 F.3d at 1365–1366, we are persuaded that a POSA would not, based on the totality of the above disclosures, reasonably understand that the inventors were in possession of the claimed HEK-293 recombinant L. polyphemus Factor C protein, in view of the state of the art as of December 10, 2013. In this regard, we note that adequate written description of a biological molecule, such as a HEK293 recombinant L. polyphemus Factor C protein, requires “more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it”; instead, what is required is “‘a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” The Regents of the” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Neither do we see Petitioner’s arguments regarding the December 10, 2013 priority date to be “mutually opposed” as Dr. Schaefer testified. Ex. 1067, 216:4– 24. Instead, we credit evidence of record, including Dr. Jain’s testimony and the February 22, 2018 Mizumura Declaration, that existence of the full sequence would permit a more complete analysis and that such an analysis would provide a POSA with a reasonable expectation that the claimed L. polyphemus recombinant protein would have a residual activity within the claimed range. See, e.g., Ex. 1029, 2–5; Ex. 1010, 48; Ex. 1065, 117:14– 130:24 (explaining that comparison of partial sequences in the Tokunaga 1991 publication showed “difference around the cleavage site” between T. tridentatus and L. polyphemus but comparison of the full sequence revealed that “the catalytic triad of histidine, serine, aspartate . . . to be more similar between Tachypleus and Limulus”). Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner’s reliance on a statement made by Dr. Mizumura in a declaration submitted during prosecution of the ’767 Application fails to fill the gap in the analysis” regarding reasonable expectation of success, because the declaration “offers no evidence of the percentage of conserved amino acid substitutions that exist to support the conclusion that a POSA would have expected residual activity to be maintained between Tachypleus tridentatus and Limulus polyphemus” PO Resp. 47. However, as noted above, Dr. Mizumura provides an alignment of Factor C proteins from the two different species of horseshoe crab, determines that the similarity between the amino acid sequence is 99.5%, states that the amino acid residues that can undergo N-type sugar chain that L. polyphemus, like T. tridentatus, would also be less susceptible to inhibition by ions. Ex. 1029, 4–5. For the reasons discussed above, we also disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner’s reasonable expectation of success argument is “nothing more than conclusory assertions with no support.” PO Resp. 46. Rather, we find Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSA would have had reason to combine the teachings of Mizumura and the ’498 PCT, with a reasonable expectation of success in arriving at the Factor C protein recited in claim 21.” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 11,236,318 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,236,318
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2026 · IPR2025-01531 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 7, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed drug sequence.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner states that, for purposes of this proceeding, it does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 8. Based on the entirety of the trial record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA’s skill level because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’552 patent and prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “We decline to discount Dr. Oberstein’s opinion based on the alleged conflict of interest and bias. Dr. Oberstein testified that the consulting fees he receives from Patent Owner reflect a small fraction of his income. Ex. 1210, 402:21–403:9. We also agree with Patent Owner that an oncologist prescribing an FDA-approved regimen does not evince bias. See Sur-reply 23; see also Ex. 1206, 49 (showing NALIRIFOX is a category 1, NCCN-preferred first-line therapy for metastatic pancreatic cancer), 69 (explaining category 1 is based upon high-level evidence). Petitioner also contends that Dr. Oberstein “offers conclusory opinions,” “fails to properly apply the law, continues to look at each reference in isolation, refuses to acknowledge logical suggestions in the art, and imports new limitations into the claims.” Reply 3–4. We evaluate each piece of evidence, including Dr. Oberstein’s opinion, as it relates to our substantive patentability analysis, and accord it proper weight.” slip op. at 9

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Petitioner, as the moving party, bears the burden of proving that the material sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a); see also Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”)15 § II.K (“A motion to exclude must explain why the evidence is not admissible.”). For the reasons explained below, we deny Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). Whether a reference qualifies as a “printed publication” involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is publicly accessible upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence can locate it. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Conroy was published on May 12, 2011. Ex. 1003, 1. Conroy refers to Conroy Protocol (Ex. 1004), stating that “[t]he protocol, including the statistical analysis plan, is available with the full text of this article at NEMJ.org.” Ex. 1003, 3. When questioned whether he has “any reason to believe that the protocol would not have been provided on NEJM.org with this text when it was published,” Dr. Oberstein testified that “if they say they provided it, then I think they probably provided it.” Ex. 1210, 165:20–166:2. 17 Alternatively, to the extent necessary, under the circumstances of this case, we waive the requirement of § 42.63(b). See 37.C.F.R. § 42.5(b). In addition, Dr. Ratain testified that “most top journals require that the protocol be submitted at the time of initial submission, and it’s always published alongside any major paper.” Ex. 2073, 42:2–5. According to Dr. Ratain, “[c]ertainly, New England Journal of Medicine does that.” Id. at 42:6–7. We credit the testimony from both Dr. Oberstein and Dr. Ratain on this issue. Accordingly, we find Exhibit 1004 was publicly accessible at the same time Conroy was published. slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 11,344,552 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,344,552
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00505 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 3–6, and 8–14 are unpatentable as obvious over the first § 103 combination; claims 2, 7, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not support the claimed drug sequence.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that [t]he person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) would have been an M.D. and/or Pharm. D who would have completed training in medical oncology, particularly in the field of gastrointestinal (GI) cancers, or a Ph.D. in clinical pharmacology, pharmaceutical sciences, pharmaceutics, and/or drug delivery, also particularly in the field of GI cancers, or their equivalents, along with at least 1-2 years of post-doctoral experience. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44–46). Patent Owner states that, for purposes of this proceeding, it does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 8. Based on the entirety of the trial record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA’s skill level because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’552 patent and prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “We decline to discount Dr. Oberstein’s opinion based on the alleged conflict of interest and bias. Dr. Oberstein testified that the consulting fees he receives from Patent Owner reflect a small fraction of his income. Ex. 1210, 402:21–403:9. We also agree with Patent Owner that an oncologist prescribing an FDA-approved regimen does not evince bias. See Sur-reply 23; see also Ex. 1206, 49 (showing NALIRIFOX is a category 1, NCCN-preferred first-line therapy for metastatic pancreatic cancer), 69 (explaining category 1 is based upon high-level evidence). Petitioner also contends that Dr. Oberstein “offers conclusory opinions,” “fails to properly apply the law, continues to look at each reference in isolation, refuses to acknowledge logical suggestions in the art, and imports new limitations into the claims.” Reply 3–4. We evaluate each piece of evidence, including Dr. Oberstein’s opinion, as it relates to our substantive patentability analysis, and accord it proper weight.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “In the DI, the Board stated that the ordinary understanding of a claim reciting a “method of treating metastatic adenocarcinoma of the pancreas” that comprises “administering an antineoplastic therapy to the patient” in order “to treat the metastatic adenocarcinoma of the pancreas” is that the “treatment” would have more than a de minimis therapeutic benefit or efficacy for the patient being treated. DI 14. We, however, rejected the notion that the claims “would require some particular degree of clinical efficacy” because “the level of clinical efficacy is not a claim limitation.” Id.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached

      “The parties, however, disagree over whether each recited dose must be the starting dose. Petitioner argues that “claim 1 requires that the method of treatment is a first-line therapy, but does not require that the claimed doses be used as a starting dose.” Paper 51, 1. In contrast, Patent Owner argues that “[t]he specification describes that the recited dose of each drug is a ‘starting’ or ‘initial’ dose.” Paper 50, 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 13:38–45, 30:5–7). For purposes of this Decision, we do not need to resolve this dispute. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). As explained below, we agree with Petitioner that, even if claim 1 recites the starting dose for each drug, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior art teaches each dose and a POSA would have had a reason to start with the recited doses. See infra Section II.G.3; Paper 51, 3 n.2. Because we find that the prior art teaches or suggests the claimed subject matter even under Patent Owner’s proposed narrower claim interpretation, we need not further construe the disputed claim language.” slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 11,344,552 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,344,552
  • PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · PGR2025-00086 · APJ Tawen Chang · PGR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and terminated the PGR as to claims 1–34 after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” including by “[d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent” or “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(b)(1)–(b)(2). Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment and terminate the proceeding. slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 12,290,598
  • PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

    Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
  • PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01353 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable: the asserted obviousness grounds failed, including because Kanan and Neri did not teach selecting the claimed cis-reactive cells.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Accordingly, for purposes of this decision we adopt Petitioner’s proposal of a person of ordinary skill in the art, with the following changes noted in italics below: A person with “an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., in organic chemistry, molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related field; and about two years of experience in industry and/or laboratory experience relating to small molecules and proteins and would have been familiar with nucleic acid chemistry and conventional hybridization techniques; and (b) access to one or more team members having an advanced degree, such as a Ph.D., in organic chemistry, molecular biology, biochemistry, or a related field; and about two years of experience in industry and/or laboratory experience relating to high throughput screening techniques such as nucleic acid sequencing. A person could also have qualified as a POSA with less formal education and more technical or professional experience.11 We emphasize, however, that our decision would not change if we instead used Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSA.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Because the parties have placed the limitation “selecting all cis- reactive cells exhibiting the detectable trace” into controversy, we construe the term below, but only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of this phrase, in light of the language of the claims, the Specification, and the prosecution history of record, requires “selecting all of the [molecular complexes or structures] meeting the defined criteria for [cis-reactive cells (CRCs)] and exhibiting the detectable trace.” Sur-reply 8 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 94, 98–119). We further agree that cis-reactive cells should be construed to mean “an association of at least two interactor moieties, joined by an associated oligonucleotide.” (PO Resp. 9 (quoting Ex. 1001, 9:35-37)). Accordingly, we determine that, properly construed, the claims require that what is “selected” at step 1(d) — what is differentiated or set apart from other molecular complexes or structures in the reaction mixture at the conclusion of step 1(d) — to be “an association of at least two interactor moieties joined by an associated oligonucleotide” that exhibits the detectable trace.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree that Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Kanan and Neri teaches “selecting all cis-reactive cells exhibiting the detectable trace,” as we have construed that phrase above. In particular, we determine that, properly construed, the limitation requires the selection of “all associations of at least two interactor moieties joined by an associated oligonucleotide and exhibiting the detectable trace.” Instead, as described in Kanan, what is “selected” is the molecules of interest joined by bond formation, with only one of the molecules of interest coupled to a nucleic acid moiety. Thus, the selected molecular complex or structure does not comprise two interactors (i.e., two molecules of interest coupled to NAMs). Moreover, to the extent there are two interactors, they are joined by the bond between the molecules of interest rather than an associated oligonucleotide.” slip op. at 35

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE Patent Owner moved to exclude Exhibit 1008, on the ground that it contains settlement statements and that Rule 408 of the Federal Rule of Evidence prohibits Petitioner from using the statements to impeach or contradict Patent Owner. Mot. 5. Because we do not rely in our analysis on this exhibit, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 43

    Patent outcomesUS 7,883,848 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,883,848
  • PTAB · Oct 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01197 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Adverse judgment

    After Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–40, the Board granted its request for adverse judgment and terminated IPR2024-01197 as to those claims.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” including by “[d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent” or “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(b)(1)–(b)(2). Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment and terminate the proceeding. slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,771,729
  • PTAB · Sep 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00605 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Desjarlais or Moore or obvious over Lazar alone.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1356. Thus, because we determine, based on the arguments and evidence on the present record, that there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail with respect to claim 1, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims under each Ground presented in the Petition. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). III. CONCLUSION For the reasons provided above, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing at trial that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’859 patent is unpatentable under at least one ground. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the Grounds presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 49

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

      “As Petitioner points out, the cited disclosure in the ’935 provisional does not “mention[] positions 364 and 368 together as a pair of positions for potential mutations on two chains.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–19). Although Patent Owner is correct that examples or actual reduction to practice are not required for adequate written description and “[a] specification may . . . contain a written description of a broadly claimed 34 invention without describing all species that [the] claim encompasses,” Prelim. Resp. 15 (quoting Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1352 and Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), the ’935 provisional must still “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor[s] had possession of the claimed subject matter” as of the relevant date. Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 127 F.4th 896, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. In this case, Table A of the ’935 provisional discloses a list of CH3 domain interface residues and identifies, for each interface residue in heavy chain A, the contacting residue in the corresponding chain B. Ex. 1030, 17, Table A. Table A does not, however, describe any particular substitutions or pairs of substitutions that should be made to the CH3 domains. See, e.g., Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–119). Table 7 of the ’935 provisional does identify specific amino acid substitutions in CH3 domains, including substitutions resulting in a positively charged residue at position 364 (e.g., S364K) and a negatively charged residue (e.g., L368D) at position 368. Ex. 1030, 52, Table 7. Patent Owner argues that this table “discloses specific positions for ‘identification of novel charge pair mutants.’” Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 48). As Petitioner points out, however, while Example 13 of the ’935 provisional relates to identification of novel charge pair mutants, Table 7 itself was only a “first step” in this identification process. Ex. 1030, 51:6–17. In this step, “many interface contact residues in the IgG CH3 domain were scanned one by one or in groups for substitutions that would result in repulsion of 35 identical heavy chains” so that identified substitutions can then be used to generate antibodies “by engineering matched pairs of CH3 residues in one or more IgG heavy chains – CH3 regions” in follow up experiments. Id. Accordingly, Table 7 does not appear to describe heterodimer combinations, such as those that would result from a pairing of chains with different substitutions. Pet. 29–30 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 111–118). As Petitioner further points out, the follow up experiments testing the matched pairs of CH3 residues did not include paired substitutions at positions 364 and 368. Id. at 29–31. Patent Owner points to disclosure in the ’935 provisional describing, as a distinguishing feature of its invention, the substitution of non-charged or neutral amino acids in wildtype CH3 with charged residues, which according to the ’935 provisional has the “advantage that at least one additional charge-charge interaction in the CH3 interface is created.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing, e.g., Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 42–48). For the same reasons discussed above, Petitioner has sufficiently established, for purposes of institution, that such disclosure would not reasonably convey to an ordinarily skilled artisan that the inventors had possession of the entire genus of heterodimeric antibodies comprising CH3 domains wherein a non-charged amino acid is replaced with a charged residue so as to create an additional charge-charge interaction in the CH3 interface. In this regard, we also note that “a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the [written description] requirement.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.” slip op. at 34

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

      “adequately describes a heterodimeric antibody comprising the recited charged residues at the recited positions of the CH3 domains, i.e., “a positively charged amino residue at position 364” at a first CH3 domain and “a negatively charged amino acid residue at position 368” of the second CH3 domain. Having considered the evidence of record at this preliminary stage of the proceeding, and for the reasons set forth below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently, for purposes of institution, that the ’935 provisional does not provide adequate written description support for claim 1 of the ’859 patent and that, accordingly, Desjarlais and Moore qualify as prior art to that claim. As Petitioner points out, the cited disclosure in the ’935 provisional does not “mention[] positions 364 and 368 together as a pair of positions for potential mutations on two chains.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 109–19). Although Patent Owner is correct that examples or actual reduction to practice are not required for adequate written description and “[a] specification may . . . contain a written description of a broadly claimed 34 invention without describing all species that [the] claim encompasses,” Prelim. Resp. 15 (quoting Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1352 and Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)), the ’935 provisional must still “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor[s] had possession of the claimed subject matter” as of the relevant date. Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 127 F.4th 896, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 34

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “The ’859 patent does not provide an explicit definition of “immunoglobulin class.” Nevertheless, we do not construe that term to require “two heavy chains with four domains, VH, CH1, CH2, and CH3, and two Fab arms.” As an initial matter, the Specification teaches that antibodies include, 16 e.g., IgE and IgM — which have an additional CH4 domain in their heavy chains — as well as functional derivatives and/or fragments of known antibody isotypes. Ex. 1001, 11:44–48. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which limits antibodies to those having two Fab arms and “two heavy chains with four domains, VH, CH1, CH2, and CH3,” excludes these embodiments and cannot be correct. Moreover, the ’859 patent defines antibody as containing “one or more domains” that bind an epitope on an antigen. Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. Thus, an antibody does not require two Fab arms as in a native immunoglobulin molecule.12 The ’859 patent also describes a preferred embodiment as “Ig-like molecules.” Id. at 11:49–52. Thus, we look to the definition of “Ig-like molecule” in the ’859 patent, i.e., “a proteinaceous molecule that possesses at least one immunoglobulin (Ig) domain,” to inform our understanding of the phrase “immunoglobulin class of proteins.” Ex. 1001, 11:4–6. Accordingly, we further construe “immunoglobulin class of proteins” to mean proteinaceous molecules comprising at least one domain that is derived from or shares sequence homology with an immunoglobulin domain.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,926,859
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