- Gettattle, Inc. v. Afterwords, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00677 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable as anticipated by Douglas and Ganesh; the revised contingent motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“record before us, we conclude that Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that each challenged claim of the ’811 patent is anticipated by Douglas and by Ganesh. Accordingly, we find that claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’811 patent are unpatentable. Moreover, we find that Patent Owner’s Revised Contingent Motion to Amend adds new matter in every proposed substitute claim, and, therefore, the motion is denied.” slip op. at 80
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Because the RMTA does not meet the foundational statutory and regulatory requirements, we decline to reach Petitioner’s arguments as to the asserted unpatentability of the proposed substitute claims. C. CONCLUSION ON REVISED MOTION TO AMEND Because the RMTA does not meet foundational statutory and regulatory requirements for a motion to amend, it is denied.” slip op. at 80
Patent outcomesUS 10,430,811 unpatentable§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,430,811 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00343 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 and 8–13 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish a reason to combine Bucknell’s multiplexing techniques with Eckert.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. a subset of radio bearers Petitioner points out that in IPR2022-01127 the Board “preliminarily determined that a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” means “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” Pet 12 (citing Ex. 1019, 18–19). Petitioner explains that, in the present proceeding, it has applied “the prior art in accordance with that construction; however, in view of the asserted grounds, no claim term requires express construction to find the Challenged Claims unpatentable.” Id. (citing Nidec 868 F.3d 1017). Patent Owner neither disputes the prior construction of “a subset of radio bearers,” nor offers additional constructions. See generally PO Resp. To the extent necessary, and in accordance with our prior determination, we construe “a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” to mean “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“bears pointing out that the specification of the ’138 patent appears to explain what “a single allocation” means: If there are multiple QoS requirements within a single 3GPP PDP context, a single physical allocation of radio resources may be made to the UE. In this manner, a single PDP context implies a single CCTrCh. This single physical allocation of radio resources provided to a UE is shared amongst a number of services, in proportion to their respective QoS requirements, for example in proportion to the signalled weight values (Stier). Ex. 1001, 9:36–43 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Ding, explains that the “abbreviation CCTrCh was understood in the art to refer to a transport channel known as the Coded Composite Transport Channel.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 88. Dr. Ding testifies that Eckert teaches selecting data for uplink within a determined TTI and scheduling the uplink transmission on a transport channel, E-DCH, where scheduling of the E-DCH in a UE is controlled by a base station. Eckert, [0012] (“[A] new dedicated transport channel called Enhanced Dedicated Channel (E-DCH) has been introduced for this purpose. The fundamental characteristics of this new transport channel include . . . scheduling controlled by the base station, also called NodeB in UMTS…” Id. ¶ 90. In addition to Eckert disclosing a single transport channel E-DCH, Petitioner argues that Eckert discloses using a “finite quantum of physical resources” where “[t]he ’138 patent disclosure parallels Eckert, with both the E-DCH and CCTrCH transport channels relating to a UMTS uplink, employing spreading codes in code division multiple access (CDMA), and Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶¶ 3, 8, 15, 23; Ex. 1071 ¶¶ 17–20; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 6, 51). We do not need to specifically interpret this claim phrase because there is no actual dispute as to the meaning of the claim language itself and because, ultimately, the construction of this phrase plays no part in our Decision.” slip op. at 15
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“D. Ground 1: Claims 1–4 and 8–11 – Alleged Obviousness over Eckert in view of Bucknell and Lohr-1 On the complete record now before us, Petitioner has not established a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–4 and 8–11 would have been obvious over Eckert, Bucknell, and Lohr-1. For the reasons explained below we determine that Petitioner has failed to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Eckert in view of Bucknell in the manner claimed. We focus our analysis below on claim 1, and more specifically on those limitations for which the combination of Eckert and Bucknell is asserted. 1. Limitations [1.0]–[1.2] and the combination of Eckert and Bucknell The combination of Eckert and Bucknell is essential to each of Petitioner’s asserted grounds in this proceeding. Pet. 13. At the outset, we address this issue because our determination that Petitioner has failed to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Eckert and Bucknell is dispositive as to all grounds.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,292,138 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,292,138 - Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00226 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, and 9 are unpatentable under §103 over Moskowitz and Steffee; the Board did not reach the Moskowitz-only ground and rejected the Hess ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline (e.g., biomedical or metals and materials engineering), and at least five years of experience consisting of (a) designing, developing, evaluating and/or using spine devices, (b) anatomy, physiology and biology of soft and calcified tissues including bone healing and fusion, and (c) biomechanical and functional loading of orthopedic implants. Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 49). “Patent Owner does not dispute the proffered definition for a POSA.” PO Resp. 9. Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s undisputed proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’385 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. “channel” Throughout the challenged claims, “channel” appears together with “curved” in the term “curved channel.” For example, claim 1 recites “the fusion member comprising a first curved channel and a second curved channel,” “a first anchoring member configured to insert through the first curved channel,” and “second anchoring member configured to insert through the second curved channel.” Ex. 1001, 26:58–59, 26:60–61, 26:65– 66. Prior to institution, Petitioner asserted that one of ordinary skill in the art would “understand the claim term ‘channel’ to refer to a passage through which something moves or is conveyed.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 54). And, for purposes of our Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed construction as being “consistent with the intrinsic record.” Institution Dec. 10. the ’385 [p]atent is readily understood by a POSA in context without needing explicit construction” and the plain and ordinary meaning should apply. PO Resp. 9–10. According to Patent Owner, the ’385 patent “consistently uses ‘channel’ to refer to a pathway within the fusion member through which an anchoring member traverses” and “explicitly states that channels may have different shapes and sizes and need not have a constant diameter, indicating the patentee did not intend to narrow the term beyond its common understanding.” Id. Petitioner replies noting that Patent Owner’s understanding “is substantively identical to Petitioner’s construction (‘a passage through which something moves or is conveyed’), specifically applied to an anchoring member.” Pet. Reply 6 (Pet. 18; PO Resp. 9–10). Thus, Petitioner concludes that “[t]he parties thus agree with the Board’s construction.” Id. Based on the full record, we agree with Petitioner that the parties’ positions on the meaning of the term “channel” are “substantively identical.” Because we see no difference between the parties’ position on the meaning of “channel,” we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction as it is consistent with the plain language of the claims and Specification. See Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:42–44, 9:53–55, 10:63–66, 11:47–63, 14:25–31, 14:65–67, 16:32–35, 22:51–57, 24:55–67) (The Specification uniformly refers to a “channel” as “a passage through which something (e.g., an anchoring member) traverses.”).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“between the spinous processes in order to decompress the spinal canal, and thus, “relieve pressure on the spinal cord and nerves by increasing the area of the spinal canal.” Ex. 1006, 1:32–34, 1:50–52, 2:1–6. In contrast, the ’385 patent identifies that “the goal is to achieve solid bony fusion between the involved endplates and eliminate the symptoms caused by motion and associated degenerative and other reactive changes between these unstable vertebral segments.” Ex. 1001, 1:53–57. Thus, Hess’s disclosed implant is designed to distract and stabilize the spinous processes, not to promote solid bony fusion between adjacent vertebral bodies. Consequently, we agree with Patent Owner that “converting Hess for intervertebral fusion would require eliminating its core dynamic stabilization functionality—directly contradicting Hess’s stated design objectives.” PO Resp. 42 (citing Ex. 1006, 2:5–26, 7:43–45). We also are not persuaded that Petitioner adequately explains why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Hess’s implant in the manner proposed. Petitioner contends that only “minimal modifications” to Hess’s shell dimension and shape would be required for intervertebral use. Pet. 61–67; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 122–128. However, simply modifying the shape and size of Hess’s shell does not, without more, support a motivation to redesign Hess’s device from a posterior interspinous implant engaging spinous processes to an interbody implant positioned between vertebral bodies and anchored into vertebral bodies. Here, Hess discloses that modifying its dimensions serves to “preserv[e] mobility and alignment.” Ex. 1006, 7:5–7. Conversely, the ’385 patent’s fusion implant serves to limit mobility between vertebrae by achieving “solid bony fusion between the fusion member and the adjacent vertebral bodies.” Ex. 1001, 24:67–25:3. spinal fusion procedures” (id. at 6:49–52), we do not find that statement, without more, to disclose or suggest reconfiguring Hess’s interspinous implant as an “a fusion member configured to position between first and second vertebral bodies,” as required by limitation [1.1]. At most, Hess’s “adjunct to” statement suggests that the interspinous implant may be used in connection with, or in support of, a fusion procedure. It does not explain how or why Hess’s implant would be redesigned for placement between two adjacent vertebral bodies, nor does it teach that Hess’s locking wings would be reoriented or adapted to anchor into vertebral bodies rather than spinous processes. On this point, Mr. Culbert states that “[t]he only changes required to modify Hess for use as an intervertebral implant would be to modify the dimensions of Hess’s shell, which was ‘dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:3–4)), but Mr. Culbert does not explain how Hess’s locking wings and guide tracks would be reoriented or adapted to function as anchoring members that are inserted into adjacent vertebral bodies rather as opposed to spinous processes. Instead, Mr. Culbert simply states that “Hess’s locking wings would engage and at least partially penetrate the superior and inferior adjacent vertebrae” (emphasis added) (Ex. 1002 ¶ 135) without explaining how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the modification with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“modify Hess for use as an intervertebral implant would be to modify the dimensions of Hess’s shell, which was ‘dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes’” (Ex. 1002 ¶ 126 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:3–4)), but Mr. Culbert does not explain how Hess’s locking wings and guide tracks would be reoriented or adapted to function as anchoring members that are inserted into adjacent vertebral bodies rather as opposed to spinous processes. Instead, Mr. Culbert simply states that “Hess’s locking wings would engage and at least partially penetrate the superior and inferior adjacent vertebrae” (emphasis added) (Ex. 1002 ¶ 135) without explaining how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have made the modification with a reasonable expectation of success. Hess’s disclosure that its shell may have shape variations to match adjacent bone (Ex. 1006, 7:7–13) also does not adequately explain why a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason to redesign Hess’s device for a different intervertebral environment, or why such a redesign would and “anchoring members,” i.e., locking wings. And, to the extent Hess discloses matching the shell to “the profile of the adjacent bone when deployed” (Ex. 1006, 7:11–13), Hess never suggests adapting the shell for placement between two adjacent vertebral bodies or for use as a fusion cage, it discloses that the “shell 12 is dimensioned and configured for placement between the spinous processes of symptomatic disc levels” (id. at 7:2–4). Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the proposed modification “minimizes the structural differences and conflicting functional objectives inherent in modifying a device intended for the posterior elements of the spine for use in the anterior load-bearing column” (emphasis omitted). PO Resp. 41. For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Culbert’s testimony amounts to more than just providing a motivation to modify Hess. Here, it amounts to relying on expert testimony to supply a missing limitation. As such, Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive to demonstrate that the prior art teaches the limitations of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 16 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (explaining that relying on expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.”).” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 8,460,385 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,460,385 - Globus Medical, Inc. v. Spinelogik, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00225 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 11, 12, and 15–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 6, 11, 12, 15, and 17 over Blain; claims 5 and 16 over Blain, Bray, and Steffee.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in mechanical engineering or a related discipline (e.g., biomedical engineering, metals and materials engineering), and at least five years of experience with a) designing, developing, evaluating and/or using spine devices, b) anatomy, physiology and biology of soft and calcified tissues including bone healing and fusion, and c) biomechanical and functional loading of orthopedic implants. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 77–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). “Patent Owner does not dispute the proffered definition for a POSA.” PO Resp. 10. proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that “housing,” as it appears in the context of the term “delivery housing” is a component that is a part of the delivery mechanism (see Ex. 1001, 11:27–31) and that simply contains and guides another component during delivery. See Ex. 1001, 13:25–27, 21:30–50. Thus, we apply the ordinary meaning of “housing,” as it appears in the context of the term “delivery housing,” and address in the context of “delivery housing,” as recited by claims 2 and 4.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“understanding of plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in the litigation.” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1022, 2 (“channel . . . [that] has a curved path”)). Thus, Petitioner concludes that the parties agree on construction of “curved channel.” Id. at 13–14.10 9 Although the parties refer to “curved” alone or to a “curved channel,” we understand the parties to be referring to a “channel of the fusion member [that] is curved,” as recited in claims 5 and 16. 10 At oral argument, the parties confirmed that there was no dispute as to the meaning of “curved channel.” See Tr. 15:12–14 (Petitioner stating that “the term “curved channel” appears consistent with the plain language of the claims and Specification. Thus, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon construction and construe a channel that is “curved” to mean a channel following a curved trajectory.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We have considered Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and Patent Owner’s counterarguments and find, on the complete trial record, that Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Blain discloses “a fusion member for positioning between two vertebral bodies, the fusion member having a first plurality of channels, each channel of the first plurality of channels having an opening on a same side of the fusion member,” as recited by limitation 1.1. At the outset, we find Patent Owner fails to establish that any of the alleged differences between Blain’s “apertures and the ’805 [p]atent’s internal channel geometry” relate to any particular recitation in argued limitation 1.1. Although we acknowledge that claims 5 and 16 each requires curved trajectories (see, e.g., claim 5 reciting “each channel of the fusion member is curved”), limitation 1.1 does not recite such a feature. As Petitioner correctly notes, “[n]othing in the claim requires a special ‘internal channel geometry,’ ‘shaped block,[’] ‘curved tubular channels,’ non ‘straight-through’ apertures, or ‘flexible’ anchors.” Pet. Reply 14 (footnote omitted). See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Therefore, after reviewing the arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Blain discloses the subject matter of limitation 1.1.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,730,805 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,730,805 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01450 · APJ Peter D Shapiro · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 were not shown unpatentable because Dziong and Sathyanath do not teach the claimed sharing definition for existing connections with allocated bandwidth.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“First, the claims use present-tense language, “one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection.”3 Ex. 1001, claim 1 (emphasis added). The exclusive use of the present tense have indicates “other connections” must have current possession of the bandwidth. For these other connections to share bandwidth with a newly established connection, they must already exist and have bandwidth ready for immediate use, rather than merely holding a dormant “reservation” pending a network failure. See PO Supp. Br. 1. The Federal Circuit addressed a similar situation where the Court found the present-tense limitation “is connected to the computer network” means a device was required to be connected at the” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“combination, do not teach or suggest limitations 1.2 and 1.3 requiring: providing a sharing definition specifying one or more other connections, which have respective bandwidths and which are permitted to share a bandwidth allocation with the new connection, such that a total bandwidth allocated jointly to the new connection and to the other connections in any given segment is equal to a maximum of the requested bandwidth and of the bandwidths of the other connections in the given segment Ex. 1001, limitations 1.2, 1.3 (emphasis added); see PO Resp. 17–22; Sur-reply 4–5, 12–14. As discussed above in Section II.C.2, we interpret “other connections” to mean “existing connections in the network that already have bandwidth allocated to them.” Because the information shared in Dziong and Sathyanath, described below, relates to reserved protection paths, rather than existing connections that have bandwidth that can currently transmit network traffic, the references do not teach or suggest the “other connections” part of the sharing definition in limitations 1.2 and 1.3. Dziong describes advertising, across the network, the amount of bandwidth reserved for recovery on each link that would be activated when a protected link fails. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60; Pet. 36. Once activated, network traffic from a “primary path” failure is rerouted to these recovery paths. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 7–9, 70, 83. Petitioner points to this advertising of the reserved bandwidth information as teaching the claimed “sharing definition.” Pet. 33–36 (arguing that the “protection paths [in Dziong] have bandwidth reservations” and “share an overall protection bandwidth reservation”); Reply 21–23. However, since the advertised information only contains information about the recovery paths “that would be activated” upon a primary path failure, such paths are not existing connections that already have bandwidth allocated to them, and therefore do not teach the claimed “other connections” that are part of the sharing definition. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 60.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 7,596,088 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,596,088 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 13, 2026 · IPR2024-00913 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable over Blease, Weyman, and Hu, with some claims also over Deng; claims 8–10 and 18 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“disclosure in Weyman (or Blease) for deactivating and activating ports, or performing certain actions in the time between such actions. Again, the only portion of Weyman cited pertains to a request to join the fabric from a processing unit having a “default” configuration, which does not relate to the timing or sequence of events in initialization. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 69, 156, 161–162; Ex. 1103 ¶¶ 93–94. Nor does Dr. Lavian point to any other evidence in the record supporting his conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “ensure[d] that the processing unit is deactivated prior to being updated for use . . . and then activate[d] the processing unit after updating.” See Ex. 1103 ¶ 94. Accordingly, we give little weight to Dr. Lavian’s conclusory opinion” slip op. at 75
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“See Axonics, 73 F.4th at 957; Allied Erecting, 825 F.3d at 1381; Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332–33. Petitioner’s position is that, based on the teachings of Weyman, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Blease’s system to distribute the functionality of control unit 44 (including its existing multicast forwarding information 48 used by OIF mapper 50). See Pet. 23–26, 38; Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“That the proposed combination of [two references]—rather than one of the individual references—discloses the disputed claim limitations does not defeat the Board’s conclusion of obviousness. In this case, it is sufficient that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the prior art in a way such that the combination discloses the claim limitations.”).” slip op. at 55
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“10 In the Cisco IPR, we determined that Cisco had proven claims 8 and 18 to be unpatentable based on a different combination of references (identified as Weyman, Jain, and LeMaire), finding that limitation 8[f.ii] was taught by Jain and LeMaire. IPR2024-00506, Paper 38 at 58–77. As explained herein, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments in this proceeding that limitation 8[f.ii] is taught or suggested by Weyman. Also, in the Decision on Institution in this proceeding, the Board found that there were questions as to Petitioner’s showing for limitation 8[f.ii] and declined to reach a conclusion on whether Petitioner had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted ground based on Blease and Weyman. Dec. on Inst. 43.” slip op. at 71
Patent outcomesUS 8,014,394 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,014,394 - Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00893 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 8, 11, 12, 15, 20, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious over Gai and IEEE 1999.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that at the time of the application for the ’986 patent (January 2002), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with computer networking.” Pet. 20. In the Decision on Institution, the Board agreed with and applied Petitioner’s proposed definition, removing the phrase “at least” to avoid unnecessary ambiguity. Dec. on Inst. 18–19. Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed definition for its Response. PO Resp. 5. Neither party made any further argument regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art in its papers during trial. In the Cisco IPR, we adopted a similar definition, determining that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or in an equivalent field, or approximately two years of experience working in the field of information technology and networking,” where “[l]ack of professional experience can be substituted by additional education, and vice versa.” IPR2024-00505, Paper 29 at 10–11 (alteration in original); see Dec. on Inst. 19 n.7 (noting the proposed definition in the Cisco IPR). Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’986 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’986 patent and cited prior art, we adopt the same definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as the Cisco IPR and apply it for purposes of this Petitioner’s similar proposed definition in this proceeding.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Gai discloses entering an Enable_Uplinkfast command at an access switch (e.g., access switch 114) to block a failed port (e.g., the root port) and configure the access switch to send dummy traffic upstream through a new active port. . . . When modified in view of IEEE 1999’s disclosure that self-healing network traffic can advantageously be sent both upstream and downstream, the command would be entered at a backbone switch (e.g., backbone switch 122) to block a failed port (e.g., a designated port connected to access switch 114) and configure the backbone switch to send dummy traffic downstream to an access switch (e.g. access switch 114) through a new active port. While Gai uses its protocol signaling command, Enable_Uplinkfast, to send dummy traffic through a new root port, [a person of ordinary skill in the art] would deem it an obvious implementation detail to modify the parameters of the port on a backbone switch. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 139 (citing Ex. 1005, col. 6, ll. 39–46).” slip op. at 34
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Cisco IPR, we addressed four claim terms in the final written decision: “access switch” and “edge switch,” which appear in independent claims 1 and 13 and various dependent claims, and “downstream” and “upstream,” which appear in claims 11, 12, 23, and 24. IPR2024-00505, Paper 29 at 11–14. We interpreted “access switch” to mean “a switch with ports that connect to LANs and/or to other network endpoints, such as user computer systems,” interpreted “edge switch” to mean “a core switch that is directly connected to an access switch,” interpreted “downstream” to mean “away from the root switch,” and interpreted “upstream” to mean “toward the root switch.” Id. As noted above, Patent Owner did not appeal that decision. We incorporate herein our previous analysis in the Cisco IPR, but note that none of the analysis of the disputed issues below depends on such determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1999, supported by the testimony of Mr. McNair, which we credit, is persuasive. See Pet. 25–30, 40–46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–145, 165–174. Based on the full trial record, we find that Gai and IEEE 1999 teach limitation [1E] and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine their teachings in the manner described by Petitioner. Based on all of the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 would have been obvious over Gai and IEEE 1999 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 4. Claims 8, 15, and 20 Claim 8 depends indirectly from independent claim 1. Claims 15 and 20 depend indirectly from independent claim 13, which is similar to claim 1 but recites a network switching device rather than a method. As to independent claim 13, Patent Owner refers to its earlier arguments regarding claim 1, asserting that limitation [13C] is “substantially similar” to limitation [1E]. PO Resp. 14–15. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments for the reasons explained above. See supra Section II.D.3.b. Patent Owner does not argue dependent claims 8, 15, and 20 separately from their respective parent claims 1 and 13. See PO Resp. 19. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and supporting evidence, including the testimony of Mr. McNair, and are persuaded that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 8, 15, and 20 would have been obvious based on Gai and IEEE 1999 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the reasons stated by Petitioner. See Pet. 21–46, 48–52, 55–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113–175, 179–185, 194–203.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 6,917,986 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,917,986 - Gettattle, Inc. v. Afterwords, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00677 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 on all four anticipation grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to determine whether to institute trial in an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’811 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ORDINARY LEVEL OF SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends: As of the effective priority date of the ‘811 patent, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field at the time would be familiar with the pre-existing point of sale and network-based technologies as above, for example in Section I.D. above as well as the “BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION” portion of the ‘811 patent specification. Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 21 – col. 5, l. 10. This person would include someone who has, through education or practical experience, at least 2-3 years of experience in software engineering, such as the development of data sets, database management, and networking integration for dynamic content generation and network-based distribution. Pet. 10. Patent Owner states, “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Petition, p. 10.” Prelim. Resp. 14. We accept and use Petitioner’s proposed, and unopposed, definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. It appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’811 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). C.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“The claim language does little to identify any meaning of “point-of- sale interface.” Looking to the ’811 patent’s written description, it never uses the term “point-of-sale interface,” but it states “moder[n] Point-of-Sale (POS) systems . . . capture rich details around their customers’ purchasing activity.” Ex. 1001, 1:52–54. The Specification further states that “[t]he transaction data may be stored locally to a point-of-sale (“POS”) device or to a remote location, such as a cloud service provider.” Id. at 2:23–25. Regarding the associated term “interface,” the written description states, “[i]n general, as used herein, an interface is a component of computer executable instructions stored in a tangible, non-transitory medium and executed by processor 12 to present a display of information related to the interface allowing someone to view and/or interact with the presented information.” Id. at 4:32–37. We are pointed to and find nothing in the ’811 patent’s prosecution history that sheds any further light on the meaning of this language. See Pet. 12–14; Prelim. Resp. 12–13; Ex. 1003. Based on the intrinsic record, we find that the ’811 patent describes a point-of-sale as being local to a transaction, e.g., a sale/purchase of a product” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this point in the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the recited survey module must be autonomous, self-contained, or a web-container package. As discussed above, we preliminarily interpret this term to mean software code for displaying a survey question. We find no support in the current record to add to this definition any additional requirements related to autonomy, self-containment, or a web-based context for the survey module. The Petition (at 19) points to Douglas as teaching the claimed survey module, i.e., in Douglas, software sent to the customer for taking a product survey on the display of the customer’s computer device. Douglas teaches, in response to a customer providing a survey trigger (e.g., purchase data signals), a survey generator creates a transaction-specific survey (e.g., “Was the item you found too expensive?”) and transmits it to the customer’s device (e.g., a mobile phone with a touchscreen); the survey is interactive; and the customer touches or clicks their device’s screen to respond to the survey questions. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 34–35. Moreover, Douglas also discloses that its survey “interact[s] with the customer using one or more software applications on customer device 106,” which may be, e.g., a computer or mobile phone, further, “[t]he one or more software applications may be provided by survey system 101, or merchant 107, or a third party,” and finally, “[t]he one or more software applications may be web-based applications and/or native mobile applications installed on the customer device 106.” Id. ¶¶ 18–20; see also Prelim. Resp. 35 (conceding as much). Thus, Douglas appears to disclose a survey system where a survey server responds to a triggering survey token created by a merchant and sent by a customer, that connects the customer with a particular purchase, by creating a purchase-specific survey question and sending it to a customer’s electronic device, where the survey question is displayed on a web-browser by software, and the customer’s survey answers may then spur the system to generate and follow up with additional questions. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 18–20, 27–29, 33–39. This appears to include the claimed survey module at issue. As for Patent Owner’s argument that the recited survey module must” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,430,811 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Portsmouth Network Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00506 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 14–18 are unpatentable as obvious over the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Weyman and Li collectively” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 8,014,394 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,014,394 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Unm Rainforest InnovationsAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2021-00375 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand
Proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable as obvious under collateral estoppel; the Board denied Patent Owner’s motion to amend.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“the Acting Director of the USPTO (Paper 81, “Acting Director’s Order”) and after a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal Circuit”) in ZyXEL Communications Corp. v. UNM Rainforest Innovations, 107 F.4th 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Federal Circuit Decision”) regarding the Board’s original Final Written Decision (Paper 68, “Final Written Decision” or “Final Dec.”) in this proceeding. In particular, the court remanded to the Board to determine if proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable as obvious under collateral estoppel based on the court’s holding that claims 1–4 and 6–8 are unpatentable as obvious. ZyXEL, 107 F.4th at 1371, 1384.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“proposed substitute claim 44 presents the same issues as those litigated before the Federal Circuit: whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the first key element and whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the second key element.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Final Written Decision, and the Federal Circuit Decision, as well as the postremand briefing, we determine that the application of collateral estoppel to proposed substitute claim 44 is appropriate. It is also appropriate to apply collateral estoppel to substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50. This is because proposed substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50 depend from proposed substitute claim 44 and recite identical limitations to dependent claims 2–4, 6, and 7. Therefore, the resolution of the question of obviousness of the subject matter of proposed substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50 necessarily presents the same issues of whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the first key element and whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the second key element.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 8,265,096 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,265,096
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.