- NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 12, 2016 · IPR2014-01079 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 6–9, 12–16, 20, and 21 are unpatentable; claims 2, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 25 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As will be described in greater detail below, headrest 22 moves variably upon vehicle impact. In the embodiment shown, such variable movement occurs in first and second manners wherein the first and second manners relate to first and second forward velocities respectively, those being the velocities of the headrest 22 forward toward the occupant or the front of the vehicle, and first and second trajectories respectively, those being the trajectories or paths of headrest 22. Such variable movement could be along any suitable combination of trajectories and velocities. As long as at least one of the first forward velocity and first trajectory is different than one of a second forward velocity and second trajectory, movement in first and second manners, variable movement, has been achieved. Ex. 1001, 5:12–26 (emphasis added). This passage is consistent with interpreting “first manner and second manner” as meaning “any two different ways.” As described in this quoted passage, if either the forward velocity or the trajectory of the headrest, or both changes, then movement in a first and second manner has occurred. For example, if the headrest were to move forward at one velocity and then merely slow down (or speed up) on the same trajectory, then movement would occur in a first and second manner.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“headrest that moves in a first manner and a second manner because Dr. Kent’s original modeling of Nakano’s headrest failed to account for the constraint imposed by brackets 35. Resp. 20–23. Lear further contends that its expert, Dr. Viano, “correctly model Nakano” and determined that brackets 35 were “essential” to predicting the motion of Nakano’s headrest. Id. at 23. Lear also argues that movement of Nakano’s headrest may be defined mathematically by a single equation, which allegedly demonstrates that Nakano’s headrest moves along “a single trajectory.” Id. at 23–24 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 112–15). Lear contends that Dr. Kent “admits” that a path of motion that can be expressed by a single equation establishes movement in only one manner. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 2012, 17:3–14). Our review of the cited testimony, reveals that it does not support Lear’s contention. We also do not understand Dr. Viano’s testimony to support a conclusion that a “single equation” defines the movement of Nakano’s headrest. Dr. Viano refers to Exhibit 2018 as reflecting his derivation of the mathematical relationships that define movement of Nakano’s headrest. Ex. 2010 ¶ 112 (citing Ex. 2018). Exhibit 2014 demonstrates that one equation defines the movement of Nakano’s headrest in the x-direction and another equation defines it in the y-direction. Ex. 2018, 1. Dr. Viano never provides an exemplary output of these two equations to illustrate how Nakano’s headrest would actually move. More importantly, however, Lear does not explain how Nakano’s express description that the coordinated operation of links 61, 62, and 63 lifts its headrest (as shown in Figure 5b) and subsequently lifts the headrest obliquely forward (as shown in Figure 5d) fails to constitute movement in a first and second manner. NHK persuades us by a preponderance of evidence that Nakano describes a headrest that moves in a first and second manner. More specifically, Nakano expressly states that it lifts the headrest (a first manner) and then subsequently lifts the headrest obliquely forward (a second manner). We need not determine whether Dr. Kent’s first or second kinematic model or Dr. Viano’s kinematic or geometric model accurately depicts the movement of Nakano’s headrest because Nakano expressly describes movement in first and second manners.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner
“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. The appropriate field of endeavor is determined by referring to the specification of the patent at issue “including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.” Id. at 1325–26. “A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“addressed by the ’949 patent, Lear persuades us that Seitzer fails to describe the guide member and follower of claims 2 and 25. Lear persuasively argues that Wiklund and Seitzer would not motivate a skilled artisan to incorporate a “bushing having a cam profile” into Wiklund’s support 24 (the alleged guideway) because Seitzer describes only rotating cams used in reciprocating machinery, not the claimed version of the guide member, a bushing having a cam configuration. Id. at 54–56. Drs. Viano and Kent agree that Seitzer describes rotating cams, Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 212–15; Ex. 2012, 198:12–14, 200:17–21. Both experts also agree that Seitzer does not describe the types of non-rotating cams to which the ’949 patent refers. Ex. 2010 ¶ 214; Ex. 2012, 205:3–5. We determine that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Seitzer fails to describe the types of non-rotating cam configurations discussed in the ’949 patent. Accordingly, we conclude that the combination of Wiklund and Seitzer does not render the guide member and follower of claims 2 and 25 obvious. Resp. 52–56. 4. Conclusion For the reasons expressed above, we conclude that NHK fails to persuade us by a preponderance of evidence that the combination of Wiklund and Seitzer renders claims 2 and 25 unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 6,631,949 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,631,949 - NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · IPR2014-01026 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11, 14, and 17–21 are unpatentable; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable because Wiklund does not disclose its required sequential contact portions.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1001, 5:9–22 (emphasis added). This passage is consistent with interpreting “first manner and second manner” as meaning “any two different ways.” As described in this quoted passage, if either the forward velocity or the trajectory of the headrest, or both changes, then movement in a first and second manner has occurred. For example, if the headrest were to move forward at one velocity and then merely slow down (or speed up) on the same trajectory, then movement would occur in a first and second manner.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Id. at 8:58–9:5 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion of the quotation establishes that Kage’s headrest moves differently at the beginning and end of its path S2'. Namely, Kage’s headrest moves quickly toward the occupant’s head at the beginning of path S2' and more slowly toward the occupant’s head at the end of path S2'.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“claims 12, 17, 18, and 21 obvious and sets forth the evidence from Wiklund and Humer to support its contentions in detailed claim charts. Pet. 43–46. NHK also proffers Dr. Kent’s testimony to explain the manner in which Wiklund describes the requirements recited in these claims. Ex. 1010¶¶ 60– 69. Claims 12 and 21 depend from claims 10 and 20, respectively, and further recite a “damper connected between the headrest arrangement and the seatback.” Ex. 1001, 13:15–16 (claim 12), 14:26–27 (claim 21). NHK relies upon Humer for its disclosure of a damper as recited in these claims. Pet. 44–46. More specifically, NHK contends that Humer teaches using a damper 118 to improve “energy absorptions” of the Saab SAHR headrest. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1007, 7:27–8:4). NHK also contends that Wiklund is directed to the same Saab SAHR headrest. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 60). NHK therefore concludes that an ordinary artisan would have found it obvious to improve Wiklund by adding Humer’s damper between the headrest arrangement and the seatback. Pet. 43–44. NHK contends that an ordinary artisan would have found it obvious to add a damper to Wiklund to “provide ‘some energy absorption to cause more even and controlled contact with the head during impact’ because without the damper 118 ‘the head tends to oscillate after impacting a headrest cushion.’” Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1007, page 8:1–4; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 60, 61, and 63).” slip op. at 34
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“IV. LEAR’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE We have reviewed Lear’s Motion to Exclude, NHK’s Opposition to the Motion, and Lear’s Reply in support of the Motion. Based on our review, we deny the Motion in all respects for one or both of the following reasons: (1) the Motion is moot because it seeks to exclude evidence not considered or relied upon in rendering this Decision or (2) the Motion addresses issues more appropriate to determining the weight ascribed to the evidence rather than the admissibility of evidence. In rendering this Decision, we determine and ascribe the appropriate weight to all proffered evidence and, when appropriate, comment upon the weight ascribed.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 6,655,733 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,655,733 - NHK Seating Of America, Inc. v. Lear CorporationSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2015 · IPR2014-00925 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over DE ’017 and DE ’826; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable because the combination lacks the claimed tab.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Not all surfaces guide a path of travel. We imposed this limitation based upon our review of the Specification. The pertinent portion of Figure 5 from the ’818 patent (reproduced at right) illustrates ramp 132 having two cam surfaces 134a and 134b (highlighted in green). These two cam surfaces together comprise cam surface 134. Ex. 1001, 8:65–9:2. Although we agree with Lear that the combination of cam surfaces 134a, 134b “changes the trajectory of travel” of the ends of lower crossbar 120, Lear fails to persuade us that the Specification justifies reading such a limitation into “cam surface.” The Specification specifically counsels against reading such a limitation into the claims by stating: “Those having ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the ramp 132 can include any number of cam surfaces oriented in any manner toward the upper armature 50 without departing from the scope of the invention.” Ex. 1001, 9:9–13 (emphasis added). Accordingly, either of cam surfaces 134a or 134b is within the “scope of the invention” because either one constitutes “any number of cam surfaces oriented in any manner.” Second, we are not persuaded by Lear’s argument that, by interpreting “cam surface” as meaning “a surface that guides a path of travel,” we render “to slide the transverse bar along the cam surface” superfluous. Resp. 33– 35. We read “to slide the transverse bar along the cam surface” as specifying which “path of travel” the “cam surface” guides, namely, the path of travel of the “transverse bar.” Because we are unpersuaded by Lear’s arguments for altering our preliminary interpretation of “cam surface,” we maintain our interpretation of “cam surface” as meaning “a surface that guides a path of travel.”” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“would render it inoperable for its intended purpose. First, we determine that both references have the same intended purpose, namely to move the head rest to a supportive position in response to a rear-end collision. Ex. 1004, Abstract, ¶¶ 15, 16, 18; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 27–30. Second, we determine that DE ’017 and DE ’826 both operate according to principles that efficiently translate the forces applied by the occupant to the seat back during a collision into movement of the head rest. Ex. 1004, Abstract, ¶ 5, claim 1; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 27–30. Third, we determine that both DE ’017 and DE ’826 do not move the head rest in response to forces encountered in normal, non-collision, conditions. Both systems respond only to forces large enough to overcome biasing forces imparted by springs that hold the head rest in the non-actuated position during normal conditions. Ex. 1004 ¶ 17; Ex. 1006 ¶ 25; Ex. 1012, 25:11–23; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 27–29. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that NHK’s proposed modification of DE ’017 would render DE ’017 inoperable for its intended purpose.” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedOther
“annotated figure is not a “tab” but instead an eyebolt. Because DE ’017 never directly describes or discusses this uppermost “tab” structure, Lear supports its argument with testimony from Dr. Viano. Surreply 3 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 19–22). The only portion of DE ’017 relating to this uppermost structure is a passage stating “At the end of the pivot lever 2d, opposite the pivotal axis 4, the coupling element 6b of the connection device 6 is suspended in an articulate fashion.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Dr. Viano testifies that, because of the way that this uppermost structure is illustrated in Figure 2b and the functional description of the connection between coupling element 6b and lever 2d, a skilled artisan would conclude that this uppermost structure is akin to an eyebolt. Ex. 2019 ¶ 22. Dr. Kent testifies that concluding that the uppermost structure is “drawn as a tab” is a “reasonable inference . . . based on the way it is characterized in the drawing and the mechanical function it performs.” Ex. 2020, 19:6–17. Dr. Kent offers no further explanation for his inference that the uppermost structure is a “tab.” We accept Dr. Viano’s tesimony on how a skilled artisan would view the uppermost structure that NHK identifies in the annotated version of Figure 2b of DE ’017 as being more credible, thorough, and reasoned than Dr. Kent’s. On the record before us, we are persuaded by Lear’s argument and evidence that the uppermost structure does not constitute the claimed “tab.”” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“surface” because slot 17 guides a path of travel for pin 18, which is operatively connected to impact plate 10 of DE ’826. Pet. 25, 31–32. On the record before us, and under our interpretation of “cam surface,” we are persuaded by NHK’s argument. Accordingly, we conclude that NHK has established by a preponderance of evidence that DE ’826 describes the “cam surface” recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,434,818 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,434,818 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2014 · IPR2013-00109 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9–12, 14, 22, and 23 were canceled as anticipated; claim 24 was not shown unpatentable, and the motion to amend was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“petitioner must establish facts supporting its challenges by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). 1. Anticipation The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit summarized the analytical framework for determining whether prior art anticipates a claim as follows: If the claimed invention was “described in a printed publication” either before the date of invention, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), or more than one year before the U.S. patent application was filed, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), then that prior art anticipates the patent. Although § 102 refers to “the invention” generally, the anticipation inquiry proceeds on a claim-by-claim basis. See Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007). To anticipate a claim, a single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose each claim limitation. Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But disclosure of each element is not quite enough—this court has long held that “[a]nticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 644, 360 F.2d 954, 960 (1966) (emphasis added)). Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We must analyze prior art references as a skilled artisan would. See Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (to anticipate, “[t]here must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention”).” slip op. at 32
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Both parties’ interpretations of “data access” are too narrow. Neither the challenged claims nor the Specification expressly limits “data access” to require a “request from the client” as proposed by Proxyconn. The claims merely recite “data access.” Even though the Specification describes examples in which the client requests data from a server, the Specification does not require that the client request data in all described embodiments of the claimed systems and methods. For example, the Specification expressly describes an embodiment in which “a sender/computer required to send data to a receiver/computer . . . initially sends a digital digest of the data.” Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 26–28. “[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321(Fed. Cir. 1989)). We decline to do so here. Microsoft’s position is similarly unsupported by the claims themselves or the Specification. None of the challenged independent claims affirmatively recites that the receiver/computer acquires data from the sender/computer. Microsoft cites no portion of the Specification, and we find no support for the proposition that the Specification equates “data access” with “data acquisition.” We determine that the plain meaning of “data access” is clear. Independent challenged claims 1, 6, 10, 11, and 22 recite “access” as a noun modified by “data.” Ex. 1002, col. 10, l. 31 (claims 1, 3), col. 10, l. 64 (claims 6, 7, and 9), col. 11, l. 20 (claim 10), col. 11, l. 35 (claims 11, 12, and 14), col. 12, l. 30 (claims 22–24). “Access” plainly means the “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1999). We conclude, therefore, that the claimed systems and methods recite “data access” to refer to the freedom or ability to obtain or use data. Although obtaining or acquiring data requires access to that data, access to the data need not involve acquisition of that data.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Resolution of the parties’ arguments relating to whether Yohe anticipates claims 1, 3, and 10 requires that we interpret “digital digests” as recited in the comparison means. We interpret “digital digests” by reading claim 1 in its entirety. Claim 1 recites that both the sender and receiver include “means for creating digital digests on data.” We conclude that the “digital digests” recited in the means for comparison refers to the “digital digests on data” that are recited earlier in claim 1 in the “means for creating.” b. Claim 10 Claim 10, like claim 1, recites that the receiver includes “means for comparison between digital digests.” Also like claim 1, claim 10 recites that the sender includes a “means for creating digital digests on data.” By contrast to claim 1, claim 10 does not recite a “means for creating” in the receiver. Ex. 1002, col. 11, ll. 20–33. Instead, the receiver includes a “means for storing a digital digest received from said network.” Id. at col. 11, ll. 31–32 (emphasis added). The reference to “a digital digest” rather than “the digital digest on data” in the storing means implies that the receiver can store any type of digital digest received from the network. Therefore, the “digests” that are compared in the “means for comparison” recited in claim 10 need not be the two digests on data created by the sender and receiver. Instead, the “means for comparison between digital digests” recited in claim 10 refers to structure that can compare any digital digest received from the network with any other digital digest.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A finding of anticipation by inherency requires more than probabilities or possibilities. Motorola Mobility LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Based on the evidence discussed above, it is possible to infer that Perlman describes such permanent storage memory. However, Microsoft has not presented evidence that the computers or routers described by Perlman necessarily use permanent storage memory as recited in claims 1 and 3. Therefore, Microsoft has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Perlman describes a receiver/computer or sender/computer necessarily having “permanent storage memory.” Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that Perlman anticipates claims 1 and 3.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 6,757,717 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,757,717
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.