- Emnos USA Corp. v. Dunnhumby LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · CBM2015-00162 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the Petition did not establish that the ’246 patent qualifies as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), the Director may not authorize a covered business method patent review unless the information in the petition, if unrebutted, “would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” As explained below, we do not institute a covered business method patent review because the Petition does not establish that the ’246 patent qualifies as a covered business method patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“remains deficient. The Petition relies on the Oracle Pro*C reference as disclosing the script template limitations of the independent claims, but as Patent Owner points out, the Petition does not present evidence establishing that Oracle Pro*C qualifies as a prior art printed publication. See Pet. 32– 34; Prelim. Resp. 50–53. Petitioner asserts that Oracle Pro*C “was published in 2002” but does not point to any specific evidence of its publication or public availability in 2002. Id. at 33. If Petitioner’s assertion is based on the “March 2002” statement that appears on the cover of the Oracle Pro*C reference, that statement is hearsay, and Petitioner does not argue that any hearsay exception or exclusion applies. See Ex. 1041, 1; see also ServiceNow, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Case IPR2015-00716, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Aug. 26, 2015) (Paper 13) (“To the extent that Petitioner relies on the date on the face of each exhibit and the indications of availability of these references for download . . . for the truth of that information, and considering that Petitioner has not established that any hearsay exception or exclusion applies, we agree [that the statements are inadmissible hearsay].”). Petitioner also argues, with citation to the testimony of Dr. Smyth, that Oracle Pro*C is a reference used by programmers who develop applications in Oracle database environments. Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶ 57). However, neither the Petition nor Dr. Smyth explains how or when the specific Programmer’s Guide, Release 9.2 that Petitioner relies on as the Oracle Pro*C reference (Ex. 1041) was made available to skilled artisans. Because the Petition does not establish that Oracle Pro*C qualifies as prior art, Section VIII.B. of the Petition does not remedy the deficient showing in Section III.D. of the Petition on the first consideration of the technological” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,214,246 - Washington Inventory Services D/B/A Wis International v. Rgis, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · CBM2014-00158 · APJ James T Moore · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 101 as directed to abstract inventory verification implemented with conventional technology, and under § 103 over Whitehouse and ordinary skill in the art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We must not import unrecited elements into the claim from the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The specification observes its own exemplary nature—“[i]t should be understood that the description and specific examples are intended for purposes of illustration only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure.” Ex. 1001, 2:16–19.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“During prosecution, in a responsive amendment, Patent Owner proffered that “mode” implied a device: Amended claim 1 recites “selecting a verification mode, which includes a set of rules that define a methodology for verifying the inventory dataset, from a plurality of verification modes” and “acquiring verification data in the completed area with the remote verification device based on the selected verification mode.” The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, 6th Edition, defines the word “mode” as “one of several alternative conditions or methods of operation of a device.” The portion regarding the “set of rules that define a methodology for verifying the inventory dataset” further clarifies what is meant by verification mode. Ex. 1002, 180–81. Claim 1, however, broadly interpreted, can reasonably refer to either “mode”—the verification mode, or the device mode. Moreover, the specification itself, in describing manual processing of prior art printed inventory sheets, also refers to that method of inventory verification as a “mode.” Ex. 1001, 1:31–38 (see in particular line 35). We, therefore, decline to limit the term “mode” to only “on a device” when inventory checking alone can have different “modes” of being” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Mr. Melucci opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’658 patent “would have at least two years [of] experience related to collecting and verifying inventory data.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 27. Dr. Jagannathan testifies that “a person of ordinary skill in the art of the [’]658 Patent would have had: (1) a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or related field; (2) one year of related professional experience; and (3) a basic understanding of inventory processes and the use of UPCs and other product identifiers. The professional experience may include, for example, work related to use of bar codes, stock keeping units, and the like. It is further my opinion that relevant professional or practical experience with computer systems and software may substitute for academic credentials.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 40. Based on our review of the ’658 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’658 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of the parties’ Declarants, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had at least two years of experience in computerized inventory management. We further note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 18
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“imports limitations into the claims from the specification. See, e.g., PO Resp. 35 (discussing the claims jointly). For example, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner “ignores the actual claim language that requires the verification mode selection to be made on and with the device.” PO Resp. 37. The defect in this argument is that the language of “selecting a particular verification mode on the verification device” is absent from claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 6:2–14. Furthermore, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “mode” does not limit the step to a device. Claim 1 positively recites the device in the downloading, deploying, acquiring, computing, and displaying steps, but the term “device” is specifically omitted from the selecting step. Accordingly, we do not interpret claim 1 as requiring the step of selecting a verification mode on the device. Contrary to Patent Owner’s position, we are persuaded by Petitioner that each of challenged claims 1–14, and 18, as a whole, is directed to the fundamental concept of providing inventory verification. Pet. 23. In the Abstract, the ’658 patent states: “[a] system and method of verifying the completeness and accuracy of inventory records is disclosed.” Ex. 1001, Abst. Additionally, in the Background section, the ’658 patent states: Prior methods of verification require that the inventory records be printed out in a predetermined format which is then taken to a specific area in the facility for comparison to the inventory physically located there. These methods are inflexible, tedious and time consuming because the mode of verification is strictly depend[e]nt on the predetermined format of the printed reports and requires a repeated reference to the report and comparison with the actual inventory. Ex. 1001, 1:31–38. The only technological features recited in claims 1–14 and 18 are a computer performing conventional computer functions. Ex. 1001, 6:2–22. Specifically, those include downloading data from a computer to a device, deploying the device, acquiring data with the device, computing, and displaying.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 8,606,658 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,606,658 - American Express Company / American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. v. Signature Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 28, 2015 · CBM2015-00153 · APJ Michael P Tierney · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–16 because those originally issued claims had been cancelled or amended during reexamination; it did not reach the merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We are persuaded that the particular facts of this proceeding counsel against institution. Our decision whether to institute a covered business method patent review must be based on the claims of the ’402 patent as it exists today. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Petitioner challenged original claims 1–16, which Patent Owner has either cancelled or amended during ex parte reexamination. See Ex. 3001. Original claims 1–16, as challenged by Petitioner, no longer exist, and any decision as to the patentability of original claims 1–16 we might reach in this proceeding would be moot and purely advisory. We do not see how the efficient administration of the Office, or the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding, would be secured by instituting a covered business method patent review in this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). In denying institution, we do not reach the merits of the unpatentability arguments in the Petition, and express no opinion on those arguments at this time. Furthermore, based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner is not prejudiced as they may elect to file a new Petition directed to the amended claims.3” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,423,402 - Square, Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 23, 2015 · CBM2015-00148 · APJ James B Arpin · CBM · Institution
Institution of CBM review of claims 1–4 was denied because § 325(e)(1) estopped Square from pursuing grounds it reasonably could have raised in its earlier CBM petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDenied
“(emphasis added). As noted above, we issued a Final Written Decision in CBM2014-00156, determining that claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. ’156 Dec. 40. Petitioner here was the petitioner in CBM2014-00156, which resulted in a Final Written Decision with respect to claims 1–4. Thus, pursuant to § 325(e)(1), Petitioner cannot “request or maintain” a proceeding before the Office with respect to these claims “on any ground” that Petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” in its Petition in CBM2014-00156.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“discovered Orlen earlier, or foreseen our determination that Petitioner had not shown Vazvan’s public availability, we are not persuaded that Petitioner reasonably could not have raised each of the challenges identified above to claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent, based on 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in its CBM2014- 00156 Petition. Section 325(e)(1) estops Petitioner from requesting or maintaining a proceeding before the Office with respect to the claims at issue in CBM2015-00148 on “any ground that [Petitioner] raised or reasonably could have raised” in CBM2014-00156. Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) is applicable to the new challenges to claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent. Consequently, Petitioner is estopped from requesting, e.g., petitioning for institution of, or maintaining a proceeding with respect to claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent on the grounds asserted here. See supra Section I.E. Because Petitioner is estopped from requesting or maintaining a proceeding with respect to claims 1–4 based on any ground it “reasonably could have raised” in its earlier petition, we deny covered business method patent review of claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent in the present proceeding.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,711,100 - Maxmind, Inc. v. Fraud Control Systems.Com CorporationAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 17, 2015 · CBM2015-00094 · APJ James A Worth · CBM · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against the Patent Owner and cancelled claims 1–30 after the Patent Owner requested cancellation.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“DISCUSSION A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Here, Patent Owner requests adverse judgment with cancellation of claims 1–30 of the ’942 patent. Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner and cancellation of claims 1–30 of the ʼ942 patent are appropriate. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Patent Owner’s Request to Abandon Contest is granted. It is, therefore, ORDERED that adverse judgment against the Patent Owner is entered under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b); FURTHER ORDERED that this constitutes a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a); and FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1–30 of U.S. Patent No. 8,630,942 B2 be CANCELLED.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,630,942 - Hewlett-Packard Company v. Yyz LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 16, 2015 · CBM2015-00050 · APJ Richard E Rice · CBM · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment based on Patent Owner’s abandonment and cancelled claims 51, 52, and 55–57 of U.S. Patent No. 7,603,674 B2.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for such an adverse judgment include abandonment of the contest. We find that Patent Owner’s actions and admissions, as set forth in the Motion, constitute abandonment of these CBM Proceedings, and we determine based on such abandonment that Patent Owner has requested adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) in both proceedings.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,603,674 - Hewlett-Packard Company v. Yyz LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 16, 2015 · CBM2015-00049 · APJ Richard E Rice · CBM · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment based on Patent Owner’s abandonment and ordered claims 22–23, 27–29 of the ’749 patent and claims 51–52, 55–57 of the ’674 patent cancelled.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for such an adverse judgment include abandonment of the contest. We find that Patent Owner’s actions and admissions, as set forth in the Motion, constitute abandonment of these CBM Proceedings, and we determine based on such abandonment that Patent Owner has requested adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) in both proceedings.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,062,749 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 8, 2015 · CBM2015-00015 · APJ Rama G Elluru · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request and request to seek termination, but granted its request for an oral hearing in both proceedings.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. We deny Smartflash’s request for rehearing of our Order and its” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for patent owner
“In our Order, we determined that 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,118,221 (“the ’221 patent”) in CBM2015-00015 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00102, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 1 of the ’221 patent. Dec. 3. We likewise determined that § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317 (“the ’317 patent”) in CBM2015-00018 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00112, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 18 of the ’317 patent. Id. at 7. Because we determined that Apple “reasonably could have raised” a 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge to these claims in its CBM2014-00102 and CBM2014-00112 petitions and because claims 1 and 18 were the only claims challenged in CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015- 00018, respectively, we dismissed Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015- 00015 and CBM2015-00018. Id. at 4–5, 7. We further stated that because Apple is the only Petitioner in these cases, we would not hear any argument” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Smartflash’s request for leave to file a Motion to Terminate is denied for the reasons previously set forth in our Estoppel Order. See Paper 37, 5– 6.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,118,221 - Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 8, 2015 · CBM2015-00018 · APJ Rama G Elluru · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Smartflash’s rehearing request and authorization to seek termination, but granted an oral hearing in CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015-00018.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. We deny Smartflash’s request for rehearing of our Order and its request for authorization to file a motion to terminate these cases. However, we grant Smartflash’s request for a hearing in CBM2015- 00015 and CBM2015-00018, as discussed below.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelDecided for patent owner
“In our Order, we determined that 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,118,221 (“the ’221 patent”) in CBM2015-00015 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00102, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 1 of the ’221 patent. Dec. 3. We likewise determined that § 325(e)(1) is applicable to Apple with respect to claim 18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,317 (“the ’317 patent”) in CBM2015-00018 because Apple was the Petitioner in CBM2014-00112, which resulted in a final written decision with respect to claim 18 of the ’317 patent. Id. at 7. Because we determined that Apple “reasonably could have raised” a 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge to these claims in its CBM2014-00102 and CBM2014-00112 petitions and because claims 1 and 18 were the only claims challenged in CBM2015-00015 and CBM2015- 00018, respectively, we dismissed Apple as a Petitioner from CBM2015- 00015 and CBM2015-00018. Id. at 4–5, 7. We further stated that because Apple is the only Petitioner in these cases, we would not hear any argument” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Smartflash’s request for leave to file a Motion to Terminate is denied for the reasons previously set forth in our Estoppel Order. See Paper 37, 5– 6.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 7,942,317 - Square, Inc. v. Think Computer CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 27, 2015 · CBM2014-00159 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–11, 13–17, and 20–22 are unpatentable under § 103; the motion to amend claims 23–43 is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Beginning with the claim terms themselves, the word “selectively” is used. We discern that the ordinary and customary usage of this word denotes expressly that a particular account need not function simultaneously as both a merchant account and a purchaser account; a user is permitted expressly to select which account mode is desired at the appropriate point in time. The following disclosure in the Specification is consistent with this understanding: An entity (e.g., a person, business, or other legally recognized entity) preferably creates an account within the payment system. The accounts of the payment system are preferably designed so that an account may selectively function as either a merchant or a purchaser during any particular transaction. In other words, within the scope of all transactions, accounts of the payment system can function as bi-directional transaction accounts. Ex. 1001, 3:15–22. Indeed, here, the Specification discloses expressly that being able to select which account mode is desired is the same as “bi-directional transaction accounts.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“more properly considered a claim construction. PO Resp. 9. And indeed, when considered in conjunction with Petitioner’s proposed construction, the two constructions are similar. As noted by both Patent Owner and Petitioner, the Specification only mentions “line item data,” or similar wording, as follows: Additionally, as one of the main benefits of having merchant product catalogs integrated into the payment system, line item transaction data can be communicated. The line item data is additionally stored as part of the transaction record of the accounts. This itemized information can be very useful, such as in one application where tax forms are automatically completed by aggregating each category of line item transaction data as appropriate. Ex. 1001, 8:6–13. From the aforementioned portion of the Specification, we determine that the key to a proper construction of “line item data” is that it is information that is itemized and capable of categorization. In other words, “line item data” is an itemized part of a larger whole, more specifically, but not limited to, product catalogs, purchase lists, and transactions records, i.e., at a most granular level, individual products involved in a purchase or sale, as advocated by Petitioner. This focus on itemization and categorization of products is supported by other portions of the Specification cited by the parties, for example, column 2, lines 15–17, which recites that “[t]he integration of the payment system and product catalog functions to enable recording and tracking transactions with itemized detail” (emphases added). See also Ex. 1001, 5:51–55 (“the method may additionally store purchase list information as a transaction record for the merchant account and/or the purchaser account, which functions to form an itemized purchase history” (emphasis added)); 4:4–6 (“[t]he product catalog preferably includes a listing of product descriptions and prices for each product contained within the product catalog” (emphases added)); 4:6–13 (“[a]dditional information may be included for a product such as categories for tax purposes and other purposes, product-related IDs for each distributor of the product (e.g., Stock-Keeping Unit or ‘SKU’), images or media files related to the product, inventory related information (the number of items on hand, on order, etc. at each warehouse location), or any other suitable product-related data” (emphases added)); 4:13–16 (“[t]he product catalog may be a database accessed by outside applications, but may additionally or alternatively include a hosted web-based store through which products can be added to a shopping cart (i.e., a purchase list)” (emphases added)). Accordingly, we construe “line item data” as “itemized information from a larger group of information, related to individual products involved in a purchase or sale, that is capable of categorization,” where non-limiting examples of “line item data” may include one or more of “quantity, description, type, cost, product identifier (e.g., stock keeping unit), tax, duty, shipping or other fees.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“valid reason for combining Bemmel and Dalzell, because Dr. Sadeh- Koniecpol’s opinions of industry custom are unsupported. We are unpersuaded that Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol’s opinions are unsupported, and especially unpersuaded that Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol has not provided adequate support regarding the reasons for combining Bemmel and Dalzell. Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol includes explicit citations to references, in particular Bemmel and Dalzell, for supporting his conclusions, and we determine that any purported “leaps of logic” taken by Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol are reasonable given the underlying support. For example, Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol opines that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the mobile payment system of Bemmel with the electronic marketplace of Dalzell.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 136. Of course, this paragraph considered in isolation would be an unsupported opinion. Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol, however, then goes on to support this opinion with explicit citations to Bemmel and Dalzell. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 137, 139, 140. Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol then reaches conclusions that we determine flow logically from those citations. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138, 141, 142.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Patent Owner asserts additionally that the Board should exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and deny the Petition, because similar art was already before the Examiner during prosecution. We note that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is normally exercised in a Decision on Institution. Moreover, we have already conducted a full trial in this proceeding subsequent to a Decision on Institution. Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is discretionary, and insofar as Patent Owner is requesting any vacating of the Decision on Institution, we decline to do so for the reasons set forth above.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,396,808 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,396,808
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.