• Dolby Laboratories, Inc. v. Intertrust Technologies CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 8, 2020 · IPR2020-00663 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1 and 2 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that either claim would have been obvious over Griswold or England.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Upon consideration of the submitted evidence and argument, we conclude the information presented does not show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’603 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the ’603 patent was filed (a “POSITA”) would have had a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, mathematics, or a related field, and approximately two years of relevant experience or equivalent study in electronic data protection, electronic content protection, or digital rights management. Pet. 16. Petitioner further states that additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 47–48). Patent Owner sets forth a similar definition, stating that a POSITA would have a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science, and three years of work or research experience in the fields of secure transactions and encryption, or a Master’s degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science and two years of work or research experience in related fields. Prelim. Resp. 19. Patent Owner states that the positions set forth in its Preliminary Response would be the same under either parties’ proposal. Id. The parties’ proposals do not differ in any meaningful way to the issues in dispute. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, except that we delete the qualifier “a minimum” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound, i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond, and thus does not meaningfully indicate the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Madisetti and is commensurate with the level of ordinary skill as reflected in the prior art and the ’603 patent. We note, however, that our analysis would be the same under either parties’ definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “should be construed to mean “conditions or characteristics determined in advance against which to check the structure and/or behavior of one or more software modules.” Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–72). To support this proposed construction, Petitioner states that the ’603 patent describes “inspector modules that ‘are operable to check the structure and/or behavior of drivers, software, and/or hardware against predefined criteria.’” Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1001, 15:36–62); see also id. (citing Ex. 1001, 16:25–34, 23:63–24:4). Patent Owner contends that the term “predetermined criteria” does not require construction and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 21. Patent Owner further asserts that construction of this term is not necessary to resolve the matters presently in dispute. Id. We agree that no explicit construction of this phrase is necessary for our decision on whether to institute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to Petitioner’s first argument, Petitioner contends that “a POSITA would have understood that in the embodiment where the software is separate from the content[,] the monitor at the licensee’s site must first identify the software in order for the software to be used together with the content . . . .” Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 93), id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). Petitioner, however, does not provide sufficient evidence to support its contention. Although Petitioner cites to the declaration testimony of Dr. Madisetti to support its argument, Dr. Madisetti’s testimony merely repeats verbatim what is stated in the Petition and provides no additional persuasive facts or objective evidence to support his conclusion. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 93; see also id. at ¶¶ 77–82. To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, 829 F.3d at 1380; see also In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value). We are also not persuaded by Petitioner’s second argument that “a POSITA would have understood that in the embodiment where the software is separate from the content[,] the monitor at the licensee’s site must first identify the software . . . so that information identifying the software can be transmitted in the license datagram for evaluation at the licensor’s site.” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1006, 5:44–45, 6:37–51; Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence or argument either that the license datagram provides information about the software (as opposed to the licensed product itself) or a reason why a POSITA would have understood information about the software would be provided in the datagram for evaluation at the licensor’s site. To support this second argument, Petitioner states Griswold’s license check system involves sending a “request datagram” or a “license datagram” to the licensor’s site in order to obtain approval to use the licensed product. Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:62–4:5, 5:44–52). Petitioner contends Griswold’s “license datagram 3 describes information related to the use of licensed product 1, including an identification of product 1 (i.e., the software).” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1006, 5:44–45, 6:37–51); see also id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1006, 5:44–45, 6:37–51; Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). Griswold, however, does not state that license datagram 3 identifies the software separately from the product. Rather, Griswold sates that datagram 3 contains a number of fields, including product model number 24 that identifies product 1. Ex. 1006, 6:45–48. Thus, we disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that license datagram 3 identifies the software separately from the product. Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have understood that, in the embodiment where the software is separate from the content, the monitor must first identify the software so that information identifying the software can be transmitted in the license datagram for evaluation at the licensors site, is conclusory and unsupported. See Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). Thus, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Griswold teaches the” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,406,603
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. Chervon (HK) LimitedInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 7, 2020 · PGR2020-00061 · APJ Linda E Horner · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that the ’420 patent was eligible for post-grant review.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s evidence in support of its assertion that “[t]he earlier [CN914] application does not disclose a ‘gripping member’ and ‘handle’” is inadequate. Petitioner attempts to show that the earlier CN914 application does not disclose these claimed features by showing that the later CN040 application does disclose them. But, Petitioner’s premise that the earlier CN914 application omits these features does not necessarily or logically flow from this showing. In other words, the depiction of what appears to be a substantially cylindrical gripping member and an elongated handle in the later CN040 application does not exclude these features also from being disclosed in the earlier CN914 application. Further, as Patent Owner demonstrated by the side-by-side annotated figures from each priority application, the earlier CN914 application appears to show similar-looking features as the substantially cylindrical gripping member and the elongated handle identified by Petitioner in the figures of the later CN040 application. A relevant difference between these two annotated figures is that the features depicted in the earlier CN914 application that Patent Owner annotates as corresponding to the “elongated handle” and the “substantially cylindrical gripping portion” do not have accompanying reference numbers “13” and “23” associated with them in that figure, while these same features depicted in the later CN040 application include the same reference numbers “13” and “23” that appear in the parent ’627 patent figures. Although the lack of reference numbers in the earlier CN914 application may suggest that the written description of this earlier application does not discuss these features explicitly, drawings alone can provide “written description” support for features depicted in them. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[D]rawings alone may be sufficient to provide the ‘written description of the invention’ required by § 112, first paragraph.”). Petitioner has failed to address the drawings presented in the earlier CN914 application or establish sufficiently that the claim features of the parent ’627 patent are not disclosed therein. For these reasons, we find that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

    “of the Petition. RPI Motion, 1 (seeking “to identify Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd., Techtronic Industries North America, Inc., and Homelite Consumer Products, Inc., as real parties-in-interest without admitting that they are, in fact, real parties-in-interest”). Because we deny the Petition for other reasons, we do not decide this motion. 2 The other eight petitions are IPR2020-00883, IPR2020-00884, IPR2020- 00885, IPR2020-00886, IPR2020-00887, IPR2020-00888, PGR2020-00059, and PGR2020-00060.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached

    “Patent Owner contends that we should exercise that discretion and not institute trial because of the state of the parallel district court litigation.7 Prelim. Resp. 14–16. Because we determine that Petitioner fails to show the ’420 patent is eligible for post-grant review, we need not address Patent Owner’s contentions concerning discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “This issue has been addressed by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337 (“This as-applied severance . . . cures the constitutional violation.”); see also Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 953 F.3d 760, 764 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Moore, J., concurring in denial of rehearing) (“Because the APJs were constitutionally appointed as of the implementation of the severance, inter partes review decisions going forward were no longer rendered by unconstitutional panels.”). Accordingly, we do not consider this issue any further for this Decision.” slip op. at 10

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,420
• Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2020 · IPR2020-01082 · APJ Amanda F Wieker · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 1–8 because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). The 3 Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Although the record reflects certain disputes regarding the claim language, it is not necessary for us to resolve those disputes in order to determine whether Petitioner has satisfied its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. See also Pet. 16–19 (construing the claim terms “alarm condition” and “alarm notification delay time,” but stating that the “Board need not construe these terms because the claims are invalid under either [parties’ proposed] interpretation”); Prelim. Resp. 27–31 (agreeing that “the Board does not need to construe any claim terms for purposes of deciding whether to institute the Petition,” but also arguing that Petitioner failed to identify corresponding structure for the purported meansplus-function term, “reporting module”). Accordingly, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been a person with at least a B.S. degree in electrical or biomedical engineering or a related field with at least two years’ experience designing patient monitoring systems,” wherein “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–43). Patent Owner does not offer a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Moreover, Petitioner provides insufficient reasoning to show that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to modify Lynn’s system to implement Kalkman’s simulation. We agree with Patent Owner that such a modification would render Lynn unsuitable for its intended purpose as an oximeter testing apparatus. Prelim. Resp. 46–47. For example, Petitioner does not explain how Lynn’s system would achieve its intended purpose of testing the responsiveness of an oximeter if the system were modified to simulate pre-alarm delay times instead of respiratory arrest. See, e.g., Pet. 43 (“[A] PHOSITA would have been motivated to modify the system of Lynn to use the pre-alarm delay time simulation of Kalkman to achieve the predictable result of optimizing pre-alarm delay times and reducing false and transient alarms.”). Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Yanulis explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to abandon Lynn’s intended purpose as an oximeter testing apparatus, even if such a combination would have resulted in the optimization of pre-alarm delay times, as Petitioner contends. Pet. 42–44; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–113. Petitioner does not discuss this trade-off in functionality or intended purpose at all.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,255,994
• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Agis Software Development, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2020 · IPR2020-00871 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–68 under § 314(a), finding that the parallel litigation’s timing, investment, and overlapping issues made review inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “Petition is particularly problematic in this case because there is significant overlap between the subject matter and alleged grounds of unpatentability found in the Petition and those petitions previously filed. See Apple Inc. v. AGIS Software Dev. LLC, IPR2018-01471, Paper 1 (PTAB July 31, 2018); Google LLC v. AGIS Software Dev. LLC, IPR2018-01086, Paper 2 (PTAB May 15, 2018). In fact, the Petition includes portions that are substantially identical to the petitions previously filed. Compare, e.g., Pet. 1–5, 8–34 with IPR2018-01471, Paper 1 at 1–2, 6–8, 12–39. This similarity shows that Petitioner was fully capable of filing the Petition at or around the time Petitioner was served with a complaint giving them notice that the ’829 patent was being asserted by Patent Owner. Moreover, Petitioner is challenging the patentability of every claim in the ’829 patent, which suggests that there was no need for Petitioner to delay filing until Patent Owner identified which specific claims of the ’829 patent were being asserted. When “the evidence shows that the petitioner[s] did not file the petition expeditiously . . . or even if the petitioner cannot explain the delay in filing its petition,” we weigh this factor toward exercising discretion to deny Petitioner had everything it needed to file the Petition much earlier in the parallel District Court proceeding and because Petitioner offers no explanation for why the filing was delayed, we find the timing of the Petition weighs heavily toward exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “relevant circumstances, Petitioner contends that this factor “favors institution because the grounds in the petition provide a strong showing of obviousness.” Pet. 67. Although we do not undertake here a full analysis of the merits, our initial inspection of the record and the parties’ arguments suggest that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition. The showing, however, is not so strong as to tip the balance in favor of institution. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 14 (“[I]f the merits of a ground raised in the petition seem particularly strong on the preliminary record, this fact has favored institution”) (emphasis added). In a balanced assessment of the relevant evidence of record, this factor neither weighs in favor nor against exercising our discretion to deny institution. G. Conclusion Based on the particular circumstances of this case, we determine that instituting an inter partes review would be an inefficient use of Board resources. As discussed above, the trial in the underlying litigation is currently scheduled to begin in about four months and may conclude several months before we would reach a final decision in this proceeding. Furthermore, the record shows that Petitioner delayed filing the Petition without any excuse for the delay and, therefore, bears significant expended effort in preparing for the upcoming trial that will address issues that substantially overlap with those raised in the Petition. On balance, after a holistic consideration of the relevant facts, we conclude that efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying institution. Thus, we exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that no inter partes review is instituted.” slip op. at 17

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,749,829
• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Agis Software Development, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2020 · IPR2020-00873 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors favored denial because trial was near, the petition was delayed, and issues substantially overlapped.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “relevant circumstances, Petitioner contends that this factor “favors institution because the grounds in the petition provide a strong showing of obviousness.” Pet. 73. Although we do not undertake here a full analysis of the merits, our initial inspection of the record and the parties’ arguments suggest that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. In a balanced assessment of the relevant evidence of record, and in view of the possible strength of Petitioner’s showing on the present record, this factor is neutral.” slip op. at 15

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “On the record before us at this time, the only persuasive facts that we have regarding the proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision is an Order by the District Court that sets trial for April 5, 2021, which will require “good cause” to be changed, and our projected statutory deadline, which would be toward the end of November 2021. While we appreciate that the trial date is susceptible to change if and when the District Court determines good cause exists to do so, we decline to speculate whether such a contingency will occur. Instead, we must base our evaluation on the existing facts supported by the evidence of record. This factor, therefore, significantly favors the exercise of discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,820,123
• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Agis Software Development, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2020 · IPR2020-00872 · APJ Trevor M Jefferson · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 314(a), finding that the parallel district court trial, unexplained petition delay, and overlapping issues made review inefficient.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “A. Fintiv Factor 1: Stay in the Underlying Litigation Petitioner contends the first Fintiv factor “favors institution because Judge Gilstrap commonly grants stays after institution of an IPR” and that it intends to seek a stay now that the Petition has been filed. Pet. 74–75 (citing Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2:17-cv-00231-JRG, Order (E.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. BITCO Gen. Ins. Corp., 6:15- cv-59, Memorandum Opinion and Order (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2016); Memsmart Semiconductor Corp. v. AAC Techs., 2:14-CV-1107-JRG, Order (E.D. Tex. July 10, 2015); Image Processing Techs. LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:16-cv-505-JRG, Order (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2017)). Petitioner notably, however, fails to provide any analysis of these cited cases to demonstrate that the facts presented here are analogous to those leading Judge Gilstrap to determine a stay was appropriate. Patent Owner counters that Petitioner’s “motion for a stay has been denied,” although a renewed motion will be permitted if we grant institution of inter partes review. Prelim. Resp. 15. Patent Owner contends, however, that any renewed motion by Petitioner for a stay of the parallel district court proceedings will likely be denied. Id. at 15–16. This is so, Patent Owner argues, because, by the time the District Court is able to hear such a motion, the case will have developed to the later stages of the proceedings. See id. Furthermore, Patent Owner argues that because “the Petitioners copied this Petition from previous filings, their delay is likely to weigh heavily against them.” Id. at 15 (citing Intellectual Ventures v. FedEx et al., No. 2:16-cv-00980-JRG, Dkt. 141 at 4–5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2017)).5 Given the District Court’s apparent willingness to reconsider a motion to stay if we grant institution of inter partes review, but also considering the later stage of the district court proceeding, with trial scheduled to begin in a little over four months, we view the first Fintiv factor, on balance, as neutral in determining whether to exercise discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “relevant circumstances, Petitioner contends that this factor “favors institution because the grounds in the petition provide a strong showing of obviousness.” Pet. 77. Although we do not undertake here a full analysis of the merits, our initial inspection of the record and the parties’ arguments suggest that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. In a balanced assessment of the relevant evidence of record, and in view of the possible strength of Petitioner’s showing on the present record, this factor is neutral. G. Fintiv Conclusion Based on the particular circumstances of this case, we determine that instituting an inter partes review would be an inefficient use of Board resources. As discussed above, the trial in the underlying litigation is currently scheduled to begin in about four months and may conclude several months before we would reach a final decision in this proceeding. Furthermore, the record shows that Petitioner delayed filing the Petition without any excuse for the delay and, therefore, bears significant responsibility for the fact that the district court and the parties have expended effort in preparing for the upcoming trial that will address issues that substantially overlap with those raised in the Petition. On balance, after a holistic consideration of the relevant facts, we conclude that efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying institution. Thus, we exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 15

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,820,123
• Banilla Games, Inc. v. Savvy Dog Systems, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 19, 2020 · CBM2020-00014 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the remaining claims did not establish that the patent claims a financial product or service, as required for CBM review.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). For reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that the challenged patent qualifies as a covered business method patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute a covered business method patent review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the limitations “determining a winning combination” and “testing the game field . . . to ensure that a winning combination more valuable . . .” are not financial in nature. Beginning with “winning combination,” we agree with Patent Owner that “winning,” by itself, is not necessarily monetary in nature. Prelim. Resp. 28. Indeed, other games include the step of determining whether a combination is a “winning combination” or not without necessarily involving any kind of prize or payout. See id. at 29–30. Instead, as is shown in the ’223 patent, some additional step after the determination of who won is necessarily if there is going to be some monetary payout corresponding to the win. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 6 (showing Step 630 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), Fig. 8 (showing Step 820 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), 6:34–40 (explaining a player “may” redeem points earned in the game for cash). Petitioner identifies nothing in the specification requiring that money be paid for just winning. Moreover, the ’223 patent makes clear that the games are intended broadly for “entertainment” and “amusement” and not just for gambling. See id. at 1:13–15 (explaining patent is related to “amusement and entertainment electronic gaming”). As Patent Owner explains, the ’223 patent expressly discusses the use of the games in Ohio, which prohibits gambling, but permits the use of games of skill for entertainment purposes. See Prelim. Resp. 52–58 (discussing Ohio’s laws in detail); Ex. 1001, 1:18–33 (describing Ohio’s laws prohibiting gambling, but allowing “games of skill”). Thus, at best, “winning combination” relates only to the possibility that a monetary payout could be received, not that a player necessarily will receive anything of monetary value for playing the game. This possibility is insufficient to meet the financial product or service requirement. See Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382 (noting “it cannot be the case that a patent covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service” and “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur”).” slip op. at 10

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,736,223
• Philip Morris Products, S.A. v. Rai Strategic Holdings, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 16, 2020 · IPR2020-00919 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution for claims 27–30 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial because the ITC was expected to decide validity before the Board.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “January 25, 2021, with a May 14, 2021 deadline for the Initial Determination and a September 15, 2021 due date for the Final Determination. Prelim. Resp. 63 (citing Ex. 2029, 3–4). If we were to institute an inter partes review, then the statutory deadline for our final written decision would be in November, 2021. Patent Owner argues that this timing “strongly favors denial of institution.” Id. at 62–63. Petitioner counters that, even though the “final written decision is due after the ITC’s target date,” the final written decision will issue “long before the district court will lift the stay and decide validity.” Reply 7. We agree with Patent Owner that the ITC is likely to reach a final determination ahead of the date of our final written decision. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 9

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,901,123
• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 12, 2020 · PGR2020-00063 · APJ Lynne H Browne · PGR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1–9, finding the § 101 arguments previously presented to the Office and the other grounds insufficient to show likely unpatentability.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied

    “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. The Board recently explained a two-part framework that the Board uses under § 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or 4 “ObjectLabel” (Ex. 1007, “ObjectLabel”). 5 US 2015/0153913 A1, issued June 4, 2015 (Ex. 1008, “Ballard”). substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The Board further explained that “[i]f a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute.” Id. at 8–9. “If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.” Id. at 9. The Becton, Dickinson6 factors, which address discretion to deny when a Petition presents the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously presented to the Office, are instructive. Id. (“[T]he Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” (Footnote omitted)).” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “(“the ’432 patent”). Supercell Oy (“Supercell”) filed a petition requesting post-grant review of claims 1–9 of the ’432 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”). GREE, in turn, filed a preliminary response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). After considering the petition and the preliminary response, as well as all supporting evidence, we determine the petition does not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’432 patent is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Thus, we do not institute post-grant review of claims 1–9 of the ’432 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “‘“the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.’” Prelim. Resp. 11 (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “Rather, ‘the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had ‘possession’ of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.’” Id. (citing Ariad Pharms, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)).” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “information.” Id. at 7:34–41. In particular, Ross explains that “[t]he user may interact with the secondary, tertiary, etc., virtual reality content and then return his view back to the movie wherein the movie has been adjusted to reflect the user’s interaction with the secondary, tertiary, etc., virtual reality content.” Id. at 7:41–45. Ross explains further that “while a user views primary virtual reality content, system 10 may be configured to display a ‘pop-up’ cue indicating that additional virtual reality content (e.g., additional characters) is available in a different (e.g., secondary, tertiary, etc.) content area.” Id. at 7:46–50. Thus, we understand Ross to disclose a system wherein a user can turn their gaze from a primary area to a secondary, tertiary, etc., area to view content related to the content in the primary area. See Ross, 7:21–33 (“Responsive to the user turning his view from the primary virtual reality content . . . a sensory cue comprising . . . secondary, tertiary, etc., . . . may be displayed to the user.”). Further, we understand Ross to disclose a system wherein the user’s focus on an item in the primary area may activate a “popup” cue in the primary area directing the user to additional virtual reality content in a secondary, tertiary, etc., area. See id. at 7:46–50 (“[W]hile a user views primary virtual reality content, system 10 may be configured to display a ‘pop-up’ cue indicating that additional virtual reality content . . . is available in a different (e.g., secondary, tertiary, etc.) content area.”). We do not, however, understand Ross’ “pop-up” cue to be activated in a secondary, tertiary, etc. area based on the user’s gaze position moving to the second area from the first area as required by claims 1, 8, and 9. See id. Therefore, because Ross describes displaying a “pop-up” cue while a user is viewing primary virtual reality content (see Ross, 7:46–50), Petitioner does not show persuasively that Ross discloses that “a gaze position moving to the second area from the first area” is an “information providing condition.” Furthermore, Petitioner’s cited testimonial evidence does not explain sufficiently how Ross discloses the recited “information providing condition.” See Ex. 1003 ¶ 73. For the reasons above, Petitioner does not show adequately that Ross discloses an “information providing condition [that] is a condition of a gaze position moving to the second area from the first area.”” slip op. at 18

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,406,432
• ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · IPR2020-00952 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b), and denied Roku’s motion for joinder.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barDenied

    “III. ANALYSIS “An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). The parties agree that the Petition was filed more than one year after the date on which Petitioner was served in the related litigation with a complaint” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s argument is nevertheless foreclosed by the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In that decision, the Federal Circuit expressly considered the impact of Thryv, determining that the Board’s joinder decisions are “unlike” the challenges it is precluded from reviewing and “more like” those that it may review. Windy City, 973 F.3d at 1332. the Board’s joinder decisions.” Id. And after reviewing such a joinder decision, the court further concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) “does not authorize same-party joinder, and does not authorize the joinder of new issues.” Id. at 1333–38. In accordance with the Federal Circuit’s decision, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Consequently, we conclude that the Petition is time-barred and that no exception applies under the facts before us. We therefore deny the Petition.” slip op. at 9

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,716,853

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.