• Precision Planting, LLC / Agco Corp. v. Deere & CompanyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2020 · IPR2019-01055 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 10, 12–17, 19, and 20 were not shown unpatentable over Hedderwick, Koning, and Benac because Petitioner did not establish motivation to combine or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “would have had either: (1) a bachelor’s degree plus four years of experience in mechanical engineering, agricultural engineering, or a related field; or (2) a master’s degree plus two years of experience in mechanical engineering, agricultural engineering, or a related field.” Pet. 45 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 19–20). In the testimony the Petition cites in support of that proposal, Mr. Prairie lists factors that are typically considered in assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, and then states “[b]ased on these factors as well as my experience and expertise,” his opinion of the level of ordinary skill in the art is the same as Petitioner proposes. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 19–20. This conclusory testimony is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim terms need only be construed “to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached

    “Patent Owner counters that Koning does not qualify as analogous art and, relatedly, that judicial estoppel bars Petitioner from contending otherwise. PO Resp. 7–17. Patent Owner further argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine Koning’s belt with Hedderwick and Benac, and would not have expected that combination to succeed. Id. at 18–33; Sur-Reply 13–19. Patent Owner also challenges the motivation and reasonable expectation of success for the incorporation of Owner argues that incorporating Benac’s paddle wheel would not yield a “nip” as claimed. PO Resp. 49–61; Sur-Reply 29. Patent Owner also submits evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 61–98; Sur-Reply 2–10. 2. Motivation to Combine and Reasonable Expectation of Success Of the disputed issues summarized in the preceding section, our analysis focuses on whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner Petitioner proposes and would have reasonably expected success in doing so. Because those issues are dispositive of Petitioner’s challenge, it is unnecessary for us to resolve the other disputed issues. See, e.g., Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., 963 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (affirming Board’s determination that claims were not shown to be obvious because the petitioner had not demonstrated that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the references); Samsung Electronics Co. v. Elm 3DS Innovations, LLC, 925 F.3d 1373, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (determining that it is unnecessary to reach other issues when reasonable expectation of success is dispositive).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “between the references’ use of a brush belt as an endless member and paddle wheels versus the proposed combination. Moreover, Patent Owner points out problems ordinarily skilled artisans would have encountered in attempting to combine the references as Petitioner proposes. Petitioner does not persuasively explain how those issues could have been overcome, and instead simply asserts, essentially, that ordinarily skilled artisans could have figured it out. See, e.g., Ex. 1135 ¶ 78 (“[A] person of ordinary skill in the art would have determined through no more than routine experimentation how to orient Benac’s paddle wheel so that it could operate with Koning’s brush belt bristles to pinch seeds from the seed meter.”). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that ordinarily skilled artisans would have been motivated to combine the references in the proposed manner and would have reasonably expected success in doing so. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner’s arguments and evidence do not carry that burden.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,699,955 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,699,955
• RPX Corporation v. Applications In Internet Time, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2020 · IPR2015-01750 · APJ Scott R Boalick · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied RPX’s rehearing request, leaving in place the remand decision terminating the reviews because Salesforce was an RPI and the petitions were time-barred under § 315(b).

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for patent owner

    “legally required for Salesforce to be a “beneficiary.” Req. Reh’g. 14. Further, Petitioner further asserts that we overlooked the authority cited by Petitioner that “‘behest’ means command, and that RPX cannot have acted as Salesforce’s representative unless RPX were appointed by Salesforce to so act.” Id. at 14–15. Petitioner asserts that the evidence, at most, demonstrates that RPX filed as a “mere volunteer to benefit Salesforce.” Id. at 15. We are not persuaded because Petitioner’s argument proposes that we apply a more narrow and rigid analysis of RPI than the one instructed by the Federal Circuit in these cases. As stated by the Federal Circuit, “[d]etermining whether a non-party is a ‘real party in interest’ demands a flexible approach that takes into account both equitable and practical considerations, with an eye toward determining whether the non-party is a clear beneficiary that has a preexisting, established relationship with the petitioner.” AIT, 897 F.3d at 1351; see also Dec. 4–5. Applying this flexible approach to the evidence of record, we determined that Salesforce is an RPI in these proceedings.” slip op. at 16

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner

    “III. ANALYSIS In the Final Decision on Remand, we determined that Petitioner had not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Salesforce was not an RPI in these proceedings. Dec. 1–2, 6–7, 30–35, 40. As noted above, in light of this determination, we terminated the previously instituted inter partes reviews, and denied inter partes reviews under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Id. at 35, 40.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for patent owner

    “entitled to due process and the protections afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act. Pet. Reply 1 (citing SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We agree with Patent Owner, however, that all requirements of procedural due process have been met here. “The indispensable ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a disinterested decision-maker.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). In this case, Petitioner had ample opportunity to brief the issue of RPI. See Paper 28, Paper 29 (redacted version); Paper 38, Paper 37 (redacted version); Paper 98, Paper 95 (redacted version); Paper 100, Paper 104 (redacted version); Paper 101, Paper 102 (redacted version). Petitioner also had an opportunity to argue the issue of RPI in two oral hearings. See Paper 77, Paper 112, Paper 123 (redacted version). Moreover, in its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner had a chance to identify any matters it believes this panel misapprehended or overlooked in its Final Decision on Remand. Petitioner further had an opportunity to file a Reply to Patent Owner’s Response to its Request. Thus, both before and after this panel issued its Final Decision on Remand, Petitioner had notice and an opportunity to be heard on issues relevant to these cases on remand from the Federal Circuit. Finally, although a change in panel after remand from the Federal Circuit is not common, this panel, like the original panel, decided the merits of each case based on the entirety of the record. Stated another way, either panel would have decided the case after careful consideration of the same evidence. Nor can Petitioner complain that it lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the panel change – Petitioner received notice of the panel change both before and in the panel decision, and Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and Board-authorized Reply gave it ample opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the change in panel has prejudiced Petitioner in any way or violated Petitioner’s due process rights.” slip op. at 4

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 8,484,111
• Longi Green Energy Technology Co., Ltd. / Longi Solar Technology Co., Ltd. et al. v. Hanwha Q Cells & Advanced Materials CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2020 · IPR2019-01072 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 12–14 are unpatentable as obvious over Hagino and over Hagino with Duerinckx and Hoex 2006; the Bhattacharyya grounds did not prove them unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Upon review, Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude fails to establish that Petitioner is entitled to the remedy it seeks. To the extent the Motion seeks exclusion of evidence under FRE 403 as overly prejudicial, Petitioner does not adequately explain what prejudice it would suffer if we were to simply disregard or give little weight to the uncited paragraphs of Dr. Lebby’s testimony, rather than excluding them from the record. Indeed, as the Board is not a jury, it would appear that the risk of unfair prejudice against which Rule 403 guards is diminished, if not eliminated entirely. See, e.g., Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994) (“in the context of a bench trial, evidence should not be excluded under 403 on the ground that it is unfairly prejudicial”); see also Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981). The Board is capable of hearing relevant evidence and weighing its probative value, including determining the weight to be given Dr. Lebby’s testimony or disregarding it entirely.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b),” which is articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under the Phillips standard, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In our Institution Decision, we determined that no term of the challenged claims required an express construction. Dec. on Inst. 8. During trial, neither party proposed that we adopt any specific construction of a claim term. Upon review of the record and the parties’ positions, we agree that no term appearing in the challenged claims requires express construction. slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner relies on the Declaration of Sanjay Banerjee, Ph. D. (Ex. 1003). Dr. Banerjee testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have “an advanced degree involving the discipline of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field,” or alternatively, “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least three years designing, developing, or researching in the field.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 46. We adopted this definition for purposes of deciding whether to institute trial. Dec. on Inst. 9. For purposes of this inter partes review, Patent Owner “does not contest this level of skill.” PO Resp. 2. In view of this agreement, we adopt Dr. Banerjee’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Banerjee’s testimony supports the conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted Hagino’s disclosure in this manner. Dr. Banerjee states that paragraph 29 of Hagino is “certainly . . . the only described method for forming ‘silicon nitride’ layers” in the reference. Ex. 1003 ¶ 211. We noted in our Institution Decision that this appeared to not be the case, because silicon nitride could also be applied through spin coating Solution A. Dec. on Inst. 30 n.10. But on the full record now before us, we credit Dr. Banerjee’s testimony, because upon further evaluation the Solution A spin-coating method does not pertain to the deposition of a silicon nitride layer. We have also reviewed Dr. Lebby’s testimony on this issue in evaluating how a person of ordinary skill would have interpreted Hagino. disclose using a CVD deposition method (Ex. 2008 ¶ 87), he does not address how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Hagino to deposit a silicon nitride layer in the First Embodiment without using CVD. In particular, Dr. Lebby did not indicate, in Hagino or elsewhere, any disclosure that spin coating was a recognized method for depositing a silicon nitride layer. The only method for depositing silicon nitride recognized by Dr. Lebby was CVD as disclosed by the ’215 patent, and he testified that CVD deposition of a silicon nitride layer in the presence of silane leads to the “cracking” of silane and “typically you would . . . see hydrogen as part of a deposited layer.” Ex. 1053, 55:6–57:20. Based on the foregoing, we find that Hagino discloses deposition of a surface layer of silicon nitride using CVD that corresponds to the second layer of claim 12. We also credit Dr. Banerjee’s uncontradicted testimony that performing CVD deposition of silicon nitride in the presence of silane, as Hagino discloses (Ex. 1006 ¶ 29), would necessarily result in hydrogen being embedded in the layer. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 206–213.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,893,215 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,893,215
• Precision Planting LLC / Agco Corporation v. Deere & CompanyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2020 · IPR2019-01048 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not proven unpatentable over Hedderwick and Koning because Petitioner did not establish a persuasive motivation to combine the references as proposed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the prior art, Dr. Glancey’s opinion testimony and analysis, and providing some, but minimal, weight to Dr. Taylor’s opinion testimony, we determine that the evidence favors Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill, primarily based on Dr. Glancey’s analysis and reasons summarized above. Accordingly, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in a technology pertinent to the challenged claims would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, agricultural engineering, or similar field, and two years of experience designing agricultural products or related machinery, or five years of experience designing agricultural products or related machinery, without a four-year undergraduate engineering degree. A recipient of other academic degrees may qualify as a person of ordinary skill if they have taken coursework or have experience in the pertinent technology. Additional education could offset less work experience; additional work experience could offset less education or coursework.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that an explicit construction of the claims is not necessary for the purposes of determining whether the challenged claims are not patentable. slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “sufficiently persuasive evidence, even in combination, to establish why a person of ordinary skill would have modified Hedderwick by (1) selectively gleaning only a portion of Koning’s conveying system, i.e., belt 44 with bristles 45, (2) selectively excluding Koning’s belt 23, and then (3) modifying Koning’s brush belt by reversing its orientation so that it carries seeds deposited into the bristles, as in the ’906 patent, rather than covering and guiding seeds carried by a separate and distinct conveyor belt, as in Koning. See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding an absence of a motivation to reverse parts to an orientation that was “totally backwards” from what one of skill in the art would even attempt). Petitioner’s arguments do not acknowledge the different function of Koning’s brush belt, or explain why a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to adapt Koning’s brush belt to such a use and reasonably expect success in doing so. We determine Petitioner fails to meet its burden of providing a sufficiently persuasive explanation or reason for concluding that one of skill in the art would have combined these particular references to produce the claimed invention. “Without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to arrive at the claimed invention, we are left with only hindsight bias.” Metalcraft v. Toro, 848 F.3d at 1367. “[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.” Id.” slip op. at 30

  • ExcludeOther

    “II. MOTION TO EXCLUDE Petitioner and Patent Owner each move to exclude a substantial number of exhibits on a number of different evidentiary grounds. See Pet. Mot. Excl.; PO Mot. Exclude. As our analysis does not refer to any of those exhibits, we dismiss each motion as moot.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 9,686,906 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,686,906
• Precision Planting, LLC / Agco Corp. v. Deere & CompanyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01044 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Hedderwick, Koning, and Benac because Petitioner did not establish motivation to combine or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “have had either (1) a bachelor’s degree plus four years of experience in mechanical engineering, agricultural engineering, or a related field or (2) a master’s degree plus two years of experience in mechanical engineering, agricultural engineering, or a related field.” Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 19– 20). In the testimony the Petition cites in support of that proposal, Mr. Prairie lists factors that are typically considered in assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, and then states “[b]ased on these factors together with my experience and expertise,” his opinion of the level of ordinary skill in the art is the same as Petitioner proposes. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 19–20. This conclusory testimony is entitled to little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)).6 That standard “includ[es] construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim terms need only be construed “to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). V. OBVIOUSNESS OVER HEDDERWICK, KONING, AND BENAC” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Glancey, explains that [i]f a wheel is used to load and place seeds within a moving belt with brush hairs, the wheel must be able to disengage from seeds while the seeds remain in between brush hairs. If the wheel maintains contact with the seed after the seed has moved into the brush hairs, the wheel will continue to apply force to the seed and eject or remove the seed from the profile of the brush hairs . . . . Ex. 2200 ¶ 223. Dr. Glancey testifies, credibly, that in Petitioner’s combination, seeds would have been rejected from the belt because, as the paddle wheel rotates, seeds “would be scooped through the belt.” Id. ¶ 225.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “way the references use endless members in the form of brush belts and paddle wheels, versus the way Petitioner uses those components in the proposed combination. Contrary to Petitioner’s and Mr. Prairie’s assertions, the proposed combination does not merely apply known techniques to a known device, because none of the cited references use brush belts and paddle wheels in the manner Petitioner proposes. As discussed in greater detail below, Benac teaches that a paddle wheel can be used to ensure that seeds jammed in vacuum holes are released reliably, and then dropped to the ground. Benac does not address brush belts as an endless member and, therefore, does not teach that paddle wheels can be used to guide seeds into the bristles of a brush belt, as Petitioner proposes. See Pet. 64. And Koning does not teach a brush belt that captures seeds released from above, as Petitioner and Mr. Prairie propose. See Pet. 61–62; Ex. 1002 ¶ 104; Ex. 2193, 190:10–191:3; Ex. 2263, 167:21–170:9. Rather, Koning’s brush belt maintains the relative position of potatoes lying on a conveying surface by holding them from above while the conveyor moves them to the furrow. Ex. 1004, 3:16–24, 5:3–14, Fig. 4. Petitioner’s arguments do not adequately account for these differences between the references’ use of a brush belt as an endless member and paddle wheels versus the proposed combination. Moreover, Patent Owner points out problems ordinarily skilled artisans would have encountered in attempting to combine the references as Petitioner proposes. Petitioner does not persuasively explain how those issues could have been overcome, and instead simply asserts, essentially, that ordinarily skilled artisans could have figured it out. See, e.g., Ex. 1135 ¶ 80. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that ordinarily skilled artisans would have been motivated to combine the success in doing so. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Petitioner’s arguments and evidence do not carry that burden.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 8,813,663 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,813,663
• Precision Planting, LLC / Agco Corp. v. Deere & CompanyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2020 · IPR2019-01046 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 3 were not shown unpatentable over Hedderwick, Koning, and Yamahata under § 103 because Petitioner did not establish motivation to combine or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the evidence and arguments of record, we determine that the evidence favors Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill. Our determination is primarily based on Dr. Glancey’s analysis and reasons summarized above, as well as the prior art of record and the sophistication of the technology of the ’199 patent. We have considered Mr. Prairie’s opinion, but we give that testimony minimal weight due to the lack of supporting explanation. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Specifically, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in agricultural engineering, or a similar field, and two years of experience designing agricultural products or related machinery. Alternatively, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had five years of experience designing agricultural products or related machinery, without a four-year undergraduate engineering degree.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION “In an inter partes review proceeding, a claim of a patent . . . shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)).7 That standard “includ[es] construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim terms need only be construed “to the extent” slip op. at 14

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Ex. 1135 ¶ 51. Yet it is Petitioner’s burden to show motivation and reasonable expectation of success for the proposed combination, not Patent Owner’s burden to show that the prior art demonstrates the futility of the proposed combination. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, Petitioner’s affirmative showing on motivation and reasonable expectation of success for using Koning’s brush belt in the proposed combination is unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above. And Patent Owner’s evidence of difficulties an ordinarily skilled artisan would have expected to encounter in that proposal serves to highlight the issues that Petitioner’s showing ignores. Petitioner additionally contends that Patent Owner’s arguments are based on the erroneous premise that an ordinarily skilled artisan must be able to physically combine the references. See Pet. Reply 7 (citing In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). We disagree. Patent Owner’s arguments, summarized above, simply point out that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have expected success in combining the references’ teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. Motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success are properly assessed with reference to the combination as Petitioner has framed it. The Federal Circuit has explained that doing so is not inconsistent with Mouttet. See Samsung, 925 F.3d at 1382–83 (“We will not fault the Board for analyzing Petitioners’ obviousness grounds in the way presented in the Petition.”).” slip op. at 34

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s and Mr. Prairie’s analysis does not acknowledge, much less bridge, the gap between Koning’s use of a brush belt to hold potatoes from above as they lie on a conveying surface, versus the brush belt’s use in above.10 During his deposition, Mr. Prairie resisted agreeing that the potatoes are lying on the conveyor in Koning, testifying that he takes from Koning’s description that “they are captured within the belt with brush hairs. And that there is some weight that’s along the conveying member 23.” Ex. 2193, 96:24–99:25. Mr. Prairie testified that he “do[es]n’t believe the brush hairs support the full weight of the potatoes,” but that Koning did not provide him sufficient information to answer whether the conveying member supports the majority of the weight of the potatoes. Id. at 106:22–107:21. In our view, it is clear from Koning’s description that the potatoes lie on the conveyor and the purpose of the brush belt is to maintain their position relative to each other while they are moved by the conveyor. Ex. 1004, 3:16–24, 5:3–14, Fig. 4; see also Ex. 2205 ¶¶ 140–141 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Glancey, testifying that a simple mechanical analysis shows that in Koning, about 87% of the potatoes’ weight is supported by the conveying member). Mr. Prairie’s refusal to acknowledge the differences between the brush belt’s function in Koning versus the proposed combination undermines the credibility of his testimony that the proposed combination would have been a simple application of a known technique to a known device. 10 See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting expert testimony that supported the absence of a motivation to combine: “[I]f I can equate this one to kind of a simple analogy, if you’re trying to build a piece of furniture. What’s a typical thing? You put on a piece of wood. You take a nail, and you hit the nail with a hammer. In control terms, what Mr. Phipps is suggesting is that you put the hammer on the workbench, pick up the piece of furniture and bash the piece of furniture onto the hammer. It’s totally backwards from what I believe one of skill in the art would even attempt . . . .”). have been simple for an ordinarily skilled artisan to adapt Koning’s brush belt for use in the proposed combination, where seeds are deposited onto the brush belt from above—is further undermined by his testimony that he “can’t recall a time where I’ve seen a seed being dropped into a brush belt.” Ex. 2193, 113:5–9; see also Ex. 2263, 81:2–12 (“Q. And you never attempted to drop a seed onto a moving brush belt to see whether that would be inserted into the brush belt, correct? A. As I stated, for the purposes of this case, I did not do any physical experimentation with a moving brush belt as I didn’t feel it was necessary. The prior art discloses sufficient information.”) (objection omitted). Mr. Prairie has “had some industrial design projects where we’ve had to utilize brushes for various applications,” but he “ha[s] not used a brush belt to convey seed.” Ex. 2194, 297:6–16. Mr. Prairie testified that “prior to writing this declaration, brush belt technology was not a specific area that I study, that I was researching.” Ex. 2263, 79:6–9. Indeed, during his initial deposition in this case, the only specific example of a moving brush belt Mr. Prairie could recall seeing was Patent Owner’s ExactEmerge product. Ex. 2193, 108:6–110:10. The basis for Mr. Prairie’s opinion, that a seed would be expected to enter a moving brush belt in the proposed combination, appears to only be Koning itself. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 79–81; Ex. 2193, 116:12–19, 118:7–23; Ex. 2263, 159:5–160:2. When asked at his deposition, Mr. Prairie did not explain any other engineering analysis he performed to make that determination. Ex. 2193, 114:23–117:12. Mr. Prairie testified that he “did not operate a brush belt for this declaration because [he] didn’t feel it was necessary to make my assessments” and he “did not do study or experimentation on a brush belt as I did not feel it was necessary.” unpersuasive because, as discussed above, Koning does not teach using a brush belt to receive and convey seeds that have been dropped onto it from above. Mr. Prairie does not account for that difference by explaining why an ordinarily skilled artisan would expect Koning’s brush belt to effectively capture and carry seeds dropped from above, as in the proposed combination.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,480,199 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,480,199
• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 18, 2020 · PGR2020-00039 · APJ Lynne H Browne · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Supercell’s rehearing request, leaving in place denial of institution of PGR challenging claims 1–24 based on the Fintiv factors and parallel litigation.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of 2 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Additionally, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) further provides that “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” i.e., Petitioner, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

    “the parties jointly requested a trial delay in the prior proceeding, from December 7, 2020, to March 1, 2021, which the district court granted. Ex. 1024, 1. Even considering these post-Decision developments, this three month delay results in a trial date in the parallel proceeding set six months before our final written decision would be due. Similar to the potential delay discussed in our Decision, a jury trial set to begin six months before a final written decision also weighs in favor of denying institution. Dec. 12; see Prelim. Resp. 11 (identifying three prior PTAB proceedings in which institution was denied where trial was scheduled to occur six months before a final written decision, including the precedential NHK Spring decision). We decline to speculate, absent case-specific evidence, as to any future additional delay of the parallel proceeding’s trial date that may— or may not—be requested by the parties, and that may—or may not— be granted by the district court. See Ex. 1024, 1, 4 (indicating that the trial date “cannot be changed without showing good cause,” which “is not shown merely by indicating that the parties agree that the deadline should be changed”) (emphasis omitted). On the current record, a cognizable risk of inconsistent results exists, due to the scheduled date of trial and the statutory due date of a final written decision.3” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedOther

    “contentions. In our Decision, we relied in part upon Dr. Claypool’s testimony from related litigation between the parties in determining that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Mastermind was publicly accessible. Dec. 24–25. Specifically, we relied upon Dr. Claypool’s prior testimony that, 4 “Mastermind’s In-Game Builder Idea (with LOADS of pictures!)” (“Mastermind”), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20130915081112/http:/forum.supercell.net:80/s howthread.php/149687-Mastermind-s-In-Game-Builder-Idea-(with-LOADSof-pictures!) (in two parts) (Ex. 1015, “Olesiuk Decl.”). it is my opinion that a diligent, skilled researcher engaged in a reasonable search for prior art would not have found Mastermind as a prior art reference even with the benefit of [Patent Owner’s] infringement contentions before the filing of the Petition for Post-Grant Review. A diligent, skilled researcher would not spend time sifting through the suggestions provided on Internet message boards, as they would normally not include useful or sufficiently detailed suggestions. Ex. 2009 ¶ 164 (emphasis added); Dec. 25.” slip op. at 8

  • Other 314aDecided for patent owner

    “different posture of PGR proceedings as compared to IPR proceedings, when exercising discretion to deny institution. As summarized above, the Decision discusses that common statutory language exists in § 314(a)— directed toward IPR proceedings—and in § 324(a)—directed to post-grant review proceedings. See supra § I.A; Dec. 5–8. The Decision also discusses the common policy justifications implicated when determining whether to institute either an IPR proceeding or a PGR proceeding. Dec. 6–7. The Decision then goes on to recognize and discuss certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings. Id. at 7–8. Despite these differences, we determined that the Board’s binding precedent set forth in NHK Spring and Fintiv applies to this PGR proceeding. Id. In doing so, we additionally evaluated certain differences between PGR proceedings and IPR proceedings, when considering the Fintiv Order factors. See, e.g., id. at 12, 15–16, 18–20. Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in doing so.” slip op. at 11

  § 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,307,676
• Workspot, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2020 · IPR2019-01002 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 7–9, 12, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 29, and 30 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because the references did not teach the required distinct content and web server limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “We credit the testimony of Dr. Hernandez on step (a), as it explains in detail the deficiencies in Petitioner’s position and is consistent with the references’ disclosures discussed above. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 90–92, 95. Based on the full record developed during trial and for the reasons explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Craft and Duursma teach step (a) of claim 1. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Craft and Duursma under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 30

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Reply is improper because it was not raised adequately in the Petition. See Sur-Reply 9–11. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” “‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Practice Guide at 74; see also Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Board did not err in refusing to consider portions of a reply declaration “rais[ing] a new obviousness argument for [a claim] limitation that could have been made in the petition” but was not); Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369–70 (concluding that the Board did not err in refusing to consider reply brief arguments advocating a “new theory” of unpatentability under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). Petitioner in its Petition never referenced any specific “software” executed by web server 49a or “portion” of web server 49a, instead referring to the device throughout as a singular entity. See Pet. 50–63. The word “software” appears only four times in the Petition, and never in reference to web server 49a of Zoller. See id. at 52, 61, 66, 77. Mr. Zoller in his declaration likewise does not refer to any particular software or portion of web server 49a. See Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 119–163, pp. 106–123. Mr. Zoller’s” slip op. at 45

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We credit the testimony of Dr. Hernandez on step (a), as it explains in detail the deficiencies in Petitioner’s position and is consistent with the references’ disclosures discussed above. See Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 90–92, 95. Based on the full record developed during trial and for the reasons explained above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that Craft and Duursma teach step (a) of claim 1. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Craft and Duursma under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’843 patent and the types of problems and prior art solutions described in the ’843 patent, we adopt the preliminary definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, with one clarification. The definition includes both an education and a work experience component. The education component is satisfied by a bachelor’s degree in computer science or equivalent education. We see no reason why such an education must have been acquired in a “formal” setting as Patent Owner suggests—as opposed to, for example, via on-the-job training or work experiences that would be the equivalent of the education one would receive by obtaining a bachelor’s degree in computer science. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science (or equivalent education) and 3–4 years of experience working with remote-accessed skill for purposes of this Decision.5” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 8,135,843 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,135,843
• Microsoft Corporation / Apple Inc. et al. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 13, 2020 · IPR2020-00224 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over TR25.835 and Abrol because the combined teachings establish each challenged limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not provide its own assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but argues that the Petition fails to link the subject matter of hybrid ARQ methods to the identified levels of education and industry experience proposed by Petitioner. PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner has failed to show that such a linkage is necessary. Rather, in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we consider several factors, such as the type of problems encountered in the art and prior art solutions to those problems, as well as education and industry experience. Here, we agree with Petitioner and find that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of the hybrid ARQ methods described in the ’917 patent and closely followed ARQ developments by 3GPP and other network standardization groups. Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:5–62, 5:13–36). Moreover, we adopt Dr. Bims’s assessment of a person with ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’917 patent and the asserted prior art. Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. We further note that the prior art of record in the instant proceeding reflects the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding the Board may omit specific findings as to the level of ordinary skill in the art “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “2018, “[claims] of a patent . . . shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the [claims] in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the [claims] in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For purposes of this decision, we need not expressly construe any claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). D. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–3, 9, and 10 over TR25.825 and Abrol” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 7,075,917 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,075,917
• Microsoft Corporation / Apple Inc. et al. v. Uniloc 2017 LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 13, 2020 · IPR2019-00973 · APJ Sally C Medley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over TR25.835 and Abrol.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Harry Bims, who testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or the” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “2018, “[claims] of a patent . . . shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the [claims] in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the [claims] in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,358 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For purposes of this decision, we need not expressly construe any claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). D. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1–3, 9, and 10 over TR25.825 and Abrol” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Rodermund’s testimony is insufficient because he did not testify, or provide documentary evidence, that email notifications were provided of the actual upload of TR25.835 to the 3GPP server. Id. Here, Mr. Rodermund’s testimony sufficiently demonstrates his personal knowledge of the business practices of 3GPP for him to testify regarding such practices. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 6, 7, 13. He explains the general practice of emailing persons having ordinary skill in the art as soon as new or additional documents are uploaded to 3GPP’s ftp server. Id. ¶ 19.8 We give substantial weight to Mr. Rodermund’s testimony that persons having ordinary skill in the art were notified by email as soon as new documents, like TR25.835, were uploaded to 3GPP’s ftp server based on his personal knowledge of the business practices of 3GPP. Id.; see Hall, 781 F.2d at 899 (accepting evidence regarding the general library procedure for cataloging as probative value of routine business practice to show the performance of the specific act of cataloging a document). In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Evidence of routine business practice can be sufficient to prove that a reference was made [publicly] accessible.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioners are not prohibited from relying on new evidence and arguments in a reply, if the evidence and arguments are responsive to arguments made in a patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. 42.23(b); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“Consolidated Practice Guide”) 73 (Nov. 2019)9; Hulu, LLC. v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 15 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (“For example, if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication”). Here, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and new evidence in connection with the Petitioner Reply are responsive to Patent Owner’s challenges to TR25.835’s status as a printed publication.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,075,917 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,075,917

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.