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  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00032 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to authorize a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,933,827
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00031 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request by authorizing a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision finding claims 1–9 unpatentable under § 101.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,246,093
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00030 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Nasdaq’s rehearing request and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “The United States Patent and Trademark Office subsequently implemented an interim procedure1 whereby review of a final written decision by the Director may be requested by a party to a post-grant review proceeding.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,921,051
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00029 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Nasdaq’s rehearing request and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,747,506
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,618,707
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00020 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021). The Supreme Court held “that 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) is unenforceable as applied to the Director insofar as it prevents the Director from reviewing the decisions of the PTAB on his own. The Director may engage in such review and reach his own decision.” Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1987. The Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the appropriate remedy is a remand to the Acting Director for him to decide whether to rehear the petition.” Id. The United States Patent and Trademark Office subsequently implemented an interim procedure1 whereby review of a final written decision by the Director may be requested by a party to a post-grant review proceeding.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,386,371
  • PTAB · Oct 1, 2021 · CBM2020-00012 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 1–46 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim abstract financial and mathematical processes without integrating them into a practical application or adding an inventive concept.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “On October 6, 2020, based on the record before us at the time, we instituted a covered business method patent review of all challenged claims on all grounds alleged. Paper 11 (“Institution Decision” or “Dec.”). The claims and ground in this proceeding are indicated in the table below.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “35 U.S.C. § 282(b) “including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2019). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as they would be understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning ‘is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.’” (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Patent Owner seeks construction of the terms “linking unit” and “combining unit” from claims 5 and 23, and “converting unit” from claim 6. Pet. 14–18. However, because we determine that even under Patent Owner’s constructions, the claims would be ineligible as discussed below, we discern no terms in need of express interpretation. Accordingly, we apply the legal standards set forth above when reading the claims. B. CBM PATENT REVIEW ELIGIBILITY” slip op. at 15

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

      “Id. at 33:66–34:12 (emphasis added). The combination of the elements italicized above recites the concept of simplifying a trade portfolio through premature termination of certain transactions. The claimed method accomplishes this through collecting information, grouping related information together, and then using mathematical techniques on the information, calculating a total value of the group, and selecting a certain group that meets certain criteria. This is all a mental process, an example of an abstract idea.” slip op. at 23

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

      “Claims 4 and 5 use a generic processor to perform well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, such as receiving and analyzing data and performing mathematical calculations. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic function--making calculations or computations-- fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.”). We do not discern any claimed element for accomplishing the claimed solution that is other than what was generically known for performing those conventional functions. See Credit Acceptance, 859 F.3d at 1057 (“[T]he claims do not provide details as to any non-conventional software for enhancing the financing process.”); see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our law demands more” than claim language that “provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.”); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (explaining that claims are directed to an abstract idea where they do not recite “any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing [conventional] functions”). Despite Patent Owner’s assertions that the claim steps add enough to make the claims patentable, we find the recitation of the steps performed by a generic processor at a high level of generality is insufficient to supply an inventive concept.” slip op. at 40

    Patent outcomesUS 8,010,441 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric Power · Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 8,010,441
  • PTAB · Dec 19, 2019 · CBM2018-00037 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 101; the motion to amend is granted for proposed substitute claims 16–23, which were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

      “does not remove the claim from the realm of abstract ideas. See Pet. 52–53; Reply 12; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that it “does not matter to [the conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea] whether the information here is information about real investments,” as “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract” (citation omitted)). Further, the last two clauses of claim 1 that recite how the transaction is viewed from the perspectives of the participant and vendor system, respectively, merely express the “non-physical result” of the information transfers and confirm the abstract nature of the claimed subject matter. See Pet. 57. In fact, as to the vendor system clause, the Specification indicates that the vendor system transfers information no differently than it would for any other transaction. See Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 15–18 (disclosing that vendor system 208 responds to purchase request 216 “in the same way that it would respond to any other purchase request from a consumer that presents a credit card”).” slip op. at 35

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

      “Our conclusion also is supported by the ’087 patent’s description of” slip op. at 41

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

      “transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75

    • 101 substituteMixed

      “transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75

    Patent outcomesUS 7,134,087 unpatentable
    § 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish
    Patents in suitUS 7,134,087
  • PTAB · Nov 20, 2019 · CBM2018-00006 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving intact its final written decision that claims 1–12 are unpatentable under § 101.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply.”” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “on this particular issue is timely. Patent Owner has argued that “the institution should never have occurred” and that institution should have been denied outright. Id. However, our Decision on Institution (Paper 19, “Dec.”) was entered on June 22, 2018. Any request for rehearing of our determinations regarding the forum selection clause in that Decision should have been filed 14 days from the entry of that decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(1). As we noted in the FWD, after institution of the covered business method patent review (“CBM review”), the parties did not present any additional evidence or arguments regarding the forum selection clause issue. FWD 8 (“In the post-institution briefing, neither party has added arguments or evidence to the record regarding this issue.”). Indeed, the Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 28, “PO Resp.”) and Sur-Reply (Paper 39, “Sur.”) and Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 31, “Reply”) did not discuss forum selection. For completeness and clarity of the record, we reiterated our” slip op. at 3

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “be instructive, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertion, that decision has not been designated precedential. Moreover, taking into consideration the discussion by the panel in Global Tel*Link, we are not persuaded that our determination misapprehended or overlooked any arguments or evidence in” slip op. at 9

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

      “the abstract idea. Nonetheless, we are not persuaded that this is clear error or deprived Patent Owner of the opportunity to defend its position. Indeed, Patent Owner does not explain why the “rules for playing a bonus wagering game” is substantively different from “allowing bonus wagers in a wagering game,” or, more importantly, the basis for Patent Owner’s contention that this is a “fundamental change.” See Reh’g Req. 11.” slip op. at 11

    § 101 eligibility
    Patents in suitUS 7,451,987
  • PTAB · Jul 23, 2018 · CBM2017-00025 · APJ Kevin F Turner · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 13–15 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of using a loan to effect a financial transaction without an inventive concept.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We preliminarily determined that the information presented in the Petition established that the ’528 Patent qualifies as a covered business method patent that is eligible for review, and that it was more likely than not that the challenged claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Paper 8. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324 and § 18(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011), we instituted a covered business method patent review as to all of the challenged claims. Id.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “Considering the claim elements as an ordered combination, each claimed method, as a whole, is simply indicative of the abstract idea of using a loan to effect a financial transaction when a buyer has insufficient funds in his or her payment account. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60 (explaining that the application of an abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention). There is no indication on the record developed during trial that these claims improve the functioning of a computer, or result in an improvement in any other technology or technical field. See id. at 2359. On the contrary, Dr. Neuman’s unrebutted testimony explains that the computer components recited in the claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately, and viewed as a whole, the claims simply recite the well-known, conventional process of debiting and crediting a funded account. Ex. 1005 ¶ 36. Furthermore, there is no evidence of record that independent claim 13 is like those of BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC (i.e., a “non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces”). 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). BASCOM explains that where claims “merely recite the abstract idea . . . along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet, or to perform it on a set of generic computer components[, s]uch claims would not contain an inventive concept.” Id. Rather, the ’528 Patent seems to indicate that the existing payment process is simply made faster and more efficient in that an immediate, real-time payment is made without the winning bidder having to access a payment page, through the use of a conventional computing network. See Ex. 1001, 4:30–34, Fig. 1; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–24. Meanwhile, the method of independent claim 13 may offer an improvement to the previously-known manual processes identified in the ’528 Patent––the need for a winning bidder “to draft checks, obtain money orders, etc. and mail them to the various sellers” (Ex. 1001, 3:3–4), or to “enter his credit card information” (id. at 3:15), or for the website operator and seller to exchange e-mails to authorize a commission payment (id. at 3:26–34). “But merely ‘configur[ing]’ generic computers in order to ‘supplant and enhance’ an otherwise abstract manual process is precisely the sort of invention that the Alice Court deemed ineligible for patenting.” Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1056 (alteration in original). Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the claim elements recited” slip op. at 29

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “in an unexpired patent according to the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b). “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner proposes a construction for the claim term “web site.” Pet. 20. We, however, need not address the construction of any claim term to resolve the issues before us.” slip op. at 16

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

      “We agree with Petitioner that independent claim 13 is directed to an abstract idea, and we adopt Petitioner’s description of the abstract idea as using a loan to effectuate a financial transaction in an electronic auction. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the abstract idea, other than by making the conclusory statement that the challenged claims are not directed to an abstract idea based on Federal Circuit precedent and USPTO examination guidance. See PO Resp. 7–8. The language of independent claim 13 supports the finding that it is directed to the abstract idea of using a loan to effect a financial transaction when a buyer has insufficient funds in his or her payment account. This independent claim recites methods for effecting payment by a process that includes the steps of providing the user with the option to enable the loaning of funds, through receipt of a user’s authorization, and loaning funds to effect the payment if insufficient funds are determined for a payment source. Ex. 1001, 20:13–37. This purchaser-seller arrangement is not meaningfully distinct from the activity relating to commercial practices found to be abstract ideas in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (“method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk”) and Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010) (arrangement between buyers and sellers to purchase commodities in the energy market at a fixed rate as a way of protecting, or “hedging,” against risks of price changes). The Supreme Court has explained that concepts like intermediated settlement and risk hedging are abstract ideas beyond the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as they are “a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611). Likewise, in this case, the concept of using a loan to effect a financial transaction when a buyer has insufficient funds in his or her payment account is a fundamental economic practice.” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 7,627,528 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish
    Patents in suitUS 7,627,528
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