- MSN Laboratories Private Ltd. / MSN Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Bausch Health Ireland LimitedNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 27, 2026 · IPR2023-00016 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–6 not shown unpatentable because unexpected results outweighed the prima facie obviousness case, and granted Patent Owner’s motion to exclude.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”)See Paper 83 (“CAFC Decision”). The Federal Circuit did not disturb our determination that Petitioner “established a prima facie case of obviousness.” See CAFC Dec. 6–8. However, it took issue with the unexpected results analysis in the Decision, explaining that “without more explanation from the Board as to its determination that the experiments [offered by Patent Owner to show unexpected results] compared the challenged claims to the closest prior art, we cannot reach a judgment on MSN’s challenges to the Board’s holding of non-obviousness.” Id. at 14. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the Decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the unexpected results evidence. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner and credit Dr. Davies’s testimony (Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 210–215) that a POSA would not have expected the Glu3 substitution to produce such a result. Indeed, the premise for Petitioner’s “conservative substitution” rationale is that the Glu3 substitution would have been expected to produce an analog having similar properties to human uroguanylin. See, e.g., Pet. 1, 36 (stating that a POSA “would have expected this particular conservative substitution to retain excellent receptor-activating activity”); Reply 3 (urging that the reason to modify a known compound may be an expectation that the new compound will have “similar properties to the old”) (internal quotations omitted). Patent Owner’s HPLC data, however, demonstrate a difference in kind between the data for SP-304 (a single HPLC peak) and uroguanylin (two distinct peaks corresponding to the active and inactive topoisomer) after incubation under the same conditions. As Dr. Davies explains, “topoisomers exist as a mixture of compounds with different[] spatial conformations” that are “continuously interconverting between spatial conformations” with “varying degrees of interconversion stability.” See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 51–56. Thus, Patent Owner’s data show that the Glu3 substitution results in a peptide that is demonstrably more stable against interconversion than the parent, unmodified peptide.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia with nexusObjective indicia outweighedDecided for patent owner
“We find Patent Owner’s evidence persuasive to show that the Glu3 substitution results in an unexpected improvement in interconversion stability. As explained above, RP-HPLC was a known technique for separating the topoisomers of human uroguanylin. Ex. 2010, 230–231; Ex. 2011, 27–28; Ex. 2020, 223; Ex. 2028, TRUL00018269; see also Ex. 1063 ¶¶ 37, 40 (Petitioner’s expert confirming same). It was also known that one of human uroguanylin’s topoisomers was biologically active, whereas the other, i.e., what we and the parties refer to as the “inactive” topoisomer, had significantly less or no activity at the same concentration. Ex. 2011, 31 (“compound I shows significant activity in the cGMP producing assay, whereas compound II is practically inactive”); see also Ex. 2010, 238–239 (Fig. 8) (showing the “A isomer” had a potency “with a minimal concentration between 10-7and 10-8 M,” but that the B isomer “had virtually no effect on cGMP level at 10-6 M”); Ex. 2074, 48 (compound II “showed maximal 10% of the activity of compound I at 10-6 M”). The chromatograph for uroguanylin in Patent Owner’s data is consistent with these teachings, showing two peaks representing the active and inactive topoisomers. Compare Ex. 2028, TRUL00018269 (Fig. 1) with Ex. 2011, 28 (Fig. 2). The chromatograph for SP-304 shows a markedly different result, i.e., a “single peak,” which was confirmed “using the cGMP T84 cell assay” to represent “the fully active conformer of SP-304.” Ex. 2028, TRUL00018269; Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 208–209. We agree with Patent Owner and credit Dr. Davies’s testimony (Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 210–215) that a POSA would not have expected the Glu3 substitution to produce such a result. Indeed, the premise for Petitioner’s “conservative substitution” rationale is that the Glu3 substitution would have been expected to produce an analog having similar properties to human uroguanylin. See, e.g., Pet. 1, 36 (stating that a POSA “would have expected this particular conservative substitution to retain excellent receptor-activating activity”); Reply 3 (urging that the reason to modify a known compound may be an expectation that the new compound will have “similar properties to the old”) (internal quotations omitted). Patent Owner’s HPLC data, however, demonstrate a difference in kind between the data for SP-304 (a single HPLC peak) and uroguanylin (two distinct peaks corresponding to the active and inactive topoisomer) after incubation under the same conditions. As Dr. Davies explains, “topoisomers exist as a mixture of compounds with different[] spatial conformations” that are “continuously interconverting between spatial conformations” with “varying degrees of interconversion stability.” See Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 51–56. Thus, Patent Owner’s data show that the Glu3 substitution results in a peptide that is demonstrably more stable against interconversion than the parent, unmodified peptide.” slip op. at 34
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“motion. The American Peptide letter contains out of court statements from a third party submitted by the EPO opponent. The statements in the letter were not made under oath, nor is there evidence that Patent Owner was ever able to question the author of that letter or anyone else with personal knowledge of the statements therein. Petitioner argues that the American Peptide letter is evidence “to doubt that the ‘singular peak’ for uroguanylin in Liu represents the active topoisomer of uroguanylin” because it evidences that American Peptide “provided its customers with the ‘B’ (i.e., inactive) form of uroguanylin at the time.” Pet. Remand Resp. 25. That is, Petitioner relies on the American Peptide letter for the truth of the matters asserted therein. Such use plainly implicates the rule against hearsay and falls squarely within our prior reasoning for excluding the Currie submission portion of Exhibit 1067. We incorporate that analysis herein. See Dec. 61–72. Petitioner asserts that the American Peptide letter is admissible under the residual hearsay exception in FRE 807. MTE Opp. 3–5. We disagree. The American Peptide letter was submitted by the EPO opponent specifically for the purpose of opposing a foreign counterpart to the ’786 patent. We see no reason to distinguish it from the other materials previously excluded as hearsay in the Currie submission. Petitioner’s assertion that it contains sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness because it was “provided by a neutral third-party” (American Peptide) and “an individual having first- hand knowledge, [American Peptide Company’s] VP of sales and marketing” is speculation. See id. at 3–4. Based on the record before us, Patent Owner has never been afforded an opportunity to examine anyone regarding the statements in this letter or even confirm that it is, in fact, a letter from the American Peptide Company. The mere fact that it was submitted in a foreign patent proceeding does not make it any more trustworthy than any other untested assertion offered by an adverse party in a legal proceeding.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 7,041,786 not shown unpatentable§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,041,786 - MSN Laboratories Private Ltd. / MSN Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Bausch Health Ireland LimitedNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 27, 2026 · IPR2022-00722 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Remand
Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable because the unexpected results from the Glu3 substitution outweighed the prima facie obviousness showing; Patent Owner’s motion to exclude was granted.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“More specifically, the Federal Circuit identified “three reasons” why “the Board’s determination that the[se] experiments compared the claimed invention with the closest prior art lack[ed] adequate explanation” and instructed us to address these issues on remand. See CAFC Dec. 11–13. First, the Court stated we “should determine, based on the evidence put forward by the parties, whether plecanatide exhibits topoisomerism and whether the testing of the challenged claims should encompass both the active and inactive forms.” Id. at 12.3 Second, the Court instructed us to reconsider what the closest prior art compound is in view of Patent Owner’s “contention that highly pure A-form uroguanylin could be maintained as a lyophilized powder,” noting that “[i]f it is true . . . that uroguanylin can be maintained and therefore tested in its active A form as a lyophilized powder, that would support that the experiments [which were conducted in solution] did not use the closest prior art.” Id. Third, the Court observed that the Decision did not sufficiently address “whether the experiments submitted by [Patent Owner] actually used” the closest prior art and instructed the Board “to reevaluate the experimental evidence consistent” with the determinations noted above. Id. at 12–13.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for patent owner
“In sum, we find that there is a sufficient nexus between Patent Owner’s results and the challenged claims and that those results are reasonably commensurate with the same. Accordingly, for all of reasons explained above, the unexpected results Patent Owner relies upon are probative of non-obviousness. E. Conclusion for Ground 1 Weighing the record as a whole in view of the findings and analysis above as well as our findings and analysis relating to Petitioner’s prima facie showing in the Decision, we conclude that Petitioner has not met its burden to show that claim 1 would have been obvious over Currie and Li. The evidence suggesting that it would have been obvious to make the Glu3 substitution because it is a conservative substitution (see Dec. 20–38 (§ III.E.ii)) is substantially outweighed by Patent Owner’s comparatively strong evidence demonstrating unexpected results relating to improved interconversion stability, potency, and binding affinity from the Glu3 substitution. See Millennium Pharms., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 862 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Evidence of objective indicia [such as unexpected results] ‘can be the most probative evidence of nonobviousness in the record,’ and . . . enable[s] ‘the court to avert the trap of hindsight.’”) (quoting Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Indeed, the interconversion and potency categories of Patent Owner’s unexpected results showing are particularly strong such that even without the additional results in Liu, we would still reach the same ultimate conclusion on obviousness. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 56
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for patent owner
“same combination of Currie and Li for the limitations of claim 1 and the similar limitations recited in the other independent claims. In the Decision, we found that, based on the teachings in those references, an ordinarily-skilled artisan would have been motivated both to select human uroguanylin as a lead compound and modify its sequence by making a conservative Glu3 substitution for uroguanylin’s Asp3. Dec. 15–37. We did not, however, credit Petitioner’s other purported rationales for that modification. Id. at 34–37. Those findings were not disturbed on appeal. See CAFC Dec. 6–8 (rejecting 9 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective after the filing of the application that led to the ’786 patent. Therefore, we apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 10 U.S. Pat. 5,489,670, issued Feb. 6, 1996 (Ex. 1005) (“Currie”). 11 Z. Li et al., Purification, cDNA Sequence, and Tissue Distribution of Rat Uroguanylin, 68 Regulatory Peptides 45–56 (1997) (Ex. 1006) (“Li”). 12 R. Narayani et al., Polymer-coated Gelatin Capsules as Oral Delivery Devices and their Gastrointestinal Tract Behavior in Humans, 7 J. Biomater. Sci. Polymer Edn. 39–48 (1995) (Ex. 1007) (“Narayani”). 13 M. Campieri et al., Oral Budesonide is as Effective as Oral Prednisolone in Active Crohn’s Disease, 41 Gut 209–214 (1997) (Ex. 1008) (“Campieri”). 14 U.S. Pat. 5,359,030, issued Oct. 25, 1994 (Ex. 1009) (“Ekwuribe”). Patent Owner’s alternative arguments for affirmance). We incorporate by reference the portions of the Decision addressing Petitioner’s prima facie showing herein. See Dec. 8–37 (§§ III.A–D and E.i–ii). We consider the findings and explanation therein to the extent it bears on our analysis below.” slip op. at 10
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“motion. The American Peptide letter contains out of court statements from a third party submitted by the EPO opponent. The statements in the letter were not made under oath, nor is there evidence that Patent Owner was ever able to question the author of that letter or anyone else with personal knowledge of the statements therein. Petitioner argues that the American Peptide letter is evidence “to doubt that the ‘singular peak’ for uroguanylin in Liu represents the active topoisomer of uroguanylin” because it evidences that American Peptide “provided its customers with the ‘B’ (i.e., inactive) form of uroguanylin at the time.” Pet. Remand Resp. 25. That is, Petitioner relies on the American Peptide letter for the truth of the matters asserted therein. Such use plainly implicates the rule against hearsay and falls squarely within our prior reasoning for excluding the Currie submission portion of Exhibit 1067. We incorporate that analysis herein. See Dec. 61–72. Petitioner asserts that the American Peptide letter is admissible under the residual hearsay exception in FRE 807. MTE Opp. 3–5. We disagree. The American Peptide letter was submitted by the EPO opponent specifically for the purpose of opposing a foreign counterpart to the ’786 patent. We see no reason to distinguish it from the other materials previously excluded as hearsay in the Currie submission. Petitioner’s assertion that it contains sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness because it was “provided by a neutral third-party” (American Peptide) and “an individual having first- hand knowledge, [American Peptide Company’s] VP of sales and marketing” is speculation. See id. at 3–4. Based on the record before us, Patent Owner has never been afforded an opportunity to examine anyone regarding the statements in this letter or even confirm that it is, in fact, a letter from the American Peptide Company. The mere fact that it was submitted in a foreign patent proceeding does not make it any more trustworthy than any other untested assertion offered by an adverse party in a legal proceeding. For these reasons, we grant Patent Owner’s motion to exclude page 86 of Exhibit 1067.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 7,041,786 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,041,786 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00763 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand
Instituted review of claims 7 and 11 on the § 103 ground over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Decision”). Petitioner requested Director Review of the Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- RemandOther
“considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Decision”). Petitioner requested Director Review of the Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01200 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the remanded proceedings concerning claim 20 because the Board had not yet decided the remanded merits.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandGranted
“Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“The parties also jointly request that the Agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request. The parties also “request that the Board order that in the event a person or entity makes a written request, as stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c)(1)-(2), for access to the settlement agreement, that any such written request be served upon Patent Owner and Petitioner on the day the written request is provided to the Board.” Req. 2. However, neither the statute nor the regulation provides for any such notification, and the parties have not provided any reason or special circumstance that would justify issuing an order that purports to impose an additional requirement. Accordingly, we deny that portion of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,247,552 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01199 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board terminated the proceedings after settlement because it had not decided the remanded merits concerning claim 20.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandGranted
“Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“The parties also jointly request that the Agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request. The parties also “request that the Board order that in the event a person or entity makes a written request, as stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c)(1)-(2), for access to the settlement agreement, that any such written request be served upon Patent Owner and Petitioner on the day the written request is provided to the Board.” Req. 2. However, neither the statute nor the regulation provides for any such notification, and the parties have not provided any reason or special circumstance that would justify issuing an order that purports to impose an additional requirement. Accordingly, we deny that portion of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,247,552 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01198 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the remanded proceedings; it also granted in part their request to protect the settlement agreement.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandGranted
“Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,247,552 - Polygroup Limited Mco v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 8, 2020 · IPR2016-01612 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of the ’186 patent were held unpatentable; other remanded challenged claims were not, and substitute claims 29 and 30 were allowed.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated our Original Decision in part and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Polygroup Ltd. MCO v. Willis Elec. Co., Ltd, 759 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2019). After conferring with the parties, we permitted additional briefing to address the issues on remand from the Federal Circuit. Paper 196.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“electrical connection in a single step (e.g., “‘when’ the mechanical connection is made, an electrical connection is also made”) as Patent Owner alleges. Rather, claim 1 requires “a first trunk electrical connector” and “a second trunk electrical connector” with “the second tree portion [being] electrically connectable to the first tree portion such that a portion of the first trunk electrical connector of the first trunk portion contacts a portion of the second trunk electrical connector of the second trunk portion.” Although the claim also requires that “the second tree portion is mechanically coupleable to the first tree portion about a central vertical axis,” the claim permits that mechanical connection to be independent of the electrical connection. Giving claim 1 its proper reading, there is no dispute that Miller teaches first and second trunk electrical connectors or that its tree portions are coupleable about a central vertical axis as outlined in the Petition. See Pet. I 45–48.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner contends that one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings based on those from Lessner. Pet. II 65–70. Petitioner reasons, for example, that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to enhance the mechanical and electrical connections between the electrical contacts sets and wiring assemblies of Miller[] with the detachable electrical connectors of Lessner” for “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly.” Id. at 65–66 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner further reasons that “the detachable connectors of Lessner provide a quick-connect engagement allowing the builder to easily and quickly attach the wires to the terminals on the trunk connector during assembly,” which “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts.” Id. at 66. Petitioner’s contentions as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings are unpersuasive. As discussed above, Petitioner cited Miller’s plug and socket connectors as corresponding to the recited trunk connectors. Petitioner’s proposed modification in the Miller alone challenge adds an additional connection point in Miller’s plug and socket connectors, further complicating assembly, rather than providing greater “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly” as alleged. Petitioner’s additional reasoning that the proposed modification “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts” is equally unpersuasive. The only difference resulting from the modification is that the plug and socket connectors could be removed from their respective wiring assemblies. That is, it provides for removal of one connector by providing yet another connector, which fails to provide a benefit because Miller’s plug and socket connectors are loose, rather than fixed within the trunk portions like Patent Owner’s connectors. For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability of claim 7 of the ’186 patent by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner
“D. Secondary Considerations As explained in the Original Decision, Patent Owner provides evidence related to non-obviousness of the claims. Original Decision 43–60. Considering that evidence, as explained in the Original Decision, relative to the fact that Miller alone teaches each element of these claims in a single embodiment16, we determine that Patent Owner’s evidence does not outweigh Petitioner’s case of obviousness for claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has established by the preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 are unpatentable. Petitioner has failed to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that claim 7 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 8,454,187 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,454,187 - Polygroup Limited Mco v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 8, 2020 · IPR2016-01610 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of the ’186 patent were held unpatentable; other remanded challenged claims were not shown unpatentable, and substitute claims 29 and 30 were allowed.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated our Original Decision in part and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Polygroup Ltd. MCO v. Willis Elec. Co., Ltd, 759 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2019). After conferring with the parties, we permitted additional briefing to address the issues on remand from the Federal Circuit. Paper 196.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“and the second wire are detachably connected to the first trunk electrical connector of the first trunk portion.” Petitioner acknowledges that “Miller does not expressly teach that the wiring assembly is ‘modular’ or ‘separably connected.’” Pet. II 65. Petitioner contends that “assemblies for providing a detachable connection between electrical contact sets and wiring harnesses were well-known in the art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner contends that “Lessner teaches a ‘quick-disconnect electrical connector for receiving and releasably retaining a male tab connector’ and a [person of skill in the art (POSA)] would recognize that it may be used to create detachable connections between the electrical contacts of a connector or plug, and the wires of a wiring assembly.” Id. (citing Ex. 1008, 1:10–11; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner contends that one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings based on those from Lessner. Pet. II 65–70. Petitioner reasons, for example, that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to enhance the mechanical and electrical connections between the electrical contacts sets and wiring assemblies of Miller[] with the detachable electrical connectors of Lessner” for “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly.” Id. at 65–66 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 261–67). Petitioner further reasons that “the detachable connectors of Lessner provide a quick-connect engagement allowing the builder to easily and quickly attach the wires to the terminals on the trunk connector during assembly,” which “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts.” Id. at 66. Petitioner’s contentions as to why one skilled in the art would have modified Miller’s teachings are unpersuasive. As discussed above, Petitioner cited Miller’s plug and socket connectors as corresponding to the recited trunk connectors. Petitioner’s proposed modification in the Miller alone challenge adds an additional connection point in Miller’s plug and socket connectors, further complicating assembly, rather than providing greater “ease and speed of assembly and disassembly” as alleged. Petitioner’s additional reasoning that the proposed modification “also allows for easy separation of the wires from the trunk connectors, as needed for repair or replacement of parts” is equally unpersuasive. The only difference resulting from the modification is that the plug and socket connectors could be removed from their respective wiring assemblies. That is, it provides for removal of one connector by providing yet another connector, which fails to provide a benefit because Miller’s plug and socket connectors are loose, rather than fixed within the trunk portions like Patent Owner’s connectors. For at least these reasons, Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability of claim 7 of the ’186 patent by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedUnpatentable
“D. Secondary Considerations As explained in the Original Decision, Patent Owner provides evidence related to non-obviousness of the claims. Original Decision 43–60. Considering that evidence, as explained in the Original Decision, relative to the fact that Miller alone teaches each element of these claims in a single embodiment16, we determine that Patent Owner’s evidence does not outweigh Petitioner’s case of obviousness for claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has established by the preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 are unpatentable. Petitioner has failed to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that claim 7 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 21
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“The figure reproduced above is a portion of Miller’s Figure 2, which is a front, partial section view of its artificial tree, along with Petitioner’s annotations noting Miller’s electrical connections (circled in red). Pet. I 29. As seen above, Petitioner cites Miller’s plug and socket connection as the electrical connection recited in the claims. See Pet. I 33 (“Miller also teaches that wires 22 of trunks 3, 5 are electrically connectable via plug and socket connectors of Fig. 2.”), 42, 57–58 (presenting similar contentions for claims 20 and 28). The problem with Petitioner’s contentions that rely on Miller alone is that the electrical connection in Miller is independent of the mechanical connection of tree portions (i.e., the mechanical connection does not result in the electrical connection in the manner claimed). For at least this reason, Petitioner’s challenges to claims 10, 20, and 28 based on Miller alone fail.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 8,454,186 mixed§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,454,186 - Kranos Corporation v. Riddell, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2019 · IPR2016-01646 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board found claims 1–7, 11, 13, 25–28, 30, 32–37 not shown unpatentable on the added grounds; it also denied Riddell’s motion to exclude as moot.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“motion to terminate the appeal in IPR2016-01646 and remand the proceeding, in light of SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018), and the Director’s Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA Trial Proceedings, for us to address claims and grounds that we had not instituted.3 In response, we modified our Decision on Institution to institute trial for all challenged claims and all grounds. Paper 32, 3 (the “November 9, 2018, Order”). We ordered briefing on those claims and grounds added to the trial in the November 9, 2018, Order. See Paper 32, 3–7.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsAdverse judgmentGranted
“certain claims and grounds added to the trial in our November 9, 2018, Order. Paper 33. In the motion, Kranos “requests adverse judgment as to . . . [c]laims 3, 4, 7, 13, and 36.” Id. at 2. The motion continues that claims 6 and 26 remain in this proceeding for the grounds of “[o]bviousness over each of Sears or Rappleyea in combination with Ispas.” Id. As to claims 3, 4, 7, 13, and 36, Kranos’s motion is granted. Accordingly, we will enter the following judgment as to those claims: (1) claim 13 is not proven unpatentable as anticipated by Sears; (2) claim 13 is not proven unpatentable as anticipated by Rappleyea; (3) claim 13 is not proven unpatentable as anticipated by Zeller; (4) claim 36 is not proven unpatentable as obvious over Sears, Rappleyea, or Monica and Halstead; and (5) claims 3, 4, and 7 are not proven unpatentable over Sears or Rappleyea and Ispas.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“record before us, and ultimately found that a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the ’118 patent pertains would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in engineering or physics and at least one year of experience in designing protective equipment, protective helmets, or plastic parts including the design of protective or structural plastic elements. Final Wrtn. Dec. 9–10. We also found that additional experience (at least three years) may be substituted for a formal engineering degree. Id. at 10. We found that the prior art of record reflects this level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 10–11. We noted that our patentability analysis presented below would reach the same findings and determinations under Kranos’s or Mr. Shewchenko’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 11. In the supplemental briefing, neither party argued for a different definition of the level of ordinary skill than the definition adopted in our Final Written Decision, nor do we discern any reason, based on the supplemental record, to change this definition.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The term “aligned along” does not appear in any claim addressed in this Supplemental Final Written Decision. See, e.g., Final Wrtn. Dec. 11 (indicating that the term “aligned along” appears in independent claim 34). In the Final Written Decision, we determined that we did not need to expressly construe the term “integrally formed” to resolve the parties’ dispute. See id. at 16. As will be apparent from our analysis below, we need not address this term further here.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 8,528,118 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,528,118
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.