- Infineon Technologies AG v. Amatech Group LimitedRehearing grantedPTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Rehearing
On rehearing, the Board held claim 3 unpatentable as obvious over Eray-WO799, revising the final written decision’s outcome for that claim.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“As stated in our Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art and found that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” Dec. 6–7 (citing Pet. 8; PO Resp. 18). Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Daniel van der Weide, supported Petitioner’s definition, which was adopted for this proceeding. Ex. 1003 ¶ 25. Dr. van der Weide defined himself as “a person of more than ordinary skill in the art during the relevant timeframe” because “[b]y 2010, [he] held a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, and [he] had at least” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“unrebutted expert testimony corroborated by two prior art patents describing RFID smart cards” and that this evidence “demonstrated that a conventional and obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799’s smart card was by forming a card antenna on a card body before adding the chip.” Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Pet. 39–40; Paper 20 (“Reply”) at 31). Thus, Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an obvious and conventional way of manufacturing the card body of Eray- WO799 would have had unconnected ends as required by our construction. Id. Paragraph 149 of Dr. van der Weide’s declaration states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that an obvious and conventional way to construct the smart card as shown in Eray-WO799 FIG. 12 would have been to form the turns S1, S2, SC3 and SC4 on or in the card body (e.g., by laying wire) before connecting the wire to (or forming) access terminals and connecting module M.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. In support of that because it was “directed to solving problems that occur during the manufacture of cards.” Dec. 42 (citing Ex. 1028, 1:25–2:53). Petitioner points out that “[w]hile Ryu discloses manufacturing techniques, Ryu also describes and claims a ‘communication system’ with a smart card and a reader.” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing Ex. 1028, code (57), claims 1–2). Petitioner is correct in noting that Ryu’s disclosures are not so narrow as we described in the Decision. As to Finn-089, we found that reference unhelpful because it was “directed to a process for the contacting of a wire conductor in the course of manufacture of a transponder unit.” Dec. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1015, 1:15–17). Petitioner asserts that we failed to acknowledge to the fact that Finn-089 was incorporated by reference in the ’240 patent noting that “[p]atents incorporated by reference ‘are effectively part of the host [patents] as if [they] were explicitly contained therein.’” Reh’g Req. 9 (citing X2Y Attenuators, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 757 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations in Rehearing Request)). On this record, we agree that we overlooked and misapprehended the import of Ryu and Finn-089 and if those references are given appropriate weight, they lend further credence to Dr. van der Weide’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that an obvious way to manufacture Eray-WO799 would have created an intermediate product with requisite free ends. Further, we adopt the full reasoning stated in the Dissent as to the unpatentability of claim 3 (Dec. 53–57). Therefore, we GRANT Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,165,240 - Dr. Reddy’S Laboratories, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., Hoffman-La Roche AG, And Abbvie Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Aug 10, 2023 · PGR2022-00023 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Rehearing
On Patent Owner’s rehearing request, the Board held claim 25 unpatentable under § 112(a) because it depends from claim 14, which lacks written description support.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“We therefore agree with Petitioner that we overlooked the correct dependency of claim 25. Claim 25, as a claim dependent from claim 14, lacks written descriptive support because claim 25 fails to cure the absence of descriptive support for claim 14.” slip op. at 4
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“In the Final Written Decision, we determined that claim 14 lacked descriptive support. We noted that Claim 14, in particular, recites a GDC-0199 dosing regimen “compris[ing] a dose of 20 mg per day for one week, a dose of 50 mg per day for one week, a dose of 100 mg per day for one week, a dose of 200 mg of GDC-0199 per day for one week, and a dose of 400 mg per day.” Unlike for claim 1, such disclosure is not found in a single example, but results from picking and choosing three separate selections from column 24. “The written description requirement is not met when, as here, the specification provides at best disparate disclosures that an artisan might have been able to combine in order to make the claimed invention.” Flash-Control, LLC v. Intel Corp., 2021 WL 2944592 *4 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.)” slip op. at 3
§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,993,942 - Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Shockwave Medical, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 2, 2023 · IPR2019-00405 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing
On rehearing, the Board held claims 1–4 and 6–17 unpatentable as obvious, claim 5 not shown unpatentable, and denied both motions.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingGranted in part
“preponderance of evidence that claims 1–4 and 6–17 are unpatentable, but for the reasons expressed below rather than those expressed in our Decision. Additionally, we maintain our prior conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that claim 5 is unpatentable without any modification to our reasoning expressed in the Decision. We repeat our prior analysis of claim 5 from our Decision so that this single paper contains the substance of our analysis of all of Petitioner’s challenges to the claims. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–4 and 6–17 are unpatentable but has failed to show that claim 5 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 6
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2002–2004, 2006, 2008, 2016, 2017, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2132, 2133, 2139, 2141, 2149, 2152, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2170–2176, 2196, and 2100 (¶¶ 18, 19, 59, 60, 66, 132, 143, 144, 165, 170, 175, 199, 201, 205, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, and 229) is denied;” slip op. at 96
- Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, deniedDenied
“FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Motion for Additional Discovery is denied; and” slip op. at 96
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed
“laser as enough of a concern that its balloon could be cooled by circulating liquid through the balloon. Pet. 18, 29 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 96, 120); Reply 31 (citing Ex. 1003, 3–5). However, Petitioner fails to adduce evidence that an EHL shockwave generator produces less heat than a laser-based shockwave generator such as Levy’s. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to substitute an EHL probe for Levy’s laser probe to reduce heat generated by the probe.” slip op. at 38
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,956,371 - Solaredge Technologies Ltd. v. Sma Solar Technology AGRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 25, 2022 · IPR2020-00021 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Rehearing
On rehearing, the Board held claims 1–10 unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–3, 5, and 7 over AAPA and Frezzolini; claims 4, 6, and 8–10 over AAPA, Frezzolini, and Iwamura.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Updated Guidance. See Opp. Reh’g 4–8. Instead, Patent Owner argues that we correctly determined in the Final Written Decision that AAPA was the foundation or starting point of the ground. Id. However, the language that we relied upon from the Guidance Memo in the Final Written Decision has been deleted from the Updated Guidance. Compare Guidance Memo 6 (directing the PTAB to determine if the applicant admitted prior art is the foundation or starting point), with Updated Guidance (language omitted). Although we properly followed the Guidance Memo in the Final Written follow the clear and unambiguous requirements of the Updated Guidance. Moreover, Patent Owner does not direct us to any Federal Circuit case law that suggests using the foundation or starting point test of the Guidance Memo. See Opp. Reh’g 4–8. Although the Qualcomm panel was aware of the Guidance Memo (see 24 F.4th at 1373), the Federal Circuit neither discussed the test set out in the Guidance Memo, nor directed that the PTAB apply the foundation or starting point test. See 24 F.4th 1367.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner argues—supported by the testimony of Dr. Wood—that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and at least two years of design experience with photovoltaic systems.” Pet. 20 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 18– 22). In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s description of a person having ordinary skill in the art, “except that we delete[d] the qualifier ‘at least’ to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of practical experience.” Inst. Dec. 15–16. Patent Owner does not address that determination. See PO Resp. Accordingly, for the reasons given in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of practical experience. See Inst. Dec. 16. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar discipline and two years of design experience with photovoltaic systems.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that all claim terms should be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning at the time of the invention. Pet. 20. Patent Owner argues that two terms require explicit constructions: “the power line modem” and “the data signal coupler.” PO Resp. 20–22. Patent Owner’s proposed claim constructions limit the “power line modem” and the “data signal coupler” to DC power lines. PO Resp. 20–22. However, during the Oral Hearing, Patent Owner agreed that, consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning, the other limitations of the claims require that the components operate on DC power lines. Tr. 37:5–23. As discussed in more detail below, Petitioner’s combination of prior art references uses DC power lines. Accordingly, no express construction is needed to resolve any dispute in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“of the background knowledge possessed by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Guidance Memo 6–7; Updated Guidance 4–5. Although Patent Owner had the opportunity to make such an argument in the Sur-reply when addressing the Guidance Memo (and by implication, the identical language of Updated Guidance), Patent Owner chose not to do so and, accordingly, forfeited the argument. See Paper 9, 7. Although Patent Owner raised the argument at the oral hearing,17 that is not enough to preserve the argument as no new arguments can by made during the Oral Hearing. See CTPG at 85– 86 (“During an oral hearing, a party . . . may only present arguments relied upon in the papers previously submitted.”); Dell, 818 F.3d at 1301 (“[T]he Board denied Acceleron its procedural rights by relying in its decision on a factual assertion introduced into the proceeding only at oral argument, after Acceleron could meaningfully respond.”). Just as a movant may not make a new argument in a request for rehearing, a party opposing such a request cannot raise new arguments that it did not make before. See Apple Inc. v. Taction Tech., Inc., IPR2022-00057, Paper 15 at 4 (“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity . . . to present new arguments.”) (Denying Request for Rehearing). Accordingly, because Patent Owner did not argue that the limitations taught by the AAPA were not known in the prior art in its Patent Owner Response or Sur-reply, that argument is forfeited and cannot be considered on rehearing.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,922,048 - Code200, Uab / Teso LT, Uab et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 19, 2022 · IPR2022-00861 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Rehearing
On remand, the Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 12, 14, 15, 17–19, and 21–29 on all petitioned grounds and granted joinder with IPR2021-01492.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“General Plastic, and clarified General Plastic by stating that, “[w]here the first-filed petition . . . was discretionarily denied or otherwise was not evaluated on the merits,” a finding favoring discretionary denial under General Plastic’s factors 1–3 is limited to “when there are ‘road-mapping’ concerns under factor 3 or other concerns under factor 2.” Remand Dec. 5. The Director noted that in this case, the Board had found “no evidence of road-mapping.” Id. at 5 (citing Dec. 13). The Director added that “‘road-mapping’ concerns are minimized when, as in this case, a petitioner files a later petition that raises unpatentability challenges substantially overlapping with those in the previously-filed petition and the later petition is not refined based on lessons learned from later developments.” Id. at 5. The Director agreed with the panel’s finding that General Plastic’s factors 2, 4, and 5 “have limited relevance.” Id. at 6. The Director similarly found factor 7 to “have limited relevance” because the one-year statutory time period may be adjusted for a joined case under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). Id. (citing Dec. 16). Further, the Director disagreed with the panel’s determination on factor 6 in view of potential inefficiencies, with the Director determining that “the Board’s mission ‘to improve patent quality and restore confidence in the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents’ outweighs the impact on Board resources needed to evaluate the merits of a petition.” Id. In accordance with the evaluation of the factors, the Director found that “the Patent Owner’s concerns of fairness are outweighed by the benefits to the patent system of improving patent quality by reviewing the merits of the challenges raised in the petitions, which have not been addressed to date.” Id. The Director remanded the case to the panel for further proceedings, with direction to reconsider the institution decision and joinder. Remand Dec. 7. The Director directed that the panel “consider the Patent Owner’s remaining arguments, including those for discretionary denial under Fintiv and against the merits of the Petitioner’s patentability challenges.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“We consider the Director’s Memorandum, which directs that “the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Memorandum, 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Memorandum 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds present compelling unpatentability challenges. See infra Sections IV, D–H. In particular, in our view at this stage of the proceeding, the Petition presents compelling evidence that three prior art references, including Border, which was not before the jury in the Teso litigation, anticipate many of the claims of the ’319 patent. We determine that instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds present compelling unpatentability challenges. See infra Sections IV, D–H. In particular, in our view at this stage of the proceeding, the Petition presents compelling evidence that three prior art references, including Border, which was not before the jury in the Teso litigation, anticipate many of the claims of the ’319 patent. We determine that instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner is correct that its previously-filed 1266 IPR was not considered on the merits, and we note that this previous IPR challenged claims of the ’319 patent based on the same primary prior art—Crowds, Border, and MorphMix—as that asserted in the instant action. See Code200, UAB v. Luminati Networks Ltd., IPR2020-01266, Paper 5, 5–6. We agree with Petitioner that Uniloc is distinguishable from this case here because Uniloc addressed a situation after a denial of an earlier petition on the merits. Reply 2; Uniloc, 6. As discussed above, we determine that the merits of this action present a compelling unpatentability challenge. Absent joinder, a one-year bar would apply to Petitioner, and, again, the merits presented in this challenge would not be reached by the Board in a final written decision. Under these specific circumstances, we determine joinder is appropriate in the interests of justice. Because NetNut has been dismissed from the 1492 IPR, there are no longer issues of cooperation and duplication that would have to be addressed between petitioners. Additionally, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316(11), maintaining the previously-set trial schedule in the 1492 IPR is not necessary when joinder is granted. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(c). Thus, the schedule will be adjusted in accordance with a Revised Scheduling Order, entered concurrently with this Decision.” slip op. at 39
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,257,319 - PTAB · Apr 7, 2022 · PGR2021-00030 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing
Granted Petitioner’s rehearing request and instituted PGR on claims 1–5, 9, and 10 based on the more-likely-than-not enablement showing and efficiency considerations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“As acknowledged by both Petitioner and Patent Owner, this proceeding and PGR2021-00042 involve essentially identical issues. See 6 Reh’g Req. 15; Prelim. Resp. 19 n.3. In particular, we note that claims 6–8 of the ’039 patent challenged in PGR2021-00042 depend from claim 1 of the ’039 patent challenged in this proceeding, and are challenged under essentially identical written description, enablement and prior art issues. Reh’g Req. 15. Thus, our decision to institute post-grant review in PGR2021-00042 effectuates our review of issues almost identical to those in this proceeding. Petitioner further argues that this proceeding and PGR2021-00042 involve related issues, and that “considerations of efficiency . . . therefore counsel in favor of the Board reviewing the patentability of claims 1–5, 9, and 10 of the ’039 patent as well.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that, because we are to review practically the same issues of this proceeding in PGR2021-00042, considerations of efficiency (i.e., efficient use of the Board’s resources) strongly weigh in favor of also instituting trial in this proceeding. See Reh’g Req. 15. Considering all the factors together as a whole, we determine that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the interests of efficiency and integrity of the patent system weigh against exercising discretionary denial under § 324(a). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution. We consider the merits of the Petition with respect to the threshold for institution below.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“3. Analysis “[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’” Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (alteration in original). “The enablement requirement ensures that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims. The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement. The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.” National Recovery Techs. Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed Cir. 1999). [Although] a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art . . . , that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule 24 of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure. . . . [W]hen there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement. Genentech Inc., 108 F.3d at 1366. Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Petitioner has established that it is more likely than not that claims 1–5, 9, and 10 of the ’039 patent lack enablement. In particular, we are persuaded based on the record at this stage of the proceeding that the Specification does not enable the full scope of the claims. The Specification focuses on dolastatin/auristatin derivatives and does not describe novel ADCs having non-dolastatin/auristatin derivative drug moieties. Ex. 1001, Abstract. For example, the Specification states that “there is a clear need in the art for dolastatin/auristatin derivatives having significantly lower toxicity, yet useful therapeutic efficiency [sic]” and purports that “[t]hese and other limitations and problems of the past are addressed by the present invention.” Id. at 4:25–29 (emphasis added). Moreover, each embodiment, example, figure, and assay disclosed in the Specification appears to use a drug moiety that is a dolastatin/auristatin derivative. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Abstract, 4:22–29, 50:56–52:30, 71:19–22, 131:23–48, Figs. 1–19, Examples 2–16. Claim 1, however, recites ADCs” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“As acknowledged by both Petitioner and Patent Owner, this proceeding and PGR2021-00042 involve essentially identical issues. See 6 Reh’g Req. 15; Prelim. Resp. 19 n.3. In particular, we note that claims 6–8 of the ’039 patent challenged in PGR2021-00042 depend from claim 1 of the ’039 patent challenged in this proceeding, and are challenged under essentially identical written description, enablement and prior art issues. Reh’g Req. 15. Thus, our decision to institute post-grant review in PGR2021-00042 effectuates our review of issues almost identical to those in this proceeding. Petitioner further argues that this proceeding and PGR2021-00042 involve related issues, and that “considerations of efficiency . . . therefore counsel in favor of the Board reviewing the patentability of claims 1–5, 9, and 10 of the ’039 patent as well.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that, because we are to review practically the same issues of this proceeding in PGR2021-00042, considerations of efficiency (i.e., efficient use of the Board’s resources) strongly weigh in favor of also instituting trial in this proceeding. See Reh’g Req. 15. Considering all the factors together as a whole, we determine that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the interests of efficiency and integrity of the patent system weigh against exercising discretionary denial under § 324(a). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution. We consider the merits of the Petition with respect to the threshold for institution below.” slip op. at 6
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Instituted
“skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’” Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (alteration in original). “The enablement requirement ensures that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims. The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement. The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.” National Recovery Techs. Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed Cir. 1999). [Although] a specification need not disclose what is well known in the art . . . , that general, oft-repeated statement is merely a rule 24 of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure. . . . [W]hen there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement. Genentech Inc., 108 F.3d at 1366.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,808,039 - Brooks Sports, Inc. v. Herbert E. TownsendRehearing grantedPTAB · May 17, 2021 · IPR2018-00577 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part, finding challenges 8 and 9 unproven and limiting challenge 3 as to claim 6; it declined to disregard the petitioner’s expert’s entire testimony.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) sets forth, in relevant part that: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed
“Dr. Shorten’s testimonies entirely. Nonetheless, in the Final Written Decision, in addressing Patent Owner’s arguments concerning the relevant art and level of ordinary skill in the art, we stated that the parties’ arguments “address what weight we should give to the testimony of the parties’ declarants” and “[f]or the reasons addressed below, the parties’ declarants both provide relevant testimony on issues being assessed dependent on the declarant’s particular background and expertise.” Final Dec. 13. We, thus, Rather, we assessed portions of the testimonies and how much weight should be given to them. In doing so, we considered Dr. Shorten’s relationship with Petitioner and the alleged conflicting testimony. Such matters go to credibility of the witness, but do not justify disregarding the testimony altogether as requested by Patent Owner. Even if there were conflicting testimonies as to whether Dr. Shorten ever tested a running shoe that has a dilatant compound in the sole, Dr. Shorten effectively corrected such discrepancy in his second declaration by testifying that his employee tested the Power Bounce shoe. See PO Sur- Reply 9. These two matters raised by Patent Owner did not rise to the level that Dr. Shorten’s entire testimony should be disregarded.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsDecided for petitioner
“In its Response in regard to secondary considerations, Patent Owner argued that “Petitioner’s expert tried and failed in 1985 to create shoes that had a dilatant compound in the sole.” PO Resp. 61. Petitioner replied that “Dr. Shorten explains there was not a failed attempt, but a reasonable decision to not to try because better materials were available.” Pet. Reply 27 (citing Ex. 1071 at ¶¶ 164–170). In his Reply Declaration, Dr. Shorten testified that Silly Putty in a shoe component “does not perform better than EVA [(ethyl vinyl acetate)],” that “it performed worse,” and that “[g]iven the additional cost and weight compared to EVA, Silly Putty does not provide a better option.” Ex. 1071 ¶ 170. We stated in the Final Written Decision that Petitioner replied that its declarant “explains there was not a failed attempt, but a reasonable decision to not to try because better materials were available.” Final Dec. 70 (citing Pet. Reply 27). Also, as pointed out in the Final Written Decision, Dr. Shorten testified that “Silly Putty is heavy and costly compared to EVA, a benchmark material,” “[g]iven the additional cost and weight compared to EVA, Silly Putty does not provide a better option,” and “I don’t think it has any -- in the form we see it in, you know, the patent referenced in the Townsend, I don’t think there’s any commercial value there personally.” Id. (citing Ex. 1071 (Shorten Reply Dec.) ¶¶ 164, 170; Ex. 2009 (Shorten “[b]ased on the record, a preponderance of the evidence persuades us that others tried but decided for economic reasons that using a dilatant compound in a shoe was an unattractive option.” Final Dec. 70. Thus, the Final Written Decision provided grounds for disregarding Petitioner’s Expert’s testimony with respect to his conclusion in 1985 to the extent that it conflicts with the later testimony. The fact that Dr. Shorten clarified or corrected his earlier testimony does not mean that we should disregard his later testimony, because there is nothing in the record to hold against the veracity of later testimonies, other than that earlier inconsistent testimony itself.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,490,416 - Shopify, Inc. / Priceline.Com LLC et al. v. DDR Holdings, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 26, 2020 · IPR2018-01014 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s rehearing request and held claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11–13, 15, 17, and 18 unpatentable over the listed prior-art grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Petitioner’s argument on rehearing is persuasive, particularly under the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages linked to the “buy” page as corresponding to the recited “hierarchical set of additional pages.” See Req. Reh’g 11 (asserting “the Petition demonstrated that the ‘view cart,’ ‘modify cart,’ and ‘checkout’ links satisfy the second ‘wherein’ clause”). In doing so, Petitioner points us to specific portions of its Petition that we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 102 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’825 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22. Petitioner thus demonstrates that the buy page shown in Exhibit 1009, i.e., the recited “composite web page,” contains one or more selectable URLs connecting the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages to the buy page, i.e., the recited “hierarchical set of additional web pages,” as required by the claim. Because each of those pages “pertain[s] to a subset of the product offerings in the electronic catalog,” such as those selected for purchase, Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of the second “wherein” clause of claim 3 is met by the Digital River Publications.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages linked to the “buy” page as corresponding to the recited “hierarchical set of additional pages.” See Req. Reh’g 11 (asserting “the Petition demonstrated that the ‘view cart,’ ‘modify cart,’ and ‘checkout’ links satisfy the second ‘wherein’ clause”). In doing so, Petitioner points us to specific portions of its Petition that we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 102 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’825 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22. Petitioner thus demonstrates that the buy page shown in Exhibit 1009, i.e., the recited “composite web page,” contains one or more selectable URLs connecting the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages to the buy page, i.e., the recited “hierarchical set of additional web pages,” as required by the claim. Because each of those pages “pertain[s] to a subset of the product offerings in the electronic catalog,” such as those selected for purchase, Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of the second “wherein” clause of claim 3 is met by the Digital River Publications.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 102 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’825 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,515,825 - Shopify, Inc. / Priceline.Com LLC et al. v. DDR Holdings, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 26, 2020 · IPR2018-01012 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Granted Petitioner’s rehearing request and held claims 1–3, 5, 7–8, 11–13, 15, 17, and 18 unpatentable, including claims 4, 5, 12, and 13 over the Digital River Publications.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Petitioner’s argument on rehearing is persuasive, particularly under the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages linked to the “buy” page as corresponding to the recited “hierarchical set of additional pages.”” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 105 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 23; Ex. 1002 ¶ 105. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 105 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’228 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22. Petitioner thus demonstrates that the buy page shown in Exhibit 1009, i.e., the recited “composite web page,” contains one or more selectable URLs connecting the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages to the buy page, i.e., the recited “hierarchical set of additional web pages,” as required by the claim. Because each of those pages “pertain[s] to a subset of the product offerings in the electronic catalog,” such as those selected for purchase, Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of the second “wherein” clause of claim 4 is met by the Digital River Publications.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 105 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 23; Ex. 1002 ¶ 105. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 105 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’228 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,043,228 - Shopify, Inc. / Priceline.Com LLC et al. v. DDR Holdings, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 26, 2020 · IPR2018-01011 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted; claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11–13, 15, 17, and 18 were held unpatentable over the listed grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. LEGAL STANDARD A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The burden of showing a decision should be modified on a request for rehearing lies with the party challenging the decision. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 107 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 107. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 107 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’876 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument on rehearing is persuasive, particularly under the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,639,876
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.