- Google LLC v. Videoshare LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 24, 2021 · CBM2020-00027 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review for claims 1–7 because the patent did not qualify as a covered business method patent; it did not reach the § 101 challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“covered business method patent review, the focus is on the claims. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (challenged patent eligible for review because the claims recited “an express financial component in the form of a subsidy” that was “central to the operation of the claimed invention”). Thus, “§ 18 (d)(1) directs us to examine the claims when deciding whether a patent is a CBM patent.” Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d at 1340. More specifically, the focus is on the claims to determine whether there is anything “explicitly or inherently financial in the construed claim language.” Id. The claims of the ’341 patent are directed to “[a] method for sharing video over a structured hierarchical network.” Ex. 1001, 25:14–15. We are not persuaded that this a financial activity. We agree with Patent Owner that the focus of the claims is video sharing technology. Prelim. Resp. 21. The claims describe a series of method steps for sharing video content involving servers and video files. Nowhere do the claims discuss or suggest obtaining payment or remuneration. Thus, the claims are unlike those in Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d 1331. In Blue Calypso, the claims expressly recited the term “subsidy,” which the Board construed as “financial assistance given by one to another.” Id. at 1339–40. The Federal Circuit explained that based on this understanding, the Board had concluded that the claims “were financial in nature” and instituted CBM review. Id. at 1340. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s analysis and affirmed its decision to institute CBM patent review: “Significantly, Blue Calypso has not challenged the Board’s interpretation of subsidy as ‘financial assistance given by one to another.’” Id.” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“covered business method patent review, the focus is on the claims. Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (challenged patent eligible for review because the claims recited “an express financial component in the form of a subsidy” that was “central to the operation of the claimed invention”). Thus, “§ 18 (d)(1) directs us to examine the claims when deciding whether a patent is a CBM patent.” Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d at 1340. More specifically, the focus is on the claims to determine whether there is anything “explicitly or inherently financial in the construed claim language.” Id. The claims of the ’341 patent are directed to “[a] method for sharing video over a structured hierarchical network.” Ex. 1001, 25:14–15. We are not persuaded that this a financial activity. We agree with Patent Owner that the focus of the claims is video sharing technology. Prelim. Resp. 21. The claims describe a series of method steps for sharing video content involving servers and video files. Nowhere do the claims discuss or suggest obtaining payment or remuneration. Thus, the claims are unlike those in Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d 1331. In Blue Calypso, the claims expressly recited the term “subsidy,” which the Board construed as “financial assistance given by one to another.” Id. at 1339–40. The Federal Circuit explained that based on this understanding, the Board had concluded that the claims “were financial in nature” and instituted CBM review. Id. at 1340. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s analysis and affirmed its decision to institute CBM patent review: “Significantly, Blue Calypso has not challenged the Board’s interpretation of subsidy as ‘financial assistance given by one to another.’” Id.” slip op. at 6
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached
“E. Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are directed to an abstract idea that is not eligible subject matter for a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 77. According to Petitioner, “[t]he claims recite the abstract idea of including advertising with appropriately formatted video.” Id. at 80. Patent Owner responds that Petitioner has failed to show that the claims recite ineligible subject matter. Prelim. Resp. 64. According to Patent Owner, “[t]he ’341 Patent claims recite specific steps that improve the functioning of a video server providing shared video files.” Id. Because we have determined that the ’341 patent does not qualify for covered business method patent review, we do not address whether the claims recite eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 11
§ 101 eligibilityDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,362,341 - Marketdial, Inc. v. Applied Predictive Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 3, 2021 · CBM2020-00025 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1–35 under Fintiv because the district court had already held the same claims invalid under § 101.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“institution decision.” Prelim. Resp. 6–7 (citing Snap, Paper 8). We agree. There will be no trial as to patent infringement because the district court already concluded that all claims of the ’916 patent are invalid under § 101. Patent Owner indicates that it will appeal that decision once the remainder of the district court case concludes. Id. at 3. The statutory deadline for a final written decision in this proceeding would be one year from institution. Under the particular factual circumstances of this case, we find that this factor strongly weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Not reached
“3 Because we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), we need not decide other issues presented by the Petition, such as whether the ’916 patent is eligible for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptNot reached
“3 Because we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), we need not decide other issues presented by the Petition, such as whether the ’916 patent is eligible for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
§ 101 eligibilityDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,571,916 - Banilla Games, Inc. v. Savvy Dog Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2020 · CBM2020-00014 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the remaining claims did not establish that the patent claims a financial product or service, as required for CBM review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). For reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that the challenged patent qualifies as a covered business method patent. Accordingly, we decline to institute a covered business method patent review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the limitations “determining a winning combination” and “testing the game field . . . to ensure that a winning combination more valuable . . .” are not financial in nature. Beginning with “winning combination,” we agree with Patent Owner that “winning,” by itself, is not necessarily monetary in nature. Prelim. Resp. 28. Indeed, other games include the step of determining whether a combination is a “winning combination” or not without necessarily involving any kind of prize or payout. See id. at 29–30. Instead, as is shown in the ’223 patent, some additional step after the determination of who won is necessarily if there is going to be some monetary payout corresponding to the win. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 6 (showing Step 630 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), Fig. 8 (showing Step 820 of “Redeem Payout and Credit Balance”), 6:34–40 (explaining a player “may” redeem points earned in the game for cash). Petitioner identifies nothing in the specification requiring that money be paid for just winning. Moreover, the ’223 patent makes clear that the games are intended broadly for “entertainment” and “amusement” and not just for gambling. See id. at 1:13–15 (explaining patent is related to “amusement and entertainment electronic gaming”). As Patent Owner explains, the ’223 patent expressly discusses the use of the games in Ohio, which prohibits gambling, but permits the use of games of skill for entertainment purposes. See Prelim. Resp. 52–58 (discussing Ohio’s laws in detail); Ex. 1001, 1:18–33 (describing Ohio’s laws prohibiting gambling, but allowing “games of skill”). Thus, at best, “winning combination” relates only to the possibility that a monetary payout could be received, not that a player necessarily will receive anything of monetary value for playing the game. This possibility is insufficient to meet the financial product or service requirement. See Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382 (noting “it cannot be the case that a patent covering a method and corresponding apparatuses becomes a CBM patent because its practice could involve a potential sale of a good or service” and “[i]t is not enough that a sale has occurred or may occur, or even that the specification speculates such a potential sale might occur”).” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,736,223 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Promptu Systems Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2018 · CBM2018-00033 · APJ Karl D Easthom · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 14–52, exercising discretion because Comcast advanced a conflicting claim construction in concurrent proceedings.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“Petitioner argues the Board should not exercise its discretion to deny this CBM Petition based on the ’344 and ’345 Petitions, because “the grounds for unpatentability identified in this petition are different than the grounds for unpatentability identified in the IPR petitions—indeed, the grounds for unpatentability raised here are not permitted in an IPR proceeding,” and Patent Owner had “not yet filed a preliminary response to the pending IPR petitions challenging the ’196 Patent.” Pet. 4, n.1 (citing General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (identifying relevant factors)). Nevertheless, as Patent Owner argues, General Plastic cites a non-exhaustive list of factors. See Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Petitioner fails to explain why it filed this CBM 2 “Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6, in response to Halliburton,” 329 U.S. at 1. Warner–Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997). Petition (filed April 2, 2018) about three and a half months after it filed the ’344 and ’345 Petitions (both filed Dec. 19, 2017) with competing claim construction arguments that impact central aspects of both trials. Petitioner’s implied argument that Congress only authorized certain grounds for inter partes reviews and limited other grounds to CBM reviews (e.g., § 112, ¶ 2), fails to explain sufficiently why the Board should entertain Petitioner’s new claim construction that potentially would impact central and major aspects of the concurrent ’344 and ’345 IPRs instituted based on a prior contradictory claim construction advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“A potential consequence of instituting the instant CBM based on Petitioner’s arguments related to the scope issue raised by Patent Owner involves at least raising the related issue of whether to terminate the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. See BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013- 00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) and reasoning that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims”). Petitioner does not propose terminating the ’344 and ’345 IPRs in the event that we decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding. Without terminating the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, instituting the instant CBM proceeding based on Petitioner’s means plus function arguments would result in different Board panels proceeding under two contradictory claim constructions on a central issue––i.e., for the same claim term of the same patent, involving all of the challenged claims in the CBM and a slight majority of the collectively challenged claims in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. The Board’s reviewing court disfavors conflicting “reasoning on a point . . . central to [the Board’s] analysis” absent an adequate explanation for the conflict. See Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, No. 2017-1866, 2018 WL 4145081, slip op. at *3 (Aug. 29, 2018 Fed. Cir.) (“Because the Board did not adequately explain its reasoning on a point that was central to its analysis and its conclusion on that point was contrary to another Board opinion on nearly identical facts, we vacate the Board’s determination as to the appealed claims and remand for further proceedings.”) (nonprecedential); Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 869 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a panel simultaneously issues opinions on the same technical issue between the same parties on the same record, and reaches opposite results without explanation, we think the best course is to vacate and remand these findings for further consideration.”). As noted above, Petitioner does not present an adequate explanation for the contradictory claim constructions. Whether a recitation constitutes a means-plus-function element does not depend on whether the claim is construed in an inter partes review or a covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, based on the particular circumstances involved as discussed above, we decline to decide whether to adopt Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position asserted here. On one hand, if we decided to adopt it and institute a CBM review on that basis, concurrent trials would proceed on diametrically opposed claim construction positions––unless the panel in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs decided to terminate those trials based on our adoption of the diametrically opposed claim construction asserted here. At the least, even without a termination the ’344 and ’345 IPRs, the diametrically opposed positions would infiltrate the three proceedings and raise collateral issues, undermining the Board’s resources and effort “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). On the other hand, if we decide Petitioner’s showing here lacks sufficient support on the merits for purposes of a CBM review, a decision denying institution may serve to advise the parties on this limited record that Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs appears to be correct even though no final decision has been reached there yet.” slip op. at 11
- BurdenNot reached
“As presented, Petitioner advances the second and third theories of unpatentability as contingent upon not adopting its central argument that “program steps” represents a means plus function term. Because we do not decide the issue of whether “program steps” constitutes a means plus function term, we decline Petitioner’s invitation to investigate further its second and third contingent theories. In addition, given the prominence of the means plus function claim construction issue raised by the parties, in the event we were to decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding, the means plus function issue likely would dominate the CBM trial and may impact the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, as discussed above.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,047,196 - Keeper Security, Inc. v. Cumberland Systems LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2017 · CBM2017-00057 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–19 because Petitioner did not show that the patent qualified as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to show adequately that the ’647 patent “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” to qualify as a covered business method patent. As we explained above, Secure Axcess requires a challenged patent to “have a claim that contains . . . a financial activity element.” Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1381 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to point to any element of claims of the ’647 patent that it contends meets the “financial activity element” required by Secure Axcess. Instead, it merely points to statements in the specification regarding potential applications for the claimed cryptographic algorithm. At best, Petitioner argues that the claimed encryption method can be for financial matters, such as securing e-commerce transactions, but this is not sufficient after the Federal Circuit’s guidance in both Unwired Planet and Secure Axcess. See id. Petitioner has simply failed to identify anything in the claims that are financial in nature.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,023,647 - Mastercard International Inc. v. Alexsam, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 21, 2017 · CBM2017-00042 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because MasterCard lacked standing: it had not been sued for or charged with infringement under the CBM statute.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“Under § 18(a)(1)(B) of the America Invents Act (AIA), “[a] person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Petitioner contends that this standing requirement is satisfied “because Patent Owner sued Petitioner for alleged breach of a patent License Agreement involving the ‘608 Patent.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002). After considering the parties’ arguments, including those set forth in their supplemental briefs, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that it is eligible to bring this CBM review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (“The petitioner must demonstrate . . . that [it] meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Under § 18(a)(1)(B) of the America Invents Act (AIA), “[a] person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Petitioner contends that this standing requirement is satisfied “because Patent Owner sued Petitioner for alleged breach of a patent License Agreement involving the ‘608 Patent.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002). After considering the parties’ arguments, including those set forth in their supplemental briefs, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that it is eligible to bring this CBM review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (“The petitioner must demonstrate . . . that [it] meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,000,608 - Mastercard International Inc. v. Alexsam, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 21, 2017 · CBM2017-00041 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because MasterCard lacked standing: it was neither sued for nor charged with infringement of the challenged patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Petitioner contends that this standing requirement is satisfied “because Patent Owner sued Petitioner for alleged breach of a patent License Agreement involving the ‘787 Patent.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002). After considering the parties’ arguments, including those set forth in their supplemental briefs, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that it is eligible to bring this CBM review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (“The petitioner must demonstrate . . . that [it] meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,189,787 - Cloud9 Technologies LLC v. Ipc Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 21, 2017 · CBM2017-00037 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution as to all challenged claims because the ’566 patent is not a covered business method patent; its claims do not recite a financial activity.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“covered business method patent review may not be instituted “unless . . . it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Because we determine that the ’566 patent is not a covered business method patent, we deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,189,566 - Google Inc. v. Alfonso Cioffi, Megan Elizabeth Rozman, Melanie Ann Rozman, And Morgan Lee RozmanInstitution deniedPTAB · May 2, 2017 · CBM2017-00015 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the challenged patent does not qualify for covered business method review; its claims are not directed to a financial activity.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We perceive no “issue of material fact” that should be resolved in favor of the Petitioner at the institution stage. Pet. Supp. Brief 3. Although the Petition discusses the construction of several claim terms, none of the proposed interpretations includes any reference to features that are related to internet banking or any other feature that is financial in nature. See Pet. 27 (e.g., proposing that “web browser process” be construed as a “process that can access data on websites” in which “this ‘access’ to website data can be direct or indirect”). In short, none of the claims of the ’528 Patent is “directed to” a financial activity on its face, and we do not read any such financial activity into them based on the Specification’s assertion that malware protection could be useful in internet banking. Thus, we are not persuaded that the ’528 Patent qualifies for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“We perceive no “issue of material fact” that should be resolved in favor of the Petitioner at the institution stage. Pet. Supp. Brief 3. Although the Petition discusses the construction of several claim terms, none of the proposed interpretations includes any reference to features that are related to internet banking or any other feature that is financial in nature. See Pet. 27 (e.g., proposing that “web browser process” be construed as a “process that can access data on websites” in which “this ‘access’ to website data can be direct or indirect”). In short, none of the claims of the ’528 Patent is “directed to” a financial activity on its face, and we do not read any such financial activity into them based on the Specification’s assertion that malware protection could be useful in internet banking. Thus, we are not persuaded that the ’528 Patent qualifies for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 13
None - Google Inc. v. Alfonso Cioffi, Megan Elizabeth Rozman, Melanie Ann Rozman, And Morgan Lee RozmanInstitution deniedPTAB · May 2, 2017 · CBM2017-00010 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because the ’528 Patent does not qualify for covered business method review; its claims are not directed to a financial activity.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We perceive no “issue of material fact” that should be resolved in favor of the Petitioner at the institution stage. Pet. Supp. Brief 3. Although the Petition discusses the construction of several claim terms, none of the proposed interpretations includes any reference to features that are related to internet banking or any other feature that is financial in nature. See Pet. 29 (e.g., proposing that “web browser process” be construed as a “process that can access data on websites” in which “this ‘access’ to website data can be direct or indirect”). In short, none of the claims of the ’528 Patent is “directed to” a financial activity on its face, and we do not read any such financial activity into them based on the Specification’s assertion that malware protection could be useful in internet banking. Thus, we are not persuaded that the ’528 Patent qualifies for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther
“We agree that the parties’ proposed constructions are consistent with the Specification of the ’528 Patent and, in that context, are the broadest reasonable interpretations of the terms. Therefore, to the extent that claim constructions are relevant to this Decision, we adopt the proposed constructions. Citing the claim construction order entered by the district court in co- pending litigation, Petitioner proposes we construe the term “system file” in claims 21, 44, and 64 to be synonymous with a “critical file” or “critical system file,” which refers to files required for the proper operation of the computer’s systems. Pet. 27–28 (citing Ex. 1012). Patent Owner does not propose a specific construction. We agree that Petitioner’s proposed construction is broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification of the ’528 Patent and we adopt it in this proceeding to the extent that claim constructions are relevant to this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingOther
“The parties also agree that the preamble of claim 64 is limiting. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 15. The preamble of claim 64 recites specific features of the claimed computer program product, e.g., that the stored code is capable of executing instructions using a common operating system having at least one electronic data processor coupled to other elements in a specific way.” slip op. at 7
Claim constructionDiscretionary denial
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.