- Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Promptu Systems Corp.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2018 · CBM2018-00033 · APJ Karl D Easthom · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 14–52, exercising discretion because Comcast advanced a conflicting claim construction in concurrent proceedings.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“Petitioner argues the Board should not exercise its discretion to deny this CBM Petition based on the ’344 and ’345 Petitions, because “the grounds for unpatentability identified in this petition are different than the grounds for unpatentability identified in the IPR petitions—indeed, the grounds for unpatentability raised here are not permitted in an IPR proceeding,” and Patent Owner had “not yet filed a preliminary response to the pending IPR petitions challenging the ’196 Patent.” Pet. 4, n.1 (citing General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (identifying relevant factors)). Nevertheless, as Patent Owner argues, General Plastic cites a non-exhaustive list of factors. See Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Petitioner fails to explain why it filed this CBM 2 “Congress enacted § 112, ¶ 6, in response to Halliburton,” 329 U.S. at 1. Warner–Jenkinson Co. Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997). Petition (filed April 2, 2018) about three and a half months after it filed the ’344 and ’345 Petitions (both filed Dec. 19, 2017) with competing claim construction arguments that impact central aspects of both trials. Petitioner’s implied argument that Congress only authorized certain grounds for inter partes reviews and limited other grounds to CBM reviews (e.g., § 112, ¶ 2), fails to explain sufficiently why the Board should entertain Petitioner’s new claim construction that potentially would impact central and major aspects of the concurrent ’344 and ’345 IPRs instituted based on a prior contradictory claim construction advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“A potential consequence of instituting the instant CBM based on Petitioner’s arguments related to the scope issue raised by Patent Owner involves at least raising the related issue of whether to terminate the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. See BlackBerry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas, LLC, Case IPR2013- 00036, slip op. at 19–20 (PTAB Mar. 7, 2014) (Paper 65) (citing In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) and reasoning that “the prior art grounds of unpatentability must fall, pro forma, because they are based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims”). Petitioner does not propose terminating the ’344 and ’345 IPRs in the event that we decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding. Without terminating the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, instituting the instant CBM proceeding based on Petitioner’s means plus function arguments would result in different Board panels proceeding under two contradictory claim constructions on a central issue––i.e., for the same claim term of the same patent, involving all of the challenged claims in the CBM and a slight majority of the collectively challenged claims in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs. The Board’s reviewing court disfavors conflicting “reasoning on a point . . . central to [the Board’s] analysis” absent an adequate explanation for the conflict. See Emerson Electric Co. v. Sipco, LLC, No. 2017-1866, 2018 WL 4145081, slip op. at *3 (Aug. 29, 2018 Fed. Cir.) (“Because the Board did not adequately explain its reasoning on a point that was central to its analysis and its conclusion on that point was contrary to another Board opinion on nearly identical facts, we vacate the Board’s determination as to the appealed claims and remand for further proceedings.”) (nonprecedential); Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc., 869 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a panel simultaneously issues opinions on the same technical issue between the same parties on the same record, and reaches opposite results without explanation, we think the best course is to vacate and remand these findings for further consideration.”). As noted above, Petitioner does not present an adequate explanation for the contradictory claim constructions. Whether a recitation constitutes a means-plus-function element does not depend on whether the claim is construed in an inter partes review or a covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Accordingly, based on the particular circumstances involved as discussed above, we decline to decide whether to adopt Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position asserted here. On one hand, if we decided to adopt it and institute a CBM review on that basis, concurrent trials would proceed on diametrically opposed claim construction positions––unless the panel in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs decided to terminate those trials based on our adoption of the diametrically opposed claim construction asserted here. At the least, even without a termination the ’344 and ’345 IPRs, the diametrically opposed positions would infiltrate the three proceedings and raise collateral issues, undermining the Board’s resources and effort “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). On the other hand, if we decide Petitioner’s showing here lacks sufficient support on the merits for purposes of a CBM review, a decision denying institution may serve to advise the parties on this limited record that Petitioner’s means plus function claim construction position in the ’344 and ’345 IPRs appears to be correct even though no final decision has been reached there yet.” slip op. at 11
- BurdenNot reached
“As presented, Petitioner advances the second and third theories of unpatentability as contingent upon not adopting its central argument that “program steps” represents a means plus function term. Because we do not decide the issue of whether “program steps” constitutes a means plus function term, we decline Petitioner’s invitation to investigate further its second and third contingent theories. In addition, given the prominence of the means plus function claim construction issue raised by the parties, in the event we were to decide to institute the instant CBM proceeding, the means plus function issue likely would dominate the CBM trial and may impact the ’344 IPR and ’345 IPR, as discussed above.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,047,196 - Mastercard International Inc. v. Alexsam, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 21, 2017 · CBM2017-00042 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because MasterCard lacked standing: it had not been sued for or charged with infringement under the CBM statute.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“Under § 18(a)(1)(B) of the America Invents Act (AIA), “[a] person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Petitioner contends that this standing requirement is satisfied “because Patent Owner sued Petitioner for alleged breach of a patent License Agreement involving the ‘608 Patent.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002). After considering the parties’ arguments, including those set forth in their supplemental briefs, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that it is eligible to bring this CBM review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (“The petitioner must demonstrate . . . that [it] meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Under § 18(a)(1)(B) of the America Invents Act (AIA), “[a] person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Petitioner contends that this standing requirement is satisfied “because Patent Owner sued Petitioner for alleged breach of a patent License Agreement involving the ‘608 Patent.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002). After considering the parties’ arguments, including those set forth in their supplemental briefs, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that it is eligible to bring this CBM review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (“The petitioner must demonstrate . . . that [it] meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,000,608 - Mastercard International Inc. v. Alexsam, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 21, 2017 · CBM2017-00041 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because MasterCard lacked standing: it was neither sued for nor charged with infringement of the challenged patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Petitioner contends that this standing requirement is satisfied “because Patent Owner sued Petitioner for alleged breach of a patent License Agreement involving the ‘787 Patent.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002). After considering the parties’ arguments, including those set forth in their supplemental briefs, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that it is eligible to bring this CBM review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (“The petitioner must demonstrate . . . that [it] meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,189,787 - Cme Group, Inc. v. Volatility Partners, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 28, 2017 · CBM2016-00024 · APJ Trenton A Ward · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1–50 because CME Group failed to establish standing to file the petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a), the Petitioner bears the burden of establishing “petitioner has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” Based on the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we determine the information presented in the Petition and supporting evidence does not establish that Petitioner had standing to file the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“Here, we determine that Petitioner fails to sufficiently establish an “adverse legal interest” by failing to identify an underlying cause of action that Patent Owner could have brought or threatened to bring. First, Petitioner has not sufficiently established that the License Agreement covers the ’RE435 patent. The License Agreement licenses “the inventions claimed in the [’184 patent]” (Ex. 1004, 2). None of the claims in the original ’184 patent was confirmed during the prosecution of the reissue application, as only claim 1 from the ’184 patent was maintained in the reissue application, and this claim was amended during the prosecution of the reissue application. See Ex. 1003, 26–40, 176–182, 189–203. Therefore, Petitioner fails to establish sufficiently how any of “the inventions claimed in the ’184 patent” are currently claimed in the ’RE435 patent.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denial - Apple Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 28, 2016 · CBM2016-00053 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied Apple’s petition and did not institute CBM review because Apple failed to establish standing, including a real and immediate controversy concerning the ’060 patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“3. Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to show sufficiently that it has standing to bring this covered business method patent review. Specifically, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established sufficiently, at this time, that there is a real and immediate 8 controversy regarding the ’060 patent. An essential link in the logical chain of Petitioner’s allegations that it has standing is that the scope of the claims of the ’060 patent and the asserted claims of ’850 patent in the district court lawsuit are “substantially similar.” See Pet. 7–10. We agree, however, with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown adequately that the claims of the two patents are sufficiently similar. Although Petitioner contends that claim 13 of the challenged patent is similar in scope to claim 12 of the already asserted ’850 patent, it fails to provide any meaningful analysis to support its contention. Instead, it merely summarizes and lists certain similar claim limitations in the two claims without providing any discussion of the actual language of the identified limitations, the other limitations in the claims, and the claims as a whole.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“petitioner’s grounds for standing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a). Rule 42.304(a) states it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.” Id. One of those eligibility requirements is that only persons (or their privies) who have been sued or charged with infringement under a patent are permitted to file a petition seeking a covered business method patent review of that patent. AIA § 18(a)(1)(B); 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Under our rules, “[c]harged with infringement means a real and substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal court.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a).” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,009,060 - HP Inc. / SAP America, Inc. v. Big Baboon, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 28, 2016 · CBM2016-00020 · APJ Trenton A Ward · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 15 and 20–34 were more likely than not unpatentable under § 101 or any of the three § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For the reasons that follow, Petitioner failed to establish that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Therefore, we deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDenied
“We believe the same is true in this matter. Petitioner fails to identify specific documentary evidence indicating that the claim element “via Web administration, producing a software configuration in which selected ones of the modules are enabled or disabled” would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’275 patent. At best, Petitioner provides a string cite to nine different documents, without pointing to any particular page or disclosure in any of those documents, as allegedly illustrating an “industry-wide push to Web-enable,” and provides a string cite to eight different paragraphs of testimony from Dr. Greenspun, as allegedly indicating why a skilled artisan “would have seen a strong need to provide Web-enabled system administration capabilities for the R/3 system described in R/3 Online and R/3 Book.” See Pet. 63–64 (citing Exs. 1017– 1021, 1023, 1026, 1027, 1030; Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 58–60, 85–86, 110–112). Petitioner, however, fails to identify with specificity which documentary evidence indicates that it would have been common knowledge to provide a Web interface for system administration of the system described by R/3 Online and the R/3 Book and, thus, that claim 15 would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan based on combining this alleged common knowledge with the system described by R/3 Online and R/3 Book. The Board, and Patent Owner, are left to speculate as to which particular evidence Petitioner is relying on. See Pet. 12, 42; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.304(b)(4)–(5) (a petition must “specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art” and identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge”), 42.22(a)(2) (a petition must include a “full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”). In view of this deficiency, we determine that Petitioner fails to articulate sufficient reasoning to support its assertion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that independent claim 15, and claims 20–34 dependent therefrom, would have been obvious over R/3 Online and R/3 Book.” slip op. at 29
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner urges the Board to construe two claim phrases. First, Petitioner urges us to construe the claimed “end-to-end, business-to-business, e-commerce business automation software for automation business functions across multiple business domains” to mean “[s]oftware that, using a computer network, at least partially automates business functions relating to two or more businesses and from two or more business domains (such as products, payments, and financial performance).” Pet. 19. Second, Petitioner urges us to construe the claimed “via Web administration, producing a software configuration in which selected ones of the modules are enabled or disabled” to mean “producing a software configuration in which modules can be enabled or disabled by (1) changing the configuration parameters of a web server program or (2) using a Web browser to change configuration parameters of software running on a server.” Pet. 21. Patent Owner does not offer any proposed constructions of claim terms in its Preliminary Response. For the reasons explained below, in this case determining the scope of the terms proffered by Petitioner is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner has met the standard for institution of a covered business method patent review, and we decline to adopt the constructions sought by Petitioner. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable
“Claim 15 (the only claim substantively addressed by Petitioner), however, does not recite any “gathering” steps, and Petitioner does not explain sufficiently how the limitations of claim 15 are directed to the concept of “gathering” information. For example, claim 15 merely recites “providing . . . business automation software, “identifying multiple modules of the software,” and producing a “software configuration.” Additionally, claim 15 requires producing a “workscope/workflow structured display of complex database records,” which constitutes “an integrated decision-making environment for a particular business function.” Thus, the method of claim 15 does not expressly require that information be gathered across “multiple business domains.” Rather, claim 15 requires providing “business automation software” to produce a “structured display” of “records” pertaining to a “business transaction,” such that the display constitutes an “integrated decision-making environment for a particular business function.” Thus, even if Petitioner is correct that “gathering information from across a business and using the information to make decisions” by itself is an abstract idea, Petitioner’s analysis does not address sufficiently the specific language of claim 15 and explain why claim 15 is directed to that idea. See Pet. 27. Similarly, dependent claims 20–34 are not directed to “gathering information,” and Petitioner provides no analysis of the language of the dependent claims. In light of the above, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish the first step of the Mayo framework; i.e., Petitioner fails to identify sufficiently an abstract idea to which claim 15 is directed.8 Petitioner combines its arguments under § 101 against dependent claims 20– 34 with its arguments against claim 15 and fails to provide any additional arguments for these dependent claims. See Pet. 25 (arguing that the “sixteen challenged claims of the ’275 patent are likewise unpatentable under §101”). Therefore, we similarly determine that Petitioner fails to establish the first step of the Mayo framework with respect to dependent claims 20–34. Based on the foregoing, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish, based on the record presented, that claims 15 and 20–34 are more likely than not directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 8 We need not decide whether claim 15 is directed to a different abstract idea, and only determine that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that claim 15 is directed to the alleged abstract idea that Petitioner proposes in the Petition.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · MayoPatents in suitUS 6,343,275 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Mar 21, 2016 · CBM2015-00180 · APJ Barry L Grossman · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1, 9, 16, 18-25, 34, 49-52, and 57 because Acxiom failed to establish standing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“Acxiom must establish more than just the fact that it has sold products to an entity that has been sued for infringement. It must establish that the relationship between itself and a sued customer is sufficient to constitute privity.1 The evidence provided by Acxiom, which will be discussed in detail below, in short, indicates that Acxiom has sold some unspecified software and/or other goods and services to a variety of entities and that some of those entities have approached Acxiom with claims of indemnity. We are not persuaded that these requests for indemnity without evidence or an acknowledgement of an obligation to indemnify are sufficient to establish privity. See Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F. 3d 899 (Fed. Cit. 2014); Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,352,317 - Ocean Tomo, LLC v. Patent Ratings, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 26, 2016 · CBM2015-00157 · APJ Peter P Chen · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution of CBM review of claims 1, 9, 16, 18–25, 34, 49, 50–52, and 57 because Ocean Tomo failed to establish standing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“must set forth the petitioner’s grounds for standing. 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a). Rule 42.304(a) states it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“this issue, and agree with Patent Owner. This case is factually distinguishable from MedImmune for the reasons described by Patent Owner. We are not persuaded any of the evidence herein sufficiently demonstrates a charge by Patent Owner of Petitioner’s infringement of the ’849 patent. For example, the parties’ amended pleadings in the Illinois action total 15 causes of action, spanning 71 pages and 280 paragraphs of allegations, yet there is no mention of the ’849 patent, or patent infringement, or non-infringement of patents, or charges of patent infringement. Exs. 1004, 1005. The parties’ contract, tort, and related causes of action concern and arise from the fractured employment and business relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Barney and Patent Owner, not from charges of infringement of the ’849 patent.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,075,849 - Square, Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 23, 2015 · CBM2015-00148 · APJ James B Arpin · CBM · Institution
Institution of CBM review of claims 1–4 was denied because § 325(e)(1) estopped Square from pursuing grounds it reasonably could have raised in its earlier CBM petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDenied
“(emphasis added). As noted above, we issued a Final Written Decision in CBM2014-00156, determining that claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. ’156 Dec. 40. Petitioner here was the petitioner in CBM2014-00156, which resulted in a Final Written Decision with respect to claims 1–4. Thus, pursuant to § 325(e)(1), Petitioner cannot “request or maintain” a proceeding before the Office with respect to these claims “on any ground” that Petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised” in its Petition in CBM2014-00156.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“discovered Orlen earlier, or foreseen our determination that Petitioner had not shown Vazvan’s public availability, we are not persuaded that Petitioner reasonably could not have raised each of the challenges identified above to claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent, based on 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in its CBM2014- 00156 Petition. Section 325(e)(1) estops Petitioner from requesting or maintaining a proceeding before the Office with respect to the claims at issue in CBM2015-00148 on “any ground that [Petitioner] raised or reasonably could have raised” in CBM2014-00156. Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1) is applicable to the new challenges to claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent. Consequently, Petitioner is estopped from requesting, e.g., petitioning for institution of, or maintaining a proceeding with respect to claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent on the grounds asserted here. See supra Section I.E. Because Petitioner is estopped from requesting or maintaining a proceeding with respect to claims 1–4 based on any ground it “reasonably could have raised” in its earlier petition, we deny covered business method patent review of claims 1–4 of the ’100 patent in the present proceeding.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,711,100 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00134 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed 3 AAA also is listed as a real party-in-interest. Pet. 3. Petitioner, however, provides no argument or evidence as to why it believes that AAA is a real party-ininterest of Petitioner. Thus, we have no basis to ascertain whether Petitioner may above, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show what services, if any, Petitioner provides to Gerber. Therefore, Petitioner does not provide us with evidence sufficient to show that Gerber is a real party-in-interest of Petitioner. Also, the heavily redacted Agreement does not provide us with sufficient evidence regarding the relationship between these entities to show that Gerber is a privy of Petitioner sufficient to support Petitioner’s argument for standing. Thus, we do not have sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner has proper standing to bring this Petition. Therefore, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute a covered business method review of the challenged claims. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,709 (Aug. 14, 2012) (Response to Comment 102) (“Facially improper standing is a basis for denying the petition without proceeding to the merits of the decision.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,234,184
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.