- Google LLC v. Withrow Networks Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00775 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over each of the five asserted §103 grounds, including Carmel with Mattavelli and Carmel with Wang.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that at the relevant time of the invention claimed in the ’849 patent (April 2005),2 a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field requiring learning computation principles, and two years of work experience in networking or streaming media systems, particularly audio and video, over the Internet,” where “[a]dditional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–23). In the Decision on Institution, the Board agreed with and applied Petitioner’s proposed definition. Dec. on Inst. 9–11. Patent Owner proposes a very similar definition of “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two to three years of experience in the design or development of (1) video processing systems, audio processing systems, and/or the equivalent; and (2) networking and communications systems, or the equivalent,” where “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” PO Resp. 23 2 Petitioner states that it “uses [the earliest possible priority date of April 18, 2005] as the priority date of the challenged claims.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees that the “earliest effective filing date” of the challenged claims is April 18, 2005. PO Resp. 19. The ’849 patent is expired. See Ex. 1001, codes (63), (*); Paper 8, 33. would be the same under either level” of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’849 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’849 patent and cited prior art, we maintain the previously adopted definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but remove the term “at least” to avoid unnecessary ambiguity. Our analysis herein, however, would be the same under either party’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner states in the Petition that it “does not presently contend that any term requires express construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not believe any terms of the ’849 [p]atent require express constructions for purposes of” this proceeding. PO Resp. 24; Sur-Reply 11. The Board did not interpret any terms in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 8. We agree that no terms require express interpretation to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Finally, Petitioner explains in detail why and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Carmel and Mattavelli, with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 50–55. Specifically, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Carmel’s system to use “Mattavelli’s CGD techniques to optimize the decoding of in more efficient network bandwidth usage and improved playback of multimedia data streams. Id. at 50, 52–53, 55. Petitioner contends that Carmel and Mattavelli are both directed to processing multimedia data playback “for the appreciation of a user,” while providing the highest perceived audio and video output quality possible in view of system constraints to ensure playback continuity. Id. at 50–51 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:35–49, 10:48–54, 11:9–18, Figs. 3D, 6B; Ex. 1004, 2309–10). Petitioner argues that Carmel and Mattavelli both pertain to compression of multimedia data using well-known coding and compression standards for video streaming. Id. at 51 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:25–26, 11:24–52; Ex. 1004, 2309–11). Petitioner further asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that Carmel and Mattavelli “complement[]” each other because Carmel addresses constraints on available network bandwidth and Mattavelli addresses limits on available processing resources at the client/multimedia player. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003, code (57), 7:36–41; Ex. 1004, 2309–2312). According to Petitioner, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the complementary teachings in Carmel and Mattavelli to create a more robust streaming system that addresses both bandwidth constraints and client processing limits to provide the best possible playback experience. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Petitioner also contends that Mattavelli teaches that merely optimizing transmission bandwidth is not sufficient and is potentially harmful, which provides an express motivation to combine Carmel’s and Mattavelli’s complementary teachings to ensure that different, related links in the streaming playback chain are optimized together. Id. at 53 (citing Ex. 1002 express disclosure that would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to incorporate Mattavelli’s complementary teachings regarding decoding because Carmel states that multimedia playback is achieved “preferably with only a minimal necessary transmission and decoding delay.” Id. at 53–54 (quoting Ex. 1003, 10:50–54; citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 218). Patent Owner in its Response does not dispute that Carmel and Mattavelli teach the preamble and limitations 1[a.i]–1[c.i], or that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references’ teachings in the manner asserted by Petitioner.6 Nonetheless, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378 (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Having reviewed Carmel and Mattavelli, on the complete trial record, we agree with Petitioner’s analysis, as supported by the testimony of” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,771,849 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,771,849 - Microsoft Corporation v. X1 Discovery, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00254 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because Petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Mr. Haeberli’s formulation, finding it to be consistent with the evidence then of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’490 patent. Dec. 9. Following a review of the full record, we agree with Mr. Haeberli’s statement that Petitioner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art is “not meaningfully different” from Mr. Haeberli’s for the purposes of this proceeding. We continue to view Mr. Haeberli’s proposed definition as consistent with the ’490 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below. However, our analysis of the issues below would have been the same had we instead adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“In our Decision on Institution, the only term that we found it necessary to construe was the term “string separator character” in claim 1. We preliminarily construed this term to mean “a single-character string separator.” Dec. 11, 30–31. We invited the parties to address the appropriateness of this construction over the course of the trial. Id. at 11, 31. In its briefing, Patent Owner agrees with the Board’s preliminary construction, arguing that it is “consistent with the intrinsic evidence.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 1001, claims 8 and 20). Patent Owner further argues that a person of ordinary skill would have understood a multi-character Boolean operator such as “AND” to be “a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 112). Petitioner’s Reply Brief does not address the issue of claim construction. See generally Reply Br.; see also Pet. 11 (“Unless otherwise noted, Petitioner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms below.”). Following our review of the full record, we determine that it is not necessary to construe this or any other claim term for the purposes of this Decision.2 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.). In our analysis below, we interpret the language of the claims according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Having reviewed the evidence of record, we find Mr. Haeberli’s testimony to be more persuasive and better supported by the evidence. According to Dr. Terveen, “[r]obust programming languages such as C and C++, together with well-developed operating system and UI frameworks, . . . allowed an ordinary programmer to build a UI that supported incremental searching, as evidenced by the numerous prior art systems that implemented such functionality, including Entourage, Eudora, Emacs, Canon Cat, SwyftWare, and others. Ex. 1100 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1004, 8–9, 161; Ex. 1021, 125, 127, 129; Ex. 1039, 102–103; Ex. 1043, 385–389). The relevant question, though, is not whether it would have been possible to build a user interface that supported incremental search, but whether it would have been “simple and straightforward” to execute an incremental search of multiple partial search strings on large, indexed multi-file databases such as those described in the Lotus Notes references, as Dr. Terveen alleges. None of the prior art discussed in the “State of the Art” section of Dr. Terveen’s initial declaration, taken individually or together, discloses incrementally searching a plurality of files using two partial search strings. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–33, 37, 40; Ex. 2001 ¶ 100. Thus, creating a user interface might be “simple,” but the evidence suggests that the back-end execution of an incremental search is not. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 126 (Raskin, concluding that “almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches”).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“different approach from that taken in Lotus Notes. The difference between Raskin’s sequential scanning method and the index-based system described in Wilcox is that sequential scanning by definition can only scan one document at a time as each document is loaded into a “buffer.” See, e.g., Ex. 2020 ¶ 35. Lotus Notes, however, only needs to load the index into memory for a user to be able to locate the single index entry identifying all instances of an indexed term across all indexed files. In fact, Raskin acknowledges that indexing may be necessary to maintain an acceptable response time. Ex. 1021, 132 n.10; see also id. at 129 (indexing speeds search times). Mr. Haeberli’s third and final reason for concluding that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Raskin’s incremental search with Lotus Notes is that at the time using incremental searches would have presented “extreme technical difficulties.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 101. Here again we find Mr. Haeberli’s explanation more persuasive than Dr. Terveen’s opinion that combining the teachings from Raskin with Lotus Notes’ teachings “would have required only simple and straightforward software modifications.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. According to Mr. Haeberli, “there are serious technical challenges with implementing the complex search strategies of the challenged claims in the systems on which Dr. Terveen relies.” Id. ¶ 96. As Patent Owner argues: searching across a set of files to find specific files requires the system to identify which files are in the set, access those files (which are often not loaded in active memory), search their contents, determine which files contain matches to search criteria, and then present results to the user; all tasks that do not exist in the same way (or at all) for a search confined to text in a single open file already loaded into memory. Sur-Reply 9; see Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 15, 35–36. There would have been other challenges as well. For example, “[t]he type of sequential scanning typically employed to search a single open document is very time and resource intensive if employed to search a large set of documents.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 15. Also, “[i]mplementing incremental search in the Lotus Notes indexed system would necessarily require a larger index, which would slow down, rather than increase the search speed.” PO Resp. 23; see Ex. 2020 ¶ 33. Finally, Raskin itself concludes that “even if incremental searching is advantageous, ‘almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches.’” Ex. 2001 ¶ 96 (emphasis added by Mr. Haeberli) (quoting Ex. 1021, 126). In short, Mr. Haeberli presents three significant reasons why there would have been no motivation or expectation of success in combining the teachings of Wilcox with those of Raskin. Dr. Terveen’s opinion to the contrary, on the other hand, is not supported by evidence. Dr. Terveen testifies that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to perform Lotus Notes’ multi-string search incrementally for the reasons stated by Raskin: speed, effectiveness, and ease of use.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 125–127). The evidence, however, not only fails to support Dr. Terveen’s testimony, but also demonstrates that one attempting to make the proposed combination would not have reasonably expected the proposed combination to result in greater speed or effectiveness.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 10,552,490 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,552,490 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00951 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over DuroMax and De Vries.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. As to the inclusion of physics in Petitioner’s definition, Patent Owner acknowledges that an undergraduate mechanical engineering degree holder would have the requisite knowledge here but does not adequately explain why an undergraduate physics degree holder would not. In addition, Patent Owner requires “a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field,” but fails to identify what fields are “closely related.” See Prelim. Resp. 10 (emphasis added). Based on the Winkel Declaration, we are persuaded at this stage that a hypothetical undergraduate physics degree holder would have had adequate knowledge for one of ordinary skill in the art of the invention here. See Winkel Decl. ¶ 106. As to the requisite years of experience proposed in the definitions— three for Petitioner versus “at least one” for Patent Owner—we note that Patent Owner’s definition is broader than, but includes, Petitioner’s definition. Moreover, for both the inclusion of physics and the years of experience issues, Patent Owner acknowledges that the arguments in the Preliminary Response “are not impacted based on which definition is applied.” Prelim. Resp. 10. Further, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the current record, we need not and do not explicitly construe the phrase “selector switch.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Although we do not expressly adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction at this stage of the proceeding, we note that it at least generally aligns with the tentative claim construction issued by the United States District Court in the California Litigation: “Mechanical device whose positioning precludes simultaneous access to two fuels.” Ex. 300310 at 2; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”); Memorandum from Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart to Members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Sept. 15, 2025), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ Memo_re_prior_findings_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law_9_16_25.pdf (“Prior Determinations Memo”) (discussing PTAB consideration of prior findings of fact and conclusions of law). We also note that Patent Owner” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Like the Federal Circuit in In re Ellis, although the patent classification of the reference is “some evidence of ‘non-analogy, . . . we consider the similarities and differences in structure and function of the inventions . . . to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d at 1372 (affirming the Board and rejecting the applicant’s nonanalogous art argument). Here, the challenged patent discusses in the Background of the Invention the need for a way to “prevent both valves from being ‘on’ at the” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,598,101 - PTAB · Nov 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00805 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“C. Patent Owner’s Arguments Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments presented in this proceeding were previously considered by the USPTO. See Prelim. Resp. 31–33. In her decision referring this matter to the Board, then-Acting Director Stewart rejected that argument. See Paper 20 at 2–3 (discussing why “Petitioner provides persuasive reasoning, supported by evidence, that discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is not appropriate”); see also Prelim. Resp. 31–33 (referring to and citing Patent Owner’s Discretionary Denial Brief (Paper 8)). We need not and do not address this issue further.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. As to the inclusion of physics in Petitioner’s definition, Dr. Singhose (a professor of mechanical engineering) testifies as to why undergraduate mechanical engineering degree holders would have the requisite knowledge here, but does not testify that undergraduate physics degree holders would not. See Singhose Decl. ¶¶ 2, 27, 28. In addition, Patent Owner and Dr. Singhose require “a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field,” but fail to identify what fields are “closely related.” See Prelim. Resp. 11; Singhose Decl. ¶ 27. Based on the Morse Declaration, we are persuaded at this stage that a hypothetical undergraduate physics degree holder would have adequate knowledge for one of ordinary skill in the art of the invention here. See Morse Decl. ¶ 31. As to the requisite years of experience proposed in the definitions— three for Petitioner versus “at least one” for Patent Owner—we note that Patent Owner’s definition is broader than, but includes, Petitioner’s definition. Moreover, for both the inclusion of physics and the years of experience issues, Patent Owner acknowledges that the arguments in the Preliminary Response “are not impacted based on which definition is applied.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Singhose Decl. ¶¶ 30–34). Further, Patent Owner does not argue at this stage that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Petitioner does not propose express constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12. Patent Owner also does not propose any express constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 12. On the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As discussed below, however, the parties dispute the meaning of “gaseous fuel.” We address this issue below in the analysis of the challenge to claims 1–3, 5–9, and 18 based on Nakafushi and Olmr.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,393,034 - Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. H2 Intellect LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00480 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Elliott/Jacob grounds did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–15 were unpatentable, and Musk did not cure the deficiencies.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“c) Summary We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We have determined that, at this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, the information presented in the Petition does not show that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to its challenge to claim 1 based on the combination of Elliott and Jacob. Specifically, the Petition does not demonstrate that the proposed Elliott/Jacob combination would teach or suggest either limitation [1.e] or limitation [1.a] of independent claim 1. For the same reasons, the Elliott/Jacob combination does not teach or suggest the commensurate limitations in independent claims 6 and 11. Compare Ex. 1001, 13:42–14:5, 14:31–15:5, 15:38–16:21.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“a Bachelors’ degree in electrical or computer science or a comparable field of study, plus at least three years of professional experience in advertisement delivery systems or other relevant industry experience. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 79. Patent Owner does not offer a competing formulation, stating that “[f]or purposes of this preliminary response only, Patent Owner applies the same skill level proposed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 12. We find Petitioner’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’296 Patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that no express constructions of the terms identified by Petitioner are needed 6 For the term “recording a request identifier associated with the request,” Petitioner asserts that it is unclear which “request” is at issue, Pet. 7–8, while Patent Owner argues that “the ‘request’ refers to the ‘request for content to be used within the registered application program’ as described in claim element 1.h.” Prelim. Resp. 13. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that it is not necessary for us to construe this term for purposes of this Decision. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). C.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“as obvious over the combination of Elliott and Jacob. Pet. 9–60. Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s mapping of the cited prior art to four limitations in independent claim 1 (and the commensurate limitations in independent claims 6 and 11): limitations [1.a], [1.b], [1.d], and [1.e]. Prelim. Resp. 14– 39. Patent Owner also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Elliott with the teachings of Jacob. Id. at 39– 46. We agree with Patent Owner that the proposed combination does not teach or suggest elements [1.a] and [1.e], for the reasons discussed below. Because the absence of these two elements from the cited prior art is a sufficient basis for denying institution, we do not address Patent Owner’s remaining arguments.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,433,296 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00710 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9, 13, and 16–20 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on both obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner states that “[w]hile Patent Owner disagrees with the proposed level of skill, under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner does not, at this point, propose a different level of skill. Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’294 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and neither party offers any particular construction for any claim term. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. Having considered both parties arguments and evidence in light of the challenged claims, at this stage, we are not apprised of any reason to explicitly construe any claim term for purposes of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Considering first the motivation to combine, we find Petitioner’s reasoning sufficiently persuasive for purposes of institution. Petitioner argues that Okita’s “pseudo values” are just like Schneier’s credits and “[b]ecause the pseudo-values can be exchanged for virtual money that can be used in other tournaments, arcades, or the like, ‘a game can be provided that generates tension for the player due to the fact that the virtual money is earned or is confiscated based on the game results.’” Pet. 51 (quoting Ex. 1009 ¶ 9). Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Crevelt, further testifies that Okita’s “[r]ewards programs are a routine feature of games because players are encouraged to play more to accumulate points or other pseudo-values to exchange for prizes or other items . . . [t]he virtual money conversion functionality would have opened up more game play options and more items to purchase.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 187. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of institution that the use of Okita’s pseudo-values and broad player’s interest and engagement with the video game.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,825,294 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00709 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–10, 14–18, 21–23, 25, 27, and 29 based on reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner states that “[w]hile Patent Owner disagrees with the proposed level of skill, under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner does not, at this point, propose a different level of skill. Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’635 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and neither party offers any particular construction for any claim term. Pet. 12– 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. Having considered both parties arguments and evidence in light of the challenged claims, at this stage, we are not apprised of any reason to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,650,635 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00711 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–13, 15, 19, 23, 24, and 29 based on a reasonable likelihood of success on the § 103 challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11‒13, 15, 19, 23, 24, and 29 of the ’164 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner argues that it is not necessary for us to provide an express construction for any claim term because the Petition “establishes the prior art meets each claim limitation under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner similarly submits that we “need not construe any terms at this stage, because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not need to expressly construe any claim terms to determine whether Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to its challenge of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Kelly discloses that game processor 12 implements the functions of game unit 10 during a game process and includes several input and output functions (Ex. 1005, 9:15–18), including: The game processor controls the game apparatus by receiving inputs from a player, from other game apparatuses, from a server (described below), from a progressive bonus apparatus, and from other sources. The game processor also controls output signals to update the game process when appropriate. In addition, the game processor controls the redemption system of the present invention by calculating when prizes are awarded, calculating and updating prize lists and prize costs, and other functions, as described below. Ex. 1005, 9:18–27. As to the redemption system, Kelly discloses prize table 480 that is displayed to the operator. Ex. 1005, 34:64–65, Fig. 9a. In one embodiment, the operator can adjust prize characteristics for the game unit and any linked game units. Id. at 35:1–2. Kelly also discloses an alternative embodiment, however, in which selection of a specific prize from the table 480 can be based on random and/or statistical determination. Id. at 36:48–49. In this alternative embodiment, “random determination of whether a particular prize is to be awarded is also modified by statistical information to create a ‘best fit’ of prizes awarded according to the operator’s desired odds.” Id. at 36:63–66. awarded every 8,000 games, so if it is randomly determined that a third video console is to be awarded within, for example, the 3000th game, then a different prize, e.g., the next most valuable prize, can be awarded so that the desired odds are better met. Id. at 37:1–9. Thus, we find Petitioner has set forth sufficient evidence to show a reasonable likelihood that Kelly’s game processor can modify the variable parameters of the prizing structure to meet the mandated parameters of the desired odds, as called for in limitation [1.c.v].” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artOther
“To remove Walker as prior art under §§ 102(a) and 102(e), Patent Owner must show either it reduced the invention to practice prior to Walker’s effective date, or that it invented prior to Walker’s effective date. In the case of the latter, Patent Owner must demonstrate conception prior to May 1, 2003, and reasonably continuous diligence throughout the entire critical period, which begins just prior to the Walker’s effective date and ends on the date of the invention’s actual or constructive reduction to practice. Patent Owner provides evidence purporting to show that it conceived of the invention prior to May 1, 2003. Patent Owner has not asserted that this evidence demonstrates actual reduction to practice, nor do we have sufficient evidence at this stage to make that determination. Further, Patent Owner’s earliest possible constructive reduction to practice (September 1, 2004) does not pre-date Walker’s effective date. Thus, at this stage, Patent Owner would need to show it invented prior to Walker’s effective date through evidence of conception and reasonable diligence to remove Walker as prior art. At this stage of the proceeding, without Patent Owner’s evidence of diligence, Patent Owner has not provided sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing that Walker is prior art. This issue of whether Walker is prior art to the ’164 patent will benefit from further development of the record during the trial proceeding.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,335,164 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00712 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 3–9, 13, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 1 over Walker.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2025). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon institution of inter partes review, the review proceeds “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on our consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’279 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedOther
“application filed November 12, 2021, that asserts the benefit of a series of applications, the earliest of which was filed September 2, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (45), (60). Petitioner asserts that the Challenged Claims of the ’279 patent “are entitled to an effective filing date of no earlier than September 2, 2003,” consistent with the date of the earliest application identified by the ’279 patent.9 See Pet. 6. For purposes of our analysis on the current record, in this Decision we apply September 2, 2003, as the priority date of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“independent claim 1. Pet. 32–63. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Mr. Crevelt in support of its contentions with respect to claim 1. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 234–286. Further, according to Petitioner, “[n]o findings regarding motivation to combine or reasonable expectation of success are necessary with a single reference ground,” but Walker “teaches that the features of the embodiments are options that can be combined.” Pet. 42 n.6 (citing Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At this stage, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered assertions about the” slip op. at 20
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,393,279 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00708 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–5, 12, 13, 18–20, 22, 24–26, 29, 42, 44–47, and 50 are unpatentable over Walker and Schneier.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2025). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon institution of inter partes review, the review proceeds “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on our consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’336 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art At this stage of the proceeding, there is no evidentiary dispute about the level of ordinary skill in the art.8 Based on the testimony of Mr. Crevelt, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or computer engineering, with at least three years of experience in game development. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Id. We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art 7 Petitioner states that it is not aware of secondary considerations that affect the obviousness arguments it presents. Pet. 66. Patent Owner has not offered objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. 8 Patent Owner “disagrees with the proposed level of skill” but asserts that “under any level of skill a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issues.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Thus, Patent Owner does not present evidence or arguments in its Preliminary Response related to the level of ordinary skill in the art. competence reflected in the ’336 patent Specification and the asserted prior art references, based on our review of the limited record.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner argues that it is not necessary for us to provide an express construction for any claim term because the Petition “establishes the prior art meets each claim limitation under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner similarly submits that we “need not construe any terms at this stage, because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” Prelim. Resp. 8. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not need to expressly construe any claim terms to determine whether Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to its challenge of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedOther
“an application filed September 20, 2010, that asserts the benefit of an application filed September 2, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (45), (54), (62). Petitioner asserts that the Challenged Claims of the ’336 patent “are entitled to an effective filing date of no earlier than September 2, 2003,” consistent with the date of the earliest application identified by the ’336 patent.9 See Pet. 7. For purposes of our analysis on the current record, in this Decision we apply September 2, 2003, as the priority date of the Challenged Claims. Walker was filed on May 1, 2003, and refers back to a provisional application filed on May 6, 2002, but Walker was not published until January 1, 2004. Ex. 1006, codes (22), (43), (60). Thus, Petitioner fails to show on the current record how, under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), Walker discloses an invention that was described in a printed publication in this country before the invention thereof by the Patent Owner, because Walker was published after the applied priority date of the Challenged Claims of the’336 patent.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,529,336
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.