- Mobileye Global, Inc. v. Facet Technology Corp.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01110 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place on claim 15 based on the Gallagher–Lumia obviousness challenge.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“or overlooked any matter. As we explained in the Institution Decision, the ’255 patent discloses that the recited characterization profile allows the system to convert the intensity values measured by the intensity sensor into luminance values based on the sensor’s ability to sense the particular color of the measured light. Inst. Dec. 21; Ex. 1001, 11:41–48. The ’255 patent states that “the light intensity sensor’s 280 ability to sense . . . a particular color” is the “the light intensity sensor’s 280 profile for [that] particular color.” Ex. 1001, 11:45–47. The ’255 patent further states that this “[l]ight intensity sensor 280 characterization is essential for high precision computations.” Id. at 11:48–49. Thus, as we stated in the Institution Decision, the recited “characterization profile” refers to a conversion factor used to convert the measured light intensity into luminance. As this conversion factor is based on the light intensity sensor’s ability to sense the particular color of light reflected by the road sign, we agree that it is empirical information. Patent Owner fails to explain adequately how the fact that the ’255 patent discloses storing multiple conversion factors for multiple colors of measured light in a digital look-up-table (see id. at 11:56–59 (“The light intensity sensor characterization 275 is empirical information about the light intensity sensor 280 that is used to create the [look-up table] 475.”)) has any bearing on our interpretation.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Owner to the Institution Decision where we fully addressed Patent Owner’s contentions. See Inst. Dec. 29–31. As we explained, “Petitioner proposes to incorporate Lumia’s teaching of measuring luminance values into Gallagher’s system, and argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success given Gallagher’s disclosure of determining calibration factors for each individual sensor in the array of sensors.” Id. at 30. In other words, Petitioner proposes to use Gallagher’s array of sensors to measure luminance in the manner taught by Lumia. We also explained in the Institution Decision how Lumia discloses using a video camera to measure the luminance of a road sign. Id. at 27–29. We further explained that, in the Petition, “Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning to support its contentions that it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of Gallagher and Lumia” by, for example, “argu[ing] that implementing Lumia’s teaching of determining the luminance of traffic signs in Gallagher’s system would allow Gallagher’s system to calculate the retroreflectivity of road markers as a means of identifying any markers that do not meet minimum acceptable reflectance levels.” Id. at 30–30 (citing Pet. 46). We further explained that Petitioner’s arguments were supported by the testimony of it witness, Dr. Thorpe. Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 116).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,335,255 - Medivis, Inc. v. Novarad Corp.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Apr 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00042 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Medivis’s rehearing request, leaving in place the decision that claims 1–6 and 11–20 were not shown unpatentable because the cited references’ public accessibility was not established.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, a reply, or a sur-reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence or merely to disagree with the panel’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence. With this in mind, we address the arguments presented in turn.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“accessibility, except the references Chen, 3D Visualization, and 3D Slicer themselves. This is insufficient and tantamount to submitting no proof of public accessibility. To find public accessibility, we must determine that a “document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art[,] exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008), quoted in Dec. 26–27. Petitioner has insufficiently explained, by a preponderance of the evidence, how Chen, 3D Visualization, and 3D Slicer themselves answer the question of whether they have been disseminated or otherwise made available to those of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we did not overlook or misapprehend any evidence of public accessibility on pages 29–30 of the Petition.” slip op. at 4
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“declaration by reference, we exercised our discretion to address a portion of it in our Decision. Dec. 30–31. We did so because we noted that his testimony was “particularly deficient for [the 3D Slicer] reference.” Id. at 30. Petitioner now asserts that in doing so, we “misapprehended or overlooked the logic that application documentation” like 3D Slicer’s “must be accessible to potential application users because it serves to help users use the application.” Req. 7. But Petitioner’s assertion that “application documentation must be accessible to potential application users because it serves to help users use the application” is a new argument, not raised in the Petition or Reply. Even if Petitioner’s assertion were correct, it falls far short of the evidence required to prove that 3D Slicer was actually disseminated to interested members of the public. See, e.g., Weber, 92 F.4th at 1068. Thus, Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us that we overlooked or misapprehended anything.” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 11,004,271 - Quectel Wireless Solutions Co. Ltd. v. Koninklijke Philips N.V.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 7, 2023 · IPR2021-00563 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request and left claim 9 unpatentable as obvious over Agin and Chen under § 103.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2020). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, [or] a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. As stated in our Decision, Agin discloses that parameters may be determined based on statistics on power control results for a transmission period before said transmission interruption, including “the largest [of] the variations of a received signal power before the interruption. See Dec. 24; Ex. 1004, 6:9– 13. Thus, Agin acknowledges that variations are possible, and can be taken into account, even with a single base station. Chen discusses that a power control processor determines the correct power control command by use of averaging or weighted averaging from “each transmitter’s signal at the receiver.” Ex. 1005, 10:45–56. Thus, although Patent Owner is correct that those signals are received from multiple transmitters, in Chen, Agin demonstrates that variations can occur and can be compensated for with even a single transmitter, countering Patent Owner’s argument that there would be nothing to average over. Taking Agin and Chen together, as Petitioner has asserted, we remain persuaded that ordinarily skilled artisans would have applied the weighted average, disclosed in Chen, in Agin, even if a single transmitter/ base station is utilized. See Dec. 23–25. We remain persuaded that those of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to apply the concept of a weighted average to signals received from a single base station.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,195,216 - Peddinghaus Corporation v. Ficep CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2021 · IPR2020-01707 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Peddinghaus’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution on claims 1–14 because Hashimoto did not disclose the claimed intersection parameters.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Reh’g Req. 7–8. Although Petitioner avers that the “identifying” of intersection parameters, or connecting holes, is completed in Hashimoto by the member totaling module before any order list is prepared, the order list is pertinent evidence for that assertion and there is nothing inappropriate in discussing that evidence. We recognize no other evidence which was identified by the Petitioner in the Petition, and Petitioner points to no such other evidence that we overlooked. Indeed, Petitioner states: “The Petition references the order list depicted in Figure 19 as merely providing a summary of the information (the ‘total’) that was previously identified and extracted by the member totaling module.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). As we stated in our Decision, Petitioner points to no description or disclosure in Hashimoto that its member totaling module recognizes the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, from a nonconnecting hole. Dec. 27. Hashimoto’s member totaling module “automatically totals, by cross section or length, the information including the shape, length, quantity, hole shape and the hole position (design drawing information) of all the light gauge sheet steel used for the steel house existing in the CAD system” and “[b]ased on this total, an order list (steel member order list) is prepared (FIG. 19).” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Nowhere in this exhaustive list of hole information, however, is mentioned any data that identifies the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, and a non-connecting hole. Further, Petitioner’s statement on page 8 of the Rehearing Request that “hole shape” and “hole position” constitute intersection parameters is not persuasive because, from this information, it is unknown how the hole is intended to be used. Moreover, the order list of Figure 19 – which “merely shows the number of holes and the die numbers and positions of where those holes are formed”1 – is the only indicated output of the member totaling module.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“meaning of “fastening holes” changes from the first to second embodiment.3 For example, in the Background section of Hashimoto, “fastening holes” are defined generally as holes formed “in the light gauge shape steel for the fastening tools.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 4. The same Background paragraph provides examples of “fastening tools such as a tapping screw and a one-side rivet.” Id. (Emphasis added). Thus, this definition does not strictly limit fastening holes to connecting holes, since it does not foreclose the likely possibility of fastening tools including wires or wiring. Moreover, a “machine for forming the fastening holes” is also disclosed in the Background, the same “non-stationary fastening hole forming machine 5” discussed in Figures 20-21 of the second embodiment. Id. ¶ 5. Thus, when “fastening holes for passing the electrical wiring” (emphasis added) are disclosed in the discussion of Figures 20-21 in Hashimoto’s paragraph 154, there is no evidence suggesting that a different type of “fastening hole” other than what has been generally described in the Background is being mentioned. Id. ¶ 154. The same applies for the 3 The statement made in footnote 3 on pages 11–12 of the Rehearing Request that the only holes in Figure 18 are joints only establishes that the holes in Figure 18 may be connecting holes, not all “fastening holes” in Hashimoto. disclosure that “fastening hole information includ[es]…[where] the wiring holes [are] formed in the stud” in paragraph 156 and how character c in Figure 23 “designates a hole for electrical wiring or a fastening hole for mounting the stud on the structural face plate” (emphasis added) in paragraph 157. Id. ¶¶ 156–157. Thus, it is a much more reasonable reading that in all embodiments of Hashimoto, the definition of “fastening holes” includes both connecting holes and non-connecting holes – such as those for wiring.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As we stated in our Decision, Petitioner points to no description or disclosure in Hashimoto that its member totaling module recognizes the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, from a nonconnecting hole. Dec. 27. Hashimoto’s member totaling module “automatically totals, by cross section or length, the information including the shape, length, quantity, hole shape and the hole position (design drawing information) of all the light gauge sheet steel used for the steel house existing in the CAD system” and “[b]ased on this total, an order list (steel member order list) is prepared (FIG. 19).” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Nowhere in this exhaustive list of hole information, however, is mentioned any data that identifies the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, and a non-connecting hole. Further, Petitioner’s statement on page 8 of the Rehearing Request that “hole shape” and “hole position” constitute intersection parameters is not persuasive because, from this information, it is unknown how the hole is intended to be used. Moreover, the order list of Figure 19 – which “merely shows the number of holes and the die numbers and positions of where those holes are formed”1 – is the only indicated output of the member totaling module.” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,974,719 - Shenzhen Mediatek Tong Technology Co., Ltd. v. The Noco CompanyRehearing deniedPTAB · May 17, 2021 · IPR2020-01387 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–3, 5, 8–17, 19–21, and 23 because Petitioner did not show an abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not reached
“We recognize that Paragraph 50 of Zhang describes two ways to measure the voltage “at the two terminals” of the vehicle battery, and the other way is by the small teeth of the output power clip. Ex. 1006 ¶ 50. But Zhang describes the two ways as occurring “at the same time,” and not as alternative implementations. Thus, measurements at both points are taken to obtain the voltage at the two terminals of the vehicle battery. Dr. Hartup does not address or explain how a measurement can be taken at the input terminal of the DC contactor that would be indicative of the voltage of the external vehicle battery connected to the output terminal of the DC contactor, if the DC contactor is not already closed. Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. The Petition does not address Zhang’s disclosure of measuring the voltage of the vehicle battery on the input side of the DC contactor at the same time a measurement is taken by the small teeth of the output power clip. Paper 9, 33 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,007,015 - Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00202 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of review on all challenged claims and grounds in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“I. ANALYSIS When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion 1 Patent Owner also requested rehearing by the Precedential Opinion Panel (“POP”) to “clarify the date from which Fintiv Factor 4 should be analyzed, namely, the Petition’s filing date.” Req. Reh’g 1; Ex. 3001. On October 27, 2020, POP denied Patent Owner’s request for review. Paper 19. may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes were misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Factor 4 must be constrained to the facts as they existed when the Petition was filed. For example, in the Board’s informative decision in Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Grp.—Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative) (“Sand Revolution”), the panel considered and gave weight to Petitioner’s stipulation to withdraw certain prior art references from a related litigation if inter partes review was instituted. Sand Revolution at 11–12. Importantly, the stipulation in Sand Revolution arose long after the Petition was filed. Compare IPR2019-01393, Paper 1, 88 (petition with July 25, 2019, filing date), with IPR2019-01393, Ex. 1015 (stipulation to withdraw prior art dated April 13, 2020). Here, we also considered the parties’ more recent efforts in the underlying litigation to narrow the issues at trial, which reduced concerns of duplicative efforts between the District Court and the Board and minimized the potential for conflicting decisions. See, e.g., Dec. 15–16. This is consistent with the policy considerations underlying Factor 4 in Fintiv, namely, “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Fintiv at 12.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,212,586 - Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00200 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in its Fintiv analysis and decision to institute review of claims 1–5 and 8–12.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes were misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Factor 4 must be constrained to the facts as they existed when the Petition was filed. For example, in the Board’s informative decision in Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Grp.—Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative) (“Sand Revolution”), the panel considered and gave weight to Petitioner’s stipulation to withdraw certain prior art references from a related litigation if inter partes review was instituted. Sand Revolution at 11–12. Importantly, the stipulation in Sand Revolution arose long after the Petition was filed. Compare IPR2019-01393, Paper 1, 88 (petition with July 25, 2019, filing date), with IPR2019-01393, Ex. 1015 (stipulation to withdraw prior art dated April 13, 2020). Here, we also considered the parties’ more recent efforts in the underlying litigation to narrow the issues at trial, which reduced concerns of duplicative efforts between the District Court and the Board and minimized the potential for conflicting decisions. See, e.g., Dec. 16. This is consistent with the policy considerations underlying Factor 4 in Fintiv, namely, “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Fintiv at 12.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,084,991 - PTAB · Feb 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01024 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place after finding no overlooked or misapprehended matter concerning claim construction or the prior-art obviousness showing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The burdens and requirements of a request for rehearing are stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d): (d) Rehearing. . . . The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. For the reason discussed below, Patent Owner’s Request for” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“preambles of claims 1, 5, and 22 are not like the preamble in the claim in Bio-Rad. Here, unlike Bio-Rad, the preamble recitation of “for use” in the preamble term “for use in a public transportation facility” expresses an intended use. See Opp. 8. Further, in Bio-Rad, the preamble recited a “method for conducting a reaction in plugs in a microfluidic system,” where the terms “a reaction” and “a microfluidic system” were recited in the body of the claim, and were intertwined with other preamble terms such as “conducting.” Bio-Rad, 967 F.3d at 1371. Here, the body of each independent claim does not recite “public transportation facility.” See Opp. 7. Further, the claim term “high voltage power source” is not intertwined with the claim term “for use in a public transportation facility,” because the “high voltage power source” is structurally complete by itself. Here, as in Catalina, “deletion of the disputed phrase [“for use in a public transportation facility”] from the preamble of Claim 1 does not affect the structural definition or operation of the [claimed apparatus] itself.” Catalina, 289 F.3d at 810; accord Opp. 8. In particular, the location or supply of the high voltage power source does not affect the structural definition or operation of the claimed “first power input adapted to be connected to the first standard high voltage power source,” nor any other limitation recited in the body of the claim of the LED light fixture itself. Also here, as in Catalina, “the specification, in its entirety, does not make the location of the [high voltage power source] an additional structure for the claimed [high voltage power source].” Id.; see Decision at 9–11; accord Opp. 3–4. Patent Owner does not show that the Decision overlooked or misapprehended Catalina or Bio-Rad. We deny rehearing on this basis.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s contentions are inconsistent with the claims and the Specification. The claims do not separately recite “a high voltage power source” and “a voltage of 450 to 1000 Volts.” Rather, claim 1 recites “a high voltage power source having a voltage of 450 to 1000 Volts.” The Specification discloses that the high voltage power “source 34 can be 450- 1000V direct current.” Ex. 1002, 5:39–40. In reciting “a high voltage power source having a voltage of 450 to 1000 Volts,” claim 1 expressly limits the “high voltage power source” to the disclosed embodiment of a “source [that] can be 450-1000V direct current,” and excludes other embodiments of power sources having a voltage outside of this range. Further, the Specification discloses that the “source,” not the third rail, “can be 450-1000V,” without describing a specific structure that provides the voltage. Ex. 1002, 5:39–40. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, the Specification itself describes the high voltage power source in terms of what source can be. Id. Thus, the Decision’s construction of this term is consistent with its usage in the context of the Specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The words of patent claims have the meaning and scope with which they are used in the specification and the prosecution history. The best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context.”) (internal citations omitted). Patent Owner does not show that we overlooked or misapprehended the meaning of the claimed “high voltage power source having a voltage of 450-1000 Volts” as used in context of the Specification. We deny rehearing on this basis.” slip op. at 8
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,190,760 - Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 15, 2020 · IPR2020-00204 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Maxell’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place because it reasonably weighed the Fintiv factors and did not abuse its discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Factor 4 must be constrained to the facts as they existed when the Petition was filed. In the Board’s informative Sand Revolution decision, the panel considered and gave weight to a petitioner’s stipulation to withdraw certain prior art references from a related litigation if inter partes review was instituted. Sand Revolution at 11–12. Importantly, the stipulation in Sand Revolution arose long after the Petition was filed. Compare IPR2019-01393, Paper 1, 88 (petition with July 25, 2019, filing date), with IPR2019-01393, Ex. 1015 (stipulation to withdraw prior art dated April 13, 2020). Just as in Sand Revolution, we focused on the effects of Petitioner’s proposal to withdraw Van der Salm here: alleviating concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board and minimizing the potential for conflicting decisions. Dec. 16. This is consistent with the policy considerations underlying Factor 4 in Fintiv, namely, “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Fintiv at 12. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that it was unreasonable for us to consider Petitioner’s post-filing proposal to withdraw Van der Salm.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,928,306 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2020 · IPR2020-00511 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied DivX’s rehearing request, leaving the institution decision in place because the rule remained effective and Dr. McDaniel’s testimony was supported on the record.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“assertions regarding Dr. McDaniel’s testimony. Dr. McDaniel testified that (a) Chen teaches video data streams, (b) “[a]s was widely known in the art, for example as disclosed by Grab-333,[1] a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that video data streams were comprised of a series of video frames,” and (c) a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that Chen teaches a plurality of frames of video are encrypted using at least one scrambling key/control word.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 112;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,184,920
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.