- PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00530 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Original claims 1–9 were canceled; the non-contingent motion to add substitute claims 10–18 was denied for lack of written-description support, and claim 18 was also indefinite.
RulingsFinal written decision- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“that either the ’303 application or the ’838 provisional contain adequate written description support for the disputed feature of limitation [10.d]. Though the disclosures cited by Patent Owner indicate that a secondary identifier can be used to aid in verification of a UAV, these disclosures also make clear that both first and second identifiers are transmitted by and received from the UAV. See, e.g., Ex. 2002, 4:15–17, 30:24–31:6; Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 14, 66. Patent Owner’s reliance on disclosure characterized as transmitting an identifier from a remote computing system “through the UAV” (Reply 2) is not persuasive. The cited disclosures from the ’303 application and ’838 provisional generally disclose that the identifiers transmitted by a UAV can be “generated remotely,” such as by a “remote computing system.” Ex. 2002, 14:23–15:2; Ex. 2003 ¶ 45. But Patent Owner has not identified disclosure indicating that a remote computing system may transmit an identifier to the identification receiver. In the ’303 application and ’838 provisional, only the UAV (which is part of the discrimination system, and thus not “remote”) actually transmits identifiers to the identification receiver. Patent Owner is correct in its assertion that an “aerial system identifier can be generated on-board the aerial system” or “generated remotely . . . at a remote computing system.” Mot. 7 (citing Ex. 2002, 14:23–15:2; Ex. 2003 ¶ 45). But even if a UAV’s identifier was at some time in the past generated by a remote computing system, the subsequent transmission of that identifier from the UAV to the identification receiver would not satisfy the plain language of limitation [10.d]. The claim language “receive … a second identifier from a computing system that is remote to the discrimination system” requires the receipt of a transmission of the second identifier from a remote computing system. This claim language limits the source of the received transmission (i.e., where the particular transmission is “receive[d] … from”). Thus, the relevant issue is from where was the recited second identifier received. The relevant is not where the second identifier was originally generated.” slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteIndefiniteMixed
“We determine that the disputed language in limitation [10.d] is not indefinite. There is no recitation in proposed substitute claim 10 that the second identifier is transmitted solely from the identifier transmission system. Thus, the alleged irreconcilable contradiction cited by Petitioner is not recited in the claims. Petitioner’s position appears to rest on the fact that the ’303 application and ’838 provisional do not disclose receiving the second identifier from a remote computing system. See Sur-reply 6 (“To manufacture written description support, [Patent Owner] argues the claim encompasses identifiers routed ‘through the UAV.’”). Though we agree that limitation [10.d] lacks adequate written description support, this defect does not render the claim indefinite because the scope of limitation [10.d] is otherwise reasonably certain based on its plain language. See supra § III.C.4.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference not prior artPriority date, deniedDecided for patent owner
“In contrast, the ’393 provisional never discloses that the described drone defense system may use the identity of a detected drone to develop a particular countermeasure. The disclosed RTSS certainly uses identity information to determine whether a drone is a threat. And if a threat is identified, the RTSS immediately starts “a series of processes … to determine what rule of engagement will be applied on the intruding drone.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 10. The ’393 provisional discloses that the system may select a particular countermeasure based on (i) the particular zone within a protected area within which a drone is located, (ii) “the behavior of the hostile drone,” or (iii) “other instructions.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 10. But the ’393 provisional never discloses that these “other instructions” may include the identity of the drone. The system disclosed in the ’393 provisional uses the identity of a drone to determine whether to activate the countermeasure system. See id. ¶¶ 16–18. But there is no disclosure in the ’393 provisional that the countermeasure system, once activated, uses the identity of the drone to develop the particular countermeasure to be employed. See generally Ex. 1006. Thus, though the Whitmarsh reference itself contains ample written description support for limitation [19e], the earlier-filed ’393 provisional does not. On this record, and having reviewed the ’393 provisional in its entirety, we determine that the ’393 provisional does not “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of” the subject matter of limitation [19e] of Whitmarsh’s claim 19 “as of the filing date” of the ’393 provisional. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.” slip op. at 27
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,249,199 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00525 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Original claim 21 was canceled; the Board denied substitute claim 22 for new matter and held it obvious under §103 based on six combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“First, Patent Owner has not shown possession of the disputed feature of a “radio communication module [that] is configured to utilize a secure identifier, the secure identifier comprising a specified excitation.” In the ’406 application, the term “excitation” is used exclusively to refer to a light beam signal. See Ex. 2015, 7:8–13, 9:8–10, 23:9.2 The ’406 application discloses that an identification box on an aircraft may include both an RF module and a separate light sensor. See Ex. 2015, 7:3–11. But nowhere does the ’406 application describe receiving a light beam (e.g., an excitation) with the RF module of the identification box (as opposed to the light sensor), so as to provide support for proposed substitute claim 22’s recitation of a “radio communication module” configured to utilize “a secure identifier . . . comprising a specified excitation.” We disagree with Patent Owner that it suffices that one of ordinary skill in the art “would recognize that these disclosures are equally applicable to the RF-only embodiments” (Reply 5). “It is not sufficient for purposes of the written description requirement . . . that the disclosure, when combined with the knowledge in the art, would lead one to speculate as to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned, but failed to disclose.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). On this record, and having reviewed the ’959 Patent, the ’153 provisional, and the ’406 application, we find no evidence in those documents that the named inventor was in possession of the concept of a radio communications module “configured to utilize a secure identifier” where “the secure identifier compris[es] a specified excitation.” Second, setting aside the “radio communication module” in proposed substitute claim 22, Patent Owner also has not shown that the named inventor was in possession of the feature of a “secure identifier comprising a specified excitation.” Patent Owner’s argument that the ’406 application describes a light beam directed to a particular aircraft (see Reply 4–5) is 2 The same is true of the ’153 provisional. See Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 29, 34. unavailing. The fact that the properties of a particular light beam indicate that the light beam is intended for a particular aircraft does not demonstrate that the light beam is a “secure identifier,” as we have construed that term. Patent Owner has not identified any disclosure in the ’406 application of a “secure identifier” comprising a light beam, let alone that such light beam can be utilized by a “radio communication module.” The only references to “secure” identifiers in the ’406 application describe radio frequency signals. See Ex. 2015, 2:4–6, 15:21–17:12.3 Having reviewed the ’959 Patent, the ’153 provisional, and the ’406 application, we find no evidence in those documents that the named inventor was in possession of the concept of a “secure identifier comprising a specified excitation.”” slip op. at 15
- ScopeDecided for patent owner
“not impermissibly broaden the scope of the claims of the ’959 Patent. As Patent Owner suggests, there were no limitations in original claim 21 on the type of radio signal the radio communication module could receive, and so it follows that proposed substitute claim 22 does not now encompass receiving a broader set of radio signals. We see no basis for Petitioner’s argument that the past tense verb “received” limited original claim 21 to “signals of a compatible ‘type’ and ‘range.’” Opp. 7. Moreover, the claim language (with the proposed deletion shown double brackets) provides that “the radio communication module is configured to receive a [[received]] radio signal.” Any radio signal that the radio communications module receives would necessarily be a “received” radio signal. Thus, deleting the redundant word “received” does not enlarge the scope of this claim limitation. We also are not persuaded by Petitioner’s suggestion that removing the term “received” broadens original claim 21 by deleting a requirement that the radio signal have already been previously received by the claimed device. See Sur-reply 9. Original claim 21 simply recited, using redundant language, that “the radio communication module is configured to receive a received radio signal.” Ex. 1001, 18:5–7. The most natural reading of this language is that the phrase “received radio signal” is just a description of a radio signal that is received by the recited radio communications module. Petitioner has cited no persuasive evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have counterintuitively interpreted this language to impose an additional requirement that the “received radio signal” must have been received twice—a first time by some other component of the device, and a second time by the recited radio communication module. Accordingly, we determine that the proposed amendment does not improperly broaden claim scope.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteNot shown unpatentable
“572 U.S. 898 (2014). See Memorandum: Approach to Indefiniteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings (Jan. 6, 2021).4 Under Nautilus, a claim is indefinite if fails to “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” 572 U.S. at 910. We agree with Patent Owner that neither of the identified terms are indefinite. Regarding the term “low-altitude aircraft,” we determine the Specification provides a sufficient basis for understanding the scope and meaning of this term with reasonable certainty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit has explained that, when a term of degree is recited in a claim, it is necessary “to determine whether the patent’s specification provides some standard for measuring that degree.” See Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Some objective standard must be provided in order to allow the public to determine the scope of the claimed invention.”). Here, the Specification describes the related art as including “small UASs (e.g., aircrafts up to 25 pounds flying up to 500 ft of the low altitude airspace).” Ex. 1001, 1:50–52. One of ordinary skill in the art would understand from the Specification that the cited disclosure provides an objective standard for determining the scope of a low-altitude aircraft as one that is designed to fly up to a maximum altitude of about 500 feet.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had the following qualifications: [E]ither (1) a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of academic or industry experience in the aerospace, avionics, telecommunications, or electronic device manufacturing industry, or (2) at least four years of industry experience in any of the above industries. Paper 13, 5 (citing Pet. 21). Patent Owner has not disputed this formulation; thus, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Paper 13, 10–11 n. 8.” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,713,959 - PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00068 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–21, applying the construction of “association” used in the parallel petition.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“The Director Review Decision determined that we should not have instituted inter partes review in both proceedings. DR 1. Instead, we “should have construed [‘association’] and instituted review of, at most, one of the petitions.” Id. at 3. Given this, the Director Review Decision vacated this proceeding’s Institution Decision and the 70 Institution Decision, remanding “to the Board panel to determine which of the two proceedings, if Board should construe the term ‘association,’” the Director Review Decision instructed us to “consider the parties’ claim construction arguments in making [our] determination.” Id. at 4. As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“As we explain in a concurrently issued decision in IPR2025-00070, the parties have persuaded us that the correct construction of the ’872 patent claims’ recitation of “association” is the construction advanced and applied in the 70 Petition, not the narrower, possible construction addressed in this proceeding’s Petition. IPR2025-00070, Paper 28. Accordingly, we deny institution of inter partes review in this proceeding. II. ORDER It is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the petitioned institution of inter partes review of the ’872 patent is denied.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 9,954,872 - PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00070 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable over Capalik.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewOther
“Patent Owner then filed a Request for Director Review, arguing that Petitioner did not need two petitions to challenge the ’872 patent’s claims. Paper 19. Acting Director Coke Morgan Stewart granted Director Review. Paper 25 (“Director Review Decision” or “DR Dec.”); IPR2025-00068, Paper 25. The Director Review Decision vacated this proceeding’s Institution Decision and the 68 Institution Decision, remanding “to the Board panel to Authorizing the parties to brief “how the Board should construe the term ‘association,’” the Director Review Decision instructed us to “consider the parties’ claim construction arguments in making [our] determination.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Thus, the parties agree on the correct construction of “association.” And the parties persuade us to adopt their construction: “association” does not require any classification as authorized or unauthorized. Pet. 4–8; PO Remand Br. 1–3; Pet. Resp. Br. 1–2. This construction of “association” is the one applied in this Petition’s claim challenges, which comports with (1) our earlier determination that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and (2) Petitioner’s preference for this Petition over the 68 Petition. Pet. 4–8, 13–74; Dec. 10–22; Paper 3, 2; Pet. Resp. Br. 2, 5.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“D. The Merits of Petitioner’s Claim Challenges In our Institution Decision, after weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determined that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent as obvious over Capalik. E.g., Dec. 16–22. Based on all of the arguments and evidence currently of record, we remain persuaded that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent. Indeed, as discussed above in Section II.A, the parties’ agreement on the correct construction of “association” reinforces this determination. III. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, having determined that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing at least claim 1 of the ’872 patent is unpatentable, we institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition IV. ORDER It is: ORDERED that inter partes review of claims 1–21 of the ’872 patent is instituted on all grounds presented in the Petition; and” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“institution under § 325(d). Prior to our Institution Decision, Patent Owner did not argue we should deny under § 325(d). See generally Prelim. Resp.; Pet. Resp. Br. 4. Patent Owner first raised § 325(d) while its Request for Director Review was pending, emailing the Office with a request to brief § 325(d) in view of Ecto World. Ex. 3101, 4–5. The Office did not grant that request. Id. at 1. Nor did the Director Review Decision authorize Patent Owner to brief § 325(d). It only authorized Patent Owner “to file a ten-page brief explaining how the Board should construe the term ‘association.’” DR Dec. 4. In sum, Patent Owner’s unauthorized § 325(d) arguments are waived. Moreover, even if Patent Owner had not waived its § 325(d) arguments, we find Petitioner’s § 325(d) arguments more persuasive.” slip op. at 16
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,954,872 - PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · IPR2023-00682 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Remand
The Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been presented to the Office and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In light of these similarities, we find that the Petition relies on art that is substantially the same as art previously evaluated by the Office. 3. Advanced Bionics Part II: Office Error Because the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is satisfied, we next determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“7 Because we deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). See Prelim. Resp. 53–60. Nor do we reach the parties’ merits arguments.” slip op. at 34
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,771,181 - PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · IPR2023-00681 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art had been presented to the Office and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review.7 IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted. 7 Because we deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). See Prelim. Resp. 53–60. Nor do we reach the parties’ merits arguments.” slip op. at 35
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,263,723 - PTAB · Jul 31, 2024 · IPR2023-00680 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board denied institution for all challenged claims under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art and arguments had been presented and no material Office error shown.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“1. Framework In evaluating the exercise of discretion to deny institution under Section 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). Within this two-part framework, the Board considers a number of non-exclusive factors in evaluating whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d). See Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first para.) (“Becton, Dickinson”); see also Advanced Bionics at 9–11. The factors set forth in Becton, Dickinson are as follows: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which petitioner relies on the prior art or patent owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8 at 17–18. Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. The art or arguments presented in the Petition are not “substantially the same” as those previously presented to the Office when there are differences between them that are material to the Office’s prior consideration of the art and arguments. Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7–8 (Vidal Mar. 30, 2023) (“Wolfspeed”). Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“4 Because we deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we deny the Petition under Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 13–14 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). See Prelim. Resp. 52–59; Sur-reply 1–5. Nor do we reach the parties’ merits arguments.” slip op. at 37
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“III. CONCLUSION After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that, for each of Petitioner’s challenges, it is appropriate to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny the Petition with respect to those grounds. We accordingly exercise that discretion for the Petition as a whole and deny institution of an inter partes review.4 IV. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 36
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,887,795 - PTAB · Mar 30, 2023 · DER2017-00031 · APJ Jameson Lee · DER · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to prove that any of Respondent’s claims 24–36 was derived from Petitioner’s inventor because Respondent proved earlier conception of the disclosed subject matter.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Conclusion As explained above, Petitioner’s proven time of conception and communication of the subject matter of “the invention disclosed to the respondent” is “February 14, 2014 4:04:17 PM EST.” Respondent’s proven time of conception of the subject matter of “the invention disclosed to the respondent” is “Feb 14, 2014 12:55 pm.” If Respondent’s time is Eastern Standard Time, then Respondent’s conception precedes Petitioner’s conception and communication by 3 hours and 9 minutes. If Respondent’s time is Pacific Standard Time, it precedes Petitioner’s conception and communication by 9 minutes. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that Bradley Burnam conceived of “the invention disclosed to the respondent” prior to Marc Selner’s conception of that same subject matter, and Petitioner has not shown that Bradley Burnam communicated “the invention disclosed to the respondent” to Marc Selner prior to Marc Selner’s conception of the same subject matter. As a result, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any one of claims 24–36 of Respondent’s Application 15/549,111 is derived from Bradley Burnam. J.” slip op. at 51
- ExcludeNot reached
“We need not decide Respondent’s Motion to Exclude because, even considering all of the evidence Respondent seeks to exclude, Petitioner still does not prevail. Further, Respondent’s reasons for excluding Exhibit 1107 do not address admissibility, but rather implicate the proper weight to give to Marc Selner’s cross-examination testimony. See, e.g, Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., IPR2013-00053, Paper 66 at 19 (PTAB May 1, 2014) (Final Written Decision) (“[T]he Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal . . . is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to the evidence presented.”). Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 52
- Expert testimonyOther
“testimony. There also is no indication that Brad Meeuwsen possessed or considered all of the evidence that is now before us, in particular Exhibits 2067, 2067A, and 2041. Further, inventorship is a legal question. Univ. of Colorado Found. Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Although Brad Meeuwsen as a fact witness may testify to what he heard or received from Bradley Burnam or Marc Selner, and such testimony would be probative, any testimony from Brad Meeuwsen with regard to the ultimate conclusion of inventorship carries no weight.” slip op. at 44
None - PTAB · Feb 3, 2020 · IPR2018-01373 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claims 1–9 and denied substitution of claims 10–12 because Wallace anticipated and rendered the substitute claims obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“need.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3) (2018). Patent Owner proposes three substitute claims—one for each of cancelled independent claims 1, 4, and 7. Mot. to Amend 1, Claims App’x. We determine that the number of proposed substitute claims is reasonable under 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)(B) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Apart from Dr. Sharony’s assessment requiring a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering or an equivalent degree and Dr. Wicker’s assessment requiring a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, we do not discern a material difference between the assessments advanced by the declarants. In any event, each party’s declarant appears to meet or exceed both parties’ assessments (see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 3–24, App’x A; Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 11– 19), and either assessment of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’851 patent and the prior art of record. We, therefore, adopt Dr. Sharony’s assessment and apply it to our anticipation and obviousness evaluations below, but we note that our conclusions would remain the same under Dr. Wicker’s assessment.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Patent Owner contends that “[t]he meanings of any new limitations (e.g., ‘maximum number of spatial paths’ or ‘request to establish a link channel’)—taken as a whole—are discernable from their context and would be readily understood by those of ordinary skill in the art.” Mot. to Amend 12 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶ 16). In its Opposition, Petitioner does not contend that any claim term requires an explicit construction to determine whether the prior art of record anticipates or renders obvious proposed substitute claims 10–12. See generally Opp. 1–30. In the course of our discussion of the merits of Petitioner’s opposition, we address the scope of proposed substitute claims 10–12 in applying them to Wallace.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Based on the record developed during trial, we find that Wallace discloses or reasonably suggests antenna number information that sets the maximum number of spatial paths that a terminal can form. Accordingly, Wallace accounts for “a value indicating the maximum number of spatial paths formable by said communication unit for multiplex communication,” as recited in proposed substitute claim 11.” slip op. at 37
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,934,851 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01438 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review of claims 1–3 and 8–12.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“they have settled their disputes regarding the ’104 patent. Paper 7, 2. The parties further represent that there are numerous related matters in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that have been dismissed with prejudice or stayed pending final determination of two related inter partes reviews involving U.S. Patent No. 7,550,870 B2 (“the ’870 patent”). Id. at 3. Based on the joint requests filed by the parties in the two proceedings involving the ’870 patent, those cases have been terminated. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Cyber Switching Patents, LLC, Cases IPR2015-00690 & IPR2015-00725 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2015) (Paper 33 in each proceeding). Lastly, the parties do not represent that the ’104 patent is involved in any other proceedings before the Office. See generally id. at 2–4. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering any further decisions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,672,104
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.