- Luxottica Of America, Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
NonePatents in suitUS 11,971,612 - Ledup Manufacturing Group Ltd. v. Seasonal Specialties, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2026 · IPR2024-01259 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are unpatentable; claims 3 and 8 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the Petition lacked a sufficient motivation to combine Inoue and Smith.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because it advocates for the importation of functional limitations from the ’794 Patent Specification into the claims––namely the disclosure that the bypass circuit continues to conduct electricity, and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one or more individual lighting elements in the series are burned out, missing, or defective. See PO Resp. 7–9. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Moreover, the language that Patent Owner wishes to import into the claim from the Specification is functional language that describes the function of the resistor bypass circuit. As explained below in the section addressing the subsequent claim recitation “conducting current at all times across the light sources when current is flowing through the circuit regardless of whether the LED light source are conducting current therethrough,” functional language is evaluated in view of the applied prior art to determine whether it imparts additional structure to distinguish the claimed invention over the prior art. Accordingly, to the extent the preamble recitation is limiting, we need not provide an express construction for “[a] resistor bypass circuit for a series lighting circuit.”” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“We understand the term “inherent resistance” to mean the resistance at a particular operating current or voltage across the LED light source. Neither party disputes our understanding of the term “inherent resistance.” See Dec. on Inst. 9–10; PO Resp. 7–9; Pet. Reply.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and four years of practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or alternatively “would have had a master’s degree and three years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Ex. 1013, 31 ¶ 3; see also Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of institution. See PO Resp. 2. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’794 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because, as explained above in Section II.A., we decline to import functional language into the claim from the Specification to construe the preamble recitation as requiring the function of “continu[ing] to conduct electricity and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one more individual lighting elements in the series are out, loose, broken, missing/removed, or defective.” Having considered both parties’ arguments and corresponding cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Inoue discloses each of the limitations of claim 1. Based on the entire record, we determine Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Inoue. See Pet. 25–26.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 11,533,794 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,533,794 - Aylo Freesites Ltd v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-00940 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over Leaning and over Leaning with Klemets; claims 12–20 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Houh, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree) and two years of experience in networking or streaming media, or a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its post-institution papers. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’234 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We determine that no construction of “virtual timeline” is necessary. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, as discussed below, the parties’ dispute appears to be about whether the “virtual timeline” identified by Petitioner is used to arrange the requested streamlets, as is also recited in claim 9. We address that argument below. See infra § II.D.10.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“On this record, we determine that the recitation “to achieve continuous presentation” is limiting and requires an amount of continuous (uninterrupted) playback/presentation after an upshift or downshift. The specification describes agent controller 702 determining whether to upshift based on a trigger threshold Θup, which itself is based on various factors including a current read ahead margin and a minimum safety margin. See Ex. 1001, 17:44–58. If agent controller 702 can sustain upshift quality, then it will upshift and request higher quality streams. See id. at 17:58–61. Conversely, when an upshift is not possible, agent controller 702 determines whether to downshift based a different threshold Θdown, which itself is based on the same sort of factors. See id. at 18:4–7. When the stream quality is not adequate, it downshifts. See id. at 18:7–14. These disclosures are similar to the language of claim 12, which recites “repeatedly generating a factor indicative of a current ability to receive the digital content at a rate sufficient for presenting the digital content as the digital content is received, . . . wherein the factor relates to a performance of the network” and “making the successive determinations whether to change the requested bit rate based on the factor to achieve continuous presentation of the digital content using the individually-requestable portions of the highest bit rate one of the copies determined receivable at that time.” Ex. 1001, 20:5–16 (emphasis added). That is, claim 12 refers to “achiev[ing] continuous presentation” based on what is “sufficient for presenting the digital content,” trading quality to ensure continuous playback.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“server comprises at least two servers and wherein at least one streamlet is requested from a first of the at least one server and at least one other streamlet is requested from a second server of the at least one server other than the first server.” Ex. 1001, 19:7–12. Petitioner references its mapping of the “at least one server” in claim 1 to Leaning’s server 1. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:15–16, 2:18–22, 2:31–32, 5:8–14, Fig. 1), 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:13–26, 9:3–7, 16:6–12), 37; see supra §§ II.D.2.b–c. Petitioner contends that, “[t]o the extent Leaning does not disclose at least two servers wherein one sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a first server and another sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a second server such an arrangement would have been obvious in view of the knowledge of a [an ordinarily skilled artisan].” Id. at 37. Citing the common nature of such an arrangement, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to provide multiple web servers containing the same sets of sub-files for streams in order to have redundancy in the system and allow for clients to establish connections with multiple servers and request a first sub-file from a first web server and, if the connection between the first web server becomes congested or the first web server otherwise fails or becomes unavailable, request a subsequent sub-file from the second web server. Id. at 37–38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85; Ex. 1012, 108,5 Fig. 4-11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis for claim 3. We are persuaded that it would have been obvious to implement Leaning’s server 1 as two servers that store different streamlets based on Dr. Houh’s uncontested testimony about system redundancy. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 85. His testimony is backed by a contemporaneous reference about HTTP that shows requests for different objects from different servers over parallel TCP connections. See, e.g., Ex. 1012, 108–09, Fig. 4-11. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claim 3 would have been obvious over Leaning.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,991,234 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,991,234 - Fubotv Media Inc. / Yanka Industries, Inc. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00917 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 3–18 as obvious over Leaning, and claim 2 as obvious over Leaning and Ala-Honkola.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. “continuous playback” This term appears in independent claims 1 and 13. For example, limitation 1D of claim 1 recites “adapting the successive determinations to shift the playback quality based on the factor to achieve continuous playback of the video using the streamlets of the highest quality copy of the video that is determined to be sustainable at that time.” Claim 13 recites a similar limitation. Petitioner contends “[t]he claims’ plain language only requires that the shift in playback quality is made ‘to achieve continuous playback.’” Pet. Reply 1 (citing claim 1). According to Petitioner, “shifting quality ‘to achieve continuous playback’ is aspirational, not limiting, language.” Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner asserts that “[n]othing in the claims requires uninterrupted playback before, during, or after the shift in quality.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredMixed
“continuous playback.” We also do not rely on Exhibit 1045. Accordingly, we consider Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike in this regard to be moot. For these reasons, we do not strike Petitioner’s reply arguments or supporting evidence regarding claim construction. B. Leaning’s Clear Buffer Step Patent Owner alleges Petitioner has shifted its position on reply slip op. at 89
Patent outcomesUS 10,757,156 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,757,156 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00432 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 8, 9, 11–13, 18, and 19 as anticipated or obvious over Zhang; the remaining claims as obvious over the listed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“and digital selector 240 disclosed by Zhang is “digital circuitry,” which is configured to receive a plurality of frequencies comprising a plurality of desired/undesired television channels from ADC 220 and to output the desired television channels to demodulators 250 as a digital datastream. Tr. 71:14–17 (PO Counsel: “There is no dispute that in both Zhang and the patent, an RF signal that has both desired and undesired channel comes in and what’s sent to demodulators are desired channels. Nobody is disputing that.”), 134:3–5 (PO Counsel: “The issue is not whether the black box 230- plus-240 is the digital circuitry. It is. The issue is not whether or not that overall circuitry selects channels. At some level, it does.”). In other words, Zhang teaches digital circuitry that is (1) capable of receiving a plurality of frequencies including desired/undesired television channels and (2) capable of distinguishing between the desired/undesired channels to output the desired television channels to a demodulator. We find these uncontested facts to be highly probative of Petitioner’s contention that, to a skilled artisan, Zhang suggests that its digital circuitry is capable of selecting the desired television channels from a digitized plurality of frequencies that include both desired/undesired television channels. This is because Zhang’s digital circuitry is able to take what is input originally as a digitized plurality of frequencies having both desired/undesired television channels and, using those frequencies, pick out the desired television channels that are subsequently output to a demodulator. Zhang teaches that “because only the selected channels are later demodulated” the disclosed digital circuitry is “much faster than traditional analog channel switching through RF tuners” and it “dissipates less heat because fewer resources are required when demodulating only the selected RF channels.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 28 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA.” Pet. 21. Although Petitioner proposes corresponding structure for the term “digital circuitry” recited in claim 1, it does so only “[t]o the extent” that term “is construed to be a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. 112, paragraph 6.” Id. at 22. But Petitioner does not argue or suggest that “digital circuitry” should be construed as a means-plus-function term; nor does Petitioner make an argument to overcome the presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, does not apply. See id. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. Because neither party actually argues “digital circuitry” is a means-plus-function term, the presumption holds and we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 9,210,362 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,210,362 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00438 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–76 are unpatentable: Zhang anticipates or renders some claims obvious, and the other challenged claims are obvious over combinations including Zhang.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons given, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–76 of the ’206 patent are unpatentable as follows.6” slip op. at 48
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not respond. See PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“B. Asserted Challenges Based on Zhang Alone Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 3–7, 9, 11, 13, 15–19, 21, 23, 25, 27– 31, 33–35, 38, 40–44, and 46–48 of the ’206 patent are anticipated by Zhang. Pet. 19–45. Petitioner also asserts that these claims would have been obvious over Zhang. Id. Patent Owner disputes certain aspects of Petitioner’s analysis. PO Resp. 3–50. For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–7, 9, 11, 13, 15–19, 21, 23, 25, 27–31, 33–35, 38, 40–44, and 46–48 are anticipated by Zhang or would have been obvious over Zhang.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“system may include a digital video recorder (DVR).” Id. at 45–46 (citing Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 5, 43, 48, 60, 73, 98, 112, 118, 191, 197, 212, 281–285, 296, 546). According to Petitioner, “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to include Reisman’s DVR in Zhang’s STB to provide a more feature-filled and individualized user experience, which in the proposed combination still includes Zhang’s wideband front-end receiver components cited for performing Elements [25A]–[25E].” Id. at 46. Petitioner explains that “Reisman’s DVR improves user experience and flexibility by allowing timeshifted and on-demand viewing, and enabling replay and trick-play (fast forwarding, rewinding, and pausing) of live programming.” Id. (citing Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 191, 197, 212, 284); see also id. at 46–47 (asserting that “[a]dding Reisman’s DVR to Zhang’s system would have been nothing more [than] applying a known technique of integrating a DVR into a set-top box . . . to a known STB . . . that was ready for improvement to yield a predictable result” and that “[a] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success”). Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions in this regard. See PO Resp. Based on Petitioner’s argument and evidence (see Pet. 45–47), we find Petitioner’s proposed combination of Zhang and Reisman teaches all the limitations of claims 25 and 38. We also find that Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for combining Zhang and Reisman supports a legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 11,399,206 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,399,206 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00435 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–82 are unpatentable: claims are anticipated by Zhang or obvious over Zhang, Zhang with Reisman, Zhang with Jackson, or the listed combinations with Pandey.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). That standard involves construing claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not respond. See PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Claim 1 recites “the DFE is configured to concurrently select and provide each of the plurality of desired channels . . . without providing any of the plurality of undesired channels.” The claim expressly covers both selecting desired channels and providing desired channels. By reciting “without providing any of the plurality of undesired channels,” the claim expressly excludes providing undesired channels; it does not exclude selecting undesired channels. Thus, the claim covers selecting both desired and undesired channels.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner argues that Zhang’s PVR is not a ‘DVR’ as recited in Elements [27D] and [41D], Reisman discloses this feature.” Pet. 50. Petitioner asserts that “Reisman teaches that STBs in a cable system may include a digital video recorder (DVR).” Id. (citing Exc. 1052 ¶¶ 5, 43, 48, 60, 73, 98, 112, 118, 191, 197, 212, 281–285, 296, 546). According to Petitioner, an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been motivated [to] include Reisman’s DVR in Zhang’s STB to provide a more feature-filled and individualized user experience, which in the proposed combination still includes Zhang’s wideband front-end receiver components cited for Elements [27A]–[27C] and [41A]–[41C].” Id. Petitioner explains that “Reisman’s DVR improves user experience by allowing time-shifted and ondemand view, and enabling, e.g., fast-forwarding, rewinding, and pausing of live programming.” Id. (citing Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 191, 197, 212, 284–285, 546, 758); see also id. at 50–51 (asserting that the proposed combination “merely applies a known technique of integrating a DVR into a STB . . . to a known STB . . . that was ready for improvement to yield a predictable result” and that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had a reasonable expectation of success”). Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions in this regard. See PO Resp. Based on Petitioner’s argument and evidence (see Pet. 50–51), we find Petitioner’s proposed combination of Zhang and Reisman teaches all the limitations of claims 27 and 41. We also find that Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for combining Zhang and Reisman supports a legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,381,866 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,381,866 - PTAB · May 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00050 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–3 and 5 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Walker.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 5. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of those claims. We do not address claims 4 and 6–13 because Patent Owner disclaimed those claims. See Exs. 2001, 2008; Prelim. Resp. 30; Supp. Prelim. Resp. 3.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Jury trial in the Related Litigation is currently scheduled to begin on June 22, 2026. Ex. 1008, 16. The statutory deadline for issuing a Final Written Decision predates the trial by approximately one month. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner was not diligent in filing the Petition, and this factor favors discretionary denial. Supp. Prelim. Resp. 2. Petitioner argues that Factor 2 favors institution because that Final Written Decision date precedes the scheduled trial date and also because based on the median time to trial for Judge Noreika, the judge presiding over the Related Litigation, the anticipated trial date would be in December 2026. Pet. Supp. Resp. 2. Petitioner also points out that even based on the median time to trial in the District of Delaware, the trial in the Related Litigation would occur in October 2026. Id.; Pet. 72. We agree with Petitioner that based on median time-to-trial statistics for the District of Delaware and for Judge Noreika, the Final Written Decision in this proceeding would issue a few months before the anticipated trial date and a month before the currently scheduled trial date. Exs. 1007, 1012. This factor therefore weighs against exercising our discretion to deny institution.5” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“Walker discloses that during normal television viewing, a broadcast program is provided to and displayed on an interactive television system and a streaming version of the broadcast program is provided to a television distribution facility in advance of the broadcast. Ex. 1005 ¶ 10. Walker explains that if a user requests a playback control function, the interactive television system may switch from displaying the broadcast television program to the streaming version of the program. Id. When switching, the system may switch to displaying the streaming version of the program at the same point in time in the program that the user was viewing in the broadcast program. Id.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner contends that “[b]ecause the asserted prior art discloses embodiments within the indisputable scope of the claims, the Board need not construe the outer bounds of the claims.” Pet. 3. Petitioner lists several terms and proffers its position on the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms. Id. at 4–6. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s claim construction positions. Prelim. Resp. 5. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no term requires express construction.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,880,592 - PTAB · Apr 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00180 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Comcast would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s filing of three parallel petitions is grounds to deny all three petitions on that basis alone. Petitioner has complied with our guidance by filing a statement ranking the petitions. See Practice Guide, 59–60. For reasons discussed in our concurrent Decisions Denying Institution in IPR2025-00181 and IPR2025- meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”). Claim construction arguments should not be relegated to patentability arguments on the facts. warranted. Given our Decisions to Deny Institution in IPR2025-00181 and IPR2025-00182 and the official guidance we have received in the Practice Guide, we have no option but to deny Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny institution on all three of the petitions challenging the ’275 patent. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to the deny institution in the instant proceeding. E. Anticipation of Claim 1 by Zhang” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not address the level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’275 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.7 7 If Patent Owner disagrees with this formulation of the level of skill in the art, it must raise that disagreement in its Response. If a different level of skill would affect the outcome in this case, the parties must brief that issue as well. The failure of Patent Owner to describe how a different level of skill in the art is determinative will be a forfeiture of that argument. If there is a dispute regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, then the parties are also encouraged to submit evidence, other than conclusory expert testimony, that supports their position. See 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner states that all of the limitations “should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a” person having ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 19. Although Petitioner argues that none of the limitations are means-plus-function terms, Petitioner provides constructions to the extent that there are means-plus-function terms. Pet. 19–20. Patent Owner does not respond. See Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.8 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor 8 If either party intends to argue a claim construction at trial, including what is the plain and ordinary meaning of a term, they should do so in a clearly designated section of their briefing. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 21, 2019) (“Practice Guide”), 46, 49 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Parallel Petitions” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,785,275 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01463 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“predict how the district court in the related district court litigation will proceed because the court may determine whether or not to stay any individual case . . . based on a variety of circumstances and facts beyond our control and to which the Board is not privy.” Sand Revolution II LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp., IPR2019-01393, Paper 24, 7 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative). We decline to speculate on how the court may rule on the pending motion to stay. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. We decline to deny the Petition on a discretionary basis as requested by Patent Owner. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–10 of the ’706 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra are result effective variables and that copper foils having ΔPD, TC(220), and ΔRz/Ra values that meet the values recited in claim 1 have advantageous properties. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 45 (Kim ’761, disclosing that preferably the “difference in peak count roughness Rpc between the shiny surface . . . and the matte surface . . . of the electrolytic copper foil . . . is preferably 60 or less” because “when the difference in the peak count roughness Rpc exceeds 60 capacity maintenance of the secondary battery is deteriorated.”);15 Ex. 1007, 3:16–23, 4:14–23 (Cheng, disclosing that the foils of Cheng’s invention have (220) and (311) surfaces that provide increased elongation and that solve a high roughness problem that rendered traditional products unsuitable for use in a lithium ion secondary battery), 10:27–34 (Cheng, disclosing that in the foils of Cheng’s invention “the roughness difference between both sides was extremely small” and thus “it was . . . not easy for the electrolytic copper foil to break or fracture during the charging-discharging cycles and the life of a battery is thus increased”), Tables 3 & 4 (Cheng, disclosing embodiments and comparative examples with TC(220) values meeting the requirements of claim 1); Ex. 1008, 6:36–44 (Wolski, disclosing that “the surface roughness Rz at the matte side of the untreated copper foil of the present invention is the same or smaller than the surface roughness Rz at the shiny side . . . so that the surface treated copper foil . . . becomes more low-profiled . . . whereby it becomes a foil having a large etching factor”), 9:1–29 & Table 2 (Wolski, disclosing 15 Dr. Randall testifies that “Kim ’761’s peak count roughness Rpc corresponds to the peak density PD of the ’706 patent.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 52. At this stage in the proceeding, this testimony is unrebutted. 38 embodiments meeting the ΔRz/Ra of claim 1, describing them as having “matte side roughnesses” that are “sufficiently small,” and as having “excellent” “high temperature elongation characteristics”), 11:37–41 (Wolski, describing comparative examples as having “large” matte side roughnesses “whereby etching factors are not good”), 12:12–27 (Wolski, teaching that “as compared with a conventional untreated copper foil, both surfaces of the untreated copper foil obtained by [Wolski’s] invention are flat” resulting in a low profile foil that has “excellent elongations at room temperature and high temperature and also high tensile strength”). The teachings in the prior art support the presently unrebutted testimony of Dr. Randall explaining why the POSA would have been motivated to modify Kim ’761’s copper foil to have the claimed TC(220) and ΔRz/Ra. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68, 71–74; Pfizer Inc., v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 94 F.4th 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Where [a gap in prior art] includes a parameter not necessarily disclosed in the prior art, it is not improper to consider whether or not it would have been recognized as result-effective. If so, then the optimization of that parameter is ‘normally obvious.’”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner failed to articulate a sufficient motivation to combine the references. To the contrary, the preliminary record presents a strong showing that the POSA would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner described in the Petition.” slip op. at 38
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’706 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,591,706
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.