• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Adobe Inc. v. Jonathan E. JaffeNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01352 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted §103 ground because the references did not teach monitoring the physical coupling between the sensor and memory.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The Institution Decision adopted and applied Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because Petitioner’s “definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “The parties present various claim construction arguments, disputing the meaning of three limitations recited in claim 1: “a sensor, which is tightly coupled to said memory”; “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor”; and “based on.” See Pet. 9–14; PO Resp. 5–12; Pet. Reply 4–9; PO Sur-reply 4–11. For purposes of this Decision, we do not need to discuss the construction of “based on.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As explained below, this Decision turns on whether Glass or Rieger discloses limitation [1c] reciting “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor.” Ex. 1001, 20:65–66; see infra §§ II.C.2, II.E.1, II.F. That limitation recites an element which overlaps with the earlier-recited limitation “a sensor, which is tightly coupled to said memory.” To reach our decision, we need only provide a limited discussion of two of the parties’ claim construction arguments. Our analysis follows.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “said integrity is compromised, then also providing an indication of said compromised integrity.” Ex. 1001, 20:65–21:2. Although Petitioner points out that the limitation does not expressly recite “‘specifically’ monitoring the tight coupling” (Pet. Reply 8), the structure of the clause suggests that the tight coupling is specifically monitored. At a high level, the limitation is straightforward in its recitation that the integrity being monitored is “of the tight coupling” (Ex. 1001, 20:65–66 (emphasis added)), plainly suggesting that the tight coupling is specifically monitored. More granularly, breaking the relevant clause down to its grammatical parts, the clause recites a gerund (“monitoring”) acting on a direct object (“the integrity”) which is modified by a prepositional phrase (“of the tight coupling”). Notably, the object of the preposition (“of”) is “the tight coupling.” Altogether, this reads that the integrity being monitored is specifically of the tight coupling. Also, the claim recites that “if said integrity is compromised, then also providing an indication of said compromised integrity.” Therefore, from the claim language we know that the “integrity” of the tight coupling is something that may be “compromised,” which is consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction of determining whether the physical coupling has been “accessed or disturbed.” Petitioner’s interpretation effectively inserts additional language into the limitation such that the limitation includes monitoring the integrity of a device containing or surrounding the tight coupling, such as a camera (or camera housing), e.g., “monitoring the integrity of a camera that includes the tight coupling.” But, because the plain reading and the structure of the limitation reads that it is specifically the tight coupling’s integrity—not another physical structure, like a camera—which is being monitored, a monitored is not consistent with the language of the claim. See PO Resp. 9 (arguing that “Petitioner’s construction is improper because the claim language explicitly requires monitoring the physical coupling between the memory and the sensor as opposed to some third structure” (emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “package 50 does not specifically monitor the integrity of the coupling between Glass’s sensor and the memory and, instead, argues that Glass detects tampering of all “the components and interconnections contained in that packaging,” e.g., control logic 44, cropper 46, compressor 47, MUX 45, code generator 48, and the various interconnections between those components. See Pet. Reply 16; Ex. 1005, 5:13–41. As explained above, we construe “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor” to mean determining whether the physical 7 Petitioner does not assert that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Glass’s device in any way; Petitioner solely argues that Glass teaches limitation [1c], based on Petitioner’s proposed claim construction. See Pet. 30–32 (“Glass discloses this limitation.”); Pet. Reply 16–17 (“Glass and Rieger disclose the ‘monitoring’ step.”). disturbed, which specifically requires monitoring the physical coupling between the sensor and the memory. See supra § II.C.2. As we agree with Patent Owner that this limitation requires monitoring the physical coupling between the sensor and the memory, monitoring Glass’s tamper resistant package 50 does not teach or disclose “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor.” Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to show that Glass teaches or suggests [1c] monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor when said at least one internal and unique parameter is generated, and, if said integrity is compromised, then also providing an indication of said compromised integrity, as required by claim 1. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Glass.8” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,757,828 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,757,828
• Biofrontera Inc. / Biofrontera Bioscience GmbH et al. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01312 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 16, 17, and 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Lundahl and Larsen; Ground 2 was conceded, and the motion to exclude was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has not provided a valid justification for requiring a POSITA to have both an engineering degree and a medical degree. Prelim. Resp. 22. We agree, insofar as Petitioner has not clearly set out any particular explanation or evidence in support of its dual-degree requirement. In all other respects, we note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar. Because we determine that Patent Owner’s proposed definition is reasonable and consistent with the ’028 patent and the cited art, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition. In any event, our Decision does not turn on this level of skill determination. B.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “device “[f]or the treatment of large-area tissues,” such as the backs of human patients, wherein several applicators 13 are “flexibly connected to each other through hinges.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 72). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have been motivated “to incorporate Larsen’s solution of connecting light applicators by hinges, to allow for adjustability of Lundahl’s device to provide the desired irradiance and irradiance uniformity to all target areas during PDT.” Id. (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 127). According to Petitioner, a “POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Lundahl with Larsen, because both references describe similar illuminators for using light to treat conditions on a patient’s skin.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 128). Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lundahl also involves using LEDs as a light source instead of Lundahl’s fluorescent tubes. Id. According to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to make this change because: (1) LEDs had a lower cost and a longer lifetime than fluorescent tubes; (2) fluorescent tubes were known to have inconsistent light output within the tube itself; and (3) “the use of LEDs would be more practical to reduce spacing between light sources and the edges of the panels, as opposed to the bulky metal couplings at the end of fluorescent tubes, to reduce optical dead space across the light surface.” Id. (citing Ex. 1014, 4:41–42, 6:31–42; Ex. 1015 ¶ 129). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success with this modification because Lundahl and Larsen “describe similar illuminators and the conversion from fluorescent tubes to LEDs was a routine practice prior to 2015.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 131). Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute the Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine Lundahl and Larsen. See generally PO Resp. To the extent Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the combination because it would negatively affecting uniform illumination (PO Resp. 24), the motivating benefit here—using adjustable LED panels instead of monolith fluorescent tubes—outweighs the alleged disadvantages for the many reasons given by Petitioner, including greater adjustability and improved LED performance. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify.”); Reply 14. We are persuaded that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Lundahl and Larsen for the reasons advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s reasoning (i.e., that it would have been obvious to try placing the hinges on the inner side surfaces) is unsupported and conclusory. PO Reps. 53–54. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to identify a single prior art reference showing hinged structures on inner side surfaces. Id. This argument ignores that Larsen expressly identifies hinges on at least bottom side surfaces, and Petitioner merely proposes modifying their location from the bottom sides to inner sides. We find credible Dr. Grove’s testimony that relocating hinges would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9 We further point out that the ’028 patent also suggests that gaps do” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,697,028 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,697,028
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 10,379,301
• Google LLC v. Sandpiper CDN, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00860 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Dilley, Pai, and Wang combination renders the claims obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’573 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the field of content delivery management or networks. Work experience can substitute for formal education and additional formal education can substitute for work experience. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 70). Patent Owner asserts that “the Board does not need to resolve the appropriate level of skill for a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] for purposes of deciding institution because the Petition fails under any articulation of a POSA.” Prelim Resp. 10. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’573 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that no claim terms need to be expressly construed by the Board and all terms should be given their ordinary meaning. Pet. 12. Patent Owner agrees that the Phillips standard applies. Prelim. Resp. 10. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this juncture. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “We consider the disclosures of the Provisional Application, which refer to cases 1 and 2, in which requests are redirected to an origin server for lower popularity content and to a parent server for medium popularity content at steps 522 and 524 as shown in Figure 5, respectively, wherein the edge server receives a redirect from the popularity service without a “followme” flag. See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 43, 44. The Provisional Application also discloses that, by comparison, if there is a “follow-me” redirect sent to the edge server, it obtains and caches a resource as shown at step 528 for higher popularity content. Id. ¶ 44. On this record, as Patent Owner asserts, these disclosures are consistent with technical reasons provided in the Provisional Application for instructing the edge server not to cache unpopular resources. See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 68–69. In light of these disclosures, we preliminarily find support for Dr. Shenoy’s testimony that, even with the words “instruction to not cache” are not literally recited in the Provisional Application, caching and not caching are alternative options that indicate the instruction to the edge server that will be implemented for each option. See Ex. 2014 ¶ 56. Further, these disclosures provide support for Dr. Shenoy’s testimony that the disclosures “reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Patent Owner had possession of the edge server receiving an instruction to not cache the resource (and instead simply forward the redirect).” Id. In re Johnson states that “it is not true that the factual context out of which the question under § 112 arises is immaterial. Quite the contrary. Here, . . . the ‘written description’ in the [] specification supported the claims in the absence of the limitation, and that specification, having described the whole, necessarily described the part remaining.” See Johnson, 558 F.2d at 1019. This is consistent with M.P.E.P. § 2173.05(i) which states, “[i]f alternative elements are positively recited in the specification, they may be explicitly excluded in the claims.” M.P.E.P. § 2173.05(i). Further, “the failure of the specification to specifically mention a limitation that later appears in the claims is not a fatal one when one skilled in the art would recognize upon reading the specification that the new language reflects what the specification shows has been invented.” All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prod., Inc., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Even though we do not discern that the Provisional Application explicitly discloses an “instruction to not cache,” at least on this preliminary record, and for the purposes of this Decision, there is positive recital of instructions to cache in the Provisional Application and Petitioner has provided sufficient supporting evidence that caching and not caching are alternative options. Further, there is sufficient evidence, in the context of the disclosures of written description support in the Provisional Application, providing support for Dr. Shenoy’s testimony that Patent Owner had possession of an edge server receiving an instruction to not cache the resource. Nonetheless, we invite additional briefing on these issues, including issues relating to alternative options of caching and not caching. On this preliminary record, we find that the ’573 patent has a priority date of April 2, 2008, which predates the earliest possible date on which Newton-471 could be effective as prior art, September 30, 2014 (the date on which the earliest application in the priority chain of Newton-471 was filed). Accordingly, we preliminarily find that Newton-471 is not prior art to the challenged claims. Thus, on the present record, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claims 1–20 are anticipated by Newton-471.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,924,573
• Google LLC v. Sandpiper CDN, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00826 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on all asserted grounds for claims 1–23, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 13–22 over Glines and Gupta.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 1–23 of the ’112 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the ’112 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the field of content delivery management or networks,” and that “additional education could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 51–53). Patent Owner does not provide any such assessment in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’112 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, the words of a claim generally are given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party proposes any express claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 12. Based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Mowry further attests that “A POSITA would have understood Glines’s disclosure of providing content from an origin source would have included supporting more than one origin source (e.g., more than one website or content provider[)].” Ex. 1008 ¶ 262 (citing Ex. 1002, 12:11–22 (storing replica files that originate at an origin server 40), 13:21–14:3 (requesting “example.com”)). That statement, however, goes only to what Glines might be capable of doing, not to whether one would have modified Glines to do so. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[o]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed inventions.”). Dr. “content providers” limitation, stating that it “would have been nothing more than replicating Glines’s teaching of storing and providing content associated with one origin server, with expected results.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 263. That statement, however, is unsupported, and moreover, does not explain how such replication would occur or what results would be expected. Prelim. Resp. 25–26. At this stage in the proceeding, Dr. Mowry’s testimony amounts to a “conclusory generalization” that does not provide the “reasoned explanation” sufficient to show that a limitation missing in the cited art was taught by the knowledge in the art. Arendi S.A.R.L v. Apple, Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,021,112
• Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,023,203
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00436 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Mizobuchi or Akashi anticipates any of claims 1–17.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “All independent claims recite “a light engine driving circuit disposed on the substrate.” Ex. 1001, 9:59 (claim 1), 10:64 (claim 12), 12:7 (claim 15). Petitioner contends that “Mizobuchi discloses a light engine driving circuit disposed on the substrate that includes a clock data recovery (“CDR”) circuit and a power supply circuit.” See Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:57–4:18, 12:27–41, Figs. 2, 3A; Ex. 1003 ¶ 76 while addressing limitation 1d); see also id. at 26–28 (addressing claims 12 and 15 by cross-referencing showing for claim 1). Petitioner identifies the driving circuit on Mizobuchi’s “first circuit board” 2 in the annotated version of Mizobuchi’s Figure 2, reproduced below. See Pet. 19.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that the Board may find it necessary to interpret “feedthrough device,” “interconnect device,” and “opposing arrangement.” Pet. 8–11. Patent Owner responds to Petitioner’s proposed interpretations of these terms, but contends that the Board need not interpret them to determine whether to institute review. Prelim. Resp. 17–18. For reasons that become apparent below, we agree with Patent Owner and do not expressly construe these terms. B. Legal Standards” slip op. at 4

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,313,024
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1–7 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2019); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2019) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions and the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’301 patent. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s request and do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)). “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We analyze” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 10,379,301
• Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther

    “On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,998,854

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.