• Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00545 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Neiss or Neiss and Hirasago; claims 7 and 16 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, mechanical engineering (including automotive engineering), civil engineering (transportation systems), physics, or a related field, and at least four years of experience (or the academic equivalent) in the field of transportation systems.” Pet. 2–3. Petitioner contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–19, 24–26; Ex. 1004). Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. We find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s interpretation of column 13, lines 40–44 of the ’161 patent to mean that a route may not have both an ending position or an intermediate position, but will have at least one of these positions. See PO Resp. 21. Patent Owner interprets “typically” in “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions” to apply to either “an ending position” or “any intermediate positions” (that is, an intermediate destination) but not to both. We see no grammatical reason to limit “typically” in this manner. Rather, the plain meaning of the quoted sentence suggests that, although not typical, a route may not contain an ending position, be that a final position or an intermediate position.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 or its dependent claims 3 and 6–9 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper. Petitioner relies on the same contentions regarding the identical language recited in independent claim 10 (see Pet. 93), and so, for the same reasons, has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 10 or its dependent claims 12, 13, and 15–18 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper.” slip op. at 36

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 8,972,161 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,972,161
• Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Newstrom’s database was not shown to be remote.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Dr. Morellas’s proposed definition or proffer a definition of its own. See generally PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2007 ¶ 43 (setting forth a substantially similar definition as Dr. Morellas). We find Dr. Morellas’s unopposed definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that claim 1 requires that a route from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination must be known. See PO Resp. 7. Initially, claim 1 does not recite “destination.” Instead, claim 1 recites only “determining a segment of a vehicle route.” Ex. 1001, 27:44 (emphasis added). Nor does the ’399 patent specification require the interpretation proffered by Patent Owner. Notably, the ’399 patent discloses that the power management device may rely on historical route information to optimize the energy used to travel each segment of a route. Ex. 1001, 17:39–43, 17:64–67. Such reliance on historical data beneficially reduces the amount of required computing power. Id. at 18:5–9. Under this approach, “the location of the vehicle is periodically determined” and “used to determine[] a historical segment corresponding to the current location.” Id. at 18:30–33 (emphasis added). If the vehicle has moved into a new route segment, the historical data is queried to determine the most efficient speed to travel for the current segment. Id. at 18:39–56. Thus, the ’399 patent explicitly discloses calculating and applying power to a vehicle based on the route segment in which the vehicle is currently traveling. See id. at 18:64–67 (“The flowchart shown in FIG. 5 illustrates a continuous process, in which the power management device can determine a probable optimal speed as the current segment changes (e.g., as the vehicle moves).”), Fig. 5. Furthermore, the ’399 patent explains that “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions.” Id. at 14:6–10 (emphasis added). Notably, the ’399 patent sometimes refers to the “entire route,” indicating that use of “route” in the claims does not necessarily mean the entire route. Indeed, the ’399 patent explains that, “[i]n some variations, the entire route (or the entire predicted route) may be divided up into N segments” and “[i]n some variations, probable optimal speeds may be identified for the entire route.” Ex. 1001, 14:38–39, 19:1–2 (emphases added). This strongly suggests that, in some other variations, the entire route is not divided into segments and optimal speeds are not identified for the entire route, further indicating that the recited “route” is not the entire path the vehicle will take. Therefore, we find that the ’399 patent contemplates routes that, although not typical, do not include an ending position. Moreover, to the extent a destination is required, the ’399 patent discloses that the destination can be derived based on the vehicle’s location or driving history, and there can be multiple “likely destinations” and the system can “continuously infer the vehicle’s destination” and the probable destination “may constantly change to revise the destination” while the vehicle is traveling along the route. Ex. 1001, 12:16–59. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, neither the claim language nor the specification of the ’399 patent requires the route be predetermined or extend from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki. Pet. 4–62. In support of its showing, Petitioner relies upon the Morellas Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record and determine that, for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–12, 15, 16, 19, and 20 would have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki and that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of these references.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “limiting, Hongo and Niki support Petitioner’s contentions. We determine that Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning as to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Hongo and Niki. See, e.g., Pet. 21–23 (arguing that the modification “would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success” and “Niki’s teachings and/or suggestions improve vehicle control in the Hongo vehicle”).” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,882,399 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,882,399
• Walt Disney Parks And Resorts U.S., Inc. v. Agile Journeys LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00029 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 16–21, 24, and 25 are unpatentable; the challenges to claims 11, 22, and 23 were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various non- exhaustive factors may be considered, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA,” “PHOSITA,” or “skilled artisan”) “would have the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in computer science, engineering, operations research, or similar discipline, along with one year of experience in computer programming” and that “[t]he more education one has, the less experience needed to attain an ordinary level of skill[, and] . . ., more experience in the field may serve as a substitute for formal education.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not remark on Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA nor does it provide a definition. See generally PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we find that the ’983 patent and the” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “3. Conclusion of Ground 1 Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find,” slip op. at 70

  • BurdenMixed

    “Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to the patentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’983 patent. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Challenged Claims 1, 3–5, 7, 8–10, 12–14, 16–19, 20, 21, 24, and 25, but has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Challenged Claims 11, 22, and 23 unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 7,212,983 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,212,983
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2025 · IPR2023-01027 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 37–70 are unpatentable: claims 37–41, 47, 50–56, 58–59, 60–62, 64–65, and 70 as anticipated by Alden; the remaining challenged claims as obvious over Alden and the listed combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “alleged invention “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems” and that more education could compensate for less experience and vice versa. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). 3 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/70538 A2 (Exhibit 1010). 4 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/01038 (Exhibit 1006). 5 U.S. Patent No. 4,970,628 (Exhibit 1007). 6 U.S. Patent No. 6,144,158 (Exhibit 1008). 7 U.S Patent No. 6,049,749 (Exhibit 1009). 8 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 02/04247 A1 (Exhibit 1011). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a person of ordinary skill in the art” (PO Resp. 4), and, as we generally agree that it is consistent with the subject matter disclosed in the ’503 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. B.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Claim Construction We construe claims using the standard that would be applied in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), giving terms their ordinary and customary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification and prosecution history. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The Petition asserts that all claim terms should be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.” See Pet. 8. Patent Owner also proposes that the claim terms be given their ordinary meaning, and identifies the “ordinary meaning” for the terms “identify,” “turn,” and “curve,” which we discuss in our analysis below. We otherwise find that that no express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

  Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,894,503
• Weber, Inc. v. Provisur Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2020-01557 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1–4 and 8–11 were held obvious; claims 5–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish claim 5’s drive-roller limitation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandFwd mixedMixed

    “Specifically, the Federal Circuit “reverse[d] the Board’s finding that Weber’s operating manuals do not qualify as printed publications.” Weber, 1 Patent Owner also submitted redacted versions of its Preliminary Response, Response, and Sur-Reply. Papers 8, 24, 48. The redactions relate to information subject to our Protective Orders. Papers 13, 57. 92 F.4th at 1069. The Federal Circuit further held that the prior art disclosed the “disposed over” limitation of claim 1 as properly construed, as well as the “stop gate” limitation of claim 1. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1069–1072. In addition, the Federal Circuit indicated it had considered Petitioner’s remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1072. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated our determinations that Petitioner failed to establish unpatentability of claims 1–11 of the ’812 patent, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1072.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering (or a similar field) and at least two years of experience working on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field)” or “(2) at least seven years of experience working on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field).” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or provide its own proposal. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal because Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill demonstrated in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “disposed over the food article loading apparatus.” The Federal Circuit reversed the construction set forth in the prior FWD and held that the “disposed over” limitation “requires only that the feed apparatus be generally positioned above the loading apparatus.” Weber, 92 F.4th at 1070. We follow the Federal Circuit’s construction of “disposed over” in this decision. We need not provide an express construction for any other claim terms to resolve the dispute before us. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). We note, though, that in reaching our conclusion, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning to all claim terms. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the preamble of claim 1 is disclosed by each of the slicing machines disclosed in 2006 904 Operating Manual, Lindee, and Sandberg. Thus, we need not and do not decide whether the preamble is limiting.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 10,639,812 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,639,812
• Weber, Inc. v. Provisur Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 3, 2024 · IPR2020-01557 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 8–11 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 5–7 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish claim 5’s recessed-diameter limitation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Specifically, the Federal Circuit “reverse[d] the Board’s finding that Weber’s operating manuals do not qualify as printed publications.” Weber, 1 Patent Owner also submitted redacted versions of its Preliminary Response, Response, and Sur-Reply. Papers 8, 24, 48. The redactions relate to information subject to our Protective Orders. Papers 13, 57. 92 F.4th at 1069. The Federal Circuit further held that the prior art disclosed the “disposed over” limitation of claim 1 as properly construed, as well as the “stop gate” limitation of claim 1. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1069–1072. In addition, the Federal Circuit indicated it had considered Petitioner’s remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1072. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated our determinations that Petitioner failed to establish unpatentability of claims 1–11 of the ’812 patent, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Weber, 92 F.4th at 1072.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering (or a similar field) and at least two years of experience working on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field)” or “(2) at least seven years of experience working on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field).” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition or provide its own proposal. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal because Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill demonstrated in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “disposed over the food article loading apparatus.” The Federal Circuit reversed the construction set forth in the prior FWD and held that the “disposed over” limitation “requires only that the feed apparatus be generally positioned above the loading apparatus.” Weber, 92 F.4th at 1070. We follow the Federal Circuit’s construction of “disposed over” in this decision. We need not provide an express construction for any other claim terms to resolve the dispute before us. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). We note, though, that in reaching our conclusion, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning to all claim terms. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “the structure and function of the 2006 904 Operating Manual’s product holder and Lindee’s grippers are similar in that they serve to grip food product and guide it to the slicing station. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 23; Ex. 1006, 18:20–35, Fig. 7A. The two devices differ in their actuation—the 2006 904 Operating Manual uses a ball screw spindle actuator to drive the product holder along the feed path, whereas Lindee uses a timing belt 334 to drive its grippers 151 along the feed path. Ex. 1005, 273–274; Ex. 1006, 18:33–34, Fig. 7A. However, Petitioner presented evidence that “unlike ball screws, belt drives do not require periodic lubrication with grease or exhibit backlash when they change direction.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 160. In addition, Petitioner demonstrates that a POSA at the time would have understood that conveyor belts like Lindee’s can be easily cleaned. Ex. 1051 ¶¶ 50–54. Petitioner further asserted that conveyor belts are easy to maintain at low cost. Id. citing ¶¶ 55–58. We agree with Petitioner that, at least for some scenarios, including those that Petitioner specifies, a POSA would have seen that there were advantages to using Lindee’s timing belt rather than the 2006 904 Operating Manual’s ball-screw to drive food article grippers. Petitioner has demonstrated a POSA would have been motivated to combine Lindee’s belt-driven grippers in the 2006 904 Operating Manual’s food slicer notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary.” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 10,639,812 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,639,812
• Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2023-01320 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 26–28, 30–36, 65–68, and 70 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 29 and 69 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish sensed fog or snow.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “At institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal, except that we omitted the qualifier “at least” and set the level of experience at two years. See Inst. Dec. 8. In its Response, Patent Owner stated that it “does not dispute the Board’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 3. We accordingly maintain the level of ordinary skill in the art we adopted in the Institution Decision. B.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “However, the reason we interpreted “light source” in the institution decision was that there was a question about whether the individual “microbeams” described in the Beam reference were “light sources.” See Inst. Dec. 11. Because, as explained below, we do not reach the Beam grounds, we need not construe “light source” in this final decision. We further find that that no other express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenMixed

    “measurement by sensor 9 is not affected by “scattered reflected light” due to “dirty cover glass 19”). Moreover, even if fog or snow might make the cover glass “dirty” nothing in Karlsson senses that. Instead, the reference simply explains that the switching of the light is helpful if the glass happens to be dirty. Sensor 9 is used to detect light, such as from oncoming vehicles, not fog or snow (see Ex. 1010, 9:9–26), and none of the other passages of Karlsson cited in the Petition describe sensing fog or snow. Petitioner does not identify anything in Harbers that senses fog or snow, and we do not find a description of that ourselves. Harbers describes adjusting the light based on vehicle velocity, the position of the steering wheel, “weather conditions,” or road type (e.g., motorway or country road). See Ex. 1011, 3:27–4:32. It seems reasonable to assume that the velocity and position of the steering wheel are sensed, and the reference indicates that light distribution for road type can be adjusted “by the driver.” Id. at 4:22–25. The reference is silent, however, on how the adjustment based on “weather conditions” is made. Dr. Jiao cites a passage from Braun about how its “headlights . . . are programmed . . . to detect fog and . . . provide light appropriate for driving in fog” (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 590), but Braun is not included in this ground in the Petition (see Pet. 3), and neither Petitioner not Dr. Jiao attempts to provide a reason to combine Braun for these claims. We conclude that, in order to show that these claims would have been obvious, Petitioner would have needed to show that sensing would have been disclosed or inherent in the Harbers/Karlsson combination, obvious in view of Karlsson and Harbers, or that it would have been obvious to add Braun’s fog detection to the Karlsson/Harbers combination. As Petitioner did not argue an express or inherent disclosure of fog/snow sensing in Harbers/Karlsson, did not argue that it would have been obvious to use fog/snow sensing in the Karlsson/Harbers combination, and did not include Braun in the combination, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that claims 29 and 69 are unpatentable” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “This argument is not persuasive because, we conclude, it overstates the problem. These claims require bluish light towards the center and yellowish light to the side. Were an oncoming vehicle in the yellow area, corresponding yellow lights would be dimmed. Were the oncoming vehicle then moved to straddle the yellow and blue areas, the corresponding yellow and blue lights would be dimmed. And if the vehicle were to move to the blue area, the corresponding blue lights would be dimmed. We agree with Dr. Jiao that one of ordinary skill in this art, which is fairly predictable, would be able to avoid or sufficiently minimize any color shifting problems. See Ex. 1051 ¶¶ 162–165. We also credit Dr. Jiao’s explanation that, in the combination, there would only be “subtle variations of illuminated color within the range, such as bluish white and yellowish white” and that “all light would be recognized as white light (as defined in standards and regulations)” that not would be problematic in practice. See id. ¶ 167.9” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,894,503
• Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2023-00328 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 26–28, 30–36, 65–68, and 70 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 29 and 69 were not shown unpatentable because the grounds did not establish sensed fog or snow.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “At institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal, except that we omitted the qualifier “at least” and set the level of experience at two years. See Inst. Dec. 8. In its Response, Patent Owner stated that it “does not dispute the Board’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 3. We accordingly maintain the level of ordinary skill in the art we adopted in the Institution Decision. B.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “At institution, we interpreted the term “light source” as the Specification defines it: “any system that is capable of receiving an electrical signal and producing light in response to the signal.” Inst. Dec. 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 17:7–10 (“As used herein, the term ‘light source’, LED or ‘solid state light source’ means any system that is capable of receiving an electrical signal and producing light in response to the signal.”)). Patent Owner agrees with that construction. See PO Resp. 6. However, the reason we interpreted “light source” in the institution decision was that there was a question about whether the individual “microbeams” described in the Beam reference were “light sources.” See Inst. Dec. 11. Because, as explained below, we do not reach the Beam grounds, we need not construe “light source” in this final decision. We further find that that no other express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We addressed this issue at institution, explaining that “we understand the asserted combinations” and that “[a]ssertions that both references disclose a particular claim element do not undermine or overly cloud Petitioner’s asserted combinations.” Inst. Dec. 15. That remains the case. Patent Owner’s attempt to spin some loose language in the Petition into “sixty-one grounds” (PO Resp. 7) is not persuasive, particularly after the institution decision, in which we explained how we viewed the combinations presented by Petitioner. See Inst. Dec. 11–13. The combinations are simply not as multiplicated and complicated as Patent Owner contends, and Patent Owner acknowledged at the hearing that the alleged multiplicity did not prevent it from addressing any issue. See Tr. 37:17–18 (“[Q]: Which of these did you address in your papers? [A]: We address every single one for every single claim.”). Patent Owner also argues that “[the] lack of particularity is compounded by Petitioner’s other two petitions challenging the ’503 Patent – Petitions that similarly implicate massive numbers of sub-grounds and comparably lacking particularity – resulting in Petitioner asserting at least 149 sub-grounds.” PO Resp. 19 (emphasis omitted). We again disagree with Patent Owner’s assessment of the number of “sub-grounds” at issue, and conclude, as we did at institution, that three petitions were justified given the number of asserted claims and differences in claim scope. See Inst. Dec. 15. D.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “a. Motivation to Combine Patent Owner first argues that “Harbers curved substrate alone has not been shown to add anything useful to the combination.” Patent Owner 56. This argument is unpersuasive because the combination does not require a curved substrate and Patent Owner does not address the motivation for the combination identified by Petitioner, which is that Harbers’ illumination schemes would have provided “improved visibility for different functions, thereby increasing safety.” See Pet. 82–84 (citing Ex. 1011, 5:14–26, 6:1–7, 6:27–7:19, 8:10–18, Figs. 1B–2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 450). b. Segmentation and Color Shifting Patent Owner next argues that “without segmentation the motivation to use Harbers hardware alone is lacking” and that “[f]urther, the use of Harbers’ colored array creates a color-shifting problem.” PO Resp. 57. With regard to “segmentation,” Patent Owner cities Section VII.A.2.b of the Response, which argues that “[w]hile the system would have included differently colored LEDs, there still would not be a single component of the combination that would have any idea how to segment the beams as Harbers suggests.” PO Resp. 34. We disagree. The combination contemplates use of Harbers’ illumination scheme, and Harbers explains, in connection with Figure 2, for example, how the light sources are controlled to produce the desired illumination pattern. See Ex. 1011, 7:20–9:6.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,894,503
• Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2023-01296 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 56–64, 66, 68–72, 74, and 76–87 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 65, 67, 73, and 75 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish the required non-contiguous LED cluster.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “F. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner submits that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had a bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of industry experience in the area of automotive lighting and lighting-control systems.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). Petitioner adds that such artisans “may work as part of a team, for example, with computer engineers to integrate/program controllers and various control inputs to affect control of a given light source.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute that proposed level of skill (PO Resp. 9), and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o claim construction is necessary because Patent Owner’s arguments do not hinge on the outcome of an actual controversy about claim interpretation.” PO Resp. 10. As to the “electronic circuitry apparatus,” Patent Owner does not dispute that the claim language reads on the asserted prior art under any construction. Thus, we need not address the construction of that term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Some of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments depend on claim scope, and we address those implicit claim-construction arguments below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “claim construction: that a controller must associate a target’s identity with a prior target. But the claim language neither imposes nor supports any such requirement. Claim 72 is illustrative, in that it expressly states that the disputed language regarding “illumination provided to the target” is achieved “by repeating the determination of target location, selection of the 10 We agree with Petitioner that the Petition’s reference to “Beam’s system” is a clear typographical error and that the Petition’s substance and citations refer to Karlsson, not Beam. See Pet. Reply 20. cluster and variance to illumination provided to the target, relative to the laterally adjacent areas, based on the subsequent data.” Ex. 1035, 12:8–11. That supports Petitioner’s view that a system can “maintain a variance of the illumination provided to the target” by iteratively performing the “determine,” “select,” and “vary” steps. Claim 80 does not expressly state that steps are repeated, but instead requires the processor be able to identify “a plurality of positions associated with the target” and “change, responsive to the positions associated with the target, first light associated with” LEDs aimed towards the target as the target moves. Id. at 13:30–40. That language, like claim 72’s, does not impose an additional requirement of correlating a detected target to prior detected targets. Rather, it requires that a given target results in multiple identified positions that produce light changes. Based on our understanding of the claim language, Patent Owner’s assertion that, in Karlsson, “[e]ach subsequent detection of light is performed anew and has no relationship to a prior detection and may or may not correspond to the same target” (PO Resp. 52) does not preclude the claim from reading on Karlsson. As Petitioner has identified, the claim language reads on Karlsson’s system when a particular vehicle results in multiple, subsequent detections at multiple positions. Pet. 74. Although Patent Owner poses an alternative situation in which Karlsson’s system might detect other objects rather than the particular vehicle first detected (see PO Resp. 50–51), that does not undermine Petitioner’s showing because the claims do not require that a system perform only as claimed. That is, even if Karlsson’s system detects and accommodates additional targets, if a single target results in multiple light configurations, the claim language is satisfied. And Patent Owner concedes that Karlsson’s system produces “a darkened area that changes position over time due to movement of the vehicle providing light relative to various light sources.” Id. at 52. That admission is consistent with Karlsson’s disclosure that its system adapts to sensed objects by “intermittently, repeatedly controlling” its light beam. Ex. 1010, 2:30–3:6. We find that when Karlsson’s system controls light to prevent glare to an oncoming vehicle, that would result in the processor identifying a plurality of positions associated with the vehicle and varying light associated with LEDs aimed toward the vehicle. Thus, the record supports Petitioner’s position that claims 72’s and 80’s disputed language reads on Karlsson. 5. “select a second, different cluster . . . directed towards the other vehicle”” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As to a change of perspective, the record does not support that Nakamura’s processing relies on a single, unchangeable perspective. Rather, Nakamura discloses identifying relevant image regions through reference markers such as “white lines of the lane” and adjustments such as “correction amount α” to accommodate the reference markers. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 36–46; see Pet. 56 (“Nakamura explains how to implement the coordinate mapping of the pixels received by a camera.”). Thus, Nakamura’s approach is already suitable to a changed perspective and Petitioner did not have to explain further details of the required adaption. See also Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 110 (“Wherever the camera is located on the vehicle, a simple calibration for camera location versus driver’s viewpoint would be conducted to carry on the image processing.”), 156 (noting that the same reasoning applies to the Karlsson–Nakamura combination as the Beam–Satonaka combination). Additionally, Patent Owner has not persuasively supported its assertion that the changed perspective—locating sensors at the headlamps rather than centered at the top of the windshield—would impair the system’s ability to detect other vehicles. See PO Resp. 59–61. Patent Owner’s expert could not testify as to the camera locations used to generate the images that form the basis for Patent Owner’s argument, as he was not present at the test that generated those images. Ex. 1053, 104:22–105:14, 106:16–107:6, 109:17– 110:4. While there may be some tradeoffs involved in using a different camera location than Nakamura discusses, those tradeoffs would be balanced by the benefits that Karlsson discloses from locating a camera with each headlamp. Nakamura’s teachings relate to identifying regions in the illuminated field that should be dimmed. Ex. 1013 ¶ 45. Such a determination aligns with Karlsson’s own similar determination, and would be implemented as a lighting change by Karlsson’s system. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 9:18–26. Having considered the full record, we find that skilled artisans would have had reason to modify Karlsson’s system with Nakamura’s teachings regarding capturing and using image coordinates as summarized above.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,955,551
• Volkswagen Group Of America, Inc. / Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2023-00318 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 56–64, 66, 68–72, 74, and 76–87 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 65, 67, 73, and 75 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish the required non-contiguous LED clusters.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “F. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner submits that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had a bachelor’s degree (B.S.) in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 years of industry experience in the area of automotive lighting and lighting-control systems.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). Petitioner adds that such artisans “may work as part of a team, for example, with computer engineers to integrate/program controllers and various control inputs to affect control of a given light source.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute that proposed level of skill (PO Resp. 9), and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that “[n]o claim construction is necessary because Patent Owner’s arguments do not hinge on the outcome of an actual controversy about claim interpretation.” PO Resp. 10. As to the “electronic circuitry apparatus,” Patent Owner does not dispute that the claim language reads on the asserted prior art under any construction. Thus, we need not address the construction of that term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Some of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments depend on claim scope, and we address those implicit claim-construction arguments below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “claim construction: that a controller must associate a target’s identity with a prior target. But the claim language neither imposes nor supports any such requirement. Claim 72 is illustrative, in that it expressly states that the disputed language regarding “illumination provided to the target” is achieved “by repeating the determination of target location, selection of the 10 We agree with Petitioner that the Petition’s reference to “Beam’s system” is a clear typographical error and that the Petition’s substance and citations refer to Karlsson, not Beam. See Pet. Reply 20. cluster and variance to illumination provided to the target, relative to the laterally adjacent areas, based on the subsequent data.” Ex. 1035, 12:8–11. That supports Petitioner’s view that a system can “maintain a variance of the illumination provided to the target” by iteratively performing the “determine,” “select,” and “vary” steps. Claim 80 does not expressly state that steps are repeated, but instead requires the processor be able to identify “a plurality of positions associated with the target” and “change, responsive to the positions associated with the target, first light associated with” LEDs aimed towards the target as the target moves. Id. at 13:30–40. That language, like claim 72’s, does not impose an additional requirement of correlating a detected target to prior detected targets. Rather, it requires that a given target results in multiple identified positions that produce light changes. Based on our understanding of the claim language, Patent Owner’s assertion that, in Karlsson, “[e]ach subsequent detection of light is performed anew and has no relationship to a prior detection and may or may not correspond to the same target” (PO Resp. 52) does not preclude the claim from reading on Karlsson. As Petitioner has identified, the claim language reads on Karlsson’s system when a particular vehicle results in multiple, subsequent detections at multiple positions. Pet. 74. Although Patent Owner poses an alternative situation in which Karlsson’s system might detect other objects rather than the particular vehicle first detected (see PO Resp. 50–51), that does not undermine Petitioner’s showing because the claims do not require that a system perform only as claimed. That is, even if Karlsson’s system detects and accommodates additional targets, if a single target results in multiple light configurations, the claim language is satisfied. And Patent Owner concedes that Karlsson’s system produces “a” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As to a change of perspective, the record does not support that Nakamura’s processing relies on a single, unchangeable perspective. Rather, Nakamura discloses identifying relevant image regions through reference markers such as “white lines of the lane” and adjustments such as “correction amount α” to accommodate the reference markers. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 36–46; see Pet. 56 (“Nakamura explains how to implement the coordinate mapping of the pixels received by a camera.”). Thus, Nakamura’s approach is already suitable to a changed perspective and Petitioner did not have to explain further details of the required adaption. See also Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 110 (“Wherever the camera is located on the vehicle, a simple calibration for camera location versus driver’s viewpoint would be conducted to carry on the image processing.”), 156 (noting that the same reasoning applies to the Karlsson–Nakamura combination as the Beam–Satonaka combination). Additionally, Patent Owner has not persuasively supported its assertion that the changed perspective—locating sensors at the headlamps rather than centered at the top of the windshield—would impair the system’s ability to detect other vehicles. See PO Resp. 59–61. Patent Owner’s expert could not testify as to the camera locations used to generate the images that form the basis for Patent Owner’s argument, as he was not present at the test that generated those images. Ex. 1053, 104:22–105:14, 106:16–107:6, 109:17– 110:4. While there may be some tradeoffs involved in using a different camera location than Nakamura discusses, those tradeoffs would be balanced by the benefits that Karlsson discloses from locating a camera with each headlamp. Nakamura’s teachings relate to identifying regions in the illuminated field that should be dimmed. Ex. 1013 ¶ 45. Such a determination aligns with Karlsson’s own similar determination, and would be implemented as a lighting change by Karlsson’s system. See, e.g., Ex. 1010, 9:18–26. Having considered the full record, we find that skilled artisans would have had reason to modify Karlsson’s system with Nakamura’s teachings regarding capturing and using image coordinates as summarized above.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,955,551

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.