- PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00103 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on each obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’766 patent on all challenges in the Petition. Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, for the reasons given below we determine there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’766 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–15 of the ’766 patent based upon the asserted grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. Pet. 1.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther
“If Petitioner succeeds in establishing these limitations lack written description support in the priority applications, then the challenged claims will not receive the benefit of the priority applications’ earlier filing dates and Singh129 will qualify as prior art. On the present record, we are not directed to adequate written description support for the limitations reciting receiving data from a “shortrange wireless enabled data capture device” or “use[s] HTTP” to upload/transfer “new-data along with user information” to a user data publishing website, and wherein “the user information corresponds to a user identifier.” See Pet. 12. Even if support for these limitations is found in Singh906, beyond the initial incorporation by reference, “Singh906 is not mentioned or otherwise referenced in the specification” of the ’766 patent, and on the current record, we are not otherwise apprised of disclosure within the four corners of the specification that demonstrates possession of the system or mobile application as claimed. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims lack adequate written description support, and thus that Singh129 qualifies as prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artOther
“If Petitioner succeeds in establishing these limitations lack written description support in the priority applications, then the challenged claims will not receive the benefit of the priority applications’ earlier filing dates and Singh129 will qualify as prior art. On the present record, we are not directed to adequate written description support for the limitations reciting receiving data from a “shortrange wireless enabled data capture device” or “use[s] HTTP” to upload/transfer “new-data along with user information” to a user data publishing website, and wherein “the user information corresponds to a user identifier.” See Pet. 12. Even if support for these limitations is found in Singh906, beyond the initial incorporation by reference, “Singh906 is not mentioned or otherwise referenced in the specification” of the ’766 patent, and on the current record, we are not otherwise apprised of disclosure within the four corners of the specification that demonstrates possession of the system or mobile application as claimed. For the above reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims lack adequate written description support, and thus that Singh129 qualifies as prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to look to the features of both Singh129 and Singh906 when considering an improved publishing system. Pet. 16. Further, Petitioner points out that Singh129 incorporates by reference the ’802 application, published as Singh906. Id. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Singh129’s system to add Singh906’s user authentication credentials to Singh129’s user preferences to give the “user more control over the publishing of their multimedia content.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶ 456). Petitioner cites four additional reasons for a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Singh129 with Singh906 including solving a known problem, avoiding sending authentication credentials to publish content, virtual spaces provided for clients in Singh906, and that authentication credentials would have been an obvious design choice. Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 47, Figs. 2, 5; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 17, 18, 27; Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 457–461). Petitioner also asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success for the modification of Singh129 with Singh906. Pet. 18. Petitioner argues “the proposed combination would have required no more than the application of known techniques (using authentication credentials and HTTP in accordance with Singh906) to a known system (Singh129’s system) in the same field of endeavor (media publishing) and from the same assignee (CellSpinSoft) to obtain the benefits described above.” Id. (citing Ex. 1030 ¶ 461). Based on the record before us, we find sufficient the argument and evidence that the combination of Singh129 and Singh906 teaches or suggests all of the limitations of claim 1, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine features from Singh906 into Singh129 with a reasonable expectation of success, for the reasons discussed in the Petition. See Pet. 16–19. We have also reviewed Petitioner’s contentions with respect to dependent claims 2–15, and find the same for these claims. See id. at 28–38.” slip op. at 25
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,900,766 - PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00102 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on both obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioners would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–10 of the ’121 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Petitioners contend that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes abbreviated herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, and two years of experience in the field consumer electronics, with exposure to digital camera technology and wireless communications. Superior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa. Pet. 6 (citations omitted) (citing Ex. 1030 (Lett Decl.) ¶¶ 94–95). Because Petitioners’ proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioners assert that no express constructions are required to institute review and find the challenged claims unpatentable. See Pet. 7. We find it unnecessary to construe any claim term to decide whether Petitioners satisfy the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Any final written decision entered in this case may include express claim constructions, or may include discussion of claim scope that differs from that provided in our analysis in this Decision. Any final claim constructions will be based on the full trial record.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“E. Ground 1 – Alleged Obviousness Over Hiroishi, Kahn, Endsley, and Bluetooth Petitioners assert that claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Hiroishi, Kahn, Endsley, and Bluetooth. Pet. 16–65. After considering Petitioners’ arguments and cited evidence, we find that for purposes of institution, Petitioners have shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing that claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Hiroishi, Kahn, Endsley, and Bluetooth.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,234,121 - PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00104 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–18 based on all presented grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness grounds 1A and 1B.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). The petitioner ultimately bears the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability of each challenged claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Board may authorize an inter partes review if we determine that the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have “had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, and two years of experience in the field [of] consumer electronics, with exposure to digital camera technology and wireless communications.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 94–95).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We find it unnecessary to construe any claim term to decide whether Petitioners satisfy the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of nonobviousness.10 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). An obviousness determination requires finding a reason to combine accompanied by a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed in the challenged patent. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[A]ny need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–20.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,904,030 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01110 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16, finding a reasonable likelihood they are obvious over Kim and over Chu and Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’171 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than January 22, 2021.” Id. at 5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’171 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“claim construction standard as that applied in federal courts in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is generally referred to as the Phillips standard. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Phillips standard, “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “Petitioner submits that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 1–2. Similarly, “Patent Owner does not contend that any formal claim construction is necessary” at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’171 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than Jan. 11, 2021. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame according to one embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20); and (4) inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a frame for allocating resource for uplink (UL) multi-user (MU) transmission to one or more terminals that includes the AID field set to a value related to a first padding field, when the padding field is included in the frame. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) an AID field for the MU UL resource allocation frame is set to a value, (2) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and (3) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and conditioned on the inclusion of the AID field in the frame. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,716,171 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01111 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18, finding a reasonable likelihood they are unpatentable over Kim and over Chu in combination with Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’186 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than April 8, 2019.” Id. at 4–5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’186 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’186 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than April 8, 2019. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support, show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the stations assigned to each channel (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 134–135, Fig. 20); (3) performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission for one or more terminals that includes an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field, and the trigger frame including the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals and including an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field; (2) the AID field for the trigger frame is set to a specific value, and (3) that trigger frame includes the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment. On the record before us, we also do not agree that KR ’754 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 17, 2015 filing date of KR ’754. The disclosures of KR ’754 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) multiplexed terminals over respective channels, (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 65–66, Fig. 10); (2) differing the number of AID values in the batch acknowledgment (BA) information field when the number of terminals assigned to each channel differs, setting the length of each multiplexed group ACK differently, and, if necessary, aligning the lengths of the multiplexed group ACKs based on the channel with the longest assigned BA information by adding zero padding or repeatedly inserting BA information (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 66–70, Fig. 11); and (3) applying the use of the AID field padding and the use of BA padding in a downlink OFDMA trigger process during multi-user downlink transmission to align the length of the trigger when the AP notifies the terminals assigned to each channel by inserting zero padding or repeating AIDs (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 71–72, Figs. 11–12). KR ’754 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission for one or more terminals that includes an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field, and the trigger frame including the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. In particular, we do not discern disclosure in KR ’754 that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals and including an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field; (2) the AID field for the trigger frame is set to a specific value, and (3) that trigger frame includes the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. We find misplaced Patent Owner’s argument that “KR ’754’s discussion about Figure 10 and Figure 11 would have been understood [by a POSITA] as disclosing a padding method used to improve predictability and consistency trigger frame” (Prelim. Resp. 12) because: (1) it addresses uplink transmissions and not a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals; (2) it does not address that the padding field is included in the trigger frame when the AID field is set to a specific value; and (3) it is unsupported attorney argument regarding the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Argument of counsel cannot take the place of objective evidence. See Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We also find misplaced Patent Owner’s argument that “the padding discussed by KR ’754 regarding its Figure 12 embodiment is not limited to downlink transmission and would have been understood by a POSITA as also being used to schedule uplink ones” (Prelim Resp. 14) because: (1) KR ’754 does not provide any suggestion that the same technique can be used for uplink transmission trigger frames; (2) Patent Owner’s argument does not address that the padding field is included in the trigger frame when the AID field is set to a specific value; and (3) Patent Owner’s argument is unsupported attorney argument regarding the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Gemtron, 572 F.3d at 1380. For the foregoing reasons and based on this record, for the purpose of institution, we find that the ’186 Patent is not entitled to an effective filing date earlier than April 8, 2019 and find that Kim is prior art. We note that the limitations at the heart of the written description dispute were added in an amendment filed August 9, 2020. See Ex. 1002, 214–21. In further briefing, the parties should address the respective burdens of production and persuasion for establishing that the ’186 Patent is entitled to an earlier” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because they are premised on Choi’s teachings as limited to AIDs transmitted via a control frame broadcast as a TIM element. A prior art “reference must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect.” EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). Chu, Choi, and the testimony of Dr. Ding (Ex. 1003), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Chu’s teachings with Choi’s use of specific AID or ΔAID values as indicators of the end of meaningful data and the beginning of padding that would allow client stations to reliably determine where the useful content of the trigger frame ends and where optional padding begins, with the benefits of improved parsing efficiency, enhanced synchronization, and reduced likelihood of misinterpreting padding as data as padding. See Pet. 46–48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–156; Ex. 1015 ¶ 93; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 24, 184), 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–163, Pet. 45–48); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 29
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,911,186 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01069 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on Bharadwaj alone and Bharadwaj with Yu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, [a]n expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 2–4. Patent Owner, however, notes that, in related district court litigation, Petitioner has asserted that some claims terms are indefinite. Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has taken inconsistent claim construction positions between the district court and the Board. Paper 14 at 1–3 (citing Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025-00340, Paper 18 at 4 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2025) (informative); Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 4–5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential)). Petitioner responds that, in the related district court litigation, the parties have narrowed the claim construction disputes and that Petitioner accords the plain and ordinary meaning to claim terms and no longer asserts that any claim term of the ’077 patent is indefinite. Paper 15 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1126 (Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief)). The evidence supports Petitioner’s position because, in the related district court litigation, the defendants agree with the plaintiff (Patent Owner) that certain phrases in the ’077 patent claims should be given their “[p]lain and ordinary meaning” and are “not indefinite.” Ex. 1126, 6 (native page 1). Thus, the record does not show inconsistent claim construction positions that warrant denial under PTAB precedent. See Revvo, Paper 20 at 5 (addressing a situation in which a petitioner advances “different claim construction positions” in district court and at the PTAB). See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Bharadwaj includes subject matter that is not in Bharadwaj-Prov59, namely the change from adding the value Resp. 20; Ex. 1007 ¶ 51 (adding m); Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (subtracting m); Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioner, however, points out this change in the Petition and acknowledges that it is after the identified critical date of August 20, 2015. See Pet. 28. Thus, we do not understand Petitioner to be relying on Bharadwaj’s disclosure of subtracting m to determine length, as disclosed in the publication of the non-provisional application, as a prior art disclosure. We understand Petitioner to be relying on disclosures in Bharadwaj-Prov059 for prior art teachings for its obviousness contentions. Patent Owner does not appear to dispute that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art, arguing instead that it is improper to rely “on matters in Bharadwaj beyond ‘incorporation by reference’ of the Bharadwaj-Prov59.” See Prelim. Resp. 20–21. On this record, we determine that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art as of its June 2, 2015, filing date by virtue of its incorporation by reference into Bharadwaj, a published US patent application. Ex. 1006 ¶ 1; see Pet. 12–13.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,313,077 - PTAB · Nov 13, 2025 · PGR2025-00042 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–33, finding likely written-description and enablement failures; it found the obviousness showing insufficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“XII. CONCLUSION Petitioner has, at this stage of the proceedings, established that it will more likely than not prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. This determination is, however, based on a preliminary record and is not final on any issues of patentability. We will make a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claims, as necessary and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, based on a fully developed record through trial. XIII. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) post grant review of claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–33 of the ’618 patent is hereby granted on the grounds set forth in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and” slip op. at 46
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner’s proposal is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the level of skill reflected in prior art relevant to the ’618 patent. It is reasonably clear that, in indicating that a POSA would have an advanced degree (like a Ph.D.) and years of experience in analysis of protein structure, Petitioner is asserting that knowledge of proteins generally is sufficient to understand the types of problems encountered in the art and the prior art solutions to those problems, and the ordinary artisan need not have expertise specifically in hyaluronidases. See Pet. 15–16. Petitioner requires that the POSA would be able to apply key scientific concepts (e.g., biochemistry, recombinant biology, sequence analysis and protein modeling) to enzymes such as hyaluronidases. See id. At this stage of the proceeding and on the record before us now, we apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level, which appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“On this record, however, we find that the entire text quoted above is part of the definition of “modified PH20 polypeptide” because it continues to detail specific elements required including a requirement that replacements in the PH20 polypeptide are permitted “so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity.” Ex. 1001, 47:2–4; see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 48, 67 (stating a “patent’s definition controls”). Indeed, while some of the language in the definitional paragraph is permissive in nature, i.e.., describing the number of amino acid replacements a modified PH20 polypeptide “can have” or “[t]ypically . . . contains” or the other modifications the polypeptide “can include,” the phrase “so long as” is not. See Ex. 1001, 47:1–11. This distinction demonstrates that hyaluronidase activity is not an optional feature of a non-limiting example as Patent Owner posits, but a requirement of the “modified PH20 polypeptide” defined and claimed in the ’618 patent. See Alynylam Pharms., Inc. v. Moderna, Inc., 138 F.4th 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that the “contrast” between “non-limiting terms” and more definitive statements may indicate that the latter is definitional). Moreover, Dr. Triggs-Raine recognizes the “therapeutic use of hyaluronidases” and notes that “different hyaluronidases were known to have different functions and substrates.” Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29, 113.6 That is, Dr. Triggs-Raine recognizes hyaluronidase activity as the primary utility for the modified PH20 polypeptides recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Instituted
“Every patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345. Ariad explains that for generic claims the question may still remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. The problem is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus. Id. at 1349. Ariad explains “that an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials.” Id. at 1350. Ariad also held that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function. . . . But merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species. Id. slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,037,618 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-01044 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least claim 1 under §103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” which we understand Petitioner identifies as September 7, 2016. Pet. 2, 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Petitioner also contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 11. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’879 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 11. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,516,879 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-01043 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least claim 1 as obvious over Zhou, Cherian, and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” which we understand Petitioner identifies as September 7, 2016. Pet. 2, 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Petitioner also contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 11. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’035 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 11. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“expressly discloses multiple options for resetting the timer, including “after the STA 106 transmits a scheduled UL transmission, or transmits a scheduled UL transmission and gets an ACK message.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 81. We find sufficiently persuasive Petitioner’s explanation that “after” in Zhou means after the transmission ends if an ACK is not requested; in the case of an ACK, Zhou expressly discloses starting the timer after receiving the ACK. See Pet. 46–49. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Valenti, testifies that “[a] STA measures the ‘completion’ of the transmission by receiving an ACK— if an ACK is requested—or upon completion of the physical transmission.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 152 (citing Ex. 1018 ¶ 9). On this record, we find this testimony to be sufficiently credible based on the evidence cited. See Ex. 1018 ¶ 9 (“A successful transmission occurs when the node either receives an expected acknowledgment correctly, or transmits a frame that does not require an acknowledgement.”).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,116,035 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00936 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 over all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1 over Lee.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 12.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’597 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 8. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- BurdenInstituted
“On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 12.” slip op. at 10
Claim constructioncites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,700,597
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.