- Meta Platforms, Inc. / Instagram, Inc. et al. v. VL Collective IP LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00923 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Handley, Basturk, and PacketCable; Judge McKone dissented over the printed-publication findings.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“broadly, how skilled artisans in the cable industry in 1999 shared information, is not based on her expertise and should not be given any weight. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, (1993) (“Presumably, this relaxation [in FED. R. EVID. 702] of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge—a rule which represents ‘a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information,’ ’ is premised on an assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.” (internal citation omitted)); FED. R. EVID. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception.”). I would find that Dr. Hall-Ellis’s opinions are not based either on her expertise or her perception; thus, I would give her opinions no weight. As to matters within her expertise, Dr. Hall-Ellis testified that she searched the Wayback Machine and library cataloging resources (e.g., WorldCat) for PacketCable and did not find it as of December 1, 1999. 25:19–26:8, 36:13–15. She further testified that she has no knowledge of whether or how PacketCable was cataloged, on CableLabs’ website or elsewhere. Id. at 50:5–13, 51:10–52:8. This testimony is credible, as it is within her expertise. Thus, I believe Dr. Hall-Ellis that no sources typically consulted by librarians cataloged or recorded PacketCable in 1999. When her expertise is considered, all Dr. Hall-Ellis has been able to establish is that there is no evidence that PacketCable was stored or cataloged, in 1999, in the places where a librarian was apt to look.” slip op. at 108
- Skill levelOther
“VI. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artUnpatentable
“Conclusion for Reasons to Combine We agree with Petitioner that Basturk teaches generating signatures “on-the-fly” as transmission proceeds in order to avoid slowing down the regular flow of data. Pet. 11 (quoting Ex. 1006, 12). We agree with Petitioner that Handley’s RTP protocol used for video conferences would benefit from Basturk’s protocol for high speed networks in order to provide secure video conferences as taught by Basturk. Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 5; Ex. 1003 ¶ 66). We agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Basturk’s technique of computing signatures “on-the-fly” with Handley’s internet conferencing architecture to provide the known benefits of transmitting data faster, reducing jitter, and reducing computing power. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). We agree with Petitioner that Handley describes the need for providing authentication in a multicast environment, and that Basturk addresses this need as well as provides a solution. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1005, 13; Ex. 1006, 3; Ex. 1003 ¶ 68). We agree with Petitioner that modifying Handley’s RTP transport protocol to include Basturk’s known authentication method of generating signatures “on-the-fly” while transmitting data is “the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for improvement.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70); KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In addition, we find that Dr. Houh’s testimony supports Petitioner’s reasons to combine Handley and Basturk. As discussed above, we find Dr. Houh’s testimony more persuasive than Dr. Stubblebine’s testimony because Dr. Houh’s testimony is supported by and consistent with the disclosures of Basturk and Handley. Dr. Houh testifies that generating a signature “on-the-fly” as data is being transmitted provides the benefits of transmitting data faster, reducing jitter, reducing computing power, and reducing latency in a live transmission. Ex. 1003 ¶ 64. We agree with Dr. Houh and find that a person of ordinary skill in the art, faced with the need to provide a signature at the application layer in Handley’s multimedia conferencing architecture as taught by Handley (Ex. 1005, 2, 13) while minimizing latency as taught by both Handley (Ex. 1005, 13–14) and Basturk (Ex. 1006, 7, 12), would have computed the signature “on-the-fly” as taught by Basturk (Ex. 1006, 7, 12) at the application layer of Handley to yield the benefits of authenticating data while minimizing latency as taught by Basturk. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–70. Dr. Houh testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art, in order to” slip op. at 40
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for patent owner
“Handley, Ex. 1005, qualifies as a prior art printed publication. I also disagree that Petitioner has shown that PacketCable qualifies as a prior art printed publication. Thus, I would not find that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any claim of the ’682 is unpatentable. Accordingly, I dissent.” slip op. at 92
Patent outcomesUS 7,266,682 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,266,682 - Meta Platforms, Inc. / Instagram, Inc. et al. v. VL Collective IP LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00924 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Zhao; claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd mixedMixed
“Decision is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 as to the patentability of claims 1–16 of the ’980 patent. We determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable, and Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyOther
“being present in another image or comparing that probability to a detection threshold.”). Dr. Saber was consistent with this testimony on cross-examination. Ex. 1051, 167–251. When I weigh the evidence, I find it to be one-sided, with all of the expert testimony weighing against Petitioner or avoiding the issue altogether. Thus, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Zhao teaches claim limitation 1e. Moreover, even if the Majority is correct about how Zhao’s RCR algorithm works, all that shows is that the detection of object presence in a previous image can be used to disambiguate segments (e.g., limbs) of an already detected object (e.g., a person), not that it can be used to detect the object in the image in the first place, as required by the claim language. For this additional reason, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden.” slip op. at 84
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of “obviousness” are primarily assertions of how a POSITA would have understood Zhao’s disclosures. For example, with regard to claim 1, Petitioner repeatedly asserts how “a POSITA would have understood Zhao” (Pet. 13, 18, 21, 27) and for each limitation contends that Zhao “disclosed or at least rendered obvious” (or a variation thereof) the limitation (id. at 13– 15, 17–18, 21, 23, 25–27). We will, accordingly, address these “obviousness” contentions when addressing the respective limitations.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 7,436,980 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,436,980 - General Motors LLC v. Edward H. NortrupAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00994 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–31 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over Knockeart and Feldman, with dependent claims also held obvious over additional combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“the proposed alternative configuration. See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Also, protecting the privacy of individuals provides further reason for combining Knockeart and Feldman. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–21, 25, 26, 29, and 31 would have been obvious over Knockeart and Feldman, that claims 7 and 8 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Simske, that claims 10, 11, and 30 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Whitsell, that claims 22–24 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Boies, and that claims 27 and 28 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Peterson. See supra Parts III.B–III.F. Because these five asserted challenges are dispositive as to all the challenged claims, namely, claims 1–31, we need not reach either the asserted challenge based on Knockeart, Feldman, Boies, and Peterson, or the asserted challenge based on Knockeart, Feldman, and Craine with respect to any of these claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding that a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Bos. Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (recognizing that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding” and agreeing that the Board has “discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”). Accordingly, we do not reach Petitioner’s arguments that claim 14 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, Boies, and” slip op. at 80
Patent outcomesUS 10,444,028 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,444,028 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxense, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-01327 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–7, 10, 12–19, and 22–27 because the condition for Microsoft's petition and conditional joinder motion had not occurred.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“of claims 1–7, 10, 12–19, and 22–27 of U.S. Patent No. 8,886,954 B1 (“the ’954 patent”) (Paper 3) and a Conditional Motion for Joinder (Paper 2). In the Conditional Motion for Joinder, Petitioner “respectfully requests that the Board institute review of IPR2024-01327 based on the concurrently-filed petition and that it grant this motion if, and only if, the Board has previously denied institution of Microsoft Corporation, v. Proxense, LLC, IPR2024- 00846.” Paper 2, 1. Petitioner makes this request to “ensure that [it] is party to one (and only one) instituted inter partes review proceeding, preferably the proceeding inspired by [Petitioner’s] initial filing (i.e., the 846 Proceeding).” Id. at 1–2. The Board has instituted an inter partes review of the ’954 patent in IPR2024-00846. See IPR2024-00846, Paper 8. Accordingly, the condition on which Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for Joinder is based has not come to pass. Therefore, we deny the Petition and the Conditional Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,886,954 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxense, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-01326 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–17 because the condition for Microsoft’s petition and conditional joinder motion was not met.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“of claims 1–6 and 8–17 of U.S. Patent No. 8,352,730 B2 (“the ’730 patent”) (Paper 3) and a Conditional Motion for Joinder (Paper 2). In the Conditional Motion for Joinder, Petitioner “respectfully requests that the Board institute review of IPR2024-01326 based on the concurrently-filed petition and that it grant this motion if, and only if, the Board has previously denied institution of Microsoft Corporation, v. Proxense, LLC, IPR2024-00775.” Paper 2, 1. Petitioner makes this request to “ensure that [it] is party to one (and only one) instituted inter partes review proceeding, preferably the proceeding inspired by [Petitioner’s] initial filing (i.e., the 775 Proceeding).” Id. at 1–2. The Board has instituted an inter partes review of the ’730 patent in IPR2024-00775. See IPR2024-00775, Paper 9. Accordingly, the condition on which Petitioner’s Petition and Motion for Joinder is based has not come to pass. Therefore, we deny the Petition and the Conditional Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,352,730 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxense, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00775 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, and 14–17 are obvious over Burger and claims 3, 10, and 13 over Burger and Robinson.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition.” slip op. at 31
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. Level of skill in the art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in wireless communications security,” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of skill or propose an alternative. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“In IPR2024-00232, we made clear that “exclud[ing] any active participant in a transaction” from the construction of third-party trusted authority would exclude preferred embodiments of the ’730 patent and, therefore, is presumptively incorrect. IPR2024-00232, Paper 10 at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:42–46, 6:32–64, 7:10–22, Figs. 3–5, 7; Sequoia Tech., LLC v. Dell, Inc., 66 F.4th 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). We also explained that “active participation alone does not make an entity a party to the transaction.” Id. at 22–23. Instead, we evaluate a party’s relationship to the transaction to determine whether it is a principal party to the transaction or a third-party. Id. at 11 (“The ‘witness’ role mentioned in the Specification (Ex. 1001, 6:35–38) refers to an agent’s relationship to the principal parties to the transaction, not to the level of activity the agent engages in.”), 22 (“We agree with Petitioner that, in this example, the TPCH is separate from, and thus a third party to, the principal parties to the transaction (the user and the vendor) and also a third party to the financial institution that pays the vendor.”). To be clear, below, we evaluate Petitioner’s showing as to obviousness over Burger based on the ordinary meaning of third-party trusted authority, namely, “a trusted authority that is an entity separate from the parties to a transaction.”” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. Remaining claim terms (including “access message”) Patent Owner acknowledges that “the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘access message’ is a message enabling entry to, communication with, or use of an object,” but argues that, “to capture all the disclosed embodiments,” enabling or announcing access,” allegedly consistent with a district court construction. Prelim. Resp. 2–7. As Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of success under the arguably narrower ordinary meaning of “access message,” it is not necessary, at this stage of the proceeding, to further construe this term. Based on the preliminary record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions for any other terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,352,730 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxense, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00846 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–29, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–13, 15, 16, 18–24, and 26–29 are obvious over Burger.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of the ’954 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“‘access message’ is a message enabling entry to, communication with, or use of an object,” but argues that, “to capture all the disclosed embodiments,” we should construe “access message” to mean “a signal or notification enabling or announcing access,” allegedly consistent with a district court construction. Prelim. Resp. 2–7. As Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of success under the arguably narrower ordinary meaning of further construe this term. Based on the preliminary record, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions for any other terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] to incorporate the age verification method of Robinson in Burger so that Burger’s system can be used by businesses interested in conducting transactions that require age-verification.” Pet. 93. Petitioner argues that it would have been predictable to include Robinson’s age-verification feature in Burger’s system in light of Robinson’s explanation that merchants and their employees face penalties if they sell age-restricted goods (e.g., alcohol or tobacco) to underage individuals. Id. at 94–95 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 5; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–80). Dr. Traynor testifies that there would have been “a reasonable expectation of success because it merely involves combining known elements in a manner that would have been easily implemented and obvious to” a skilled artisan. Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. At this stage of the proceeding, we credit Dr. Traynor’s uncontroverted testimony. As to claims 3, 14, and 17, Petitioner points to Robinson’s description of a user registering a biometric sample, identity-verifying information (SID), and age-verifying information with a database of an age-verification system. Pet. 95–96 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15, 28, 43, 48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175– 178). Petitioner argues that, in the combination of Burger and Robinson, Robinson’s age-verifying information would be stored in the database of Burger’s network server 114. Id. at 95 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 176). Patent Owner does not yet provide separate arguments for claims 3, 14, and 17. Prelim. Resp. 26. On the current record, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Robinson teaches the additional limitations of claims 3, 14, and 17, and that a skilled Burger and Robinson.” slip op. at 29
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Petitioner contends that Burger’s pocket vault 102 is “an integrated device.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 94–95, 118, 134, Fig. 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 90). Petitioner argues that write-once memory 212, a storage element that is not capable of being subsequently altered, persistently stores biometric data of the user, and that other hard-wired memory stores a pocket vault ID and encryption/decryption information. Id. at 24–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 112, 114, 118, 127, 129, 154, 182, 551–552, Fig. 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23, 91–96). Dr. Traynor testifies that it would have been obvious to implement the hardwired memory as protected, write-once memory so that sensitive information that is not subject to change (e.g., device ID, encryption information) is kept secure and not tampered with. Ex. 1003 ¶ 98. We credit this testimony at this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,886,954 - Iriusrisk, Inc. v. Threatmodeler Software Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 14, 2024 · IPR2023-00821 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3 are unpatentable as anticipated by Jones; claims 2 and 4–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Jones, Zheng, and Keenan.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“9 In arguing that Jones does not disclose a “predefined interrelated group” of threat model components, Patent Owner, in a footnote, alleges that the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Hurlbut, is “tainted by bias” arising from his “personal and professional connections” to Petitioner. PO Resp. 27 n.4; see PO Sur-reply 21–22. Patent Owner cites no authority to show that such connections necessarily render expert testimony biased, and identifies no actual testimony of Mr. Hurlbut that it alleges to be driven only by bias. On the other hand, Petitioner submits that Mr. Hurlbut also has personal and professional connections to Patent Owner—it’s a small world. See Pet. Reply 24 (“Mr. Hurlbut personally knows Mr. Agarwal, [Patent Owner’s] CEO and inventor of the ’008 patent.”). In this case, we assess the credibility of both parties’ experts based on the plausibility of and support for their testimony, and weigh such testimony accordingly. See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“CTPG”) at 32 (“[T]he credibility of experts often turns less on demeanor and more on the plausibility of their theories.”), 35 (“The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony.”); see also 84 Fed. Reg. 64,280 (Nov. 21, 2019).” slip op. at 37
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 10,699,008 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,699,008 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxsense LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 12, 2024 · IPR2024-01328 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed all challenged claims in IPR2024-01328.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Here, Patent Owner requests adverse judgment in each proceeding because no claims remain in the trial after Patent Owner’s disclaimer of all the claims at issue in this proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). We grant Patent Owner’s requests and enter judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) in both proceedings.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,298,905 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxsense LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00776 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed claims 1, 3-7, 9, 10, and 12-18.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Here, Patent Owner requests adverse judgment in each proceeding because no claims remain in the trial after Patent Owner’s disclaimer of all the claims at issue in this proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). We grant Patent Owner’s requests and enter judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) in both proceedings.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,298,905
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.