- PTAB · Nov 24, 2014 · PGR2014-00010 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · PGR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated PGR2014-00010 without a final decision; it also granted confidential treatment of the settlement agreement.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Patent Owner’s preliminary response is not yet due. On November 20, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the proceeding (Paper 7) and a copy of their written settlement agreement (Ex. 2001). Along with the motion to terminate, the parties also filed a joint motion to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information and keep it separate from the file of U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (“the ’219 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 327(b) and 37 C.F.R § 42.74(c). Paper 8, 1.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,598,219 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00555 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without issuing final written decisions.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
None - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00557 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five related inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,047,705 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00554 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id.” slip op. at 2
None - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00556 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id. 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations are to the record of IPR2013-00554; similar papers may be found in the records of the other related proceedings. Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,607,803 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00558 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,047,705 - Lenroc Company v. Enviro Tech Chemical Services, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 10, 2014 · IPR2014-00382 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Lenroc’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of inter partes review of claims 1–12 because the Board did not err in construing “wetcake” to exclude free-flowing powder.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Challenged independent claims 7, 11, and 12 recite “method[s] for preparing a dry, solid monoalkali metal cyanurate.” Ex. 1001, claims 7, 11, 12 (emphasis added). Method claims 7, 11, and 12 recite a first step of forming a monoalkali metal cyanurate wetcake by “blending cyanuric acid” (id., claims 11, 12) or “cyanuric acid wetcake” (id., claims 7, 11, 12) “with a monoalkali metal base” (id.). The ’132 patent specifies the cyanuric acid starting material may be either a “dry, virgin material or . . . by-product material . . . available as a water-washed wetcake” (Ex. 1001, 4:40-48, 6:53-62, 8:66-9:8 (emphasis added), quoted in Dec. 8). Dooney confirms that prior to the effective date of the ’132 patent, cyanuric acid was commercially available in powder and granular forms, or in cake/wetcake form. Ex. 1004, 1:17-20, 28-29, cited in Dec. 9. Given the evidence that cyanuric acid starting materials were available in either wetcake or powder/dry forms, it is not clear whether Dr. Howarth viewed the terms “wetcake” and “powder” as synonymous, or was unconsciously using terms which describe two different forms of cyanuric acid starting materials encompassed by the claimed method. On this record, even if we consider the new evidence that was not raised in the Petition, we are not persuaded that Petitioner shows sufficiently that Dr. Howarth’s declaration testimony controls the proper construction of claims 7, 11, and 12 in this proceeding. Each of claims 7, 11, and 12 also recites a second step of drying the monoalkali metal cyanurate wetcake. Ex. 1001, claims. With respect to the drying step, claim 12 recites: “(b) Drying the formed wetcake of monoalkali metal cyanurate by allowing heat of neutralization caused by a reaction of the blended cyanuric acid or cyanuric acid wetcake and the monoalkali metal base to remove water from the monoalkali metal cyanurate wetcake as steam and by allowing the steam to escape.” The process described in the Howarth Declaration includes the drying step recited in claim 12. Compare Ex. 1001, claim 12(b) with Ex. 1009, ¶ 10. A process which meets the limitation of claim 12 produces a “dry, solid monoalkali metal cyanurate” (Ex. 1001, claim 12). Dr. Howarth stated that “Picture 8 shows the sodium cyanurate wetcake product being conveyed from an opening at the bottom of the ribbon blender.” Ex. 1009, ¶ 13 (emphasis added). Dr. Howarth then described the product exiting the ribbon blender in picture 8 as a “sodium cyanurate wetcake [that] is a free-flowing powder” (Ex. 1009, ¶ 13). However, we are not convinced Dr. Howarth’s statement was based on an understanding that the term “wetcake” encompasses a free-flowing powder, as opposed to an assumption that the reader appreciated that the sodium cyanurate material in the described process transitioned from a wetcake to a dry solid product (a free-flowing powder) during the drying step in the ribbon blender. With respect to the Amendment, Petitioner has not explained clearly how arguments distinguishing a wetcake from a slurry based on relative dryness support their contention that we erred in interpreting the term “wetcake” as not encompassing a free-flowing powder. See Dec. 8, 1st para. (indicating the term “wetcake,” as used in the ’132 patent, describes a material that is not a slurry and noting the dry-blending process described in the ’132 patent forms a semi-dry solid cake). In sum, Petitioner has not convinced us that the intrinsic evidence of record as a whole, taking into account the Howarth Declaration and Amendment, supports an interpretation of the claim term “wetcake” as encompassing a free-flowing powder. Therefore, we are not persuaded that we erred in interpreting the claims as excluding Stephen’s free flowing powder of monosodium cyanurate monohydrate containing 89.35% monoalkali metal cyanurate and 10.65% water by weight. Petitioner has not met its burden to show that the decision should be modified.” slip op. at 5
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,728,132 - PTAB · Aug 29, 2014 · IPR2013-00178 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
The Board canceled claims 1–20 and denied substitution of claims 21–30 because the proposed claims lacked written-description support and were not shown patentable over prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“2. Written Description Support Patent Owner bears the burden to show written description support in the original disclosure for each proposed substitute claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). The test for written description support is “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Sughrue testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “different reactor configurations and catalysts” used in Jakkula “could and would lead to differing optimal temperatures from those reported in Craig.” Ex. 1040 ¶ 36 (emphasis added). For example, Dr. Sughrue testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that reduced temperatures, as well as dilution—which was used in Jakkula but was not studied as an operating variable in Craig—could “greatly reduce the rate of dimerization and oligomerization of free fatty acids” and would lead to lower levels of high molecular weight hydrocarbons. Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 42, 60, 90; Ex. 1013, 4:11–13. Dr. Sughrue also provides evidence that in the years after the publication of Craig “the activity of hydroprocessing catalysts increased dramatically,” permitting lower reaction temperatures in the HDO step. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. In light of these differences, Dr. Sughrue concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art “would not have been dissuaded from considering HDO reaction temperatures at or near the low end of the preferred temperature range taught in [Jakkula], e.g., 300 °C, or even lower temperatures within the more broadly taught range of 200-500 °C.” Ex. 1040 ¶ 37. We find Dr. Sughrue’s testimony persuasive. In particular, in light of Jakkula’s disclosed successful results, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have viewed Craig’s 350 °C minimum temperature for “trouble-free operation” as a line not to be crossed, but would have understood that the optimal and minimum temperatures for the HDO step would vary depending on the particular reactor configuration and operating conditions used. See In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA 1980) (“Discovery of an optimum value of a results effective variable in a known process is ordinarily within the skill in the art.”). Although Dr. Klein presents an opposing view from that of Dr. Sughrue, upon review of both expert declarations and their corresponding depositions, on balance, we find that Dr. Sughrue’s testimony more persuasively considers not only the express teachings of Craig and Jakkula, but also the timing of the two disclosures, the differences in reactor configuration and operating conditions, and the knowledge, skill, and reasoning ability of one of ordinary skill in the art. Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“What a reference teaches or suggests must be examined in the context of the knowledge, skill, and reasoning ability of a skilled artisan.”)” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Sughrue testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “different reactor configurations and catalysts” used in Jakkula “could and would lead to differing optimal temperatures from those reported in Craig.” Ex. 1040 ¶ 36 (emphasis added). For example, Dr. Sughrue testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that reduced temperatures, as well as dilution—which was used in Jakkula but was not studied as an operating variable in Craig—could “greatly reduce the rate of dimerization and oligomerization of free fatty acids” and would lead to lower levels of high molecular weight hydrocarbons. Ex. 1040 ¶¶ 42, 60, 90; Ex. 1013, 4:11–13. Dr. Sughrue also provides evidence that in the years after the publication of Craig “the activity of hydroprocessing catalysts increased dramatically,” permitting lower reaction temperatures in the HDO step. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. In light of these differences, Dr. Sughrue concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art “would not have been dissuaded from considering HDO reaction temperatures at or near the low end of the preferred temperature range taught in [Jakkula], e.g., 300 °C, or even lower temperatures within the more broadly taught range of 200-500 °C.” Ex. 1040 ¶ 37. We find Dr. Sughrue’s testimony persuasive. In particular, in light of Jakkula’s disclosed successful results, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have viewed Craig’s 350 °C minimum temperature for “trouble-free operation” as a line not to be crossed, but would have understood that the optimal and minimum temperatures for the HDO step would vary depending on the particular reactor configuration and operating conditions used. See In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA 1980) (“Discovery of an optimum value of a results effective variable in a known process is ordinarily within the skill in the art.”). Although Dr. Klein presents an opposing view from that of Dr. Sughrue, upon review of both expert declarations and their corresponding depositions, on balance, we find that Dr. Sughrue’s testimony more persuasively considers not only the express teachings of Craig and Jakkula, but also the timing of the two disclosures, the differences in reactor configuration and operating conditions, and the knowledge, skill, and reasoning ability of one of ordinary skill in the art. Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 407 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“What a reference teaches or suggests must be examined in the context of the knowledge, skill, and reasoning ability of a skilled artisan.”)” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill in the art, upon reading a reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “[I]n weighing the suggestive power of each reference, [the Board] must consider the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another.” In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). When two references do not use directly comparable techniques or operating conditions, the impact of an allegedly discrediting reference may be significantly reduced. See id. at 592. slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,212,094 - PTAB · Aug 4, 2014 · IPR2014-00731 · APJ Jacqueline Wright Bonilla · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motion to terminate the proceeding and the request to keep the settlement agreement confidential; no institution decision was made.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“This case is in the preliminary proceeding1 stage; no decision whether to” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The Board generally expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Considering the facts and early stage of this 1 A preliminary proceeding begins with the filing of a petition for instituting a trial and ends with a written decision as to whether trial will be instituted. 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. proceeding, we agree with the parties that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,071,073 - Lenroc Company v. Enviro Tech Chemical Services, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2014 · IPR2014-00382 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“3. Analysis “It is axiomatic that for anticipation, each and every claim limitation must be explicitly or inherently disclosed in the prior art.” In re NTP, INC., 654 F.3d 1279, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “The anticipation analysis asks solely whether the prior art reference discloses and enables the claimed invention, and not how the prior art characterizes that disclosure or whether alternatives are also disclosed.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1324 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2003).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“G. Analysis Based on our review of the Specification and related prior art, we agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood that a wetcake is a wet solid, which physically differs from a dry solid. See Ex. 1001, claims 7, 11, and 12 (requiring a step of drying monoalkali metal cyanurate wetcake to produce a dry solid); Ex. 1001, 7:3-5, 9:16-18 (“[w]hen the cyanuric acid is dry, virgin material, sufficient water may be added so that it can be processed as if it were cyanuric acid wetcake”), id. at 8:60-61, 9:35-39 (describing preparation of a dry solid monoalkali metal cyanurate by drying a monoalkali metal cyanurate wetcake); Ex. 1005, 1:66-68, 2:1, 9-12 (disclosing cyanuric acid is commercially available in powder and granular forms, or in cake/wetcake form); Ex. 1004, 1:17-20, 28-29 (disclosing cyanuric acid is typically available in dry, granulated form and that cyanuric acid in slurry form may settle and form hard cakes); Shimamura 2:39-42 (“Sodium cyanurate that is obtained by the process according to the invention has rich fluidity and is free from any cakes. Thus, it can be used in the form of powder.”). One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a wetcake and a powder may have the same moisture content, yet differ physically in that the particles of a wetcake are capable of adhering together to form a cake, while the particles of a powder do not adhere to each other, but are free flowing. Compare Ex. 1005, 2:9-12 (a wet cake of cyanuric acid containing from about 65-99% cyanuric acid) with Shimamura, 1:44- 45 (“wherein at least one of said starting materials in powder form is a hydrate”). Therefore, we interpret the claim term “wetcake” as meaning a solid material comprising particles having some adherence to one another such that they are not free flowing. We do not adopt Declarant’s proposed construction of “wetcake of monoalkali metal cyanurate” as necessarily encompassing material in the form of a hydrate, see Ex. 1006, 10, ¶ 11c, because Declarant’s testimony is at odds with the intrinsic evidence, see Shimamura 1:44-49 (“wherein at least one of said starting materials in powder form is a hydrate, or both of said starting materials are anhydrates, in which case water is added to the anhydrates in an amount sufficient to produce a hydrate at room temperature, and wherein the starting materials are mixed and kneaded together in powder form”). We find that, for purposes of this Decision, a determination as to the specific moisture content of a “cyanuric acid wetcake” or a “wetcake of a monoalkali metal cyanurate” is unnecessary.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable
“3. Analysis “It is axiomatic that for anticipation, each and every claim limitation must be explicitly or inherently disclosed in the prior art.” In re NTP, INC., 654 F.3d 1279, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “The anticipation analysis asks solely whether the prior art reference discloses and enables the claimed invention, and not how the prior art characterizes that disclosure or whether alternatives are also disclosed.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1324 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2003).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“C. Obviousness Grounds Petitioner argues claim 10 would have been obvious over Stephan in view of Jany, claims 11 and 12 would have been obvious over Stephan in view of Doonan, and claims 1-9 would have been obvious over Stephan in view of Jany and Doonan. Those grounds depend on Petitioner’s contention that Stephan describes a “wetcake” as specified in the challenged claims. For the reasons stated above, on this record, Petitioner fails to show that Stephan contains such a disclosure, and neither Jany nor Doonan remedies that failure. Based on the information presented, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to any claim challenged in the remaining grounds.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,728,132
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.