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  • PTAB · Aug 10, 2023 · PGR2022-00023 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Rehearing

    On Patent Owner’s rehearing request, the Board held claim 25 unpatentable under § 112(a) because it depends from claim 14, which lacks written description support.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “We therefore agree with Petitioner that we overlooked the correct dependency of claim 25. Claim 25, as a claim dependent from claim 14, lacks written descriptive support because claim 25 fails to cure the absence of descriptive support for claim 14.” slip op. at 4

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

      “In the Final Written Decision, we determined that claim 14 lacked descriptive support. We noted that Claim 14, in particular, recites a GDC-0199 dosing regimen “compris[ing] a dose of 20 mg per day for one week, a dose of 50 mg per day for one week, a dose of 100 mg per day for one week, a dose of 200 mg of GDC-0199 per day for one week, and a dose of 400 mg per day.” Unlike for claim 1, such disclosure is not found in a single example, but results from picking and choosing three separate selections from column 24. “The written description requirement is not met when, as here, the specification provides at best disparate disclosures that an artisan might have been able to combine in order to make the claimed invention.” Flash-Control, LLC v. Intel Corp., 2021 WL 2944592 *4 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.)” slip op. at 3

    § 112 disclosure
    Patents in suitUS 10,993,942
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00032 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing to authorize a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,933,827
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00030 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Nasdaq’s rehearing request and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “The United States Patent and Trademark Office subsequently implemented an interim procedure1 whereby review of a final written decision by the Director may be requested by a party to a post-grant review proceeding.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,921,051
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00029 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Nasdaq’s rehearing request and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “Given the particular circumstances of this proceeding, particularly that the Request for Rehearing was filed prior to the Supreme Court’s Arthrex decision, we construe Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing as requesting authorization to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision and grant this request. Patent Owner is authorized to file a Request for Rehearing by the Director of the Final Written Decision within 30 days of the date of this decision. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.5, 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,747,506
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00020 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021). The Supreme Court held “that 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) is unenforceable as applied to the Director insofar as it prevents the Director from reviewing the decisions of the PTAB on his own. The Director may engage in such review and reach his own decision.” Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. at 1987. The Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the appropriate remedy is a remand to the Acting Director for him to decide whether to rehear the petition.” Id. The United States Patent and Trademark Office subsequently implemented an interim procedure1 whereby review of a final written decision by the Director may be requested by a party to a post-grant review proceeding.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,386,371
  • Eis GmbH v. Novoluto GmbHRehearing granted
    PTAB · Sep 25, 2020 · IPR2020-00007 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Rehearing

    Granted EIS GMBH’s rehearing request and instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17–21, and 23–26 on all asserted grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “We find that Dr. Prisco’s testimony is a reasonable interpretation of how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “We conclude from a review of Fang and Taylor that they are not substantially the same art nor is Petitioner making substantially the same argument as was presented the Office during prosecution of the ’061 Patent based on Fang. We find that the way in which Fang and Taylor work appear to be materially different. Fang appears to apply only suction to the skin whereas Taylor, with the sealingly connected suction cup, appears to apply a cyclical vacuum that Dr. Prisco testifies meets the claim limitations requiring generation of a pattern of negative and positive pressures, modulated with respect to a reference pressure. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 62–64, 75. Thus Taylor appears to teach the claim element Patent Owner argued during prosecution was missing from Fang. Also, in applying factors (b) and (d) of Becton, Dickinson, because of such differences noted above, we find that Taylor is not cumulative of Fang, which was considered and applied by the Office during prosecution of the ’061 Patent. 4. Conclusion Thus, we find that Taylor and Fang are not substantially the same art, nor were substantially the same arguments based on these references presented in the Petition and during prosecution of the ’061 Patent, respectively. As discussed above, because Petitioner primarily relies on Taylor in all four grounds for teaching the modulation of positive and negative pressures with respect to a reference pressure as required by all of the challenged claims, we also find that, overall, the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office nor were the same or substantially the same arguments previously presented to the Office. Therefore, we do not need to reach the application of the remaining Becton, Dickenson factors relating to whether the Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review here.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “We find that Dr. Prisco’s testimony is a reasonable interpretation of how Taylor works if the bellows are bidirectional, and the bellows are expanded and contracted when the suction cup is sealingly engaged. Figure 3 of Taylor shown above appears to support Dr. Prisco’s testimony that the bellows may be expanded or contracted from the initial position shown in Figure 3 and does not appear to show any valve or second opening in the bellows to provide unidirectional flow as Dr. Jensen, Patent Owner’s declarant, asserts. Also, as Petitioner asserts, Taylor indicates that a squeeze ball may be substituted for the bellows expressly indicating a device with a bidirectional flow. Although Patent Owner raises valid arguments concerning a common definition of bellows indicating unidirectional flow and provides testimony from Dr. Jensen reasonably supporting such a position, these dueling positions create a genuine issue of material fact that we weigh in favor of Petitioner on institution. See 37 C.F.R. 42.108(c).” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,849,061
  • Eis GmbH v. Novoluto GmbHRehearing granted
    PTAB · Jun 17, 2020 · IPR2019-01302 · APJ John E Schneider · IPR · Rehearing

    Granted rehearing and instituted inter partes review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Guan, Lee, and Hovland.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision (1) is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact findings; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on which the Board could rationally base its decision.” Redline Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 442 (Fed. Cir. 2015). With this in mind, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner in turn.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Request for Rehearing and conclude there are genuine issues of material fact about the teachings of Guan that warrant institution and resolution at trial.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner contends that Guan is non-analogous art in that it is not related to stimulation of the clitoris. Prelim. Resp. 59. Patent Owner also contends that there is no motivation to combine the teachings of Lee and Guan. Id. at 60–63. Patent Owner argues that one skilled in the art would not consider using the indirect stimulator of Guan in the dildo of Lee as it would require a modification of Lee beyond a simple substitution of elements. Id.” slip op. at 5

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner has also provided a reasonable motivation to combine the teachings of Lee and Guan. Lee comprises a dildo with an extension which directly stimulates the clitoris, a body part. Ex. 1006, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002, ¶¶ 72, 134–137. Guan discloses an apparatus, which indirectly stimulates a body part. Ex. 1007, 3; Ex. 1002 ¶ 137. Given the teaching in the art of the problems with direct stimulation versus indirect stimulation, we agree on this record with Dr. Prisco that one skilled in the art would have had a reason to substitute the indirect stimulation device of Guan for the direct intensive and is best decided on a full record. Cf. Monark Knitting Mach, Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining that issues of fact concerning secondary considerations precluded grant of summary judgment) reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 132–137.” slip op. at 6

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,937,097
  • PTAB · Oct 26, 2017 · IPR2017-00731 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Hospira’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1–14 for obviousness over Baselga ’94 and Baselga ’96.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “recites “in the absence of an anthracycline derivative.” In the Petition and the Preliminary Response, neither party proposed a construction for that term. Patent Owner, however, argues that “[e]ven if a person of ordinary skill would have chosen to combine an anti-ErbB2 antibody and a taxoid, there is no reason an ordinarily skilled artisan would have avoided anthracyclines as part of that treatment.” Prelim. Resp. 52 (emphasis added). In our Decision denying institution, we agreed with Patent Owner, stating that evidence of the record is “insufficient to suggest that an ordinary artisan would have avoided anthracyclines while pursuing the combination therapy with anti-ErbB2 antibody and a taxoid in a treatment regimen for humans.” Dec. 10 (emphasis added). In its Request for Rehearing, Petitioner contends that we erred in interpreting the limitation “in the absence of an anthracycline derivative” as requiring “avoidance” of an anthracycline derivative. Reh’g Req. 6. According to Petitioner, this term “is a negative limitation that is satisfied by anti-ErbB2 antibody–paclitaxel combinations that do not include an [anthracycline] derivative.” Id. at 5. After reconsidering the current record, we find Petitioner’s argument persuasive. In particular, because Baselga ’94 suggests a therapeutic composition consisting of an anti-ErbB2 antibody and paclitaxel, and does not suggest that doxorubicin must necessarily be included as part of the same treatment regimen, we are persuaded that the reference satisfies the limitation “in the absence of an anthracycline derivative.” Cf. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. Pamlab, L.L.C., 412 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding the prior art anticipates a claim requiring a composition “essentially free of antioxidants,” because the prior art teaches “optional inclusion” of antioxidants, “despite no express teaching to exclude the antioxidants”).” slip op. at 17

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In sum, Petitioner has presented sufficient evidence, for purposes of instituting trial, to show that in considering prior therapy received, an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to treat patients with ErbB2- overexpressing breast cancer by administering a combination of an anti- ErbB2 antibody and a taxoid, and “in the absence of an anthracycline derivative.”” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner, however, points to other evidence to show that prior art teaches an ordinary artisan to combine an anti-ErbB2 antibody with a taxoid. Specifically, Petitioner refers to Baselga ʼ94 for teaching that, in mouse xenografts, “individual treatment with either anti-HER2 4D5 or paclitaxel alone resulted in 35% growth inhibition whereas the combination ‘resulted in a major antitumor activity with 93% inhibition of growth’ without increasing toxicity.” Id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1005 at 4). Similarly, Baselga ’96, citing Baselga ’94, teaches that “[i]n preclinical studies, both in vitro and in xenografts, rhuMAb HER2 markedly potentiated the antitumor effects of several chemotherapeutic agents, including … paclitaxel without increasing their toxicity.” Id. at 44 (quoting Ex. 1004, 15). Based on these teachings, we are persuaded that an ordinary artisan would have had a reason to treat HER2-positive breast cancer patients with a combination of rhuMAb HER2 and a taxoid.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner argues that Exhibit 2029, which states that “breast cancers that overexpress p185 [i.e., HER2] will not respond well to Taxol,” teaches away from the claimed combination therapy. Prelim. Resp. 51 (citing Ex. 2029,5 1362). We are not persuaded on this record. In an obviousness inquiry, we must analyze the prior art as a whole, and not individually. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the question is “whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination”). Other evidence of record shows paclitaxel had been approved for treating breast cancer (see, e.g., Ex. 1025, 10), demonstrates synergy of paclitaxel and an anti-ErbB2 antibody in human breast cancer xenografts (see, e.g., Ex. 1005, 4; Ex. 1004, 15), and suggests clinical trials of the combination therapy (see, e.g., Ex. 1005, 4; Ex. 1004, 15). Weighing all evidence of record, we are not persuaded that prior art as a whole teaches away from combining paclitaxel and an anti-ErbB2 antibody in treating HER2-positive cancers.” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,846,441
  • PTAB · Jan 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01462 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing and instituted trial on claims 21–30 under Ground 2, as obvious over Redford, alongside the grounds previously instituted.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “Specifically, Petitioner acknowledges that the Petition (Paper 2, “Petition”) included a “typo[graphical error] in the heading [that] might have caused the Board to overlook claims 21–30 in Ground 2 of the Petition.” Id. at 2–3; Paper 2, 26 (listing claims 1–5, 14–20, and 32–34 in the heading of Ground 2 of the Petition). Upon reviewing the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that the typographical error in the Petition caused us to “overlook the fact that claims 21–30 were included in Ground 2 of the Petition.” Req. Reh’g 2. Furthermore, based on our review of Petitioner’s explanations and supporting evidence, we are also persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge of claims 21–30 under Ground 2, in addition to claims 1–5, 14–20, and 32–34, as obvious over Redford. See Paper 2, 4, 26–31; see also Paper 7, 19–20 (instituting review of claims 1–5, 14–20, and 32–34 under Ground 2 in the Decision).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Upon reviewing the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that the typographical error in the Petition caused us to “overlook the fact that claims 21–30 were included in Ground 2 of the Petition.” Req. Reh’g 2. Furthermore, based on our review of Petitioner’s explanations and supporting evidence, we are also persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge of claims 21–30 under Ground 2, in addition to claims 1–5, 14–20, and 32–34, as obvious over Redford. See Paper 2, 4, 26–31; see also Paper 7, 19–20 (instituting review of claims 1–5, 14–20, and 32–34 under Ground 2 in the Decision).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,579,555
  • PTAB · Jan 13, 2016 · IPR2015-00710 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing in part and instituted review of claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 20 on anticipation and obviousness grounds; it denied rehearing on the remaining claims.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “When the Petition and Dr. Irazoqui’s testimony are considered in view of the Request for Rehearing, we agree that we overlooked Petitioner’s argument that the “gas flow passage” of Figure 2 extends from the upper surface of insulator 122 to the upper exterior of feedthrough 100, i.e., traverses the space between insulator 122 and washer 124. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:18–21, 7:27–29). Given this evidence associating the “minute” gaps with the space between insulator 122 and washer 124, and in light of our current construction of “laminar delamination gap” requiring no specific dimensions for a “very thin gap,” we are persuaded that the evidence of record sufficiently supports Dr. Irazoqui’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Fraley discloses a “laminar delamination gap,” under a construction requiring a “very thin space.” 3 Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 52 (p. 45). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, we grant-in-part and deny-in-part Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and institute inter partes review on the grounds set forth below.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “7. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 20 of the ’553 patent are anticipated by Fraley; we are not persuaded that claims 3, 4, 8, 9, 12–15, 18, and 19 of the ’553 patent are anticipated by Fraley.” slip op. at 12

    • BurdenMixed

      “of the Request for Rehearing, we agree that we overlooked Petitioner’s argument that the “gas flow passage” of Figure 2 extends from the upper surface of insulator 122 to the upper exterior of feedthrough 100, i.e., traverses the space between insulator 122 and washer 124. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003, 7:18–21, 7:27–29). Given this evidence associating the “minute” gaps with the space between insulator 122 and washer 124, and in light of our current construction of “laminar delamination gap” requiring no specific dimensions for a “very thin gap,” we are persuaded that the evidence of record sufficiently supports Dr. Irazoqui’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Fraley discloses a “laminar delamination gap,” under a construction requiring a “very thin space.” 3 Pet. 37–38; Ex. 1002 ¶ 52 (p. 45).” slip op. at 6

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument because Exhibit 2008, relied upon by Patent Owner to support its argument, instructs that “[a] braze fillet should ideally be very small.” Ex. 2008, 1; see also id. at 2 (“Keep the fillet small. Remember, all the good things about a braze joint are happening INSIDE the joint, not in the outside fillets.”). Thus, on this record, regardless of any variation in the size of the braze-fillet, Patent Owner’s evidence and attorney argument do not demonstrate that the space between insulator 122 and washer 124 would be “substantial.” Based on the foregoing, and upon review of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s arguments, the evidence of record, and the supporting testimony of Dr. Irazoqui, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 16 of the ’553 patent are anticipated by Fraley.” slip op. at 8

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,327,553
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