• Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01350 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5–10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11–14 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish the claimed capacity retention after 400 cycles.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have held a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, with at least 4 years of experience in cell design, electrochemical techniques, and battery materials development.” Pet. 4. Petitioner further contends that a “Master’s Degree can substitute[] for some of the relevant experience,” and “[e]quivalent training with battery specific experience can accommodate other degreed fields.” Id. 9 The parties here do not address objective evidence of nonobviousness. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. PO Resp. 20. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the ’641 patent, the prior art of record, and the parties’ arguments.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties agree that the term “charge cut-off voltage” is “the maximum voltage to which the battery is configured to be charged.” PO Resp 21–22; Pet. Reply 1. The parties dispute, however, whether the “charge cut-off voltage” is a “battery property” or “the voltage applied to the battery during charging.” PO Resp. 21–24; Pet. Reply 1–6. We need not resolve the precise meaning of “charge cut-off voltage” because there is no dispute that Yamaki discloses this limitation under either party’s interpretation of the claim term. Upon review of the prior art and the parties’ arguments, we determine that no terms of the ’641 patent require express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Pet. Reply 1 (asserting that the challenged claims are unpatentable under either parties’ construction of “charge cut-off voltage”).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner’s arguments do not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position. Sakamoto expressly discloses setting the ratio of negative to positive electrode active material in the range of 1.05 to 1.30. Ex. 1005 ¶ 8. Sakamoto also explains why this range is preferable, i.e., if the ratio is roughly equal “the charge-discharge cycle performance is insufficient due to significant deterioration from charging and discharging,” and if the ratio is 10 Citations to the prosecution history of Yamaki are to the page numbers added to the lower right corner of the document. too high “too much of the compound does not participate in charging and discharging.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. These disclosures are sufficient to explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to select the ratios disclosed in Sakamoto in Yamaki. Id. ¶ 8 (providing a secondary battery with a capacity ratio between 1.05 and 1.30 and noting that by setting the ratio within this range the resulting secondary lithium battery is “safe due to low risk of heat being generated and an explosion occurring”). We also disagree that Sakamoto teaches away from elevated voltages or from increasing the amount of lithium in circulation. See PO Resp. 29. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Sakamoto provides no general teaching against using a charge cut-off voltage above 4.2 V, or against increasing the level of lithium in circulation. Nor does Sakamoto “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Sakamoto warns against setting the reversible capacities of the positive and negative electrode substantially equal as this may result in excess lithium plating on the surface of the electrode. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 8. We agree with Petitioner that this disclosure would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to design a battery with a higher capacity in the negative electrode active material than the positive electrode active material. Pet. 11–12.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We also disagree that Sakamoto teaches away from elevated voltages or from increasing the amount of lithium in circulation. See PO Resp. 29. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Sakamoto provides no general teaching against using a charge cut-off voltage above 4.2 V, or against increasing the level of lithium in circulation. Nor does Sakamoto “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Sakamoto warns against setting the reversible capacities of the positive and negative electrode substantially equal as this may result in excess lithium plating on the surface of the electrode. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6, 8. We agree with Petitioner that this disclosure would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to design a battery with a higher capacity in the negative electrode active material than the positive electrode active material. Pet. 11–12.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,749,641
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00597 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–4 and 6–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Abe and Guyomard, with claims 9–10 also obvious over Iwaizono; claims 1 and 5 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years of experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We also agree with Patent Owner that the charge cut-off voltage is not necessarily the applied voltage during charging. PO Resp. 20. Rather, depending on the charging protocol used and when in the charging cycle the voltage is applied, the applied voltage could be higher than the battery voltage. Ex. 2013; Ex. 2006 ¶ 91. For example, as discussed in more detail below with respect to the Uemura grounds, when fast charging using constant current is used and the charging rate is not slow, the applied voltage will be higher than the battery voltage when the constant current charging phase is stopped. Ex. 2006 ¶ 91; Ex. 2013. Likewise, during constant current/constant voltage charging, the applied voltage approximates the battery voltage only when the battery is nearly completely charged. Ex. 2013; Ex. 2006 ¶ 91. Thus, the applied voltage may be, but is not necessarily, the charge cut-off voltage. In view of the foregoing, we construe “charge cut-off voltage” in claims 1 and 5 as “the maximum value to which the battery is configured to be charged.” PO Resp. 18; Ex. 2008, 217:6–11; Pet. Reply 5. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, however, we do not understand the phrase “configured to be charged” to necessarily represent a single voltage for the battery that is determined based on the structure and chemistry of the battery. Pet. Reply 4–5. Rather, the charge cut-off voltage is a selected potential, or voltage, of the battery or cell at the end of charging that is controlled by a circuit or device, such as a charger or control circuit within the battery. Ex. 1001, 9:50–55; Ex. 1048, 2, 7–8; Ex. 1008, 3:9–13. And, for the reasons discussed herein, the charge cut-off voltage may be, but is not necessarily, the same as the applied voltage during charging. PO Resp. 20.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “charge cut-off voltage “greater than 4.2 V but less than 5.8 V” and calculating a specific or theoretic capacity “with a charge cut-off voltage limited to 4.2” (claim 1) or “with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5). Ex. 1001, 16:56–61, 17:6–11. Although the parties dispute the precise scope of these claim terms, the parties agree that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claims 1 and 5 refers to the potential of the battery as a whole (between the cathode and the anode), and not a half-cell voltage using lithium metal as a counter electrode.10 Tr. 17:1–3 (agreeing 10 With respect to the phrase “as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V,” the parties in fact appear to be in that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claim 5 refers to a full-cell voltage); Sur-reply 5; PO Resp. 22. We need not further construe the claims to resolve the disputes between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Given Mr. Juzkow’s unambiguous testimony that Uemura uses constant current charging that would stop when the applied voltage reached 11 The chart is reproduced from SAFT, Charging your lithium-ion batteries: 5 expert tips for a longer lifespan, (https://www.saft.com/energizing-iot/charging-your-lithium-ion-batteries-5-expert-tips-longerlifespan#:~: text=When%20the%20battery%20provides%20current,This%20restore s%20the%20battery's%20capacity). 4.3 V, as well as Dr. Yao’s persuasive testimony that Uemura’s constant charging rate is not slow, we credit the testimony of Dr. Yao that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the internal voltage to which the battery of Uemura was charged is less than 4.3 V. Ex. 2006 ¶ 119. In particular, Dr. Yao persuasively testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have believed that the charge cut-off voltage was no more than 4.2 V, and most likely equal to “about 4 V.” Id. ¶¶ 119–122.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,749,641
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 17, 2025 · IPR2023-01183 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–4 and 6–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Abe and Guyomard, with claims 9 and 10 also obvious over Iwaizono; claims 1 and 5 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Master’s degree in material science, chemical engineering, chemistry, or similar field with four years of experience designing testing, and building secondary lithium batteries.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been aware of “(1) positive electrode materials, (2) negative electrode materials, (3) separators, (4) electrolytes, (5) charge-discharge parameters, and (6) protection circuits, as well as ‘battery failure modes’ such as plating and the formation of dendrites.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 50–51). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’641 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “constructions. First, we agree with Petitioner that the ’641 patent indicates that the charge cut-off voltage selected for a particular battery need not be a fixed property of the battery or something that is set by the design and chemistry of the battery. Consistent with this conclusion, the ’641 patent discloses that a “charging device controls the charge cut-off voltage of the single lithium-ion cell within a range from 4.3 V to 5.8 V.” Ex. 1001, 9:50– 55. This strongly suggests that the charge cut-off voltage is controlled by the charger and is not necessarily an inherent property of the battery. Patent Owner contends that this is merely an unclaimed embodiment, but the relevant disclosure states that the charging device for the “present invention” may be any type of device “with the proviso that said charging device controls the charge cut-off voltage.” Id. at 9:50–53.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “charge cut-off voltage “greater than 4.2 V but less than 5.8 V” and calculating a specific or theoretic capacity “with a charge cut-off voltage limited to 4.2” (claim 1) or “with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V” (claim 5). Ex. 1001, 16:56–61, 17:6–11. Although the parties dispute the precise scope of these claim terms, the parties agree that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claims 1 and 5 refers to the potential of the battery as a whole (between the cathode and the anode), and not a half-cell voltage using lithium metal as a counter electrode.10 Tr. 17:1–3 (agreeing 10 With respect to the phrase “as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V,” the parties in fact appear to be in that the first use of “charge cut-off voltage” in claim 5 refers to a full-cell voltage); Sur-reply 5; PO Resp. 22. We need not further construe the claims to resolve the disputes between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Given Mr. Juzkow’s unambiguous testimony that Uemura uses constant current charging that would stop when the applied voltage reached 11 The chart is reproduced from SAFT, Charging your lithium-ion batteries: 5 expert tips for a longer lifespan, (https://www.saft.com/energizing-iot/charging-your-lithium-ion-batteries-5-expert-tips-longerlifespan#:~: text=When%20the%20battery%20provides%20current,This%20restore s%20the%20battery's%20capacity). 4.3 V, as well as Dr. Yao’s persuasive testimony that Uemura’s constant charging rate is not slow, we credit the testimony of Dr. Yao that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the internal voltage to which the battery of Uemura was charged is less than 4.3 V. Ex. 2006 ¶ 119. In particular, Dr. Yao persuasively testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have believed that the charge cut-off voltage was no more than 4.2 V, and most likely equal to “about 4 V.” Id. ¶¶ 119–122. Petitioner argues that because the battery of Uemura is charged “to” a maximum voltage of 4.3 V, Uemura discloses the claimed charge cut-off voltage under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s construction of the term. Pet. Reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 81; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 56–59). This argument is not persuasive because Mr. Juzkow unambiguously testified that charging in Uemura stopped when the applied voltage reached 4.3 V, and Uemura discloses that the battery was charged “at” a voltage ranging from 4.3 V to 2.0 V, not “to” such a voltage. Ex. 1009 ¶ 81; Ex. 2008, 113:2–13; Ex. 2006 ¶ 119 n.64; Sur-reply 9. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Uemura anticipates independent claims 1 and 5 of the ’641 patent.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,749,641 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,749,641
• Chongqing Yanmei Technology Co., Ltd. v. Terves, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 27, 2024 · IPR2023-00521 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 19–61, 63–77, and 79 are unpatentable as anticipated by Doud; claims 78, 80, and 81 are not shown unpatentable. The contingent motion to amend is granted in part and denied in part.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Ph.D. in chemistry, metallurgy, or material science or material engineering” or, in the alternative, “would have a Bachelor of Science or Master of Science degree in one of these disciplines plus experience involving the use and design of dissolvable metal alloys for use in creating tools and other downhole parts for well drilling or completion activities.” Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s contentions regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 12 n.4. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan as it is consistent with the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “With respect to claim 19, Petitioner proposes constructions for the terms “in situ precipitate” and “a plurality of particles of said in situ precipitate having a size of no more than 50 µm.” Pet. 11–12. With respect to claims 76–81, Petitioner proposes a construction for the term “wherein said additive material includes one or more metal materials selected from the group consisting of 0.1–35 wt. % copper, 0.1–24.5 wt. % nickel and 0.1–20 wt. % cobalt.” Id. at 13. Patent Owner contends no claims require construction for purposes of this Decision. PO Resp. 12 n.4, 17–18; Mot. 16–17. Upon review of the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateWritten description adequateMixed

    “Ex. 2027, 20:25–21:5 (emphasis added). The disclosure that the “magnesium composite” of “[t]he present invention” “includes at least 50 wt% magnesium” is unambiguous and constitutes strong evidence that the inventors were not in possession of a magnesium composite with less than 50 wt. % magnesium, or additive concentrations above 50 wt. %. See SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovasular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that a description of the “present invention” as having a particular structure “is strong evidence that the claims should not be read to encompass the opposite structure”). Consistent with this conclusion, the original claims of the ’295 application all limited the additive material in the composite to 0.05 wt %–45 wt %. Ex. 2027, 26:1– 13, 29:9–15. Likewise, in each example where copper, nickel, or cobalt additives are used in the range recited in the proposed substitute claims, the magnesium composite is “over 50 wt% magnesium,” and any claims that do not require this range of magnesium are limited to an additive range of “about 0.05 wt%–45 wt% of said mixture.”8 Ex. 2027, 6:13–7:4, 7:16–19, 8 Written description support is considered from the view point of the ordinarily skilled artisan. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Patent Owner, bearing the burden to show written description support in any priority application for which it seeks the benefit of its filing date, provides no testimony from an ordinarily skilled artisan regarding written description support in the ’295 application, or any evidence to show what such an artisan would conclude from the express disclosures of the ’295 application. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 7; In re NTP, 654 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that “a patent’s claims are not entitled to an earlier priority date merely because the patentee claims priority . . . Rather, for a patent’s claims to be entitled to an earlier priority date, the patentee must demonstrate that the claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120”). Where there is any ambiguity in the disclosures of the ’295 application, the absence of supporting testimony tends to cut against 26:2–31:2; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 12, 13, 18, 19, 16–21, 26, 28, claims 16–21, 26– 28. In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that Patent Owner has demonstrated that the inventors of the priority applications were in possession of a magnesium cast composite that included less than 50 wt. % magnesium, or greater than 50 wt. % additives. As proposed substitute claim 104 encompasses a magnesium cast composite with up to 90 wt. % additives, and therefore as little as 10 wt. % magnesium, Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the full scope of this claim finds written description support in any application prior to the ’915 application, filed on October 12, 2018.” slip op. at 17

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteIndefiniteMixed

    “The definiteness requirement of § 112(a) is satisfied when “a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable clarity.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (changing the claim construction standard used to review a claim proposed in a motion to amend from the broadest reasonable construction to the “same construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b)”). Proposed substitute claim 104 generically requires “in situ precipitate” and also a specific type of in situ precipitate: “in situ galvanically-active intermetallic precipitate.” Mot. Appendix A. Although this claim would have best been clarified by Patent Owner after seeking preliminary guidance on its Motion to Amend, upon review of the written description, claims, and figures of the ’740 patent, as well as Patent Owner’s clarification in its Reply to the Opposition, we agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “in situ galvanically-active intermetallic precipitate” is merely a more complete description of the “in situ precipitate” mentioned earlier in the sentence. Mot. Reply 4. As such, we do not find that this part of proposed substitute claim renders claim 104 indefinite.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,689,740 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,689,740
• JSR Corporation / JSR Life Sciences, LLC v. Cytiva Bioprocess R&D ABSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00044 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, and 23–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 17 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner contends that based on Patent Owner’s implicit construction in the district court litigation “that the term ‘the ligand comprising at least two polypeptides’ refers to a multimeric ligand (such as a tetramer) comprised of multiple polypeptides, each of which is a monomer.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 41, 50, 58, 62, 74, 87).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, and C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number—five (5)—SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation, but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that [s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds. For example, a prior art compound may suggest its homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Neither claim 1 nor claim 14 recite a need to bind the Fab region of an antibody or that the target molecule is Fab. All that is required by these claims is that they adsorb a target molecule and that you can elute the target molecule from the matrix. The target molecule, therefore, can reasonably encompass IgG. Petitioner’s articulated rationale is that there was an expectation that the composition binds antibodies, including monoclonal antibodies, and therefore, would be useful in a process of for isolating antibodies. Petitioner contends that: A POSA would have also reasonably expected such a combination to achieve a process for isolating one or more target compounds using the recited affinity chromatography matrix given the well-known fact that each individual SPA domain, including the C domain, has affinity for antibodies (Ex. 1004, [1]) as well as Abrahmsén’s confirmation that a G29A mutation on SPA “would not interfere with folding [of SPA] or binding to [antibodies]” (Ex. 1005, 5:13-16). (Ex. 1002 ¶131.) Pet. 25; Reply 8 (“‘A POSA would not have been motivated only by Fab-binding ability, as even Dr. Bracewell agreed that ‘a POSA would have understood that it was desirable to purify monoclonal antibodies for therapeutic use in 2006.’(Ex. 1057, 75:17-76:4, 113:23-114:11, 157:24- 158:9; Ex. 1061 ¶29)”). The law does not require that the teachings of the reference be combined for the reason or advantage contemplated by the inventor, as long as some suggestion to combine the elements is provided by the prior art as a whole. In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1304 (CCPA 1976); see In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 10,343,142 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,343,142
• JSR Corporation / JSR Life Sciences, LLC v. Cytiva Bioprocess R&D ABSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00041 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, and 23–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 17 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two Domain C units, or a functional fragments or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:27–30. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. 7: 44–45. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’142 patent’s express construction of the term, and because Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s construction, we apply it here.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, and C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number—five (5)—SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation, but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentable

    “Here, the teachings of Linhult, Abrahmsén, and Hober suggest mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine in any one of the IgG binding domains of E, D, A, B, or C of SPA in order to avoid protein degradation. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 5:4–9. We, therefore, agree with Petitioner that the art expressly suggests that the glycine codon can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 99–111). Attaching any one of SPA mutated IgG binding domains E D A B or C to a matrix using “known ligand-construction methods to yield a predictable result[] (e.g., the claimed affinity chromatography matrix)” would have been obvious. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 130). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[w]here a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from ‘a finite number of identified, predictable solutions,’ the resulting invention is obvious under Section 103.” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Linhult Abrahmsén, and Hober expressly suggests mutating the glycine codon for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 99–111). We also agree that the cited art teaches using these mutant SPA domains in column chromatography for the isolation of antibodies.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 10,343,142 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,343,142
• JSR Corporation / JSR Life Sciences, LLC v. Cytiva Bioprocess R&D ABSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00045 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 29 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here. C.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “support, the ligand capable of binding the one or more target compound(s) and comprising at least two polypeptides.” Ex. 1001, 15:46–49; 17:28–31. Petitioner argues that “‘the ligand comprising at least two polypeptides’ refers to a multimeric ligand (such as a tetramer) comprised of multiple polypeptides, each of which is a monomer.” Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 43–45). Petitioner argues that this construction is consistent with Patent Owner’s implicit construction in the Delaware litigation between the parties. Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s claim construction. See generally PO Resp. According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two domain C units, or a functional fragments [sic] or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:35–38. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. at 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. at 7:52–53. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’007 patent’s express construction of the term, we apply that construction for the purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner’s articulated obviousness ground is premised on the knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, or C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number – five (5) – SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “(c) No Teaching Away We are also not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that the art teaches away from the G29A substitution because it interferes with Fab binding. See PO Resp. 39–42; Sur-reply 9; Ex. 2009 at 2; Ex. 2010 at 25; Ex. 2012 at 25–26; Ex. 2029 at 7. None of claims 1, 2, or 20 recite a need to bind the Fab region of an antibody or that the target molecule is Fab. All that is required by these claims is that they adsorb a target molecule and that you can elute the target molecule from the matrix. The target molecule, therefore, can reasonably encompass IgG.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 10,875,007 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,875,007
• JSR Corporation / JSR Life Sciences, LLC v. Cytiva Bioprocess R&D ABSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00042 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 29 were not shown unpatentable because Fab binding was not predictable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here. C.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two domain C units, or a functional fragments [sic] or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:35–38. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. at 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. at 7:52–53. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’007 patent’s express construction of the term, we apply that construction for the purposes of this decision. Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, we determine that the express construction of any other claim term is unnecessary to resolve the disputed issues in this matter. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner’s articulated obviousness ground is premised on the knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, or C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number – five (5) – SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that [s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds. For example, a prior art compound may suggest its homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 10,875,007 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,875,007
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 5, 2023 · IPR2022-00098 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations; claim 2 was not shown unpatentable because the driver was not shown configured to receive the rectifier’s forward voltages.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had experience in LED devices. For this reason, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the level of skill reflected in the ’149 patent and the prior art of record. However, if we were to apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, our Decision would not be affected.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Upon review of the entire record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “Dr. Ducharme’s testimony that “the spacing of the chips in Zhang would not likely be so close as to create overheating issues” (Ex. 2002 ¶ 111) is unsupported by any disclosure of the actual spacing of Zhang’s chips. Consequently, his testimony that there would be no overheating concerns in Zhang due to the spacing of the chips is entitled to little, if any, weight. Dr. Ducharme further testifies that the components of Zhang’s driver “could easily increase the temperature of the LED 19 chips on the circuit board, which can cause LEDs to generate less illumination, burn out and otherwise adversely affect their performance.” Ex. 2002 ¶ 126. Dr. Ducharme further testifies that “[i]t is well-known that excessive operational temperatures can reduce the illumination provided by the LEDs, can decrease the operational lifetime of the LEDs, and if the temperature is sufficiently high, it can cause LED junction failure and a burnt-out LED.” Id. We agree with this testimony, which as discussed below, is consistent with Salam. Dr. Ducharme’s testimony concerning overheating issues caused by the driver components contradicts Patent Owner’s ’s contention that there would not be “an overheating issue with Zhang’s LED exit sign circuit in Figure 2.1.” PO Resp. 30. Regardless of whether Zhang’s LEDs in Figure 2.1 have a heat problem or not, Salam teaches the advantages of using a heat sink. Salam teaches that a heat sink will result in a higher efficiency of the LEDs and improved life. Ex. 1006, 16:38–43. The Federal Circuit, in DyStar Textilfarben GmBH & Co v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006), stated that “the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal–and even common-sensical . . . the proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses the knowledge and skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art references.” Id. at 1368. Dr. Ducharme testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have an understanding of the generation of heat and using a heat sink to remove unwanted heat from electronics and LED lighting devices.” Ex. 1102, 23:18–24:3. Dr. Ducharme’s testimony is consistent with Petitioner’s contention that the combination of Zhang and Salam “would have been a straightforward combination of known components and technologies, according to known methods, to produce the predictable result of reducing/ mitigating heat effects in a circuit.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 106). Patent Owner next contends it would be extremely burdensome and costly to modify Zhang to add a heat sink layer because “each of the multiple chips mounted and epoxied to Zhang’s circuit board in the exit sign would have to be modified.” PO Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 112). Dr. Ducharme’s testimony repeats the Patent Owner Response verbatim and is entitled to little, if any, weight. Ex. 2002 ¶ 112. Nonetheless, this contention is unavailing because it is based on Patent Owner’s bodily incorporation of Zhang and Salam. Patent Owner next contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Regardless of whether Zhang’s LEDs in Figure 2.1 have a heat problem or not, Salam teaches the advantages of using a heat sink. Salam teaches that a heat sink will result in a higher efficiency of the LEDs and improved life. Ex. 1006, 16:38–43. The Federal Circuit, in DyStar Textilfarben GmBH & Co v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006), stated that “the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal–and even common-sensical . . . the proper question is whether the ordinary artisan possesses the knowledge and skills rendering him capable of combining the prior art references.” Id. at 1368. Dr. Ducharme testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have an understanding of the generation of heat and using a heat sink to remove unwanted heat from electronics and LED lighting devices.” Ex. 1102, 23:18–24:3. Dr. Ducharme’s testimony is consistent with Petitioner’s contention that the combination of Zhang and Salam “would have been a straightforward combination of known components and technologies, according to known methods, to produce the predictable result of reducing/ mitigating heat effects in a circuit.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 106).” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,517,149 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,517,149
• Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 5, 2023 · IPR2022-00023 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 4 are unpatentable over the stated § 103 combinations; Petitioner did not show claim 2 unpatentable because it did not explain how the LED array’s forward voltage is received by the driver.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of experience in the field of design and/or development of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and circuits in the context of lighting control systems.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 34). Petitioner further contends that “[a]n increase in experience could compensate for less education.” Id. at 12. Patent Owner proposes the same level of skill in the art. See PO Resp. 6. We apply the parties’ undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art because it comports with the level of skill reflected in the ’149 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We credit Dr. Lebby’s testimony over Dr. Ducharme for the following reasons. First, in Deese, power cable 28 is inserted into an opening in rubber housing 21. Ex. 1008, Fig. 2A. [R]ubber housing 21 forms a water-tight seal around the power cable 28.” Id. at 4:63–65. Dr. Ducharme does not explain why Hochstein’s protruding heat sink shell could not similarly be inserted through rubber housing 21 with a water-tight seal. Further, Dr. Lebby relies on the similarity between the structures of Deese and Hochstein. Hochstein uses gasket 45 and weather seal 48 to seal housing 10 with electrical lead 49 and heat sink shell 38 extending therethrough. Ex. 1010, 5: 39–40, 5:63:65, Fig. 8.” slip op. at 47

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionOther

    “Our analysis starts with the claim language. Claim 1 recites “a driver, wherein the driver includes at least one transistor and at least one capacitor” and “the driver is configured to receive an AC voltage from a mains power source and provide a voltage and current to the at least one LED circuit.” Ex. 1001, 23:16–17, 26:22–24. Dr. Ducharme testifies that power is determined by multiplying voltage and current. Ex. 2008 ¶ 63. The language of claim 1, thus, supports Patent Owner’s construction which is also consistent with the dictionary definition offered by Petitioner which also defines “driver” as [a] program, circuit or device used to power or control other programs, circuits or devices.” Ex. 1007, 4 (emphasis added). The Specification provides “the driver providing an AC voltage and current to one or more LED circuits.” Ex. 1001, 3:65–67. Thus, the Specification also provides support for Patent Owner’s construction. For the foregoing reasons, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “driver” because it is consistent with the language of claim 1 and the description of driver in the Specification. We note that the adjective “LED” prior to circuits or devices in Patent Owner’s construction is not necessary because that it essentially repeats limitation 1.e.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for petitioner

    “We begin with the claim language itself which is “the package is a heat sinking reflective material.” Ex. 1001, 23:18–19 (emphasis added). In its analysis, Patent Owner parses “heat sinking reflective material” out of context by omitting the italicized language “the package is” preceding “heat sinking reflective material.” PO Resp. 29. The deposition testimony of Dr. Lebby and Dr. Ducharme’s declaration testimony cited by Patent Owner are also out of context. The Specification of the ’149 patent defines “package” as an integrated unit that “in certain applications may preferably include a heat sink, a reflective material, a lens for directing light, phosphor nano-crystals or light changing or enhancing substances.” Ex. 1001, 5:30–33. Because heat sink and reflective material are listed separately in the Specification, this disclosure suggests that, at least in certain embodiments, a package with a heat sink separate from a reflective material would fall within the scope of limitation 1.c. This is further confirmed by comparing the packages illustrated in Figures 25 and 26 of the ’149 patent which are reproduced above. Figure 25 is described as illustrating “heat sinking material 198 . . . integrated into the package 30.” Id. at 17:34–35. Figure 26 is described as illustrating reflector 202 “integrated into the package 30 for optimized light dispersion.” Id. at 17:47–49. As can be seen from a visual comparison of Figures 25 and 26, reflector 202 is separate from heat sinking material 198. Given the disclosure in the ’149 patent of a package with a heat sink” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,517,149 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,517,149

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.