• Mobile Tech, Inc. v. Invue Security Products Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2018 · PGR2018-00004 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show an abuse of discretion in finding claims 1–45 supported and enabled.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When requesting rehearing of a decision, the challenging party must identify specifically all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in the record. Id. When considering a request for rehearing of a decision on whether to institute trial, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “’472 patent is eligible for post-grant review. Dec. 16. Here, eligibility for post-grant review depends on the effective filing date of the challenged claims. When determining the effective filing date, a claim is entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing date when an earlier application discloses the claimed invention “in the manner provided by § 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode).” See id. at 6 (citing US Endodontics, LLC v. Gold Standard Instruments, LLC, Case PGR2015- 00019, slip. op. at 7 (PTAB Dec. 28, 2016) (Paper 54)). The ’472 patent was the latest in a chain of continuation applications that dates back to U.S. Patent Application No. 13/169,9685 (“968 Application”), which was filed on June 27, 2011. Ex. 1001, at [63]. We previously determined that the 968 5 There are other applications in this chain, but none of those applications are relevant to the issues presented here and thus, we do not address those applications. Application and the ’472 patent have substantially identical specifications and figures. See Dec. 7 (finding that the 968 Application and the patent application from which the ’472 patent issued are substantially identical). We thus determined that we were able to “analyze the ’472 patent’s eligibility for post grant review through a discussion of Petitioner’s arguments as to written description support in the ’472 patent.” Id. at 8. We then found that Petitioner failed to establish that the challenged claims lack written description support or are not enabled. See id. at 12, 15–16.” slip op. at 4

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “The ’472 patent expressly recites: Actuation of activation switch 85 causes logic control circuit 18 of programming station 3 to randomly generate a unique security code (i.e. SDC) that is transmitted via communication circuit 20 to communication circuit 79 of programmable key 5, which in turn stores the randomly generated SDC in security code (SDC) memory 81 of the key . . . . [T]he SDC initially provided by the programming station 3 is randomly generated and is unique to that programming station and always remains with that programming station for subsequent use. Thus, the SDC initially generated always stays with the programming station 3 and is subsequently programmed into one or more programmable keys 5. Ex. 1001, 9:23–43 (emphases added); see also id. at 10:6–12 (“[T]he particular programming station 3 of the retail store [is] used to program the key with the SDC.”). The ’472 patent also discloses that the programming station “reprogram[s] or refresh[es] the SDC into the key” after the programmable key times out, which occurs after a predetermined period elapses from the time that the programmable key was last programmed or refreshed. See e.g., id. at 12:63–13:8. Specifically, the programming station performs a “handshake” with the key “to determine whether the key has not previously been programmed with a SDC (i.e. a ‘new’ key), or is an authorized key that is being presented to the programming station a subsequent time to refresh the SDC,” and once a proper “handshake” is completed, the programming station “permits the SDC generated by the logic control circuit and/or stored in the memory to be transmitted . . . [to] the programmable electronic key.” Id. at 16:4–19. Thus, the programming station is responsible for generating the SDC and transmitting it to the programmable key. More to the point, the ’472 patent discloses that “the programming station will deactivate a SDC stored in the SDC memory of a key if an incorrect SDC is encountered when the programming station is attempting to reprogram or refresh the key.” Id. at 13:13–17 (emphases added). This contradicts Petitioner’s proposition that a key programmed with one SDC from a first programming station can then program that same SDC into a second programming station. The ’472 patent expressly teaches how to deal with a situation in which a second programming station encounters an incorrect SDC in the memory of a key: it deactivates the SDC stored in the key.” slip op. at 7

  § 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 9,659,472
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01390 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed volume concentration in the formed magnetic layer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “define the term “volume concentration.” In the context of the ’331 patent, “volume concentration” refers to the volume concentration of the magnetic particles in the formed magnetic layer.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(1) a bachelor’s degree in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience in the field of magnetic recording, or (2) a Master’s degree or higher in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, with an emphasis in magnetic recording, and at least three years of experience in the field of magnetic recording. Pet. 12; Ex. 1017 ¶ 60. Although Patent Owner does not expressly define the appropriate level of skill in the art in the Patent Owner Response or its Supplemental Response, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Bain, presents a definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in his declaration that is nearly identical to Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2001 ¶ 44. In view of this, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “information, is not sufficient evidence to establish that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that there is some magnetic alloy present “in the magnetic layer” of Mori. The relevant question, however, is how much and how Mori’s disclosed values were determined. Unlike the term “volume concentration,” for which the parties offered undisputed evidence regarding accepted meanings of the term in the art (i.e., packing fraction and pigment volume concentration), we have not been directed to similar evidence regarding the phrase “fill rate”/“filling rate” in Mori. Thus, although Mori states “[t]he filling rate by volume of the strongly magnetic alloy powder in the magnetic layer can be equal to or higher than 30%” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 11 (emphasis added)), Petitioner has not offered sufficient evidence demonstrating that the term “filling rate” in Mori refers to a final product-based value. As a result, we find that this language in Mori does not establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the combined teachings of Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest “[a] dual layer magnetic recording medium comprising . . . a magnetic upper recording layer formed over [a] lower support layer, the magnetic upper recording layer comprising a volume concentration of at least about 35% of a primary magnetic particulate pigment,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 16. Ex. 1001, 11:14–20, 12:25–31. Claims 2–15, 17, and 18 depend from claim 1 or claim 16, and, therefore, include the “volume concentration” limitation of claims 1 and 16. As a result, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest each limitation of claims 1–18, and, therefore, has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Aonuma and Mori.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,115,331 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,115,331
• NVIDIA Corporation v. Polaris Innovations LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 20, 2018 · IPR2017-01781 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–12, 14, 16–23, 26–31, 43–45, and 48–51 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish data arrangement alteration or a sufficient motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the ’344 patent (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and at least 2 years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 13. Neither Patent Owner, nor its declarant, Dr. Przybylski, offers a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 36 (“I am applying the definition of the level of experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art that has been put forward by Dr. Tredennick in his declaration. I do not necessarily agree with the definition offered there, but I do not presently believe that the exact level of experience of a person of ordinary skill impacts my opinions offered herein.”). Based on the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Tredennick’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the language “at least.” Thus, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Even if so, the arrangement of the data must be altered to give full effect to the claim language. The portions of the specification of the ’344 patent cited by Petitioner confirm this. In one instance, the ’344 patent states: In the first error coding path 120, the first data arrangement alteration device 122 is adapted to create a second data block on the basis of the first data block, which comprises the given number of data in a second arrangement, and to output it to the first error coder 124. Ex. 1001, 3:63–67 (emphasis added), cited in Paper 47, 2. Another passage states: The data arrangement alteration device 222 is adapted to receive, at the input 222E or 102, a first data block comprising a given number of data in the first arrangement, and to generate, on the basis of the first data block, a second data block comprising the given number of data in a second arrangement . . . . Ex. 1001, 6:14–18 (emphasis added), cited in Paper 47, 2. These passages show that data arrangement alteration takes data and puts those data into a different arrangement. Petitioner also cites the ’344 patent’s disclosure of a deserializer changing the “representation” of data. Paper 47, 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:58–62, 9:2–7). But, in this operation, “the second data block 440 . . . comprises the same data, namely the 72 bits of the first data block 435 in a second arrangement which is different from the first arrangement of the first data block.” Ex. 1001, 9:32–35 (emphasis added). Petitioner also cites an example in the ’344 patent in which the burst length is halved from eight time pulses to four time pulses. Ex. 1001, 11:52–61, cited in Paper 47, 4. The ’344 patent describes that, in this scenario, only half of the bits (36 out of 72) “will be occupied with processable data.” Ex. 1001, 11:59–60. Petitioner contends that this describes an output of 72 bits that is larger and different than the input of only 36 bits. Paper 47, 4. The ’344 patent, however, describes providing “a further subarea of the matrix 420 for this mode, and to control the multiplexer 430, via the mode register 110, such that this subarea will be read out, so that, for example, only 36 of the 72 bits will be occupied with processable data.” Ex. 1001, 11:56–60 (emphasis added). Thus, it is the subarea having the 36 bits of processable data that is read out. But even if Petitioner is correct that the output is larger than the input in this example, data arrangement alteration still requires an alteration of the arrangement of the input data, even if the output contains additional data. In all of the examples in the specification of the ’344 patent, therefore,” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “a data arrangement alteration algorithm’ is described in the ’344 patent as a ‘data arrangement alteration device,’ which is part of the ‘one or more devices’ of the first means of claim 19. Thus, the corresponding structure is ‘a data arrangement alteration device.’” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:14–25, 6:42–65, 7:10–24; Ex. 1019 ¶ 32). In the Decision on Institution, we addressed Petitioner’s proposed construction for “means for performing a data arrangement alteration algorithm,” but we did not adopt it. Dec. on Inst. 11–12. Rather, we set out the following construction of this term: Limitation Function and Structure Claim 19: means for performing a Function: performing a data data arrangement alteration arrangement alteration algorithm algorithm Structure: data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222 and equivalents. See id. at 3:27–34, 5:65–6:25, 6:42–65, 8:55–57, 10:34–45, Figs. 1–4. During the trial in this proceeding, neither party further disputed this interpretation. Having considered the entire record developed during trial, we determine that this is the proper interpretation for “means for performing a data arrangement alteration algorithm.” Thus, we apply this interpretation in our analysis below.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed above in the section addressing claim interpretation, “data arrangement alteration” requires alteration of the arrangement of data, not merely alteration of data. Petitioner’s allegation that Yoon’s data bus inversion alters some portion of the data is insufficient to show that Yoon describes altering the arrangement of data, as required by the claims. For the same reasons, we are not persuaded that Yoon’s data bus inversion devices describe the same or equivalent structure as that set forth in the specification of the ’344 patent, namely data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222, as set forth in our claim interpretation discussion above. Because Petitioner has not shown Yoon describes the “data arrangement alteration” limitations of independent claims 1, 16, 19, and 43, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yoon anticipated these claims. Dependent claims 8–12, 14, 26–31, and 48–51 incorporate the “data arrangement alteration” limitations by virtue of their dependency from their respective independent claims, and, therefore, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yoon anticipated these claims.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,161,344 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,161,344
• NVIDIA Corporation v. Polaris Innovations LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 20, 2018 · IPR2017-01346 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 8–12, 16, 18, 43, 45, and 48–51 are unpatentable; claims 2, 19, 20, 22, 26–30, and 44 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Tredennick, testifies that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the ’344 patent (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and at least 2 years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 13. Neither Patent Owner, nor its declarant, Dr. Przybylski, offers a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 38 (“I am applying the definition of the level of experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art that has been put forward by Dr. Tredennick in his declaration. I do not necessarily agree with the definition offered there, but I do not presently believe that the exact level of experience of a person of ordinary skill impacts my opinions offered herein.”). Based on the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Tredennick’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the language “at least.” Thus, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “Thus, “data arrangement alteration” requires the alteration of the arrangement of data, not merely the alteration of data.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownOther

    “Structure: first error coding path 120 and equivalents. See Ex. 1001, 3:27–34, 3:57–4:25, 5:53–64, Figs. 1A, 1E. Function: performing a data Claim 19: means for performing a data arrangement alteration arrangement alteration algorithm algorithm Structure: data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222 and equivalents. See id. at 3:27–34, 5:65–6:25, 6:42–65, 8:55–57, 10:34–45, Figs. 1–4. Dec. on Inst. 8–9.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) Metallic Interface, and it bears a copyright date of 1999. Ex. 1004. Citing the Declaration of Jessica Coral Sheldon- Hess, Petitioner contends ADSL is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1014, 4–5). Ms. Sheldon-Hess testifies that, based on ADSL’s Machine Readable Cataloging (MARC) record obtained from Illinois State Library, ADSL was available to the public as of 1999. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 8–10. Patent Owner does not dispute the prior art status of ADSL. Petitioner’s evidence establishes that ADSL was publicly available as a printed publication more than one year before the U.S. filing date for the ’344 patent, which is March 11, 2008. See Ex. 1001, [22]. Based on this evidence, we determine that ADSL qualifies as a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,161,344 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,161,344
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01268 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15 and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ishikawa; the petitioner did not show claims 1–11, 16, and 18–20 unpatentable over Aonuma or Aonuma and Abe.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) at the time of the ’774 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; Ex. 1018 ¶ 60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed

    “considerably greater than Ishikawa’s stylus load of 50–300 μN (Ex. 1015 ¶ 45). The Talke Declaration does not address this discrepancy, and Dr. Talke stated during his deposition that reducing the stylus load would reduce scratching of the magnetic tape surface. Ex. 1030, 108:14–19 (“Q: Would reducing the contact pressure for the stylus instrument reduce the scratching of the magnetic tape surface by the stylus? A: Yes, it would, but you have to remember the other problem is the diameter and size of the stylus.”). Moreover, Petitioner provides evidence that it was not uncommon to use stylus-type profilometers to measure the properties of magnetic tape, even after Bhushan was published in 1996. See Reply 6. In particular, Petitioner points to Saliba,6 which describes using a stylus-type profilometer, under identical conditions to those used in Ishikawa, to measure the surface characteristics (including peak-to-valley roughness) of the backcoating of magnetic tape. Ex. 1027, 7:28–40, 57–60. Petitioner further points to Ohno,7 which also describes using “a stylus type 3D profilometer in accordance with JIS B0601” to measure the surface roughness characteristics of magnetic tape. Ex. 1028 ¶ 36; see also Ex. 1015 ¶ 45 (Ishikawa explaining that surface roughness characteristics were measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”); Ex. 1027, 7:28–39 (Saliba explaining that surface roughness characteristics where measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”). Accordingly, we are persuaded that the 6 US Patent No. 6,558,774 B1, issued May 6, 2003 (Ex. 1027). 7 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2005/0175866 A1, published Aug. 11, 2005 (Ex. 1028). evidence establishes that a stylus-type profilometer is a suitable device for measuring the surface characteristics of magnetic tape.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Ishikawa teaches “peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15. Pet. 24–25; Reply 5–8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 216. In particular, Ishikawa teaches a backcoating layer of a magnetic tape that has a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 44. Ishikawa provides five example embodiments of its magnetic tape, and reports the measurements of a number of characteristics of the backcoat layer for each example, including peak-to-valley roughness Rz. Id. ¶¶ 120–134, Table 1. Ishikawa discloses that peak-to-valley roughness Rz was measured using a stylus-type profilometer under the following conditions: Stylus: diameter: 1.5 to 2.5 μm; curvature: 60º Contact pressure: 50 to 300 μN Cut-off length: 80 μm Sampling length: 80 μm Assessment length: 400 μm Id. ¶¶ 45, 49. The reported peak-to-valley roughness Rz values for the five examples ranged from 58 to 87 nm, as shown in the annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 from the Petition, reproduced below: Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1015, Table 1). The annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 shows the results for the measured characteristics of the backcoat layer of Examples 1–5, with the peak-to-valley roughness Rz values highlighted by a red box. Id. Because Ishikawa teaches that the backcoating layer of its magnetic tape should have a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm,” and because Ishikawa presents examples of magnetic tape with backside surfaces having a peak-to-valley roughness of 87 nm or less, Ishikawa discloses “a peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,029,774
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2018 · IPR2017-01267 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–13 and 15–20 not shown unpatentable over Law and Sasaki because the evidence did not establish the claimed surface properties.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. B.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [the claims] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (May 2, 2016); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Institution Decision, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The evidence, however, does not establish that a backside surface having a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0 necessarily results from reducing the size and prevalence of the protrusions on the backside surface of Law’s magnetic tape. As Petitioner agrees, Law and Sasaki do not discuss skew and kurtosis values. See Pet. 29 (stating that Law does not expressly disclose skew or kurtosis values); Reply 23 (recognizing that neither Law nor Sasaki contain express disclosures of skew and kurtosis); Tr. 18:22–23 (Petitioner’s counsel noting that there are no reported skew and kurtosis values in Law or Sasaki). Thus, Petitioner relies on Mr. Isobe’s testimony to establish that reducing the protrusions on Law’s backside surface would result in a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0. See Pet. 45–49; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–81, 170–174. In that regard, Mr. Isobe testified as follows:” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “At best, the evidence establishes that reducing protrusions in Law’s backside coating may result in the surface approaching a Gaussian distribution (namely, a skew of 0 and a kurtosis of 3). See Ex. 1003 ¶ 171 (“By reducing the number of peaks the overall surface may become closer to a Gaussian distribution, which by definition has a skew of zero.” (emphasis added)), ¶ 174 (“As the frequency of large protrusions is reduced, the skew of the backcoat surface approaches 0 and the kurtosis becomes closer to 3.” (emphases added)). There is no evidence of record, however, that establishes the skew and kurtosis values of Law’s backside coating before reducing the protrusions as Petitioner proposes. While it is possible that reducing Law’s protrusions could result in skew and kurtosis values within the claimed range, it is also possible that reducing the protrusions could result in a surface that approaches a Gaussian distribution but still has a skew above 0.5 and a kurtosis above 4.0. See Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 36–60, 77–83, 90; see also PAR Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1195 (Inherency “may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.”). Thus, even if reducing the protrusions on Law’s backside coating caused the surface to approach a Gaussian distribution, that is not sufficient to establish that it necessarily results in a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0 as claimed. The skew and kurtosis values recited in claims 1 and 20 are not simply properties possessed by any backside coating that otherwise satisfies the structural limitations. Instead, they are recited as limitations on which magnetic recording media fall within the scope of the claims. The evidence of record does not establish that reducing the protrusions in Law’s backside coating, as taught by Sasaki, “would have naturally led to a backside surface having a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0” as Petitioner contends. Pet. 45. Accordingly, on the record before us, we find that Petitioner has not established that claims 1 and 20 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Law and Sasaki.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,029,774
• Panduit Corp. v. CCS Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 4, 2018 · IPR2017-01323 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3 and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Eichenberger and Bennett under § 103(a).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Although there are differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties and their declarants agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical degree and some amount of professional experience with fiber optic equipment. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person having a four year technical degree with a minimum of two years of professional technical experience in fiber optic equipment design. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis below. However, we note that our analysis would be the same if we adopted either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the evidence of record, we maintain our determination that an optical interconnection module requires an optical connection within the module. See Dec. on Inst. 10. This is consistent with the intrinsic record, particularly the ’600 patent’s disclosure that “the optical paths of connector 40 and the optical connectors at stations 51–56 are optically interconnected by optical fibers disposed in cavity 62 of the module 60, the fiber pairs being formed by the optical fibers.” Ex. 1001, 3:20–24, Fig. 2. As discussed above, the module itself does not require fibers to be plugged into it. Rather, an “optical assembly,” such as that recited in claim 3, is formed by connecting modules via fibers. We further clarify that, because it is an “optical interconnection module,” it must be a module that forms an optical interconnection. This is consistent with the ’600 patent’s disclosure that “[m]odule 60 also includes an optical interconnection section having an optical connector. The preferred connector is an MTP or MPO connector 40.” Ex. 1001, 2:49–51 (emphasis added). In Figure 2, the optical interconnection section optically interconnects with fibers in ribbon 20. The ’600 patent describes that the optical paths of the connector in the optical interconnection section are “immediately adjacent to at least one other optical path for optical alignment with the optical fibers in an optical fiber ribbon.” Ex. 1001, 2:57–60.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded by these contentions. Eichenberger discloses that “the connectors 64 have key tabs 69 which limit the orientation of the connector when inserted in connector receptacle 56, in that the connector can only be mated to the receptacle with the key tab point upwards in FIG. 1.” Ex. 1004, 7:52–56. We find Eichenberger’s disclosure of a key on the connector for proper mating with the adapter teaches an adapter having a key. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 53. We further credit Dr. DeCusatis’s testimony that “[a] key 69 would provide no orientation limitation without a compatible, keyed adapter 56 configured to receive the key 69.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 54. We further find a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to include a key on adapter 56 to properly mate the keyed connector with the adapter, to the extent this is not taught, as we find it is. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 54; Ex. 1004, 7:52–56.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “c. Conclusion as to Claim 3 In summary, we find that the combination of Eichenberger and Bennett teaches all of the limitations of claim 3, and we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to, and would have been motivated to, combine the teachings of Eichenberger and Bennett in the manner asserted. Patent Owner does not present any objective evidence of nonobviousness as to any of the challenged claims. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 would have been obvious based on Eichenberger and Bennett under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 4. Dependent Claim 4 Claim 4 depends from claim 3 and recites that “all of said optical paths remain with their respective color from one module to another.” Petitioner argues that “[t]he straight ribbon illustrated in modified Fig. 3 shows that all colors are connected to the same colors.” Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79). Although Patent Owner does not provide specific arguments regarding claim 4, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability, as discussed above. We agree with Petitioner that all of the optical paths stay with their respective colors from one module to another in Petitioner’s proposed configuration because, as discussed above with respect to claim 3, the optical paths stay with their respective colors between the modules. Therefore, having considered the full record developed during trial, we conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 would have been obvious based on Eichenberger and Bennett under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 6,758,600 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,758,600
• Panduit Corp. v. CCS Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 4, 2018 · IPR2017-01375 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6, 7, and 11 are unpatentable under § 103: claim 6 over Toyooka, Eichenberger, and Giebel; claim 7 over Toyooka and Eichenberger; and claim 11 over Toyooka and Giebel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Although there are differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties and their declarants agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical degree and some amount of professional experience with fiber optic equipment. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person having a four year technical degree with a minimum of two years of professional technical experience in fiber optic equipment design. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis below. However, we note that our analysis would be the same if we adopted either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We see nothing the record before us indicating that we should deviate from our construction of the term “optical ribbon” in the Final Written Decision in IPR2016-01648. See IPR2016-01648, Paper 27, 10–19. We, therefore, adopt the construction in that case—that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “optical ribbon” in view of the specification of the ’227 patent “encompasses optical fibers that are bonded together in a generally planar array or optical fibers that are grouped and aligned in a generally planar array.” IPR2016-01648, Paper 27, 18–19. We apply this construction below in our analysis of the grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “2. Remaining Terms In our Decision on Institution, we determined that the remaining terms of the challenged claims did not require express constructions at that time. Dec. on Inst. 19. Based on the record developed during trial, we maintain our initial determination that the remaining terms of the challenged claims do not require express constructions.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

  Patent outcomesUS 6,869,227 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,869,227
• Dexcom, Inc. v. Waveform Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 12, 2018 · IPR2017-01051 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–12, and 15–19 were held unpatentable as obvious over Hagiwara; claims 2, 3, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable. The motion to amend was granted in part.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “j. Conclusion Regarding Obviousness Based on Hagiwara (Proposed Substitute Claims) We conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 20, 22, 23, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara. We conclude that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 21, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara. 2. Remaining Grounds of Unpatentability Asserted by Petitioner (Proposed Substitute Claims) In view of our determination that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 20, 22, 23, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara, we do not reach Petitioner’s remaining grounds of unpatentability as to these claims. Regarding proposed substitute claims 24 and 25, Petitioner’s contentions regarding the Handbook, Wilson, and Say do not remedy the deficiencies in Petitioner’s contentions regarding Hagiwara, as discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude that a preponderance of the evidence does not show that proposed substitute claims 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious based on Hagiwara in view of the Handbook, Wilson, or Say. H.” slip op. at 71

  • ExcludeOther

    “As discussed above, we do not reach the Wilson-Based Grounds with respect to claims 1, 4–12, and 15–19 of the ’574 patent. As for claims 2, 3, 13, and 14, we determine that Petitioner has not shown unpatentability based on the Wilson-Based Grounds, even if Exhibit 1037 and the corresponding portions of Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 37) are not excluded, because Petitioner does not offer Exhibit 1037 to cure the deficiency we noted in Wilson. See Section II.F, supra. For this reason, we dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion.” slip op. at 72

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “sensor would not have been a motivation to combine Hagiwara’s embodiments” because Hagiwara’s catheter prevents damage to the sensor during insertion and because a sensor with a side sensor window creates a greater risk of damage and vascular injury and reduces exposure to blood, as compared with a sensor with an end sensor window. PO Resp. 20–25. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has established a motivation to combine, notwithstanding the conflicting expert testimony regarding the disadvantages of a side sensor window versus an end sensor window. Neither of the expert opinions on this topic is supported by objective facts or data. Ex. 1006 ¶ 155;13 Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 54–57, 87–95; Ex. 2009, 92:8–97:12. For this reason, we give little or no weight to either side’s expert testimony 13 Dr. Vachon cites “WO 01/13102, Vadgama” (Ex. 1006 ¶ 155), however, this reference was not submitted as an exhibit in this proceeding. on this topic. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence or Federal Circuit jurisprudence requires the fact finder to credit unsupported assertions of an expert witness). As discussed above, however, there is no disagreement that a side sensor window was a known alternative to an end sensor window. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 73, 155; Tr. 43:22–44:3. That undisputed fact, together with Petitioner’s other evidence, is sufficient to establish a motivation to combine.” slip op. at 42

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art For purposes of our Institution Decision, we accepted the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) provided by Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Vachon. Dec. 11 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 28). That definition is: a person having a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent training or experience in mechanical engineering, bioengineering, or related field and at least three years of experience relating to biosensor research and development, or a master’s degree or the equivalent training or experience in mechanical engineering, bioengineering, or related field, and at least one year of experience relating to biosensor research and development. Id. Patent (https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_motions_ to_amend_11_2017.pdf); Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Matal, 878 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Iancu, Order on Petition for Panel Rehearing, No. 2015-1928 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2018). Owner’s declarant accepts and applies this definition of a POSITA for purposes of his opinions. Ex. 2008 ¶ 30. Neither party’s declarant indicates that any proffered opinion would change depending on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, consistent with our Institution Decision, we adopt Dr. Vachon’s definition of a POSITA. Ex. 1006 ¶ 28. We also rely on the cited prior art references as reflecting the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,529,574 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,529,574
• Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd. v. United Technologies CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00966 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 8–13, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because SEI did not establish a sufficient reason to combine the references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree. As the Federal Circuit has observed, “[a] preamble is not a claim limitation if the claim body ‘defines a structurally complete invention . . . and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Georgetown Rail, 867 F.3d at 1236 (citing Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The fact that the claims were amended to include storage tanks and recirculation loops actually cuts against UTC’s position, as the claim as amended describes a structurally complete invention and reliance on the preamble for this structure is unnecessary. UTC also points to the fact that the Examiner amended the preamble during prosecution, from merely reciting a “flow battery” to a “redox flow battery.” PO Resp. 15. While “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art” (Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 809) may be a reason to view the preamble as limiting, UTC directs us to no evidence here that the Examiner intended the amendment to distinguish the claims from the prior art. Indeed, as UTC acknowledges in its Response, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’243 patent to use “‘redox flow battery’ and ‘flow battery’ to mean the same thing.” PO Resp. 13 (emphasis added). If, as UTC concedes, the Examiner’s amendment merely substituted one synonym for another, the amendment could not have changed the scope of the claim or distinguished over the prior art. For these reasons, we conclude that the preamble of the claims is not limiting, and, therefore, we need not construe the term redox flow battery.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “SEI contends that the person of ordinary skill should not be limited to only a degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, because the claimed features of the flow batteries are not directed to chemistry. Pet. Reply 7. We agree, and adopt SEI’s definition of the relevant educational background. While the parties differ as to the number of years of experience in working with flow batteries, we do not consider the difference (one versus two years) to be significant. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would be a person with a degree in chemistry, physics, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, or mechanical engineering, who has at least one year of experience designing or testing flow batteries so as to obtain functional knowledge of their structure and operation. We have reviewed the level of skill reflected in the prior art and consider it consistent with this definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “evidence. Our Rule 42.64 provides that a motion to exclude is necessary to preserve any objection, and refers to those objections as “objections to the admissibility” of evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a), (c). The Board’s Trial Practice Guide further explains that a motion to exclude “must explain why the evidence is not admissible.” See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767. In other words, objections to the timing of late-arising evidence or procedural infirmities are not proper for a motion to exclude. For this reason, the objections raised in UTC’s motion to exclude are improper. First, UTC argues that Exhibit 1066 is untimely under 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b), which requires a translation of a foreign-language document to be filed with the document. Mot. 5. By UTC’s reasoning, because the Supplemental Declaration revisits Mr. Yagaeshi’s prior translation, but was not submitted with the foreign-language document, it violates the Board’s rules. Id. As this is clearly a procedural objection to the timing of the evidence, as opposed to its admissibility, we deny the motion to exclude on this basis. In any event, even if it were procedurally proper, we would not exclude the Supplemental Declaration on this basis. The Board’s Rule requires only that the original foreign-language document be accompanied by a translation, and there is no dispute that is what happened here. We see nothing in Rule 42.63(b) that prohibits a party to revisit, or even modify, its translation at a later date, given sufficient notice and opportunity to respond by the opposing party. Here, we granted UTC the opportunity to submit its own responsive declaration and address the translation issue at the oral hearing, and UTC did so.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “character as a minus sign, which is consistent with Mr. Yagaeshi’s original translation, makes more grammatical sense in the context of the sentence. We take note of the fact that SEI only changed its position on the translation—and asked Mr. Yagaeshi to correct his prior translation—once UTC made arguments based on the original translation that might be detrimental to SEI’s case. While it is conceivable that SEI only became aware of the alleged error once UTC called attention to it in the Response, we consider it fair to hold SEI to its original interpretation, especially given that that original interpretation is in agreement with Mr. Baldwin’s translation, which has remained consistent since at least 2016. For these reasons, we will interpret the disputed passage of JP228 to read “the potential was negative 0.4V.”” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,166,243 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,166,243

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.