• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01390 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed volume concentration in the formed magnetic layer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “define the term “volume concentration.” In the context of the ’331 patent, “volume concentration” refers to the volume concentration of the magnetic particles in the formed magnetic layer.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(1) a bachelor’s degree in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience in the field of magnetic recording, or (2) a Master’s degree or higher in materials science, physics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, with an emphasis in magnetic recording, and at least three years of experience in the field of magnetic recording. Pet. 12; Ex. 1017 ¶ 60. Although Patent Owner does not expressly define the appropriate level of skill in the art in the Patent Owner Response or its Supplemental Response, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Bain, presents a definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art in his declaration that is nearly identical to Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2001 ¶ 44. In view of this, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “information, is not sufficient evidence to establish that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that there is some magnetic alloy present “in the magnetic layer” of Mori. The relevant question, however, is how much and how Mori’s disclosed values were determined. Unlike the term “volume concentration,” for which the parties offered undisputed evidence regarding accepted meanings of the term in the art (i.e., packing fraction and pigment volume concentration), we have not been directed to similar evidence regarding the phrase “fill rate”/“filling rate” in Mori. Thus, although Mori states “[t]he filling rate by volume of the strongly magnetic alloy powder in the magnetic layer can be equal to or higher than 30%” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 11 (emphasis added)), Petitioner has not offered sufficient evidence demonstrating that the term “filling rate” in Mori refers to a final product-based value. As a result, we find that this language in Mori does not establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Mori discloses the “volume concentration” recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the combined teachings of Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest “[a] dual layer magnetic recording medium comprising . . . a magnetic upper recording layer formed over [a] lower support layer, the magnetic upper recording layer comprising a volume concentration of at least about 35% of a primary magnetic particulate pigment,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 16. Ex. 1001, 11:14–20, 12:25–31. Claims 2–15, 17, and 18 depend from claim 1 or claim 16, and, therefore, include the “volume concentration” limitation of claims 1 and 16. As a result, we find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Aonuma and Mori disclose or suggest each limitation of claims 1–18, and, therefore, has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Aonuma and Mori.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,115,331 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,115,331
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2018 · IPR2017-01268 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15 and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Ishikawa; the petitioner did not show claims 1–11, 16, and 18–20 unpatentable over Aonuma or Aonuma and Abe.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) at the time of the ’774 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; Ex. 1018 ¶ 60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed

    “considerably greater than Ishikawa’s stylus load of 50–300 μN (Ex. 1015 ¶ 45). The Talke Declaration does not address this discrepancy, and Dr. Talke stated during his deposition that reducing the stylus load would reduce scratching of the magnetic tape surface. Ex. 1030, 108:14–19 (“Q: Would reducing the contact pressure for the stylus instrument reduce the scratching of the magnetic tape surface by the stylus? A: Yes, it would, but you have to remember the other problem is the diameter and size of the stylus.”). Moreover, Petitioner provides evidence that it was not uncommon to use stylus-type profilometers to measure the properties of magnetic tape, even after Bhushan was published in 1996. See Reply 6. In particular, Petitioner points to Saliba,6 which describes using a stylus-type profilometer, under identical conditions to those used in Ishikawa, to measure the surface characteristics (including peak-to-valley roughness) of the backcoating of magnetic tape. Ex. 1027, 7:28–40, 57–60. Petitioner further points to Ohno,7 which also describes using “a stylus type 3D profilometer in accordance with JIS B0601” to measure the surface roughness characteristics of magnetic tape. Ex. 1028 ¶ 36; see also Ex. 1015 ¶ 45 (Ishikawa explaining that surface roughness characteristics were measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”); Ex. 1027, 7:28–39 (Saliba explaining that surface roughness characteristics where measured “in accordance with JIS-B0601-1994”). Accordingly, we are persuaded that the 6 US Patent No. 6,558,774 B1, issued May 6, 2003 (Ex. 1027). 7 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. US 2005/0175866 A1, published Aug. 11, 2005 (Ex. 1028). evidence establishes that a stylus-type profilometer is a suitable device for measuring the surface characteristics of magnetic tape.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Ishikawa teaches “peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15. Pet. 24–25; Reply 5–8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 216. In particular, Ishikawa teaches a backcoating layer of a magnetic tape that has a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm.” Ex. 1015 ¶ 44. Ishikawa provides five example embodiments of its magnetic tape, and reports the measurements of a number of characteristics of the backcoat layer for each example, including peak-to-valley roughness Rz. Id. ¶¶ 120–134, Table 1. Ishikawa discloses that peak-to-valley roughness Rz was measured using a stylus-type profilometer under the following conditions: Stylus: diameter: 1.5 to 2.5 μm; curvature: 60º Contact pressure: 50 to 300 μN Cut-off length: 80 μm Sampling length: 80 μm Assessment length: 400 μm Id. ¶¶ 45, 49. The reported peak-to-valley roughness Rz values for the five examples ranged from 58 to 87 nm, as shown in the annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 from the Petition, reproduced below: Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1015, Table 1). The annotated portion of Ishikawa Table 1 shows the results for the measured characteristics of the backcoat layer of Examples 1–5, with the peak-to-valley roughness Rz values highlighted by a red box. Id. Because Ishikawa teaches that the backcoating layer of its magnetic tape should have a peak-to-valley roughness “Rz of 40 to 250 nm, particularly 50 to 200 nm,” and because Ishikawa presents examples of magnetic tape with backside surfaces having a peak-to-valley roughness of 87 nm or less, Ishikawa discloses “a peak-to-valley roughness less than about 325 nm” as recited in claim 15.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,029,774
• Fujifilm Corporation v. Sony CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2018 · IPR2017-01267 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–13 and 15–20 not shown unpatentable over Law and Sasaki because the evidence did not establish the claimed surface properties.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “degree in materials science, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, chemistry, or a closely related field, and at least five years of experience” in industry or academic research relating to magnetic tape, or “a master’s degree or higher” in the same fields and at least three years of experience relating to magnetic tape. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response, and Dr. Talke agrees that it “is reasonable.” Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. B.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [the claims] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (May 2, 2016); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Consistent with the broadest reasonable construction, claim terms are presumed to have their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of the Institution Decision, we determined that, based on the record at that time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed during trial. C.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The evidence, however, does not establish that a backside surface having a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0 necessarily results from reducing the size and prevalence of the protrusions on the backside surface of Law’s magnetic tape. As Petitioner agrees, Law and Sasaki do not discuss skew and kurtosis values. See Pet. 29 (stating that Law does not expressly disclose skew or kurtosis values); Reply 23 (recognizing that neither Law nor Sasaki contain express disclosures of skew and kurtosis); Tr. 18:22–23 (Petitioner’s counsel noting that there are no reported skew and kurtosis values in Law or Sasaki). Thus, Petitioner relies on Mr. Isobe’s testimony to establish that reducing the protrusions on Law’s backside surface would result in a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0. See Pet. 45–49; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–81, 170–174. In that regard, Mr. Isobe testified as follows:” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “At best, the evidence establishes that reducing protrusions in Law’s backside coating may result in the surface approaching a Gaussian distribution (namely, a skew of 0 and a kurtosis of 3). See Ex. 1003 ¶ 171 (“By reducing the number of peaks the overall surface may become closer to a Gaussian distribution, which by definition has a skew of zero.” (emphasis added)), ¶ 174 (“As the frequency of large protrusions is reduced, the skew of the backcoat surface approaches 0 and the kurtosis becomes closer to 3.” (emphases added)). There is no evidence of record, however, that establishes the skew and kurtosis values of Law’s backside coating before reducing the protrusions as Petitioner proposes. While it is possible that reducing Law’s protrusions could result in skew and kurtosis values within the claimed range, it is also possible that reducing the protrusions could result in a surface that approaches a Gaussian distribution but still has a skew above 0.5 and a kurtosis above 4.0. See Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 36–60, 77–83, 90; see also PAR Pharm., 773 F.3d at 1195 (Inherency “may not be established by probabilities or possibilities.”). Thus, even if reducing the protrusions on Law’s backside coating caused the surface to approach a Gaussian distribution, that is not sufficient to establish that it necessarily results in a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0 as claimed. The skew and kurtosis values recited in claims 1 and 20 are not simply properties possessed by any backside coating that otherwise satisfies the structural limitations. Instead, they are recited as limitations on which magnetic recording media fall within the scope of the claims. The evidence of record does not establish that reducing the protrusions in Law’s backside coating, as taught by Sasaki, “would have naturally led to a backside surface having a skew less than about 0.5 and a kurtosis less than about 4.0” as Petitioner contends. Pet. 45. Accordingly, on the record before us, we find that Petitioner has not established that claims 1 and 20 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Law and Sasaki.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,029,774 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,029,774
• Formlabs Inc. v. Envisiontec, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 5, 2018 · IPR2017-01258 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9–15 are unpatentable: claims 9, 11, 12, and 15 as anticipated; claims 13–15 as obvious over Akamine; and claim 10 as obvious over Akamine, Mizukami, and McDonald.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Owner. During prosecution, the applicant argued that “the general understanding of the term ‘gel-like elastic material[]’ to one of ordinary skill in the art . . . is a material that has the required elasticity for being deformable, yet [sic] the elasticity for recovering its original state after deformation.” Ex. 1004, 15. An inventor may define specific terms used to describe an invention, but must do so “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and must “‘set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). This definition may appear in either the patent specification or the prosecution history. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Applicants can define . . . claim scope during prosecution,” just as they can in a patent specification.). In our view, the statement in the prosecution history that “the general understanding of . . . ‘gel-like elastic material[]’ . . . is a material that has the required elasticity for being deformable, yet the elasticity for recovering its original state after deformation” is a reasonably clear, deliberate, and precise definition of the term. Ex. 1004, 15 (emphasis added). Accordingly, at least on this record, this is the proper interpretation of “gel-like elastic material.” Thus, we construe “gel-like elastic material” as “a material that has the required elasticity for being deformable, yet the elasticity for recovering its original state after deformation.”” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “2. “Adhesion” Patent Owner proposes construing the term “adhesion” as “separation force per unit area.” PO Resp. 26–27. Petitioner argues that no construction of “adhesion” is necessary but does not otherwise object to Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Reply 4. The evidence of record supports Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. 28 (arguing that “the adhesion of the silicone coating to the hardened resin is approximately 1.85 x 104 N/m2”); Ex. 1001, 1:65–2:7 (suggesting that adhesion is “independent[] of [the] hardened surface area”); Ex. 1007, Fig. 5 (reporting “Adhesion strength” in units of “N/m2”); Ex. 2001 ¶ 46 (“Adhesion is a well-known evaluation of the force per unit area required to separate two surfaces.”); Ex. 2002, 147:13–149:9 (“The adhesion strength is an overall number that is agnostic of the actual cross-section[al] area that is being produced.”). Accordingly, on the record developed during this proceeding, we conclude that the proper construction of “adhesion” is “separation force per unit area.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Because Petitioner’s proposed construction is broader than the alternative, if it is reasonable, it is the broadest reasonable construction we have been offered. The parties dispute whether this construction is reasonable. There is, however, no need for us to resolve this dispute. As discussed below, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable even under the narrower “at least twice” construction. Because the claims are unpatentable under the narrower construction, they also would be unpatentable under the broader construction, and we need not decide whether the broader construction is reasonable. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we base our analysis on Patent Owner’s construction of “greater by a multiple” as “at least twice.”” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “As noted above, “gel-like elastic material” is “a material that has the required elasticity for being deformable, yet the elasticity for recovering its original state after deformation.” Akamine discloses that layer 7 is “elastically deformable” and that layer 7 elastically deforms when fabricated article 10 is separated from transparent plate 4. Id. Akamine also discloses that the sequence of preparing a gap between the cured layers and the irradiation face, then curing a new layer, then peeling the fabricated article off the irradiation face is repeated to create a series of layers making up the fabricated article. Id. ¶ 27. Based on these disclosures, Petitioner directs us to evidence suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that layer 7 returns to its original shape after deforming upon separation of fabricated article 10 from transparent plate 4. Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 59). In addition, Akamine discloses that layer 7 is part of “an irradiation face” that “is a composite molded body formed with a transparent glass or plastic plate.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 26. Patent Owner does not contest this evidence or Petitioner’s assertion that Akamine anticipates claim 9. We find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Akamine discloses the “gel-like elastic material that is applied directly to the plane” limitation of claim 9.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,195,472 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,195,472
• Dexcom, Inc. v. Waveform Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 12, 2018 · IPR2017-01051 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–12, and 15–19 were held unpatentable as obvious over Hagiwara; claims 2, 3, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable. The motion to amend was granted in part.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “j. Conclusion Regarding Obviousness Based on Hagiwara (Proposed Substitute Claims) We conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 20, 22, 23, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara. We conclude that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 21, 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara. 2. Remaining Grounds of Unpatentability Asserted by Petitioner (Proposed Substitute Claims) In view of our determination that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 20, 22, 23, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Hagiwara, we do not reach Petitioner’s remaining grounds of unpatentability as to these claims. Regarding proposed substitute claims 24 and 25, Petitioner’s contentions regarding the Handbook, Wilson, and Say do not remedy the deficiencies in Petitioner’s contentions regarding Hagiwara, as discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude that a preponderance of the evidence does not show that proposed substitute claims 24 and 25 are unpatentable as obvious based on Hagiwara in view of the Handbook, Wilson, or Say. H.” slip op. at 71

  • ExcludeOther

    “As discussed above, we do not reach the Wilson-Based Grounds with respect to claims 1, 4–12, and 15–19 of the ’574 patent. As for claims 2, 3, 13, and 14, we determine that Petitioner has not shown unpatentability based on the Wilson-Based Grounds, even if Exhibit 1037 and the corresponding portions of Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 37) are not excluded, because Petitioner does not offer Exhibit 1037 to cure the deficiency we noted in Wilson. See Section II.F, supra. For this reason, we dismiss as moot Patent Owner’s motion.” slip op. at 72

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “sensor would not have been a motivation to combine Hagiwara’s embodiments” because Hagiwara’s catheter prevents damage to the sensor during insertion and because a sensor with a side sensor window creates a greater risk of damage and vascular injury and reduces exposure to blood, as compared with a sensor with an end sensor window. PO Resp. 20–25. We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has established a motivation to combine, notwithstanding the conflicting expert testimony regarding the disadvantages of a side sensor window versus an end sensor window. Neither of the expert opinions on this topic is supported by objective facts or data. Ex. 1006 ¶ 155;13 Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 54–57, 87–95; Ex. 2009, 92:8–97:12. For this reason, we give little or no weight to either side’s expert testimony 13 Dr. Vachon cites “WO 01/13102, Vadgama” (Ex. 1006 ¶ 155), however, this reference was not submitted as an exhibit in this proceeding. on this topic. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence or Federal Circuit jurisprudence requires the fact finder to credit unsupported assertions of an expert witness). As discussed above, however, there is no disagreement that a side sensor window was a known alternative to an end sensor window. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 73, 155; Tr. 43:22–44:3. That undisputed fact, together with Petitioner’s other evidence, is sufficient to establish a motivation to combine.” slip op. at 42

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art For purposes of our Institution Decision, we accepted the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) provided by Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Vachon. Dec. 11 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 28). That definition is: a person having a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent training or experience in mechanical engineering, bioengineering, or related field and at least three years of experience relating to biosensor research and development, or a master’s degree or the equivalent training or experience in mechanical engineering, bioengineering, or related field, and at least one year of experience relating to biosensor research and development. Id. Patent (https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_motions_ to_amend_11_2017.pdf); Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Matal, 878 F.3d 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Bosch Automotive Service Solutions, LLC v. Iancu, Order on Petition for Panel Rehearing, No. 2015-1928 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2018). Owner’s declarant accepts and applies this definition of a POSITA for purposes of his opinions. Ex. 2008 ¶ 30. Neither party’s declarant indicates that any proffered opinion would change depending on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, consistent with our Institution Decision, we adopt Dr. Vachon’s definition of a POSITA. Ex. 1006 ¶ 28. We also rely on the cited prior art references as reflecting the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,529,574 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,529,574
• Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd. v. United Technologies CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00966 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 8–13, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because SEI did not establish a sufficient reason to combine the references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree. As the Federal Circuit has observed, “[a] preamble is not a claim limitation if the claim body ‘defines a structurally complete invention . . . and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Georgetown Rail, 867 F.3d at 1236 (citing Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The fact that the claims were amended to include storage tanks and recirculation loops actually cuts against UTC’s position, as the claim as amended describes a structurally complete invention and reliance on the preamble for this structure is unnecessary. UTC also points to the fact that the Examiner amended the preamble during prosecution, from merely reciting a “flow battery” to a “redox flow battery.” PO Resp. 15. While “clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art” (Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 809) may be a reason to view the preamble as limiting, UTC directs us to no evidence here that the Examiner intended the amendment to distinguish the claims from the prior art. Indeed, as UTC acknowledges in its Response, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’243 patent to use “‘redox flow battery’ and ‘flow battery’ to mean the same thing.” PO Resp. 13 (emphasis added). If, as UTC concedes, the Examiner’s amendment merely substituted one synonym for another, the amendment could not have changed the scope of the claim or distinguished over the prior art. For these reasons, we conclude that the preamble of the claims is not limiting, and, therefore, we need not construe the term redox flow battery.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “SEI contends that the person of ordinary skill should not be limited to only a degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, because the claimed features of the flow batteries are not directed to chemistry. Pet. Reply 7. We agree, and adopt SEI’s definition of the relevant educational background. While the parties differ as to the number of years of experience in working with flow batteries, we do not consider the difference (one versus two years) to be significant. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would be a person with a degree in chemistry, physics, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, or mechanical engineering, who has at least one year of experience designing or testing flow batteries so as to obtain functional knowledge of their structure and operation. We have reviewed the level of skill reflected in the prior art and consider it consistent with this definition. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “evidence. Our Rule 42.64 provides that a motion to exclude is necessary to preserve any objection, and refers to those objections as “objections to the admissibility” of evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a), (c). The Board’s Trial Practice Guide further explains that a motion to exclude “must explain why the evidence is not admissible.” See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767. In other words, objections to the timing of late-arising evidence or procedural infirmities are not proper for a motion to exclude. For this reason, the objections raised in UTC’s motion to exclude are improper. First, UTC argues that Exhibit 1066 is untimely under 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b), which requires a translation of a foreign-language document to be filed with the document. Mot. 5. By UTC’s reasoning, because the Supplemental Declaration revisits Mr. Yagaeshi’s prior translation, but was not submitted with the foreign-language document, it violates the Board’s rules. Id. As this is clearly a procedural objection to the timing of the evidence, as opposed to its admissibility, we deny the motion to exclude on this basis. In any event, even if it were procedurally proper, we would not exclude the Supplemental Declaration on this basis. The Board’s Rule requires only that the original foreign-language document be accompanied by a translation, and there is no dispute that is what happened here. We see nothing in Rule 42.63(b) that prohibits a party to revisit, or even modify, its translation at a later date, given sufficient notice and opportunity to respond by the opposing party. Here, we granted UTC the opportunity to submit its own responsive declaration and address the translation issue at the oral hearing, and UTC did so.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “character as a minus sign, which is consistent with Mr. Yagaeshi’s original translation, makes more grammatical sense in the context of the sentence. We take note of the fact that SEI only changed its position on the translation—and asked Mr. Yagaeshi to correct his prior translation—once UTC made arguments based on the original translation that might be detrimental to SEI’s case. While it is conceivable that SEI only became aware of the alleged error once UTC called attention to it in the Response, we consider it fair to hold SEI to its original interpretation, especially given that that original interpretation is in agreement with Mr. Baldwin’s translation, which has remained consistent since at least 2016. For these reasons, we will interpret the disputed passage of JP228 to read “the potential was negative 0.4V.”” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,166,243 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,166,243
• Commvault Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Jul 18, 2018 · IPR2017-02178 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution because Medina ’93 did not teach or suggest the required page-by-page binary choice between compression methods.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We “review [our] decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. § 42.71(c). In addition, we may not consider an argument made in a request for rehearing unless the request “specifically identif[ies] . . . the place where [that argument] was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. § 42.71(d). After considering the Request for Rehearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that we abused our discretion in denying institution. Accordingly, we deny the Request for Rehearing. slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “persuasive of an abuse of discretion in failing to institute inter partes review. Under this argument, Petitioner adopts our construction of claim 1 and maintains its definition of the page of Medina ’93 as the data block of claim 1. Req. 14. Under the construction we applied in our Institution Decision, claim 1 requires a binary choice between compressing a given data block using the single data compression encoder and compressing that data block using the one or more content-dependent data compression encoders. Dec. 11–13. Thus, Petitioner must show that Medina ’93 teaches or suggests a binary choice between two types of compression to be applied on a page-by-page basis. Even if Petitioner is correct that it is possible, under the right circumstances, for the system of Medina ’93 to operate in a way that results in compressing an entire page of text or in compressing an entire page of non-text data, Medina ’93 does not teach or suggest the required binary choice between those two outcomes, because its system is capable of compressing portions of a page using one method and other portions of the same page using a different method. Ex. 1004, 5:16–60, Fig. 4. Thus, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown that we abused our discretion by denying institution of inter partes review on the ground of obviousness over Medina ’93.” slip op. at 5

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,054,728
• LG Electronics, Inc. / LG Electronics U.S.A. Inc. et al. v. Fundamental Innovation Systems International LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2018 · IPR2018-00460 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the same challenge had already been denied in the ZTE/Samsung IPR, and dismissed LG’s joinder motion as moot.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “grounds, arguments, and supporting evidence as the petition in the ZTE/Samsung IPR. Pet. 2 (“This petition is substantially identical to IPR2018-00110.”); Mot. 1 (“[Petitioner’s] Petition is substantively identical to the petition in the ZTE/Samsung IPR—challenging the same claims of the ’550 Patent on the same grounds while relying on the same prior art, arguments, and evidence.”). On May 8, 2018, we denied institution in the ZTE/Samsung IPR. ZTE/Samsung IPR, Paper 12, 13. In view of the identity of the challenge between the present Petition and that filed in the ZTE/Samsung IPR, and for the reasons set forth in the decision denying institution in the ZTE/Samsung IPR, which we hereby incorporate by reference, we likewise do not institute inter partes review in this proceeding. See id. at 7–13.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “III. DISMISSING MOTION FOR JOINDER As noted above, Petitioner seeks to join, as a Petitioner, in the ZTE/Samsung IPR. Mot. 1. Because the ZTE/Samsung petition was denied, however, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is moot. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).” slip op. at 3

  None
  Patents in suitUS 8,624,550
• Micron Technology, Inc. / Intel Corporation et al. v. Daniel L. FlammAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2018 · IPR2017-00391 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1 and 5–7 over Lieberman-based or Qian grounds, claims 2–3 over grounds adding Hanawa, and claim 4 over grounds adding Collins.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’221 patent would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical, mechanical, or chemical engineering, physics, chemistry, or a similar field, and three to four years of work experience in semiconductor manufacturing or related fields,” a Master’s degree in the same fields “and two to three years of work experience in semiconductor manufacturing or related fields,” or “a PhD in electrical, mechanical, or chemical engineering, physics, chemistry, or a similar field.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment in its Response. Petitioner’s assessment appears consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. B.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “May 30, 1997); see Pet. 16. For claims of an expired patent, the Board’s claim interpretation is similar to that of a district court, i.e., consistent with Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See In re Rambus, Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Under the Phillips standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, and in the context of the entire patent disclosure and prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–14. Only those terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined that, based on the record at the time, no claim term required express construction (Dec. on Inst. 6–7), and we see no reason to modify that determination in light of the record developed at trial. C.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary and do not agree with them for the following reasons. Patent Owner contends that Lieberman’s capacitive currents “are not the same thing as the capacitive currents referenced in the ’221 patent” (PO Resp. 4), but does not provide sufficient objective analysis or evidence demonstrating why that is the case. As Petitioner notes, claim 1 does not limit the claimed capacitive currents coupled from the inductive coupling structure to a specific type of capacitive current, the ’221 patent does not provide a definition of “capacitive current,” and Patent Owner “has not provided any proposed construction for the term.” Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 6). Moreover, we do not credit Dr. Flamm’s supporting testimony on this issue because it is conclusory in nature. Ex. 2003 ¶ 11; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating a lack of objective support for an expert opinion “may render the testimony of little probative value in [a patentability] determination”). In particular, Dr. Flamm’s testimony is identical to Patent Owner’s argument as it appears in the Patent Owner Response, and does not provide objective support for his statements. Absent underlying facts or data to support Dr. Flamm’s opinion, we are not convinced that Lieberman’s capacitive currents are different than those encompassed by claim 1 of the ’221 patent. See Reply 6 (“Lieberman expressly contradicts [Patent Owner’s] argument by teaching that the transformer ‘reduces the undesired capacitively coupled rf current flowing from coil to plasma by a factor of two.’” (citing Ex. 1006, 56; emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s contention “that the systems described by Lieberman and Dible ‘have a high degree of similarity in structure, purpose, and operation’ that ‘would render modification of the former with aspects of the latter straightforward and well within the skill of a person having ordinary skill in the art’” is “purely conclusory,” and, therefore, Petitioner fails to establish a motivation to combine Dible with Lieberman. PO Resp. 27. We disagree. Petitioner provides a number of reasons, supported by rational underpinnings, as to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to combine or modify the teachings of Lieberman and Dible. Pet. 47–48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132– 135); see In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 911, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that the relevant inquiry is whether there is “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). With respect to degree of similarity between the systems disclosed in Lieberman and Dible, Petitioner persuasively argues, with citations to evidence of record, that both references “are directed to inductively-coupled plasma generation for semiconductor processing, specifically including etching and deposition,” and “also discuss the manipulation of phase and anti-phase portions of an RF field.” Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1006, 5, 56; Ex. 1007, 1:15–19, 2:42–56, Fig. 5(a)–5(b)); Ex. 1003 ¶ 135. Petitioner also argues that “Dible offers user control” that “would allow for fine-tuning of the phase and anti-phase portions, e.g., to render the device a capacitive coupling device, inductive coupling device, or a combination thereof” that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have recognized “would augment Lieberman’s design.” Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1007, Abs., 2:39–46; Ex. 1003 ¶ 133). Specifically, Petitioner points to Dible’s teaching that “inductively coupled plasma generates higher plasma density that is more suitable for certain low pressure processes.” Id. (citing Ex. 1007, 1:52–54). Dr. Graves further testifies that “capacitively coupled plasma has known uses, e.g., for relatively high pressure applications,” which “can result in faster etch rates,” and, “[a]ccordingly, Dible’s user control provides greater flexibility for different processes and fabrication techniques.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1025, 1:15–23; Ex. 1026, 1:5–50, 2:42–57). Additionally, Petitioner notes that “Lieberman specifically describes, for certain applications, the desirability for reducing capacitively coupled radio frequency currents flowing from the coil to the plasma,” and that Dible similarly “describes the possibility of adjusting relative proportions of inductive and capacitive coupling components of the coil to the plasma by adjusting the relative phases on the ends of the coil.” Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1006, 56; Ex. 1007, 2:39–42). Based on these disclosures, we find Petitioner’s argument that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to improve Lieberman’s system with Dible by including Dible’s control circuit to enable adjustment of the phase and anti- phase portions to control the proportions of inductive and capacitive coupling currents, e.g., to minimize the capacitive coupling and apply power only by inductive coupling” to be persuasive. Id. at 47–48; Ex. 1003 ¶ 134. Accordingly, we find that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Dible when determining how to control the adjustment of the phase difference in Lieberman’s system. We also have reviewed the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition and find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that all of the elements of independent claim 1, and claims 5–7 that depend, directly or indirectly, therefrom, are disclosed in the combined teachings of Lieberman and Dible. Pet. 41–45. After considering Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s positions, as well as their supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that independent claim 1, and claims 5–7 that depend, directly or indirectly, therefrom, would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Lieberman and Dible. G.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 6,017,221 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,017,221
• Laird Technologies, Inc. v. Parker Intangibles LLC And Parker-Hannifin Corp.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · May 21, 2018 · IPR2018-00049 · APJ George C Best · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Parker’s rehearing request, granted institution on every ground in Laird’s petition under SAS, and denied Laird’s rehearing request as moot.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedGranted in part

    “(d) Rehearing. A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2018). To be entitled to relief, the party seeking rehearing must demonstrate that the Board abused its discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2018); see also PNY Techs., Inc. v. Phison Elecs. Corp., No. IPR2013-00472, slip op. at 2 (PTAB April 24, 2014) (Paper 16) (available at https://go.usa.gov/xQUuS). A decision based on an erroneous interpretation of law, a factual finding that is not supported by substantial evidence, or an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors may represent an abuse of discretion. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 3

  • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

    “of an IPR. Wi-Fi One LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that § 314(a) “grants the Director discretion not to institute even when the threshold is met.”). The Director has delegated this discretion to the PTAB. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The Board has identified a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in deciding whether or not to refuse to institute an IPR in the context of evaluating follow-on petitions. Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR 2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (PTAB September 6, 2017) (Paper 19) (precedential in relevant part) (available at https://go.usa.gov/xQUvu). For the purpose of this decision, we assume without deciding that at least two of these factors also are relevant to our decision regarding whether or not to institute an IPR that does not involve a follow-on petition—for example, whether to institute an IPR with respect to all 15 grounds of alleged unpatentability set forth in Laird’s Petition even though we have determined that Laird has not established a reasonable likelihood of success with respect to 13 of those 15 grounds. These factors are (6) the finite resources of the Board and (7) the Board’s statutory obligation to issue a final written decision not later than one year after the IPR institution date. See id. (factors 6 and 7).” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “opinion in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). In that decision, the Supreme Court held that in an instituted IPR, we must issue a final written decision addressing each patent claim challenged by the petitioner. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “stability of Nguyen’s soft gel material because Nguyen does not describe the physical properties of this soft gel. Paper 13, 3–4. This argument is not persuasive because Nguyen describes the soft gel material as “a colloid in which the disperse phase has combined with the continuous phase to form a viscous ‘jelly-like’ product.” Ex. 1008, col. 3, ll. 6–8. Nguyen further states that the degree of cross-linking between the amine resin and the rubber composition and/or between the rubber compounds themselves will determine the consistency of the soft gel, which can range from “liquid-like” to “solid-like.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 18–34. In the absence of evidence to the contrary—and Parker has provided none—this is sufficient support for the opinion provided by Laird’s expert that Nguyen describes a form-stable composition.” slip op. at 4

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,208,192

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.