PTAB
Advanced fields
9 decisions · 752msnewest first
  • PTAB · May 22, 2023 · PGR2022-00009 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5, 7–12, and 14–19 are unpatentable based on lack of written description, anticipation by Bruning, or obviousness over Bruning and Kabel.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “lighting device.” Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of LEDs and circuits,” as Petitioner proposes and that “the field of design and/or development” would be “in the context of lighting devices” as Patent Owner proposes, in which “[a]n increase in experience could compensate for less education.” Id.; Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 46).” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

      “theoretically fall under the “or greater” portion of the amended claim limitation “forward voltage of 6V or greater,” Applicant distinguished Colby on the basis that the 120V AC voltage from a wall outlet is not “the minimum voltage difference required between the anode and cathode of the LEDs in the claimed circuit to allow current to flow through the LEDs.” See Ex. 1023, 9 (emphasis added). Applicant’s argument specifically identifies the claim language at issue––“forward voltage of 6V or greater”––and specifically states that it is not disclosed because Colby does not disclose the minimum voltage and instead, discloses something else, something larger–– 120V AC voltage. Accordingly, we conclude that Applicant disclaimed any voltage that is more than “the minimum voltage difference required between the anode and cathode of the LEDs in the claimed circuit to allow current to flow through the LEDs” from the scope of “forward voltage.”” slip op. at 25

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

      “4. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) With respect to the written description requirement, we are persuaded” slip op. at 32

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable

      “Basis § Unpatentable Unpatentable Lack of written description, 3, 10, 17 112(a) 3, 10, 17 Lack of enablement 3, 10, 17 112(b) Indefiniteness 3, 10, 17 Lack of written description, 4, 11, 18 112(a) 4, 11, 18 Lack of enablement 4, 11, 18 112(b) indefiniteness 4, 11, 18” slip op. at 77

    Patent outcomesUS 10,932,341 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 10,932,341
  • PTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2020-01212 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Kobayashi and Kaun; the contingent motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 14–25.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “that “Kaun discloses that the cell is sealed ‘by a ‘U’ shaped insulator/gasket 32 . . . to seal the cell without pressure-loading,’” and therefore, venting via a pressure release seal is not required. Pet. 64 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 120). In an alternate embodiment, Kaun provides a means to relieve gas pressure “via the peripheral gasket which can reseal after an event.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 91. As Petitioner explains, “Kaun discloses that it is sealed, but upon the application of certain conditions, the internal pressure of gases within the cell can cause gases to vent. During such events, Kaun discloses ‘[t]he specified limit for internal pressure is handled by release via the peripheral gasket which can reseal after an event.’” Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 37–39; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 91, 101). Thus, while Kaun discloses venting to prevent pressure build up, Kaun “is otherwise sealed at all times during functioning.” Id. (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 38–39; Ex. 1005 ¶ 101). Neither the ’835 patent nor Patent Owner’s own proposed construction of “closed without being beaded over” requires closure at all times. Furthermore, Mr. Gardner testifies that “[i]f a battery which, upon application of significant internal pressure, would be considered not ‘closed’ at other times, th[e]n almost no battery could be considered closed. [Because] [a]ny battery, when subjected to certain pressures, would leak or burst.” Ex. 1041 ¶ 39. We credit Mr. Gardner’s undisputed testimony in this regard. Mr. Gardner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Kaun is closed.” Id. Dr. Peckerar similarly testifies that Kaun shows a housing that is closed without being beaded over. Ex. 1034, 131:4–11; 237:19–238:22 (describing Kaun as “closed during normal operation”). Accordingly, the record evidence supports Petitioner’s assertion that the combination of Kobayashi and Kaun suggests a button cell that is closed without being beaded over.” slip op. at 28

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We discern no material difference between the parties’ respective constructions. Additionally, Patent Owner, during the hearing, expressed a general view that claim construction was unlikely to affect the parties’ positions.8 In particular, Patent Owner states that “[o]ur position is that really nothing turns on claim construction. You don’t have to engage in 8 The parties disagree as to what the newly added phrase “the cup casing include[ing] a first part proximal to the flat bottom area and a second part disposed in the overlapping area, the first part of the casing being disposed radially inward with respect to the second part” means. See generally MTA Opp.; MTA Reply; MTA Sur-reply. Neither party proposes an express construction for this phrase. Id. We address the interpretation of this phrase below and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute raised by the parties’ substantive arguments. claim construction in this case.” Tr. 56:18–20, 56:20–24 (explaining that limitations were submitted for construction “to gain some benefit in the co-pending litigations.”). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) in the context of an inter partes review). Because the outcome of our decision does not depend on either parties’ claim construction position, we determine that none of the identified claim terms require construction to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “Thus, Patent Owner identifies three claimed features—i.e., the jelly- roll configuration, the insulating layer, and a housing closed without being beaded over—as responsible for the improved performance of the VARTA CoinPower® button cell batteries. Id. However, Patent Owner’s declarants testify further and explain that it is the combination of the three identified features, in addition to a flat foil conductor resting flat between the electrode top and housing and welding the foil conductor from outside the housing, that are responsible for improved performance. In particular, Mr. Miehlich, employed in VARTA’s marketing and sales department, testifies that the new cell design, which “provided unprecedented increases in performance, including in energy density, charge capacity, and cycling stability,” consisted of a “jelly roll electrode coil packed tightly into an uncrimped, button-like housing. The electrode coil was protected against short-circuiting by [an] insulating means, and was connected to the cell terminals by a flexible flat foil conductors resting flat between the electrode top and housing, and welded to the housing components from the outside. These features are all found in the claims of the VARTA patents here under review. Ex. 2045 ¶¶ 15–16. And, Dr. Lindner, one of the named inventors of the ’835 patent, testifies that the complex issues we faced were how to safely pack the required amount of electrode material into the very small “button”-sized housing and protect it against short circuits; how to connect the “jelly roll” electrode to the terminals in such a confined space without itself consuming much volume, and how to seal the top and bottom of the cell housing, all while accommodating the expansion and contraction of the electrode winding and the resulting mechanical forces. Ex. 2046 ¶ 33. According to Dr. Linder, the jelly-roll configuration with an insulator, flexible foil output conductors, sealing the cell without crimping, and welding the foil conductors from outside the housing each contributed to the improved battery performance. Id. ¶¶ 34–43. Thus, it is the combination of five elements—not the three claimed in the ’835 patent—that are purportedly responsible for the “vastly increased performance characteristics” of the CoinPower® products. Id. ¶ 43; see also id. ¶ 45 (noting that “various aspects of our invention are covered by 10 issued patents, including the four United States patents here under review” (emphasis added)); Tr. 84:24–85:10 (explaining that welding, for example, is “also part of the success”). Like the patent owner in Fox Factory, “[i]n light of the patentee’s own assertions about the significance of the unclaimed features, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that these features are insignificant.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d 1375. As a result, the patent claims are not coextensive with the CoinPower® products because those products include “‘critical’ unclaimed feature[s] that [are] claimed by a different patent and materially impacts the product’s functionality.” Id.” slip op. at 40

    Patent outcomesUS 9,153,835 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,153,835
  • PTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2020-01213 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kobayashi and Kwon; substitute claims 10–14, 16, and 17 are allowed, while the motion to amend is denied as to claim 15.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “On this issue, we agree with Petitioner. Mr. Gardner explains that the skilled artisan “would further recognize that the output conductor can be comprised of various materials . . . . which could be metal or any various materials [and] the shape of the output conductor is not particularly limited.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 322. Mr. Gardner further testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would recognize, not only that metal foil conductors could be inserted into these grooves without difficulty, but also that the depth of the grooves can be altered in order to better accommodate metal foil output conductors.” Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 53, 70. We recognize Patent Owner’s argument that numerous factors must be considered and that conventional battery design does not necessarily translate to button cell designs (PO Resp. 20– 21), but as Mr. Gardner testifies, “this may be true in some cases, [but] the lessons and advantages of using techniques from conventional battery design and applying it to button cell would be obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Ex. 1041 ¶ 103. He continues to explain that “[n]aturally, such transposition of techniques would require some modification and adjustments. . . . [and that] each of these adjustments, . . . would be well within the skill of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. ¶ 104 (describing, for example, “reducing the thickness of the conductor plates of Kobayashi”). We credit Mr. Gardner’s testimony. Moreover, Patent Owner does not allege that any proposed modification would be beyond the skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art or explain how any of the “difficulties in manufacturing a button cell” (PO Resp. 52) are relevant to the proposed substitution of a metal foil for a metal terminal electrode plate. See generally id.; Sur-reply. Thus, based on the evidence and argument of record, we determine that the combination of Kobayashi and Kwon, and the general knowledge of those skilled in the art, would suggest the use of foil in place of Kobayashi’s terminal electrode plates, and that the foil would bear flat on one of the lateral ends of the electrode separator assembly.” slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In the Decision on Institution, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’858 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a similar field, such as materials engineering, chemical engineering, or physics with at least five years of experience in the field of battery design and manufacturing. A person with a master’s degree in one of the above fields could have less practical experience of approximately three years. A person with a PhD could have less practical experience, about two years. A person with less education but more relevant practical experience may also meet this standard. DI 20 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed definition). For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we maintain our determination from the Decision on Institution because neither party disputes that determination and because the level of skill is consistent with the record. See PO Resp. 7 (person of ordinary skill “would possess a Bachelor’s degree in electrical, mechanical or chemical engineering or equivalent [and] would also have two to three” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “We discern no material difference between the parties’ respective constructions. Additionally, Patent Owner, during the hearing, expressed a general view that claim construction was unlikely to affect the parties’ positions. In particular, Patent Owner states that “[o]ur position is that really nothing turns on claim construction. You don’t have to engage in claim construction in this case.” Tr. 56:18–20, 56:20–22 (explaining that limitations were submitted for construction “to gain some benefit in the co-pending litigations.”). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) in the context of an inter partes review). Because the outcome of our decision does not depend on either parties’ claim construction position, we determine that none of the identified claim terms require construction to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 13

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “We are not persuaded that the identified portions of Mr. Gardner’s Supplemental Declaration are improper. In the Petition, Petitioner alleged that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to substitute known metal foils for the metal conductor plates of Kobayashi in order to reduce the size of inactive materials and improve performance. Pet. 69–70 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 323). In its Response, Patent Owner argued, among other things, that the metal foil lacks the requisite rigidity to support the remaining components of the winding axis core (PO Resp. 26–27, 31) and that because metal connecting plates 4a and 5b are positioned within recesses of insulating plates 8 and 9, replacing the metal connecting plates with metal foils would result in an unreliable connection because the metal foil would become embedded within the grooves of the insulating plates (id. at 28–29, 30). Mr. Gardner’s supplemental testimony specifically addresses Dr. Peckerar’s and Patent Owner’s concerns that metal foils would be unsuitable in Kobayashi due to their flexibility and thickness as compared to the insulating plates. Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 53 (“the depth of the grooves can be altered in order to better accommodate metal foil output conductors”), 70, 71 (explaining that it is the winding core that provides structure not the output conductor plates), 81, 86 (explaining that the person of ordinary skill in the art could either adjust the size of the output conductors or the depth of the cavities themselves), 87. Therefore, Mr. Gardner’s testimony that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood how to account for the technical challenges Patent Owner identified properly responds to arguments raised by Patent Owner in its Patent Owner response. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to Mr. Gardner’s testimony on this issue.” slip op. at 9

    Patent outcomesUS 9,799,858 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,799,858
  • PTAB · Jan 5, 2022 · IPR2020-01211 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Kobayashi; substitute claims 14–25 are allowed because the cited combinations do not teach the claimed cup casing structure.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In the Decision on Institution, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’581 patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a similar field, such as materials engineering, chemical engineering, or physics with at least five years of experience in the field of battery design and manufacturing. A person with a master’s degree in one of the above fields could have less practical experience of approximately three years. A person with a PhD could have less practical experience, of about two years. A person with less education but more relevant practical experience may also meet this standard. DI 20 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed definition). For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we maintain our determination from the Decision on Institution because neither party disputes that determination and because the level of skill is consistent with the record. See PO Resp. 6 (stating that “[t]he claims are patentable regardless of which definition is used.”); see generally Pet. Reply.” slip op. at 14

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “We are not persuaded that the identified portions of Mr. Gardner’s Supplemental Declaration are improper. In the Petition, Petitioner alleged that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to substitute known metal foils for the metal conductor plates of Kobayashi in order to reduce the size of inactive materials and improve performance. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 323). In its Response, Patent Owner argued, among other things, that the metal foil lacks the requisite rigidity to support the remaining components of the winding axis core (PO Resp. 22–27, 31), and that because metal connecting plates 4a and 5b are positioned within recesses of insulating plates 8 and 9, replacing the metal connecting plates with metal foils would result in an unreliable connection because the metal foil would become embedded within the grooves of the insulating plates (id. at 28, 31). Mr. Gardner’s supplemental testimony specifically addresses Dr. Peckerar’s and Patent Owner’s concerns that metal foils would be unsuitable in Kobayashi due to their flexibility and thickness as compared to the insulating plates. Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 53 (“the depth of the grooves can be altered in order to better accommodate metal foil output conductors”), 70, 71 (explaining that it is the winding core that provides structure not the output conductor plates), 81, 86 (explaining that the person of ordinary skill in the art could either adjust the size of the output conductors or the depth of the cavities themselves), 87. Therefore, Mr. Gardner’s testimony that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood how to account for the technical challenges Patent Owner identified properly responds to arguments raised by Patent Owner in its Patent Owner Response. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Mr. Gardner’s testimony regarding Kobayashi’s modified electrode assembly.” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Upon review of Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence, we find that Petitioner adequately shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Kobayashi to include metal foils in place of its terminal electrode plates. Petitioner explains that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that metal foil may be used in batteries because the use of metal foil as a conductor is common in the art. Pet. 31, 39 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 256, 323). Petitioner directs our attention to Kobayashi which details use of metal foil for conducting elements. Id. at 39; see also Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7, 21, 26, 27 (describing metal foil electrodes). Furthermore, Mr. Gardner testifies that “reducing the thickness of the output conductors has the effect of reducing the ratio of inactive to active components within the cell, which improves energy density . . . . [and is] a well-known goal in the art.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 323. Mr. Gardner further opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would be motivated to reduce the thickness of the output conductors of Kobayashi in order to increase energy density within the cell” and “to use metal foils as the output conductors, as this furthers the well-known goal in the art of reducing the size of internal battery components.” Id. We acknowledge Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Gardner relies on teachings related to conventional battery design—not button cell batteries—and that he discusses considerations “relating to thickness of the electrodes, not of output conductors.” PO Resp. 19–20. But, Mr. Gardner’s testimony similarly relies on passages directed to “basic concepts” of battery operations and, as a whole, focuses on the concept that reducing the thickness of the terminal electrode plates would “maximize the space available inside the cell for active components,” thereby increasing electrode density and improving battery performance. Ex. 1003 ¶ 323 (citing Ex. 1009, 35). According to Mr. Gardner, “these adjustments would be well within the skill of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 104. We credit Mr. Gardner’s testimony. “Moreover, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond that person’s skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Upon review of Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence, we find that Petitioner adequately shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Kobayashi to include metal foils in place of its terminal electrode plates. Petitioner explains that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that metal foil may be used in batteries because the use of metal foil as a conductor is common in the art. Pet. 31, 39 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 256, 323). Petitioner directs our attention to Kobayashi which details use of metal foil for conducting elements. Id. at 39; see also Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 7, 21, 26, 27 (describing metal foil electrodes). Furthermore, Mr. Gardner testifies that “reducing the thickness of the output conductors has the effect of reducing the ratio of inactive to active components within the cell, which improves energy density . . . . [and is] a well-known goal in the art.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 323. Mr. Gardner further opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would be motivated to reduce the thickness of the output conductors of Kobayashi in order to increase energy density within the cell” and “to use metal foils as the output conductors, as this furthers the well-known goal in the art of reducing the size of internal battery components.” Id. We acknowledge Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Gardner relies on teachings related to conventional battery design—not button cell batteries—and that he discusses considerations “relating to thickness of the electrodes, not of output conductors.” PO Resp. 19–20. But, Mr. Gardner’s testimony similarly relies on passages directed to “basic concepts” of battery operations and, as a whole, focuses on the concept that reducing the thickness of the terminal electrode plates would “maximize the space available inside the cell for active components,” thereby increasing electrode density and improving battery performance. Ex. 1003 ¶ 323 (citing Ex. 1009, 35). According to Mr. Gardner, “these adjustments would be well within the skill of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 104. We credit Mr. Gardner’s testimony. “Moreover, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond that person’s skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 401.” slip op. at 21

    Patent outcomesUS 9,496,581 unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,496,581
  • Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’S, Inc.All claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Sep 10, 2021 · IPR2020-00689 · APJ John E Schneider · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 15 and 16 are unpatentable: claim 15 as anticipated by Ogawa and obvious over Ogawa and Masahiro; claim 16 as obvious over Ogawa with Cherk, and with Masahiro and Cherk.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We have considered the arguments presented by the parties and the evidence of record and are not persuaded that our original definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art was in error. While the claims at issue refer to an optical grade fabric, we note that the fabric is not the invention. Rather, as stated in the Specification, the field of the invention is “cleaning tools for electronic display screens, and more specifically to cleaning tools for computer display screens and the like.” Ex. 1001, col. 1, ll. 4–6. The claims further narrow the field of the invention to cleaning tools in the form of a doll-like structure. Id. at col. 6, l. 37. Based on the forgoing, we continue to apply the same definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art we used in our Decision on Institution. However, the findings and conclusions set forth below would have been the same had we instead adopted Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We have considered the arguments presented by the parties and the evidence of record and conclude that Petitioner has the better position. The term “display screen,” as used in the challenged claims, refers to an intended use of the cleaning tool. As such, it does limit the scope of the claims. We begin by noting that the challenged claims are directed to a device or apparatus. Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 8–13. As such, the claims “cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (1990). The preamble of both claims 6 and 11 read in part: “doll-like figure for cleaning or wiping the surface of a display screen.” Ex. 1001, col. 6, ll. 37–38; col. 7, ll. 1–2. Both claims end with the clause “providing a pliant cleaning tool for wiping a display screen.” Id. at col. 6, ll. 50–51; col. 7, ll. 13–14. These phrases are crafted in terms of a device for performing a specific function or use. This type of phrase has been found to recite an intended use and not a physical limitation. See Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1294–96 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The recitation of the intended use in the body of the claim does not affect our analysis. The term for wiping a display screen still recites a use of the device that does not impart a structural limitation.” slip op. at 11

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We have considered the testimony of both experts and the evidence of record and find Mrs. Ryan’s testimony to be more persuasive. Therefore, we agree with Petitioner that Ogawa discloses a wiping tool which has an inner chamber formed by a strip of optical grade fabric — the wipe portion — and a non-optical grade fabric — the gripping body. We give more weight to Mrs. Ryan’s testimony based on her extensive experience in designing plush toys. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3–5. Mrs. Ryan has worked in the area of plush toy design for over twenty-six years and has taught classes relating to plush toy design. Id. ¶¶ 3–4; page 40. In addition, Mrs. Ryan’s testimony regarding how one skilled in the art would envision the wiping tool of Ogawa is consistent with the evidence of record. For example, King4 teaches that teddy bears are formed by joining pieces of fabric creating an inner pocket into which stuffing is inserted. Ex. 1026, 7–12. Cockrill5 also teaches that teddy bears are traditionally made by cutting out the material, sewing the pieces together, and then stuffing the bears. Ex. 1025, 67.” slip op. at 17

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “We have considered the testimony of both experts and the evidence of record and find Mrs. Ryan’s testimony to be more persuasive. Therefore, we agree with Petitioner that Ogawa discloses a wiping tool which has an inner chamber formed by a strip of optical grade fabric — the wipe portion — and a non-optical grade fabric — the gripping body. We give more weight to Mrs. Ryan’s testimony based on her extensive experience in designing plush toys. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3–5. Mrs. Ryan has worked in the area of plush toy design for over twenty-six years and has taught classes relating to plush toy design. Id. ¶¶ 3–4; page 40. In addition, Mrs. Ryan’s testimony regarding how one skilled in the art would envision the wiping tool of Ogawa is consistent with the evidence of record. For example, King4 teaches that teddy bears are formed by joining pieces of fabric creating an inner pocket into which stuffing is inserted. Ex. 1026, 7–12. Cockrill5 also teaches that teddy bears are traditionally made by cutting out the material, sewing the pieces together, and then stuffing the bears. Ex. 1025, 67. Dr. Adanur’s experience and expertise appears to be primarily focused on textiles. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 8–24. While Dr. Adanur testified that he has some experience in the area of plush toys, that experience appears to be limited to selection of fabric that could be used to manufacture plush toys and making several puppets at home to earn extra money. Ex. 1027, 52, 57–59, 78–79. In addition, Dr. Adanur does not cite to any evidence other than Ogawa to support his opinions as to what one skilled in the art would envision upon reading Ogawa. See Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 84–87. Patent Owner, however, contends that Ogawa is silent as to whether the tool has an inner chamber made from a piece of optical grade fabric and a piece of non-optical grade fabric. PO Resp. 1, 22. 4 King, Make Your Own Teddy Bears, 1985 (Ex. 1026) (“King”). 5 Cockrill, The Teddy Bear Encyclopedia, 1993 (Ex. 1025) (“Cockrill”).” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 6,195,831 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,195,831
  • PTAB · Dec 19, 2019 · CBM2018-00037 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision

    Claims 1–15 are unpatentable under § 101; the motion to amend is granted for proposed substitute claims 16–23, which were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

      “does not remove the claim from the realm of abstract ideas. See Pet. 52–53; Reply 12; SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that it “does not matter to [the conclusion that the claim is directed to an abstract idea] whether the information here is information about real investments,” as “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract” (citation omitted)). Further, the last two clauses of claim 1 that recite how the transaction is viewed from the perspectives of the participant and vendor system, respectively, merely express the “non-physical result” of the information transfers and confirm the abstract nature of the claimed subject matter. See Pet. 57. In fact, as to the vendor system clause, the Specification indicates that the vendor system transfers information no differently than it would for any other transaction. See Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 15–18 (disclosing that vendor system 208 responds to purchase request 216 “in the same way that it would respond to any other purchase request from a consumer that presents a credit card”).” slip op. at 35

    • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

      “Our conclusion also is supported by the ’087 patent’s description of” slip op. at 41

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

      “transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75

    • 101 substituteMixed

      “transaction, . . . display[ing] an order message indicating the completion of the purchase transaction to the respective participant.” Mot., App’x A, 4. An example in which a judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application is when “an additional element adds insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (holding that a step of adjusting an alarm limit variable was “post-solution activity”). Displaying an order message after the facilitated transaction has been completed amounts to insignificant post-solution activity, and does not support a conclusion that the abstract idea of claim 16 is integrated into a practical application.” slip op. at 75

    Patent outcomesUS 7,134,087 unpatentable
    § 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Berkheimer · Enfish
    Patents in suitUS 7,134,087
  • PTAB · Jul 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01818 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–11 of the ’730 patent and claims 1–15 of the ’988 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the Advisory Committee Art, with claims 2 and 10 of the ’988 patent also obvious over that …

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In view of the claims at issue here, we are not persuaded that the level of ordinary skill in the art is limited to the level of skill or interest of a pharmacist that dispenses FDA-approved drugs, such as one that “sits behind the counter at Walgreens.” Id. at 31:1–5. We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art as described by Petitioner and its witness, Dr. Valuck, because it is consistent with the subject matter before us, the ’730 patent, and with prior art of record, such as Talk About Sleep (Ex.1033), Honigfeld (Ex. 1034), Elsayed (Ex. 1035), and Lilly (Ex. 1036). See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionTerm construed board ownMixed

      “Upon considering all of the evidence before us, we are not persuaded that the plain and ordinary meaning of “periodic” in the context of the ’730 patent limits “periodic reports” to those generated only at regular intervals, as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 28. Rather, the term includes reports generated at regular intervals and reports generated “now and again” or “intermittently,” without any particular regularity in time between events. Thus, we construe “periodic reports” as recited in the challenged claims to refer to reports that are generated at regular intervals or intermittently, i.e., now and again, including those not generated at regular intervals.” slip op. at 18

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “For the reasons given above, we find Petitioner’s evidence sufficient to prove by a preponderance that Exhibits 1004–1006 were publicly accessible on the FDA’s website not later than July 1, 2001.” slip op. at 35

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “of the ’730 patent (and claims 1, 4–9, and 12–15 of the ’988 patent) would have been obvious over the ACA (Exhibits 1003–1006), because the ACA is a public disclosure of the proposed risk management system for Xyrem—the same system covered by the ’730 and ’988 patents. Pet. 18–38; Reply 1. Petitioner relies on the Declaration testimony of Dr. Valuck in support of its argument that a POSA would have had “ample” reason to combine the ACA documents because the documents were prepared for the Advisory Committee Meeting and “relate to the same restricted distribution program, which the meeting was convened to discuss.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 51). Petitioner asserts, in particular, the Preliminary Clinical Safety Review (Ex. 1004), Briefing Booklet (Ex. 1005), and Xyrem Video and Transcript (Ex. 1006) were “all distributed together for a single meeting before the FDA seeking approval for prescription Xyrem®,” and the FDA Advisory Committee Transcript and Slides (Ex. 1003) was “a public transcript of and presentation given at the meeting itself.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 51) (emphasis added). In addition, according to Petitioner, all four ACA documents “clearly relate to the same restricted distribution program, which the meeting was convened to discuss,” and are “all linked from a single [web] page.” Id. Patent Owner does not address directly the cited evidence in the context of motivation to combine the ACA. Patent Owner challenges the motivation of a POSA to confirm that a patient has read the Xyrem educational material prior to shipping the drug product to the patient (step 1.4), an issue we address below. PO Resp. 37, 49–59. We agree with Petitioner’s analysis and determine that a POSA would have had ample motivation to combine the ACA documents, which were prepared at the same time, relate to the same drug product and the same restricted drug distribution system, were discussed together at the same Xyrem Advisory Committee Meeting, and were made available via file links from a single FDA web page.” slip op. at 39

    Patent outcomesUS 7,668,730 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,668,730
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2015 · IPR2014-00631 · APJ Richard E Rice · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 8, 11, 13–16, 19–21, and 24 as anticipated by Mishima; claims 3–7, 9, 10, 12, and 15–23 under specified obviousness combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner’s argument that we should limit “selecting” in claim 1 to “user . . . selecting” (PO Resp. 3) is not persuasive for the reasons that we provided in the Decision to Institute. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In addition, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction would exclude embodiments in which the image capture device, itself, selects an automatic trigger condition. E.g., Ex. 1001, 10:28–32 (“The camera automatically enters the automatic response mode as soon as power is applied unless otherwise instructed by the operator. Alternately, configuration tools can be provided to select from various sensed conditions.”), 12:23–26 (“Once one or more subjects of interest have been stored, digital image capture device 10 can employ these subjects of interest as image capture triggers whenever it is placed in automatic response mode.”). Patent Owner has not explained sufficiently why “selecting” should be interpreted to exclude such embodiments. See, e.g., Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that, at least where claims can be interpreted reasonably to include a specific embodiment, it is incorrect to construe the claims to exclude that embodiment, absent probative evidence to the contrary). For the above reasons, we determine that the term “selecting” carries its ordinary and customary meanings, and is not limited to acts performed by a user of the image capture device; and we maintain our interpretation.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “[D]isavowal requires that ‘the specification [or prosecution history] make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.’” GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Applying that standard in this case, we are not persuaded that the prosecution history makes clear that claim 1 does not include “entering” of a threshold level by the image capture device itself. The statement on which Patent Owner relies is only part of a sentence; the full sentence reads as follows: In amended Claim 1, a trigger condition and associated threshold [are] selected by a user in a step prior to image capture, the image capture device then monitors a signal corresponding to the trigger condition so that the image capture device can automatically determine when an image should he captured without intervention by a user. Ex. 1015, 6 (emphasis added). The thrust of that sentence, as explained in the paragraph that follows it in the prosecution history, is that, in claim 1, “the timing of image capture[] is determined automatically by the image capture device without the involvement of the user.” Id. (emphasis added). The Beck reference is not distinguished by the applicant on the basis of how the threshold level is selected, but rather on how an image is captured “after a trigger condition and associated threshold ha[ve] been satisfied.” Id. As such, whether “a trigger condition and associated threshold” are selected by a user, or by the device itself, is not central to applicant’s argument distinguishing the Beck reference. Accordingly, the statement that “a trigger condition and associated threshold [are] selected by a user” does not evidence a clear intent to disavow claim scope, contrary to Patent Owner’s contention. For the reasons discussed above, we determine that the broadest slip op. at 24

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “In opposition, Patent Owner argues that Mishima fails to disclose entering a threshold level corresponding to the automatic trigger condition, because, as asserted by Dr. Bovik, “the user is not involved in setting the threshold in any way.” PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 72). As discussed above, however, the user does not need to be involved in setting the threshold level under our interpretation of “entering.” See supra Section II.A.4. That is, the term “entering” is not limited to acts of entering performed by a user, but encompasses acts of entering performed by the image capture device itself. See id. We determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Mishima discloses “entering a threshold level.” See PO Resp. 32. In particular, Petitioner has shown that, when the user sets Mishima’s device in the automatic mode and selects a reference image for comparison with a captured image or photographic subject, the device sets or selects a threshold level, such as Kn, P, or 40%, and, thus, satisfies the “entering a threshold level” requirement under our claim construction. See Pet. 13–15; Pet. Reply 13–15; Ex. 1002 ¶ 43; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 13, 48–50; Ex. 1005 ¶ 40 (describing “setting a threshold value Kn” based on reference brightness value K0), ¶ 90 (setting or selecting “X < P” to determine a match, where P is a threshold value and X is the average square of differences between the part that is subject to recognition and the user-selected image pattern); ¶ 114 (describing setting a threshold level as “40%” of “the number of pixels that produce 1”). Moreover, we are not persuaded by Dr. Bovik’s testimony that “the user [in Mishima] is not involved in setting the threshold in any way.” See Ex. 2006 ¶ 72. Dr. Bovik does not address adequately Mishima’s disclosure that the user places the camera in the automatic imaging mode and selects a reference image6 for comparison with a captured image or photographic subject. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 37, 38, 83, 85, 87, 97, 98, 107, 108; see Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 37, 83). Those acts satisfy “selecting an automatic image trigger condition.” See Pet. 14; Ex. 1002 ¶ 42. Dr. Bovik does not discuss whether those acts also satisfy “entering a threshold level corresponding to the automatic image trigger condition.” As such, Dr. Bovik’s analysis of Mishima is inconsistent with his” slip op. at 31

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “In opposition, Patent Owner argues that a person of skill in the art would not have combined the teachings of Mishima and Misawa because: (1) the devices of Mishima and Misawa are not similar as Petitioner contends and, in fact, operate in fundamentally different ways, (2) the reasons Petitioner provides for combining Mishima and Misawa are undermined by the teachings of those references, and (3) Misawa would discourage one of ordinary skill from combining it with Mishima to arrive at the inventions of claims 3-6. PO Resp. 34. Patent Owner argues, for example, that Misawa “has nothing to do with automatic image trigger conditions, thresholds, or automatic image capture.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 91). We are persuaded by Petitioner, however, that Patent Owner’s argument is largely unresponsive to Petitioner’s asserted reason to combine, which “does not rely on Misawa for automatic image capture, but for an example user interface for creating an image database.” See Pet. Reply 15. We also are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill “would have looked to Misawa’s user interface as an example of how to construct/control image feature database 80 used in Mishima’s camera.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex 1005 ¶¶ 80, 94); see Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 53–55. Patent Owner has not persuaded us that using Misawa’s selection/extraction process in Mishima’s camera would have been outside the skill in the art, or yielded an unpredictable result. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Further, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Misawa would have led one in a divergent direction and, thus, teaches away from the recited method. See PO Resp. 44–45 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 108–111). Patent Owner has not shown that Misawa criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages investigation into the invention claimed. See Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009 (“A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into the invention claimed.”) (emphases added; citation omitted). Patent Owner makes essentially the same arguments for claims 4–6 as” slip op. at 37

    Patent outcomesUS 7,817,914 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,817,914
  • PTAB · Aug 19, 2015 · IPR2014-00632 · APJ Richard E Rice · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 8, 11, 13–16, 19–21, and 24 as anticipated by Mishima; claims 3–7, 9, 10, 12, 15–18, 22, and 23 as obvious over specified combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner’s argument that we should limit “selecting” in claim 1 to “user . . . selecting” (PO Resp. 3) is not persuasive for the reasons that we provided in the Decision to Institute. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In addition, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction would exclude embodiments in which the image capture device, itself, selects an automatic trigger condition. E.g., Ex. 1001, 10:28–32 (“The camera automatically enters the automatic response mode as soon as power is applied unless otherwise instructed by the operator. Alternately, configuration tools can be provided to select from various sensed conditions.”), 12:23–26 (“Once one or more subjects of interest have been stored, digital image capture device 10 can employ these subjects of interest as image capture triggers whenever it is placed in automatic response mode.”). Patent Owner has not explained sufficiently why “selecting” should be interpreted to exclude such embodiments. See, e.g., Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that, at least where claims can be interpreted reasonably to include a specific embodiment, it is incorrect to construe the claims to exclude that embodiment, absent probative evidence to the contrary). For the above reasons, we determine that the term “selecting” carries its ordinary and customary meanings, and is not limited to acts performed by a user of the image capture device; and we maintain our interpretation.” slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “[D]isavowal requires that ‘the specification [or prosecution history] make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.’” GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Applying that standard in this case, we are not persuaded that the prosecution history makes clear that claim 1 does not include “entering” of a threshold level by the image capture device itself. slip op. at 24

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “7 Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art as “(1) a Bachelor’s degree in electronics, computer science, or a related discipline and 2-3 years of camera electronics design and implementation experience, or (2) a Master’s degree or higher in a field such as electronics, computer science, or a related discipline with some concentration in imaging systems or image processing.” PO Resp. 5 n.2 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 16–17; Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 25–27). We adopt that definition for purposes of this Final Written Decision. 8 Patent Owner does not contend in the Patent Owner Response that any secondary considerations are present that would render the challenged claims patentable over the combined teachings of these references.” slip op. at 35

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “electronic device.” See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 9–16). We credit Dr. Stevenson’s testimony on this point: Data entry in electronic devices occurs through a variety of different mechanisms. For instance, in the context of electronic devices, including digital cameras, “entering” of data encompasses the electronic input of data into a component of the electronic device, such as a processor or memory. An electronic device’s operating instructions may cause the device to input data into a processor or memory. The entered data may be data from another memory (e.g., read-only memory (“ROM”)), a removable memory card, or a network.” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 7,817,914 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,817,914

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.