- Stmicroelectronics, Inc. v. Neodron Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 15, 2021 · IPR2021-01161 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Philipp and QT60161.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Givargis Declaration (Ex. 1003), which Patent Owner does not address at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that the combination of Philipp and QT60161 teaches each claim limitation recited in claim 1 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of the references in the manner set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated, on this record, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Philipp and QT60161. 4. Claims 2–20 Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’251 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (indicating that a decision whether to institute an inter partes review “requires a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every” slip op. at 18
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Parallel Petitions Challenging the Same Patent. Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). CTPG, 59. Nonetheless, the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide recognizes that “more than one petition may be necessary, including for example, . . . when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. The present circumstance is consistent with the exception referenced in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide because there is a potential dispute about the effective filing date of the ’251 patent, which may require arguments to be made under multiple prior art references. See Paper 3, 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner has not requested that we exercise our discretion to only consider, at most, one petition. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition under § 314(a). E.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“implement these functions with a touch screen and to trigger the claimed time duration from detecting a ‘key touch on a/the touch screen’ pursuant to the touch screen teachings of QT60161.” Pet. 36.9 More specifically, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to apply the timed features of Philipp “to a ‘touch screen’ and to trigger the claimed time duration from detecting a ‘key touch on a/the touch screen.’” Id. at 29. According to Petitioner, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have made such a combination because (1) “the primary timer-based functions described and claimed in the ’251 Patent are not only compatible with the touch screen described in QT60161, but are expressly discussed in QT60161” (id. at 30; see also id. at 3031 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:61– 7:2; Ex. 1017, 7)), 9 The Petition emphasizes the names of prior art references. The emphasis is omitted throughout this Decision. (2) QT60161 and Philipp “are compatible with the same sensor technology” (id. at 31; see also id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1017, 5, Figs. 1-1, 1-2; Ex. 1024 ¶ 48, 49; Ex. 1003 ¶ 52; Ex. 1028, Figs. 1b, 7)), (3) both the ’251 patent and QT60161 are directed to saving power after the passage of time (id. at 32–33 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:55–65, 10:41–13:59; Ex. 1017, 11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97– 103)), and (4) implementing Philipp “with QT60161’s touch screen would have yielded predictable results” (id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 97–103)). After reviewing Petitioner’s arguments and information, including the Givargis Declaration (Ex. 1003), which Patent Owner does not address at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that the combination of Philipp and QT60161 teaches each claim limitation recited in claim 1 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of the references in the manner set forth in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated, on this record, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable over Philipp and QT60161.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner
“In evaluating the effective filing date of the ’251 patent, we first address the parties’ respective burdens. In an inter partes review, Petitioner bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding unpatentability, which never shifts to patent owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Dynamic Drinkware also establishes that Petitioner has the initial burden of production to show a reference is prior art. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379. However, the burden of production then shifts to Patent Owner to refute Petitioner’s argument by either showing the prior art does not actually render the claims unpatentable or does not qualify as prior art. Id. at 1380. The burden of production then shifts back to Petitioner to respond to Patent Owner’s argument. Id. The Board then evaluates all of the evidence and determines whether Petitioner has satisfied its burden of persuasion regarding unpatentability. Id. We apply the same framework when considering whether the parties have met their respective burdens at this stage of the proceeding. (2) Application of Dynamic Drinkware Based on the current status of the proceedings, we are sufficiently persuaded that Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production under Dynamic Drinkware. Specifically, Petitioner identifies two claim terms— “touch screen” and “key touch on a/the touch screen”—that are recited in each of the independent claims and were added to the ’274 application. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002, 38–41); see also id. at 11–17. Additionally, as discussed below, Petitioner has also sufficiently shown that the combination of Philipp and QT60161 teaches each of the limitations of the claims of the ’251 patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.2d at 1379 (finding Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production by arguing that the prior art rendered the claims unpatentable). Because Petitioner satisfied its initial burden of production, the burden of production now shifts to Patent Owner to argue or produce evidence that either (1) the prior art does not render the claims unpatentable or (2) that Philipp is not prior art because the asserted claims of the ’251 patent are entitled to the benefit of a filing date (constructive or otherwise) prior to Philipp. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380. Because Patent Owner—as is its right—chose not to file a Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, for purposes of institution only, Patent Owner did not meet its burden of production to show that the ’251 patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than Philipp.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,749,251 - Stmicroelectronics, Inc. v. Neodron Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 15, 2021 · IPR2021-01160 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” PTAB Rules of Practice for Instituting on All Challenged Patent Claims and All Grounds and Eliminating the Presumption at Institution Favoring Petitioner as to Testimonial Evidence, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,120, 79,129 (Dec. 9, 2020) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2021)).” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Parallel Petitions Challenging the Same Patent. Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). CTPG, 59. Nonetheless, the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide recognizes that “more than one petition may be necessary, including for example, . . . when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. Because there is a dispute about the effective filing date of the ’251 patent, which may require arguments to be made under multiple prior art references, the present circumstance is consistent with the exception referenced in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide. See Paper 3, 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner has not requested that we exercise our discretion to only consider, at most, one petition. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny this Petition under § 314(a). E.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have been a person having at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of human-machine interfaces such as touch sensors and the firmware or system software that govern said interfaces, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22). Patent Owner does not address this issue. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art that Petitioner proffers, except that we delete the qualifiers “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of education and practical experience. The qualifiers expand the range indefinitely without an upper bound, and thus precludes a meaningful indication of the level of ordinary skill in the art.7 C.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes constructions for two terms. See Pet. 11–16. Because no express construction is needed to resolve any dispute in this proceeding, we do not construe any of the claim limitations. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 10
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,749,251 - PTAB · Dec 14, 2021 · IPR2021-00862 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness over the Swinger-based combinations in grounds 1–3.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The Supreme Court has held that a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least 1 claim of the ’001 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, an inter partes review of all of the claims and all of the grounds presented in the Petition is hereby instituted.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“For purposes of this Decision, at this stage of the proceeding we generally accept Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’001 patent; however, we also agree with Patent Owner that such a definition should be flexible enough to include a person with a lesser academic degree and having experience working in the field, such as an engineer with clinical experience in ophthalmic surgery, as well as also including a medical doctor, such as an ophthalmic surgeon with experience working with medical optics and lasers, and that these people may collaborate. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Such an expanded definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, including aspects of both parties’ definitions, is appropriate based on our review of the record, which includes a significant number of prior art references authored by PhDs, MDs, and BSs and combinations thereof. See, e.g., Ex. 1015 (we understand includes inventors that are PhDs and MDs); Ex. 1039 (we understand includes PhDs and MDs as inventors); Ex. 1040 (we understand inventor is a JD with a BS); Ex. 1041 (we understand authors are MDs); Ex. 1042 (we understand authors are PhDs, MD, and BS); Ex. 1043 (we understand authors are MDs); Ex. 1045 (we understand inventor is MD); see also Ex. 1053; Ex. 1054; 1; Ex. 2010; Ex. 2019. However, our decision to institute trial in this proceeding is not dependent upon the specific definition of ordinarily skilled artisan and would not change were we to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not assert that any claim term requires express construction. See Pet. 6 (stating that it “reserves the right to respond to any constructions that PO submits”). Patent Owner does not present any remarks regarding claim construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“After considering both the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence on the issues of motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success provide a sufficient basis on which to institute trial. We recognize the merit of Patent Owner’s counterarguments, which are supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Kang. Prelim. Resp. 21–22, 27–29 (citing generally Ex. 2002). The issues identified by Patent Owner implicate genuine issues of fact more appropriately resolved at trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). We decline to engage in weighing of the information presented at this stage of the proceeding. We will evaluate both parties’ arguments and evidence once the record is fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,709,001 - PTAB · Dec 13, 2021 · IPR2021-01128 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–12, and 14–19 on all petitioned grounds, after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes the same articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art that the Administrative Law Judge adopted in the related ITC proceeding, which is as follows: one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of touch sensors, human-machine interaction and interfaces, and/or graphical user interfaces, and related firmware and software, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 6; Ex. 1008, 8. Dr. Bederson agrees with it. See Pet. 6, Bederson Decl. ¶ 30. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’173 patent and the prior art of record. Therefore, we adopt the proposed articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Although a number of ’173 patent claim terms have been construed in the related ITC proceeding, Petitioner contends that we do not need to explicitly construe any claim terms. Pet. 6–7. In particular, the constructions for the selected terms in the related ITC proceeding are as follows, according to Petitioner. Term Construction a sensing element that com-a physical electrical sensing element prises a sensing path that com-made of conductive substances that prises a length comprises a path for sensing that is determined for each use that com-prises a length object either an inanimate object, such as a wiper, pointer, or stylus, or alterna-tively, a human finger or other ap-pendage any of whose presence ad-jacent the element will create a lo-calized capacitive coupling from a region of the element back to a cir-cuit reference via any circuitous path, whether galvanically or nongalvanically displacement distance and direction of movement Pet. 6−7. Petitioner does not dispute these constructions (id.), which we find reasonable at this juncture. Therefore, we preliminarily adopt these constructions for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At our discretion, we may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all asserted grounds and all challenged claims of the ’173 patent for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record, including any timely response by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Further, to the extent the range of parameter values is not expressly or inherently taught by Trent, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to set a parameter to an initial value within a range that is associated with the length of the sensing path. Id. Relying on testimony of Dr. Bederson, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the volume control knob of Trent’s Figure 36 (reproduced above in our overview of Trent) with functionality that sets the volume to an initial value as disclosed in Trent’s paragraph 92. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 4−11; Bederson Decl. ¶¶ 91–93). Petitioner also argues that Trent identifies, as part of the prior art “solutions” to the problem of the invention, a two-dimensional sensor in which users can slide their fingers to generate scrolling actions. Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 11). According to Dr. Bederson, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that such a sensor would set a parameter to an initial value as recited in the claims. See Bederson Decl. ¶ 93. We find Petitioner’s arguments, and Dr. Bederson’s supporting testimony on the above points, sufficiently persuasive at this preliminary stage to show by a reasonable likelihood that Trent discloses or teaches the Setting Parameter Limitation.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,432,173 - PTAB · Dec 8, 2021 · IPR2021-00608 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same arguments were previously presented and examiner error was not shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its petition. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Advanced Bionics, we exercised our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and determined not to institute inter partes review. Dec. 7−26 (citing Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte Gmbh, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential)). As to Part 1 of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that the same or substantially the same arguments were presented previously to the Office. Id. at 10−13. Under Part 2 of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that Petitioner failed to show that the Examiner erred by not realizing that Chu ’330 and Chu ’886 qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art and are material to the patentability of the claims in the ’654 patent. Id. at 14−26.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are new arguments raised for the first time in its Rehearing Request. Petitioner acknowledges that “NRG and Hollmer were not cited in the Petition.” Req. Reh’g 10. Nevertheless, Petitioner alleges that it “could not have anticipated the Patent Owner’s mischaracterization of the Droplets decision, nor the Board’s reliance on this mischaracterization,” and that Petitioner was not authorized to file a reply to the Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Id.; see also id. at 2−3, fn.1. Petitioner’s new arguments in connection with Hollmer and NRG are improper. As we discussed above, Patent Owner did not mischaracterize and we did not misapprehend Droplets. It was not necessary to authorize Petitioner to file a reply, as we were capable of determining whether Patent Owner mischaracterizes Droplets. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to recognize that the language relied upon by Patent Owner in Droplets is consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 and MPEP § 608.01(p). Although Petitioner relies on MPEP § 608.01(p) in its Petition, Petitioner now in its Rehearing Request for the first time suggests that we should ignore MPEP § 608.01(p) and the case law cited in MPEP § 608.01(p). Pet. 11–12; Req. Reh’g 6−7. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new arguments, after the decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). It is Petitioner’s burden to identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked in our Decision to Institute. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked the new arguments that were not presented in the record until after the Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, section 1.57 of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations is not a “statute,” but a regulation that became effective on September 21, 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg. 56,482. The ’882 application, which incorporated Chu ’886 by reference, was filed on September 8, 1998, and issued as Chu ’330 on February 5, 2002. Ex. 1005, codes (21), (22), (45), (60), 6:1–7. The ’654 patent, which incorporated the ’882 application by reference, is a reissue of Application No. 09/312,199 (“the ’199 application”) filed on May 14, 1999, now U.S. Patent No. 6,634,777 (“the ’777 patent”), issued on November 4, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (63), (64); 5:63–67. Both the ’882 application (issued as Chu ’330) and the ’199 application (reissued as the ’654 patent) were filed and issued as patents prior to the effective date, September 21, 2004, of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57. Petitioner does not explain why the applicant should have complied with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57, which did not exist at the time of filing of those applications or issuance of those patents that incorporated by reference Chu ’886 and the ’882 application. Pet. 7–8, 10−17; Req. Reh’g 1−12. We decline to apply 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 retroactively to the incorporation by reference statements submitted in the ’882 application and the ’199 application.” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial - Google LLC v. Traxcell Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 7, 2021 · IPR2021-01004 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–30 because Google did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim of the ’196 patent. The Petition is denied.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“Nonetheless, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the proffered combination, as required by KSR. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, it is not the case that “the identification technique disclosed in Hancock necessarily includes a determination of whether the device type is fixed or mobile.” Pet. 15. Rather, each separate embodiment of a portable computing device used in the Hancock system has an automatic location identification (ALI) device that is specifically designed for that device. Ex. 1005, 23:51–24:4 (describing “ALI Example I” and “ALI Example II” for cellular devices, and an additional example for land-line telephone devices). There is no suggestion of providing, for any of Hancock’s devices or server, the capability to determine whether the device is fixed or mobile, and Hancock suggests no reason to have that capability. Each device has its own ALI that is specifically designed for that device. Because we find insufficient factual support for Petitioner’s basic premise, that “the identification technique disclosed in Hancock necessarily includes a determination of whether the device type is fixed or mobile,” the rationale for the combination fails scrutiny. Even though Karp discloses a step in which a server determines whether a communicating device is a cell device, there is no persuasive reason in the present record why one of ordinary skill would have considered that pertinent to Hancock.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Either proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). On this record, the level of ordinary skill is neither in dispute nor dispositive of any challenge. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner states, “[n]o claims need be expressly construed.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner does not propose any constructions of the claims for purposes here. Prelim. Resp. 3–4. For purposes of this Decision, we do not construe any claim terms. D.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,918,196 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2021 · IPR2021-00846 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–12 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would show at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim of the ’356 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“A petition must “identify with particularity the grounds for institution and evidence supporting such grounds,” including “the prior art relied upon and evidence that it qualifies as such.” Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)). The Petition identifies the grounds for institution and the evidence supporting such grounds, and presents evidence that Weikert qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 5–6, 27. For example, Petitioner and Dr. Lubatschowski assert that CATARACT AND REFRACTIVE SURGERY “is a quarterly review series comprising chapters written by well-known specialists,” and that Weikert was included in the 2005 edition of” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded, on this record, that this disclosure rises to the level of a teaching away. First, Weikert does not address the specific laser system disclosed in Blumenkranz, which is already designed to successfully treat eyes with cataracts, and Patent Owner and Dr. Kang do not persuasively explain why Weikert’s concerns would apply to a non-excimer laser surgery system that is already designed to treat “eyes with cataracts.” See Ex. 1017 ¶ 8; Ex. 2002 ¶ 62; see also Ex. 2002 ¶ 57 (Dr. Kang asserting that the PRK and LASIK excimer laser systems disclosed in Weikert are unrelated to the claimed relaxation incision made during cataract surgery). Second, Weikert suggests that eyes with cataracts “could reduce the efficacy and safety of laser treatment” and that refractive keratotomy “can be an effective” option, but does not indicate that laser surgery is never, or is generally not, suitable for treating astigmatism in eyes with cataracts. Ex. 1019, 227 (emphasis added). As such, we are left with a disputed issue of material fact that is best resolved on a complete trial record.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“The evidence set forth by Patent Owner presents significant issues of fact to be addressed at trial. On the one hand, it is evident that modifying cataract surgical systems for use on the cornea, or providing a system that is capable of performing both corneal and lens surgery, was extremely difficult. Ex. 2006, 5:33–36, 25:27–31; Ex. 2007, 8:32–39, 15:53–58; Ex. 2009, 1209–11. On the other hand, Blumenkranz specifically asserts that its system is useful for not only cataract surgery, but also surgery on other areas of the eye, including the sclera, and Dr. Lubatschowski testifies that the system of Blumenkranz is “well-suited to perform . . . anterior incisions to permit access to the inner eye chamber.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 71; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 107–108. Such evidence facially supports Petitioner’s case for obviousness. Thus, considering this evidence as a whole, we are left with a material issue of fact as to the capabilities of the Blumenkranz system that is best resolved on a complete trial record, and after reviewing the cross-examination testimony of the parties’ declarants.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,376,356 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2021 · IPR2021-00849 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims would be unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim of the ’548 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–14 of the ’548 patent. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“For purposes of this Decision, we generally accept Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosures of the ’548 patent; however, we also agree with Patent Owner that such a definition should be flexible enough to include a person with a lesser academic degree and having experience working in the field, such as an engineer with clinical experience in ophthalmic surgery, as well as a medical doctor, such as an ophthalmic surgeon with experience working with medical optics and lasers. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in “the prior art itself”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Such an expanded definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, including aspects of both parties’ definitions, is appropriate based on our review of the record, which demonstrates individuals having a broad array of scientific degrees that collaborate as a team. We note, however, that our decision to institute trial in this proceeding would not change were we to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Both parties provide a construction of the term “cataract incision.” Pet. 7–9; Prelim. Resp. 17–18. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we determine that no claim terms require construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“and evidence supporting such grounds,” including “the prior art relied upon and evidence that it qualifies as such.” Hulu, Paper 29 at 13 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)). The Petition identifies the grounds for institution and the evidence supporting such grounds, and presents evidence that Weikert qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 5–6, 28–29. For example, Petitioner and Dr. Lubatschowski assert that CATARACT AND REFRACTIVE SURGERY “is a quarterly review series comprising chapters written by well-known specialists,” and that Weikert was included in the 2005 edition of CATARACT AND REFRACTIVE SURGERY as Chapter 14: Refractive Keratotomy: Does it Have a Future Role in Refractive Surgery? Ex. 1001 ¶ 73. Although minimal, given the type of document involved, and in the absence of any reason to question Petitioner’s and Dr. Lubatschowski’s assertions, Petitioner’s evidence is sufficient to present a reasonable likelihood that Weikert is prior art to the ’548 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,709,548 - Intel Corporation v. Acqis LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2021-01099 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–22 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same arguments had been presented to the Office and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Under § 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. If the petitioner fails to show that the Office erred, the Director may exercise his or her discretion not to institute inter partes review. Id.; see also Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8, 24 (exercising discretion where “Petitioner has not pointed to error by the Examiner”). slip op. at 7
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,529,769 - Intel Corporation v. Acqis LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2021-01103 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 14–38 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same arguments had been presented before and Intel had not shown material Office error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Under § 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. If the petitioner fails to show that the Office erred, the Director may exercise his or her discretion not to institute inter partes review. Id.; see also Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8, slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office and that Petitioner fails to show that the Examiner erred in determining that the ’882 application (issued as Chu ’330) incorporated Chu ’886 by reference or in entering the amendment that added the subject matter from Chu ’886 in the ’138 application. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion not to institute inter partes review. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8; see also Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8, 24. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 25
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“In short, under Part II of the Advanced Bionics framework, Petitioner has the burden to show that the Examiner erred in determining that Chu ’330 incorporated by reference Chu ’886. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denial
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.