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  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00710 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9, 13, and 16–20 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on both obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner states that “[w]hile Patent Owner disagrees with the proposed level of skill, under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner does not, at this point, propose a different level of skill. Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’294 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and neither party offers any particular construction for any claim term. Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. Having considered both parties arguments and evidence in light of the challenged claims, at this stage, we are not apprised of any reason to explicitly construe any claim term for purposes of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Considering first the motivation to combine, we find Petitioner’s reasoning sufficiently persuasive for purposes of institution. Petitioner argues that Okita’s “pseudo values” are just like Schneier’s credits and “[b]ecause the pseudo-values can be exchanged for virtual money that can be used in other tournaments, arcades, or the like, ‘a game can be provided that generates tension for the player due to the fact that the virtual money is earned or is confiscated based on the game results.’” Pet. 51 (quoting Ex. 1009 ¶ 9). Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Crevelt, further testifies that Okita’s “[r]ewards programs are a routine feature of games because players are encouraged to play more to accumulate points or other pseudo-values to exchange for prizes or other items . . . [t]he virtual money conversion functionality would have opened up more game play options and more items to purchase.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 187. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of institution that the use of Okita’s pseudo-values and broad player’s interest and engagement with the video game.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,825,294
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00709 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–10, 14–18, 21–23, 25, 27, and 29 based on reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Schneier and over Schneier with Okita.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner states that “[w]hile Patent Owner disagrees with the proposed level of skill, under any level of skill a POSITA would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issue.” Prelim. Resp. 5. Patent Owner does not, at this point, propose a different level of skill. Id. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not contradicted and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’635 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction At this early stage of the proceeding, no claim terms are disputed and neither party offers any particular construction for any claim term. Pet. 12– 13; Prelim. Resp. 5. Having considered both parties arguments and evidence in light of the challenged claims, at this stage, we are not apprised of any reason to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,650,635
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00711 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–13, 15, 19, 23, 24, and 29 based on a reasonable likelihood of success on the § 103 challenges.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11‒13, 15, 19, 23, 24, and 29 of the ’164 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner argues that it is not necessary for us to provide an express construction for any claim term because the Petition “establishes the prior art meets each claim limitation under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner similarly submits that we “need not construe any terms at this stage, because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not need to expressly construe any claim terms to determine whether Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to its challenge of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Kelly discloses that game processor 12 implements the functions of game unit 10 during a game process and includes several input and output functions (Ex. 1005, 9:15–18), including: The game processor controls the game apparatus by receiving inputs from a player, from other game apparatuses, from a server (described below), from a progressive bonus apparatus, and from other sources. The game processor also controls output signals to update the game process when appropriate. In addition, the game processor controls the redemption system of the present invention by calculating when prizes are awarded, calculating and updating prize lists and prize costs, and other functions, as described below. Ex. 1005, 9:18–27. As to the redemption system, Kelly discloses prize table 480 that is displayed to the operator. Ex. 1005, 34:64–65, Fig. 9a. In one embodiment, the operator can adjust prize characteristics for the game unit and any linked game units. Id. at 35:1–2. Kelly also discloses an alternative embodiment, however, in which selection of a specific prize from the table 480 can be based on random and/or statistical determination. Id. at 36:48–49. In this alternative embodiment, “random determination of whether a particular prize is to be awarded is also modified by statistical information to create a ‘best fit’ of prizes awarded according to the operator’s desired odds.” Id. at 36:63–66. awarded every 8,000 games, so if it is randomly determined that a third video console is to be awarded within, for example, the 3000th game, then a different prize, e.g., the next most valuable prize, can be awarded so that the desired odds are better met. Id. at 37:1–9. Thus, we find Petitioner has set forth sufficient evidence to show a reasonable likelihood that Kelly’s game processor can modify the variable parameters of the prizing structure to meet the mandated parameters of the desired odds, as called for in limitation [1.c.v].” slip op. at 23

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artOther

      “To remove Walker as prior art under §§ 102(a) and 102(e), Patent Owner must show either it reduced the invention to practice prior to Walker’s effective date, or that it invented prior to Walker’s effective date. In the case of the latter, Patent Owner must demonstrate conception prior to May 1, 2003, and reasonably continuous diligence throughout the entire critical period, which begins just prior to the Walker’s effective date and ends on the date of the invention’s actual or constructive reduction to practice. Patent Owner provides evidence purporting to show that it conceived of the invention prior to May 1, 2003. Patent Owner has not asserted that this evidence demonstrates actual reduction to practice, nor do we have sufficient evidence at this stage to make that determination. Further, Patent Owner’s earliest possible constructive reduction to practice (September 1, 2004) does not pre-date Walker’s effective date. Thus, at this stage, Patent Owner would need to show it invented prior to Walker’s effective date through evidence of conception and reasonable diligence to remove Walker as prior art. At this stage of the proceeding, without Patent Owner’s evidence of diligence, Patent Owner has not provided sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing that Walker is prior art. This issue of whether Walker is prior art to the ’164 patent will benefit from further development of the record during the trial proceeding.” slip op. at 31

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,335,164
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00712 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 3–9, 13, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 1 over Walker.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2025). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon institution of inter partes review, the review proceeds “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on our consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’279 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedOther

      “application filed November 12, 2021, that asserts the benefit of a series of applications, the earliest of which was filed September 2, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (45), (60). Petitioner asserts that the Challenged Claims of the ’279 patent “are entitled to an effective filing date of no earlier than September 2, 2003,” consistent with the date of the earliest application identified by the ’279 patent.9 See Pet. 6. For purposes of our analysis on the current record, in this Decision we apply September 2, 2003, as the priority date of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “independent claim 1. Pet. 32–63. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Mr. Crevelt in support of its contentions with respect to claim 1. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 234–286. Further, according to Petitioner, “[n]o findings regarding motivation to combine or reasonable expectation of success are necessary with a single reference ground,” but Walker “teaches that the features of the embodiments are options that can be combined.” Pet. 42 n.6 (citing Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At this stage, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered assertions about the” slip op. at 20

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,393,279
  • PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00708 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–5, 12, 13, 18–20, 22, 24–26, 29, 42, 44–47, and 50 are unpatentable over Walker and Schneier.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2025). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon institution of inter partes review, the review proceeds “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Based on our consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’336 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art At this stage of the proceeding, there is no evidentiary dispute about the level of ordinary skill in the art.8 Based on the testimony of Mr. Crevelt, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or computer engineering, with at least three years of experience in game development. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Id. We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art 7 Petitioner states that it is not aware of secondary considerations that affect the obviousness arguments it presents. Pet. 66. Patent Owner has not offered objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. 8 Patent Owner “disagrees with the proposed level of skill” but asserts that “under any level of skill a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the asserted Grounds to raise any unpatentability issues.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Thus, Patent Owner does not present evidence or arguments in its Preliminary Response related to the level of ordinary skill in the art. competence reflected in the ’336 patent Specification and the asserted prior art references, based on our review of the limited record.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner argues that it is not necessary for us to provide an express construction for any claim term because the Petition “establishes the prior art meets each claim limitation under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner similarly submits that we “need not construe any terms at this stage, because under any reasonable construction of the claim terms, the prior art fails to disclose or suggest the claimed features.” Prelim. Resp. 8. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not need to expressly construe any claim terms to determine whether Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to its challenge of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedOther

      “an application filed September 20, 2010, that asserts the benefit of an application filed September 2, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (45), (54), (62). Petitioner asserts that the Challenged Claims of the ’336 patent “are entitled to an effective filing date of no earlier than September 2, 2003,” consistent with the date of the earliest application identified by the ’336 patent.9 See Pet. 7. For purposes of our analysis on the current record, in this Decision we apply September 2, 2003, as the priority date of the Challenged Claims. Walker was filed on May 1, 2003, and refers back to a provisional application filed on May 6, 2002, but Walker was not published until January 1, 2004. Ex. 1006, codes (22), (43), (60). Thus, Petitioner fails to show on the current record how, under pre–AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), Walker discloses an invention that was described in a printed publication in this country before the invention thereof by the Patent Owner, because Walker was published after the applied priority date of the Challenged Claims of the’336 patent.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,529,336
  • PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00226 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7, and 9 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Moskowitz and Steffee render at least one challenged claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and “the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which that subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness when presented. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). In analyzing the obviousness of a combination of prior art elements, it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted one of skill in the art “to combine . . . known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. A precise teaching directed to the specific subject matter of a challenged claim is not necessary to establish obviousness. Id. Rather, “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420. Accordingly, a party who petitions the Board for a determination of unpatentability based on obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have had to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “according to what Petitioner purports to be Patent Owner’s “apparent construction” is relevant to only Petitioner’s challenge based on Moskowitz and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art (Ground 1). Here, Petitioner acknowledges that “even if a ‘curved’ channel has a narrower meaning requiring the channel to follow a curved path (instead of the straight path identified in the accused products), Petitioner demonstrates that the challenged claims are also unpatentable over at least Grounds 2 and 3.” Pet. 24–25. For purposes of this decision, we find Petitioner’s alternative construction to be consistent with the ’385 patent’s disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 15:49–53 (“The anchoring member is advanced through the curved fusion member channel and into the vertebral body. As the fusion member channel is curved, the path that the anchoring member travels is also curved.”). We also find it to be consistent with the construction Petitioner advances in the related litigation. See Ex. 1029, 1 (Petitioner preliminarily construing “curved channel” to mean “channel that has a curved path”). However, because construing “curved,” as it appears in the term “curved channel,” is not necessary to determine whether Petitioner has made a sufficient showing to support institution, we determine that an express interpretation of this term is not needed at this stage of the proceeding. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). On this limited record, and at this early stage of the proceeding, the Board has not made a final determination on the construction of “curved,” as it appears in the term “curved channel.” The parties should consider developing this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “a) Motivation to Combine Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been “motivated to use Steffee’s curved anchors with Moskowitz’s screw box to minimize potential migration of the screw box after implantation.” Pet. 84 (citing id. at 88–90). According to Petitioner, “Steffee taught that forces tending to cause sagittal or lateral movement of the fastener (and thereby migration of the implant) can be minimized or eliminated by using a curved fastener that increases the entry angle of the fastener to near-perpendicular.” Id. at 88. Thus, Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been “motivated to use Steffee’s curved anchors with Moskowitz’s screw box to lower the forces (acting through Moskowitz’s existing screws) that tended to cause migration of fusion implants.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 169). Petitioner also points out that “Moskowitz’s anchors are threaded screws” (Pet. 89 (citing id. at 30–48)), and Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that such screws could strip (e.g., due to misalignment or over-torquing), which would reduce the stability of engagement between the fusion member and vertebrae. Ex. 1002 ¶ 170. Because the fasteners in Steffee do not contain threads, and further contained barbs to prevent the fastener from backing out (Ex. 1005, 2:61–68), a POSA would have understood that such fasteners would not be subject to such stripping. Ex. 1002 ¶ 170. Therefore, a POSA would have been motivated to use similar curved fasteners having barbs to eliminate the risk of stripping inherent when using Moskowitz’s screws. Id. Pet. 89. In addition, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “had a reasonable expectation of success in making this modification because it would only require the use of known machining techniques, and because the use of both curved anchors and curved channels had already been shown successful in spinal implants.” Id. at 84. Petitioner provides several reasons to support its contention. See id. at 90–91.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,460,385
  • PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00225 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–6, 11, 12, and 15–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Blain anticipates or renders at least one claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “1. Anticipation A prior art reference can only anticipate a claim if it discloses all the claimed limitations “arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.” Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Alternatively, to the extent Blain may not disclose that its instrument guide 14 “extend[s] outside a patient’s body to a medical practitioner,” Petitioner argues that it would have “been obvious based on common sense and the general knowledge of POSAs to make the length of the shaft of instrument guide 14 sufficiently long so that the physician would not have to stick his or her hand inside the incision location to insert the implant between the vertebrae.” Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood such a configuration to “provid[e] the known benefit of allowing the physician to maneuver and manipulate the delivery tool without having to insert his or her hand into the patient’s body to deliver and position the implant.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 124). And, relying on the declaration testimony of Mr. Culbert, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying the instrument guide 14 such that its handle 20 and shaft 22 extends outside the patient’s body, as this involved nothing more than lengthening the proximal shaft 22A and/or distal shaft 22B.” Id. at 54 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 126); see also Ex. 1004, 5:4–6; Ex. 1005 ¶ 21 (Blain disclosing that “the relative lengths between the proximal shaft 22A and the distal shaft 22B can vary”).” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “At this stage of the proceeding, however, we determine that no terms require explicit construction to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,730,805
  • PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00115 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution

    Instituted review of claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 33, and 35 on all asserted grounds, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “4. Determination as to a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence of record, we conclude, for the reasons provided above, that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, and Wampler.” slip op. at 41

    • BurdenDecided for patent owner

      “With respect to Patent Owner’s assertions about word count limits, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019 (“Consolidated TPG”) states that “deleting spacing between words, or using excessive acronyms or abbreviations for word phrases, in order to circumvent the rules on word count, may lead to a party’s brief not being considered.” Consolidated TPG, 40 (citing Pi-Net Int’l, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 600 F. App’x 774 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). As the basis for denying the Petition, Patent Owner alleges “undue prejudice.” Prelim. Resp. 76. Patent Owner, however, did not raise with the Board, prior to filing its Preliminary Response, any concern with the manner in which Petitioner formatted its Petition. As a result, Patent Owner did not avail itself of the opportunity to seek relief to address any alleged undue prejudice short of denying the Petition through, for example, an increase in the word count for its own brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(2). Under the circumstances alleged improper formatting.8” slip op. at 12

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 1–2. We find, for purposes of the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’517 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 22

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “In sum, Petitioner maintains a narrower construction of “magneto coupling” is correct, and alleges grounds of unpatentability based on both its narrower proposed construction (a construction encompassed by the broader construction), as well as based on the broader construction that Patent Owner does not dispute. We, therefore, find no merit to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s contention “contradicts itself” or fails to present a “prima facie obviousness position.” See Prelim. Resp. 3. Patent Owner does not dispute the broader construction applied by Petitioner, which encompasses the narrower construction Petitioner proposes. For purposes of this Decision, we apply the broader construction of “magneto coupling,” which encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator.” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,674,517
  • PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00116 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Abbott would prove at least one claim unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2024). Upon consideration of the papers, we conclude that the information presented shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’077 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). At this stage, “Patent Owner takes no position regarding the appropriate level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 1. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 6. We view this definition for the level of ordinary skill as consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “axially adjacent.” In particular, Petitioner argues in connection with mapping cited art to challenged claims for the Wampler and Akamatsu asserted grounds that “a magnetic element sealed within a rotor is . . . ‘axially adjacent.’” Pet. 20 n.6. Petitioner fails to point to any intrinsic evidence to support this construction. Rather, Petitioner alleges that Patent Owner took this position in the parallel litigation in a chart mapping claim 1 to accused products. Id. (citing Ex. 1019,6 5–7). Petitioner does not explain how Patent Owner’s chart supports Petitioner’s construction here. See id. at 6 Petitioner identifies this exhibit as “Exhibit 13 of Complaint, dated November 27, 2023,” which comprises a claim chart mapping accused products to claim 1. when “a magnetic element [is] sealed within a rotor,” it necessarily means being “axially adjacent,” as Petitioner alleges. See Ex. 1019. Rather, we agree with Patent Owner that this chart instead labels product components that are adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis. Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1019, 6–7). In addition, we agree with Patent Owner that “[t]his [mapping] is in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms and does not suggest that any component ‘sealed within’ another component would categorically be axially adjacent thereto.” Id. We note that Petitioner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” for other asserted grounds, arguing that components which are adjacent to one another along a central axis are “axially adjacent.” E.g., Pet. 55–57. Accordingly, we find, for purposes of this Decision, that the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” is being adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis, and does not mean a magnetic element sealed within a rotor. Id. at 20. slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “would have found it obvious to include Wampler’s “techniques related to its axially aligned inflow tube” in the HeartMateIII device taught by Bourque. Pet. 81–88. Petitioner argues that Wampler teaches an arrangement for which “[g]ood anatomic compatibility is possible . . . fitting well between the apex of the heart and the adjacent diaphragm.” Id. at 83 (quoting Ex. 1008 ¶ 76) (alterations in original). Petitioner reasons that applying Wampler’s arrangement to Bourque combines old elements performing known functions yielding expected results. Id. at 83–84. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known from Wampler that an axial inflow, as taught by Wampler, would have improved blood flow for the device of Bourque by eliminating the flow restrictive elbow in Bourque. Id. at 84 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 648–649; Ex. 1007, 2; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). Petitioner contends that Bourque recognized certain components, including inflow components, were the cause of clinical troubles, and that Wampler “taught how to eliminate these components that caused clinical troubles–using the inlet to also ‘serve[] as the inflow canula.’” Id. at 85–86 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 741–747; Ex. 1007, 1, 5; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). Petitioner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Wampler’s arrangement would have reduced “rates of infection” by avoiding placement of the pump in a preperitoneal pocket person of ordinary skill in the art “would have adhered to the express teachings of [Wampler], which focused on ‘[g]ood anatomic compatibility’ so that the device ‘fit[s] well between the apex of the heart and the adjacent diaphragm,’ eliminating the need for a peritoneal pocket dissection associated with increased rates of infection.” Id. at 86–87 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 651–654; Ex. 1008 ¶ 76) (second and third alterations in original). Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success because the asserted combination of Bourque and Wampler “would ‘fit[] well between the apex of the heart and the adjacent diaphragm’ due to the pump’s ‘development as a compact’ device and the existence of several similar LVADs that fit well at that position.” Id. at 87 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 652–655; Ex. 1007, 5). Lastly, Petitioner argues that the asserted combination would have been obvious to try, because “there were a finite number (i.e., two) [of] options for LVAD implantation: the device would be implanted at a preperitoneal pocket, or at the cardiac apex.” Id. at 87–88 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 656). At this stage, we find Petitioner’s arguments persuasive, and find that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support combining Wampler and Bourque’s teachings in the manner Petitioner does.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,754,077
  • PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, and 18–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over Bourque and Wampler.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the Challenged Claims of the ’879 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenMixed

      “Decision we find “axially adjacent” to mean “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” Petitioner does not contend or show in the Petition that Wampler teaches a magnetically driven rotor adjacent to a first magnetic device as measured along a central axis. See Pet. 24–26. In” slip op. at 30

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 1. We find, for purposes of this appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’879 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 22

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Magnetic Device” and “Magnetically Driven Rotor” along a “Central Axis”. Ex. 1019, 6. We find nothing in Exhibit 1019 that defines “axially adjacent” to mean “a magnetic element sealed within a rotor,” as Petitioner alleges. In this regard, Patent Owner argues as follows: Exhibit 1019 contains no mention of “a magnetic element sealed within a rotor” or a contention that such a configuration would represent an “axially adjacent” orientation of such components. Instead, [in Exhibit 1019], Patent Owner illustrates a Petitioner product and labels components identified as the claimed magnetically driven rotor and first magnetic device that are adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis. [See Ex. 1019 at 5]. This is in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms and does not suggest that any component “sealed within” another component would categorically be axially adjacent thereto.” slip op. at 29

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,572,879
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Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.