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  • Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

      “2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 11,998,854
  • PTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,886,774
  • Google LLC v. Escapex IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Mar 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00337 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103: claims 1–3, 5–6, 13–15, 17–18 over Fuloria and Andler; the remaining claims over combinations adding WO ’100, Bartholomew, Kirk, or Cheung.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar field and three years of professional computer programming experience, including experience with networked media and databases, where additional education can substitute for experience or vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–31). In the Decision on Institution, Inst. 7–8. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed definition “because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’687 [p]atent as well as the asserted prior art.” PO Resp. 4; Tr. 36:4–18. Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’687 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’687 patent and cited prior art, we maintain the previously adopted definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that the term “engagement” in independent claims 1, 11–13, 23, and 24 is defined in the Specification of the ’687 patent and should be interpreted to mean “an indication that a user should be distinguished with respect to the content over another user.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 53–55; Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Patent Owner agrees that the Specification “defines” the term in that manner. PO Resp. 13. The Board did not interpret any terms in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 9. We agree with the parties’ proposed interpretation of “engagement” and apply it for purposes of this Decision, based on the Specification’s disclosure that “[a] user engagement with content refers to an indication that a user should be distinguished with” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “No other terms require express interpretation to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
    Patent outcomesUS 10,474,687 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,474,687
  • PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01192 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of the Lorex Manual or Lorex Video with the identified references.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute any of Petitioner’s contentions as to the effective filing date, stating in agreement with Petitioner’s asserted Effective Filing Date of the Challenged Claims that “[t]he ’916 Patent claims a priority of a provisional application 61/924,240 filed on January 7, 2014.” PO Resp. 8. Given that the parties are in agreement on the January 7, 2014, effective filing date, we similarly use January 7, 2014, as the effective filing date of the challenged claims for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Vlad Kardashov, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’916 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two 7 US 2012/0198040 A1, published August 2, 2012 (Ex. 1011, “Kuo”). 8 The subject ’916 patent claims priority to Kuo as a continuation-in-part of that earlier filed application. Ex. 1001, code (63). 9 Lorex Technology Inc., “How to set up remote access for DVR using - Lorex Stratus Connectivity” (June 18, 2013), available at https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fMPRi9WFuTM (Ex. 1012, the “Lorex Video”). 10 US 2012/0113265 A1, published May 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013, “Galvin”). years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’916 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner

      “that Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that the Lorex Manual was based on a disclosure made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. The Lorex Manual is relied on under Ground 1A, exclusively or in the alternative to or in combination with Kim, for all claim elements. Pet. 9– 31. Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that this subject matter was disclosed to Lorex by ThroughTek, much less by one of the inventors of the ’916 Patent.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 9,774,916 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,774,916
  • PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed

      “construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16

    Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,602,448
  • PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-01052 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 7–12, and 17–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–6 and 13–16 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted Watanabe combinations were unsupported.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–38). Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute and applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. PO Resp. 6. We find that Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’832 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Thus, we apply Petitioner’s proposal in our analysis.” slip op. at 13

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In our Institution Decision, we construed “determin[ing] a viewing window for the visual content as a function of progress through the progress length” as “requiring determining a viewing window for different times of the video.” Inst. Dec. 21. Neither party disputes this construction. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1–7. We maintain this same construction.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Thomason are in the same field of endeavor. Thomason describes a camera and method for correctly orientating pictures from the camera. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1, 2 29–40, Figs. 3a–3b. In particular, Thomason is interested in rotating and cropping images to reduce the effect of poor orientation. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 34, 36). Pacurariu likewise describes aligning and resizing/cropping of a captured image to correct poor orientation. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 3, 45–56, Figs. 5A–5C. The preponderance of the evidence also supports that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the Pacurariu’s teachings with Thomason to predictably improve Thomason. Thomason teaches correct rotation of video data and makes use of rotation sensor to correct rotated images. Pet. 19–21 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–77). Pacurariu similarly uses sensors and measures tilt angle of the camera. Id at 21–22 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 51–52, Fig. 6; Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). Pacurariu further teaches that its tilt data angle can be stored for each “video frame.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 52). Petitioner, with support from credible testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos, explains how the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu could be successfully combined. Id. at 23 (citing, for example, Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). A person of ordinary skill in the art could have known that Thomason’s system could be improved by saving rotation data for each video frame and correcting images on a frame-by-frame basis. Id. at 23–24. The testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos is credible in this regard. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–81. Petitioner and Dr. Katsaggelos explain the references’ teachings and, based on these teachings, assert that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine with reasonable expectation of success based on those teachings. Reason to combine may properly come from the references themselves. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining reason to combine may come from “interrelated teachings of multiple patents”). Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–81, 89–92; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 8–9, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 41, 46, 51–52, 55–57, Figs. 6, 7.” slip op. at 27

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner

      “evaluating nexus between the claimed invention and objective evidence of nonobviousness, also referred to as secondary considerations. Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential). We first consider whether Patent Owner has demonstrated “that its products are coextensive (or nearly coextensive) with the challenged claims,” resulting in a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Id. at 33. If not, that “does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. (quoting Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75).” slip op. at 62

    Patent outcomesUS 11,336,832 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,336,832
  • PTAB · Nov 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00984 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Meulen and Chao; claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Meulen does not disclose transforming an image captured by its camera.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras,” or alternatively “would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras.” Pet. 6. Petitioner further argues that an “advanced graduate degree” may “make up for the work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–34). “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 19–20). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’413 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “From the outset we note that the words of the claim recite “non- uniformly shift[ing] the pixels” and do not recite a “non-linear” transformation. This favors Petitioner’s position, which is based directly off the definition of “non-uniform,” over Patent Owner’s position, which substitutes “non-linear” for “non-uniform.” Generally, then, we would determine the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term in the context of the entire Specification. Here, however, the ʼ413 patent does not mention “uniform” or “non-uniform” shifting of pixels anywhere except in the claims. The Specification, therefore, provides limited guidance, by itself, as to the ordinary and customary meaning of the term. Nonetheless, even reviewing the portions of the Specification cited by the parties, we see no clear or unambiguous effort to limit the challenged claims to require only non-linear transformations in which the pixels to which a transformation is applied do not have the same amount of shift. is not non-linear. Pet. Reply 1. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the center circle of Figure 2B maintains the original circular shape after the transformation is applied to the image which contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that no two pixels will have the same amount of shift. Pet. Reply 1–2. We agree. In Figure 2B of the ʼ413 patent, the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest. Ex. 1001, 4:19–21. After the input image goes through linear scaling (step 204) and then non-linear warping (step 206) the circles become more vertically compressed as they approach the top and bottom edges and more horizontally stretched as they approach the left and right edges. Id. at 4:22–30. But “the center circle is fully corrected so that it maintains the original circular shape of the corresponding circle in the input image 212.” Id. at 4:23–25. This means that at least some pixels, such as those of the center circle, undergo the same amount of shift after being transformed.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “readable instructions” of claims 1 and 2 must occur in a particular order. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the step of “determine a portion within the input image” must occur after “obtain[ing] an image” and before “apply[ing] a transformation to the input image.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the specification does not require such an order and, in fact, describes an embodiment where such an order is not followed. Pet. 3. We determine that the “determine a portion within the input image” step does not need to occur after the “obtain an image” step and before the “apply a transformation to the input image” step. As Patent Owner itself points out, claims 1 and 2 are apparatus and system claims respectively, and an ordering of the limitations of such claims is not necessary. PO Resp. 17. Even if we were to treat the apparatus and system claims as reciting the steps of a method, “as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We see nothing in the claims that would cause us to break this general rule. Patent Owner argues that the claims imply a “specific order because the ‘determine a portion’ requirement operates on ‘the [obtained] input image’ and defines the ‘portion’ that is necessary for the 23; Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Although the steps are recited in a specific order in the claim, as they necessarily must be, the claim does not expressly specify that the certain steps must occur before or after other instructions, nor does logic imply such a requirement. For example, if certain characteristics of the image are known before the image is obtained (e.g. the size, dimensions, resolution, aspect ratio, or content etc.) the determination of the portion of the image could be made before the image is obtained. These characteristics may be based on the specific device taking the image or the subject matter of the image, both of which may be known before the image is captured or obtained. It is, therefore, not necessary that the image be obtained in order for a portion of the image to be determined. Similarly, we do not find the written description to expressly or implicitly specify an order the claimed step of “determine a portion of the input image.” For example, the written description of the ʼ413 patent states that in Figure 2B “the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction as the frame boundary is approached.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–22. Patent Owner emphasizes that this disclosure implies that an input image is obtained before the center portion is chosen. PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:63–64, 4:19–22). But the description of this embodiment does not expressly recite an order. For example, the description of Figure 2A explains that “an input image is obtained” in step 202, “the image is then scaled” in step 204, and a “non-linear warping is then applied” in step 206. Ex. 1001, 3:63–4:3. This description does not mention “determin[ing] of a portion of the image” as a separate step or as part of the listed steps, and therefore, does not specify an order in which this step must occur. is configured so that some areas of the image are fully corrected geometrically, while some other areas are distorted. . . . [T]he center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction.” Id. at 4:17–19. This excerpt from the ʼ413 patent, which the Patent Owner specifically relies on (PO Resp. 19), also does not specify an order in which the determination step (choosing of the region of interest) takes place. Moreover, because the ʼ413 patent states that the warp module is configured so that some areas are fully corrected while others are not, the determination step could take place at the time the warp module was configured, presumably before the image was obtained. Finally, the ʼ413 patent states that “in the case, of video, the area may dynamically change between images (e.g. to follow a moving object).” Ex. 1001, 4:34–36. Patent Owner argues that this description “requires first obtaining the image in order to locate the object that is being followed.” PO Resp. 19–20. This embodiment is related to the case of video or a moving object, which the challenged claims do not mention. We, therefore, decline to limit the scope of the claim based on this embodiment. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and cited evidence we determine Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Meulen and Chao. For example, Petitioner argues that “[i]t would have been obvious that when performing image scaling, pixels from the input to output positions are shifted based on a scaling factor.” Pet. 91. Meulen teaches scaling but does not provide the details regarding scaling. E.g., Ex. 1007, 1:55–56, 4:37–49. We agree that in light of Meulen’s disclosure of scaling, a POSITA would have looked to other references, such as Chao, for further details on how to perform scaling. Dr. Katsaggelos provides credible support, testifying that “Meulen mentions ‘compression and/or scaling,’ and provides details on how to perform compression. But Meulen does not disclose the details of how to perform scaling. A POSITA when faced with Meulen and having the knowledge about scaling would have been motivated to turn to a prior art reference that discloses the details of scaling.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 262. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides no motivation to combine other than asserting that it involves combining prior art elements. PO Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 92). As explained above, however, Petitioner does more than just assert that the motivation involves combining prior art elements. Instead, Petitioner explains that Meulen discusses both compression and scaling, and provides details regarding compression but does not provide details on how to scale. Pet. 91–92; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–262. Thus, Meulen teaches that scaling was a known technique. See Hybritech, (“a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”). Dr. Katsaggelos testifies that, in this situation, a POSITA would have looked to Chao for details regarding scaling. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–263. We determine this establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have had reason to combine Meulen’s teachings with Chao. Patent Owner draws a distinction between Meulen and Chao, arguing that “Meulen is concerned with modifying content from a media source to be displayed on a device’s screen while Chao, by contrast, is directed to changing the aspect ratio of a document intended for printing.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 89–90). Patent Owner’s argument is contradicted, however, by Chao’s disclosure which states that “after all the background and foreground elements in the image have been resized . . . [t]he image may be output by displaying the image on or as part of: a display screen such as a computer monitor, camera screen, printer screen, printed page, projected image, or the like.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 32. Patent Owner argues that Meulen’s system avoids distortion near the middle where the user’s focus is more likely to be, while Chao, on the other hand, is directed to avoiding distortion of stylized borders on differently sized pages. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:26–29; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 25; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 91–92). This argument reads the prior art too narrowly and does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner does not rely on Chao for its teaching of avoiding distortion near the borders of the image, but rather on its teaching of scaling the image while maintaining the design intent of the original image. Ex. 1008 ¶ 22; Ex. 1014 ¶ 67. Thus, Petitioner is applying Chao’s techniques of scaling (regardless of where the area of 92. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Chao’s approach of stretching/shrinking only the background and uniformly scaling entire foreground objects is suitable for graphic design but incompatible with Meulen which is concerned with adapting externally derived media source content for display on a fixed size screen. PO Resp. 37–38 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 93). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner relies on Chao’s teaching of stretching/shrinking of background elements and applies that stretching/shrinking to Meulen’s images displayed on its screen. Pet. 91–92 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 28, 63; Ex. 1002 ¶ 263). The fact that Chao applies its teaching to graphic design does not prevent a POSITA from applying those teachings to Meulen’s media content displayed on its screen.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 10,015,413 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,015,413
  • PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00868 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–11, 13–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Trigui; claims 4–6, 13–15, and 18 are also unpatentable over Trigui and Rudrapatna.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art, or provide an alternative level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 9. In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which was also undisputed by Patent Owner at that stage of the proceeding. Inst. Dec. 11–12. Because nothing in the record establishes that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because there is no dispute, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction Petitioner contends “[n]o specific construction of any term is required,” and Petitioner has applied the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the claim terms. Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner agrees that no formal claim construction is necessary.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner provides the Board with the district court’s constructions in the related litigation. Id. (citing 2007, 39).4 4 The Petition in this case was filed on May 8, 2024. In the related litigation, Patent Owner’s opening brief on claim construction was filed on July 15, 2024, defendants’ responsive brief on claim construction was filed on this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, to the extent necessary, we apply the district court’s constructions and the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Figures 6 and 10 show multiples of the system of Figure 2A. Id.; see also id. ¶ 81 (describing Figure 6) ¶ 85 (describing Figure 10). We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that Trigui’s arrays may consist of “subarrays.” See Pet. 24; Reply 9. For example, Trigui describes that “[t]he antenna arrays 256 may consist of sub-arrays where the antenna elements of each sub-array are combined passively to achieve a predefined pattern.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. To that end, Figure 6 shows one antenna array that consists of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements), and Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each consist of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements). See Pet. 28–32; Reply 9–11. Given this disclosure in Trigui, we do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that Figure 6 does not show a single antenna array, or that Figure 10 does not show two antenna arrays. PO Resp. 17–18. Patent Owner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Trigui’s sub-arrays are not intended to be combined. PO Resp. 18. This argument contradicts Trigui’s disclosure, which shows multiples of the hardware of Figure 2A in Figures 6 and 10, and encourages multiple operator sharing of passive antenna arrays and transceivers. See, e.g., Reply 4 (describing Trigui as “providing building blocks that should be combined to understand Trigui’s full teachings”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 48, 68. Trigui even states as much: Although FIG 2A illustrates only a single MIMO branch DIAA, the present invention contemplates the use of multiple MIMO branches (as will be illustrated below with reference to FIGS. 6–11) . . . Similarly, I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems, as well as the beamforming weights 214, can be sent to other MIMO branches. Patent Owner’s argument that “Trigui does not teach any relationship between the number of beams and the number of MIMO transceivers” is not well developed and is unpersuasive in light of Petitioner’s showing. Petitioner has demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 6 depicts one antenna array with two bi-directional beams. Pet. 27–28. Petitioner has further demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 10 depicts two antenna arrays, i.e., where m=2, where each array comprises a beamformer configured to produce n different bi-directional beams, i.e., where n=2. Id. at 28–29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 is reproduced below: Id. at 29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 shows two copies of the arrangement shown in Figure 6, where Petitioner has identified in red the two antenna arrays, and identified in blue the beams. That is, Trigui’s Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each produce two beams. Figures 3 and 4 of Trigui (PO Resp. 16–17) do not address Petitioner’s contentions. See Reply 6–7. Petitioner relies on Figures 4A and 4B to support that “[e]ach of Trigui’s arrays can produce multiple beams.” Pet. 26; Reply 7. Dr. Cooklev agrees. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 91). However, as described above, Petitioner relies on Figure 6 to show “n” different bidirectional beams where n=2. Pet. 27. Petitioner does not rely on Figures 3 and 4 to teach the “n” number of beams. See Reply 7. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition provides no evidence for the “n different bidirectional beams.” See Sur-reply 11–12; see Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 9, 14, 74, 77, 81; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 192, 193).” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Trigui explicitly discloses that its system may have multiple modems. See Pet. 38; Reply 15. For example, Figure 2A shows Modem A, Modem B, and Modem C for a single MIMO branch. Ex. 1004 Fig. 2A; see also id. ¶37 (“one or more modems 204, such as, for example, baseband modules of cellular base stations”) ¶ 41 (“I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems . . . can be sent to other MIMO branches”); see Pet. 34. We find persuasive Petitioner’s explanation, supported by testimony from Dr. Negus, that “Trigui teaches use cases in which two separate wireless network operators would share certain tower [equipment,] such as the antenna arrays, but each wireless network operator would have its own baseband unit (i.e., modems A for the first operator and B for the second operator).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 226–232); e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 48 (stating that “the present invention . . . enable[s] multiple operator sharing of a passive antenna array, transceivers, and the total available power of the DIAA”); id. (“[S]plitting resources between the multiple operators is flexible and should be done on the basis of the individual operator needs”); ¶ 2 (“enabling a versatile solution for sharing antenna elements and active electronics between multiple operators servicing the same geographic area”); see also Pet. 38–41 (providing further explanation that one modem would be implemented for each operator); Reply 18–21. Patent Owner agrees that the second modem would be for a different operator. PO Resp. 20 (stating that “[E]ven if a second modem is added, it would be for a different operator”).5 Therefore, we are persuaded 5 In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues the opposite; that the operators would not have separate modems. Sur-reply 4. We rely on Patent Owner’s modems that share the two DIAA arrays in Figure 10. Pet. 42; Reply 18; In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A reference must be considered for everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred embodiment.”). Thus, we find that Petitioner’s proposed modification for Figure 10 is derived from Trigui’s disclosures, not through hindsight. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.3d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper”).” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 8,737,511 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,737,511
  • PTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00983 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Alexander and Cosper; the alternative Gregorio-based grounds did not establish unpatentability.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

      “112(f). Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But if the term does not use the word “means,” then it is presumed not to be subject to Section 112(f). Id. “That presumption can be overcome, but only if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “The correct inquiry, when ‘means’ is absent from a limitation, is whether the limitation, read in light of the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and relevant extrinsic evidence, has sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 12

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “both parties have asserted in the Apple Litigation that the “control component” requirement is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f), despite the fact that the control component limitation does not recite “means for.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1012, 3–8; Ex. 1013, 13); PO Resp. 6–7. Indeed, the court in the Apple Litigation has concluded that the control component requirement is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and has construed that requirement accordingly: Function: receiving control signals input to the oscillating resonant module; receiving outputs from the one or more sensors; controlling oscillation of the mass to produce a vibration response according to the received control signals by generating, using one or more of the received sensor outputs, control outputs to an actuator that drives the mass to oscillate. Structure: a microcontroller, a processor, a microprocessor, or a CPU that performs the algorithm shown in Figure 45 or the algorithm described in the corresponding text. See, e.g., 31:19–32:13, and equivalents thereof. Ex. 2001, 10; Ex. 2002, 40. Because of the Apple Litigation record, Petitioner presents its challenges in the alternative, first applying a plain meaning approach to the control component requirement, and also analyzing the requirement under the construction adopted in the Apple Litigation. Pet. 3–5. We adopt the court’s construction in the Apple Litigation. 35 U.S.C.” slip op. at 11

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of vibration-generating systems; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 2. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’882 patent specification.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “(1) Analogous Art Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419.” slip op. at 22

    Patent outcomesUS 11,152,882 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,152,882
  • PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 based on the asserted combinations of Izumi, Cosper, Rossi, Ibuki, and Aldrich.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

      “Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi’s module to include multiple sensors in accordance with Cosper’s teachings. Pet. 15. Petitioner argues that the sensors would monitor the moving element and generate a control signal in accordance with Izumi. Id. at 15–16. Petitioner further argues that Izumi’s controller would have been implemented using a microprocessor and memory as Cosper suggests. Id. at 16. Petitioner argues three reasons why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi with Cosper’s teachings. Id. at 16–19. First, Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Cosper as a way to further Izumi’s objective of having a sensor that detects the and controls the movement of the moving element. Id. at 16–17. Second, Petitioner argues that the combination of Izumi and Cosper would have enhanced reliability of the feedback sensors by capturing “data specific to different operating parameters.” Id. at 17–18. Third, combining the references’ teachings would “facilitat[e] implementation of software instructions” by using a microprocessor and memory. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale to combine the references’ teachings. Based on our review and consideration of the record, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Izumi and Cosper in the manner Petitioner argues (“the Izumi-Cosper combination”).” slip op. at 17

    Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,093,767
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