• Google LLC v. Escapex IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00337 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103: claims 1–3, 5–6, 13–15, 17–18 over Fuloria and Andler; the remaining claims over combinations adding WO ’100, Bartholomew, Kirk, or Cheung.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar field and three years of professional computer programming experience, including experience with networked media and databases, where additional education can substitute for experience or vice versa.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–31). In the Decision on Institution, Inst. 7–8. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed definition “because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’687 [p]atent as well as the asserted prior art.” PO Resp. 4; Tr. 36:4–18. Based on the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’687 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’687 patent and cited prior art, we maintain the previously adopted definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that the term “engagement” in independent claims 1, 11–13, 23, and 24 is defined in the Specification of the ’687 patent and should be interpreted to mean “an indication that a user should be distinguished with respect to the content over another user.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 53–55; Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). Patent Owner agrees that the Specification “defines” the term in that manner. PO Resp. 13. The Board did not interpret any terms in the Decision on Institution. Dec. on Inst. 9. We agree with the parties’ proposed interpretation of “engagement” and apply it for purposes of this Decision, based on the Specification’s disclosure that “[a] user engagement with content refers to an indication that a user should be distinguished with” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “No other terms require express interpretation to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to prove unpatentability of the challenged claims. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 10,474,687 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,474,687
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01192 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of the Lorex Manual or Lorex Video with the identified references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute any of Petitioner’s contentions as to the effective filing date, stating in agreement with Petitioner’s asserted Effective Filing Date of the Challenged Claims that “[t]he ’916 Patent claims a priority of a provisional application 61/924,240 filed on January 7, 2014.” PO Resp. 8. Given that the parties are in agreement on the January 7, 2014, effective filing date, we similarly use January 7, 2014, as the effective filing date of the challenged claims for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Vlad Kardashov, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’916 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two 7 US 2012/0198040 A1, published August 2, 2012 (Ex. 1011, “Kuo”). 8 The subject ’916 patent claims priority to Kuo as a continuation-in-part of that earlier filed application. Ex. 1001, code (63). 9 Lorex Technology Inc., “How to set up remote access for DVR using - Lorex Stratus Connectivity” (June 18, 2013), available at https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fMPRi9WFuTM (Ex. 1012, the “Lorex Video”). 10 US 2012/0113265 A1, published May 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013, “Galvin”). years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’916 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner asserts that “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner

    “that Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that the Lorex Manual was based on a disclosure made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. The Lorex Manual is relied on under Ground 1A, exclusively or in the alternative to or in combination with Kim, for all claim elements. Pet. 9– 31. Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that this subject matter was disclosed to Lorex by ThroughTek, much less by one of the inventors of the ’916 Patent.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,774,916 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,774,916
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed

    “construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,602,448
• Ericsson Inc. / Nokia Of America Corporation v. XR Communications LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00868 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–11, 13–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Trigui; claims 4–6, 13–15, and 18 are also unpatentable over Trigui and Rudrapatna.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art, or provide an alternative level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 9. In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which was also undisputed by Patent Owner at that stage of the proceeding. Inst. Dec. 11–12. Because nothing in the record establishes that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because there is no dispute, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Petitioner contends “[n]o specific construction of any term is required,” and Petitioner has applied the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the claim terms. Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner agrees that no formal claim construction is necessary.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner provides the Board with the district court’s constructions in the related litigation. Id. (citing 2007, 39).4 4 The Petition in this case was filed on May 8, 2024. In the related litigation, Patent Owner’s opening brief on claim construction was filed on July 15, 2024, defendants’ responsive brief on claim construction was filed on this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, to the extent necessary, we apply the district court’s constructions and the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Figures 6 and 10 show multiples of the system of Figure 2A. Id.; see also id. ¶ 81 (describing Figure 6) ¶ 85 (describing Figure 10). We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that Trigui’s arrays may consist of “subarrays.” See Pet. 24; Reply 9. For example, Trigui describes that “[t]he antenna arrays 256 may consist of sub-arrays where the antenna elements of each sub-array are combined passively to achieve a predefined pattern.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. To that end, Figure 6 shows one antenna array that consists of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements), and Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each consist of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements). See Pet. 28–32; Reply 9–11. Given this disclosure in Trigui, we do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that Figure 6 does not show a single antenna array, or that Figure 10 does not show two antenna arrays. PO Resp. 17–18. Patent Owner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Trigui’s sub-arrays are not intended to be combined. PO Resp. 18. This argument contradicts Trigui’s disclosure, which shows multiples of the hardware of Figure 2A in Figures 6 and 10, and encourages multiple operator sharing of passive antenna arrays and transceivers. See, e.g., Reply 4 (describing Trigui as “providing building blocks that should be combined to understand Trigui’s full teachings”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 48, 68. Trigui even states as much: Although FIG 2A illustrates only a single MIMO branch DIAA, the present invention contemplates the use of multiple MIMO branches (as will be illustrated below with reference to FIGS. 6–11) . . . Similarly, I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems, as well as the beamforming weights 214, can be sent to other MIMO branches. Patent Owner’s argument that “Trigui does not teach any relationship between the number of beams and the number of MIMO transceivers” is not well developed and is unpersuasive in light of Petitioner’s showing. Petitioner has demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 6 depicts one antenna array with two bi-directional beams. Pet. 27–28. Petitioner has further demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 10 depicts two antenna arrays, i.e., where m=2, where each array comprises a beamformer configured to produce n different bi-directional beams, i.e., where n=2. Id. at 28–29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 is reproduced below: Id. at 29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 shows two copies of the arrangement shown in Figure 6, where Petitioner has identified in red the two antenna arrays, and identified in blue the beams. That is, Trigui’s Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each produce two beams. Figures 3 and 4 of Trigui (PO Resp. 16–17) do not address Petitioner’s contentions. See Reply 6–7. Petitioner relies on Figures 4A and 4B to support that “[e]ach of Trigui’s arrays can produce multiple beams.” Pet. 26; Reply 7. Dr. Cooklev agrees. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 91). However, as described above, Petitioner relies on Figure 6 to show “n” different bidirectional beams where n=2. Pet. 27. Petitioner does not rely on Figures 3 and 4 to teach the “n” number of beams. See Reply 7. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition provides no evidence for the “n different bidirectional beams.” See Sur-reply 11–12; see Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 9, 14, 74, 77, 81; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 192, 193).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Trigui explicitly discloses that its system may have multiple modems. See Pet. 38; Reply 15. For example, Figure 2A shows Modem A, Modem B, and Modem C for a single MIMO branch. Ex. 1004 Fig. 2A; see also id. ¶37 (“one or more modems 204, such as, for example, baseband modules of cellular base stations”) ¶ 41 (“I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems . . . can be sent to other MIMO branches”); see Pet. 34. We find persuasive Petitioner’s explanation, supported by testimony from Dr. Negus, that “Trigui teaches use cases in which two separate wireless network operators would share certain tower [equipment,] such as the antenna arrays, but each wireless network operator would have its own baseband unit (i.e., modems A for the first operator and B for the second operator).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 226–232); e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 48 (stating that “the present invention . . . enable[s] multiple operator sharing of a passive antenna array, transceivers, and the total available power of the DIAA”); id. (“[S]plitting resources between the multiple operators is flexible and should be done on the basis of the individual operator needs”); ¶ 2 (“enabling a versatile solution for sharing antenna elements and active electronics between multiple operators servicing the same geographic area”); see also Pet. 38–41 (providing further explanation that one modem would be implemented for each operator); Reply 18–21. Patent Owner agrees that the second modem would be for a different operator. PO Resp. 20 (stating that “[E]ven if a second modem is added, it would be for a different operator”).5 Therefore, we are persuaded 5 In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues the opposite; that the operators would not have separate modems. Sur-reply 4. We rely on Patent Owner’s modems that share the two DIAA arrays in Figure 10. Pet. 42; Reply 18; In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A reference must be considered for everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred embodiment.”). Thus, we find that Petitioner’s proposed modification for Figure 10 is derived from Trigui’s disclosures, not through hindsight. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.3d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper”).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,737,511 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,737,511
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00867 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 84 are unpatentable as obvious over Nozaki and Haitani, alone or combined with Graham or Kim.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties’ descriptions of the level of skill in the art are very similar, with only a slight difference in the number of years of work experience suggested. Petitioner states that “[a]lthough the experts propose slightly different POSITA definitions, the differences are immaterial to the analysis here.” Pet. Reply. 1. Patent Owner does not believe the two definitions are materially different, and states that “the arguments herein do not change under either definition. PO Resp. 8. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the technical complexity of the subject matter described in the ’848 patent. This understanding is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Bederson, who states that he is “well acquainted systems and methods described in the ’848 patent.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 36. Accordingly, we continue to use Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. B. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “the meaning of the claim term “mode” as it is used in the ’848 patent and as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand it at the time of the invention. First, the parties do not necessarily disagree as to the meaning of the term “mode.” Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand ‘mode’ to mean “an operational state that a system has been switched to.” PO Resp. 13. Petitioner “do[es] not necessarily object to the concept of a ‘mode’ as an operational state,” but does object to how Patent Owner applies the term. Pet. Reply 1. Petitioner objects to Patent Owner’s “application of its construction,” which, Petitioner argues, “is far narrower than the words alone suggest.” Id. Second, the intrinsic evidence, including the claims and the ’848 specification, makes it readily apparent what the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “mode” would be to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Based upon our consideration of the claims and the ’848 specification, we find that the term “mode,” as it is used by the ’848 patent, means a “state,” “condition,” or “operational state” of a recording device, such as a video camera, that is selected by a user and may include a selection function using threshold values.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner. In determining obviousness, the scope of relevant prior art “necessarily encompasses not only the field of the inventor's endeavor but also any analogous art.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103(a) when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). A reference is analogous to the claimed invention when it is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Similarity in the structure and function of the invention and the prior art is indicative that the prior art is within the inventor's field of endeavor.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Here, Petitioner provides a persuasive rationale as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine the teachings of Nozaki, Haitani, and Graham as described in the Petition. For example, Petitioner explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Nozaki’s facedetection data could be used as an additional method by which to identify Figure 5 of Nozaki could be configured as a scrollable list of keyframe data similar to Graham. Pet. 37–38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 141). Petitioner also explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement this modification to improve the efficiency of searching for specific moments within a long video file. Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 142). Petitioner also explains that Graham’s video segmenting methods address this need and could have been easily implemented in the Nozaki device. Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 142). Dr. Bederson testifies that such implementation would have been within the skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1005 ¶ 142. Accordingly, based upon the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had a reasoned basis to combine the teachings of Nozaki, Haitani, and Graham in the manner described and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in that endeavor.” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 10,176,848 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,176,848
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00717 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Chinn-based and Kim-based combinations listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “Accordingly, based upon the complete record, we are persuaded that” slip op. at 39

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “d. Conclusion as to Independent Claim 1 Based on the complete record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has” slip op. at 73

  Patent outcomesUS 11,223,757 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,223,757
• Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00828 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over the Rogers-based combinations with Rosenberg, Rekimoto, and, for claims 9–14, Miyazawa.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “13 The Court was very critical of Dr. Wobbrock’s testimony in the related district court case. See generally Ex. 1026 (September 18, 2025 Order). With regard to the ’086 patent, the Court found that Dr. Wobbrock’s testimony was not based on any record evidence (id. at 7, 9), arbitrary (id.), contrary to the evidence (id. at 7–8), unjustified (id. at 8), ipse dixit (id. at 9), conclusory (three times) (id.), insufficient to support a jury verdict (three times) (id. at 9, 27), untethered from the Specification (three times) (id. at 28, 30, 31), inconsistent (id. at 29), insufficient to support his opinion (id. at 29–30), unsupported (id. at 30), and not to be credited by a reasonable jury (id. at 31). We have considered this criticism of Dr. Wobbrock’s testimony in view of the September 16, 2025, Memorandum to the Members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board on the subject of “PTAB consideration of prior findings of fact and conclusions of law” (available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Memo_re_prior_finding s_of_fact_and_conclusions_of_law_9_16_25.pdf?utm_campaign=subscripti oncenter&utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=g ovdelivery&utm_term=) and in light of the case law (see, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 659 (1949) (“[I]n the determination of litigated facts, the testimony of one who has been found unreliable as to one issue may properly be accorded little weight as to the next.”). We have similarly found Dr. Wobbrock’s testimony to be contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the claims, untethered from the Specification, unsupported by the evidence, inconsistent, arbitrary, and conclusory. We accord the testimony of Dr. Wobbrock little or no weight. We view the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Nielson, as more credible and persuasive as it tracks more closely with the ’086 patent and the cited art. EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Parms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 589 (1993) (“The Supreme Court has explained ‘that the trial judge plays a “gatekeeping role,’” ‘through which it must “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’”)).” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “with touch interfaces.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 76–77). Although there are minor differences in these definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, the parties agree that this issue is not disputed. Tr. 11:24–26 (Petitioner’s counsel); 43:16–22 (Patent Owner’s counsel indicating agreement with Petitioner’s definition); see also Pet. Reply 1 (“The experts agree on the definition of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’).” Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is not disputed and is consistent with the ’086 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We find no support in the language of claim 1 for construing the “first registering mode” and the “second registering mode” as “operating modes,” or as “different operational states,” or “sub-operating modes of the ‘said registering mode’” as contended by Patent Owner. There is no express statement in claim 1 that the “first registering mode” and the “second registering mode” are “operating modes,” or are “different operational states,” or are “sub-operating modes of the ‘said registering mode.’” The language of claim 1 is clear that the only two “operating modes” explicitly recited in claim 1 are the “identification mode” and the “registration mode.” Claim 1 recites that these two “modes” are “operating modes,” but does not recite that the “first registering mode” and the “second registering mode” are “operating modes.” The language of claim 1 cannot be read to include the requirements that the “first registering mode” and the “second registering mode” are “operating modes,” or are “different operational states,” or are “sub-operating modes of the ‘said registering mode.’” Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the language of limitation 1c that specifically refers to the “registering mode” as an “operating mode” and the language of limitation 1f that refers to the “first registering mode” and the “second registering mode” as “mode[s] for inputting input information” that are “provided in said registering mode” contradicts Patent Owner’s proposed construction that would require the “first” and “second registering mode[s]” to be “different operational states.” The plain and ordinary meaning of the language of claim 1 provides that the “first registering mode” and the “second registering mode” are “mode[s] for inputting input information” that are “provided in said registering mode” which is one of the two delineated “operating modes.” Both “first” and “second” “registering mode[s]” ”for inputting input information” are recited as “provided in said registering mode,” a single “operating mode.”17” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Both references are directed to allowing users to input information via touchsurface technology and are analogous art to the ’086 patent. . . . [A] POSITA would have found Rogers and Rosenberg to be compatible because of the technical similarity of their teachings, and a POSITA would have further recognized that Rosenberg’s finger orientation disclosures, applied to Rogers’ graphical passcode disclosures, would facilitate a “natural and intuitive” means of implementing the teachings of Rogers. A POSITA therefore would have been motivated to look to Rosenberg to improve Rogers, and vice-versa. . . . A POSITA . . . would have considered the disclosures in Rosenberg and been motivated to modify Rogers’ “large fingertip and a small stylus tip” example so that it instead used the “natural and intuitive” finger pad versus finger end distinction discussed in Rosenberg. A POSITA would have found this modification to be a simple substitution of elements well known in the art and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the benefits disclosed in Rosenberg by making the modification, which involved only routine skill. . . . [A]dding finger end and finger pad touch detection to Rogers would involve no more than applying a known technique (i.e., finger end and finger pad touch detection/distinction as taught by Rosenberg) to a known device ready for improvement (Rogers’ apparatus having “large fingertip and a small stylus tip” capabilities) to yield predictable results (simple to use touch screen interface with multipoint targeting and multi-finger gesturing). . . . It also would have been obvious to combine Rogers with Rosenberg because both references disclose touch screen interfaces that detect a contact area of a finger. . . . A POSITA would have considered Rosenberg’s disclosures and been motivated to modify the “graphical passcode” features of Rogers so that the disclosed device is capable of detecting information input by a pad or end of a finger, because it would provide a “generally easily distinguishable” basis upon which to program the device disclosed in Rogers to detect a “measurable parameter” based on “contact area.” A POSITA would have further recognized that these features of Rogers and Rosenberg could be successfully combined because both references teach a “calibration” mode in which the user trains the device to recognize a specific range of input parameters that allows for some variation in input while remaining within acceptable tolerances. . . . A POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Rogers in this manner for at least the same reasons.” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 8,982,086 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,086
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00509 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 6–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Throughtek-2012 and the Lorex Video; claims 1–3, 6, 10, 12–14, 17, and 18 are also unpatentable under two other grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Bims, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’842 patent would have been a person having a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 15–16). Patent Owner does not provide any proposed qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art is also reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’842 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving the controversy in this proceeding.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 55; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. §42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “In addition, “[n]egative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reason to exclude an element may be found in “statements in the specification expressly listing the disadvantages of using” that element. Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351. Another reason to exclude may be when the specification “distinguishes among” the element and alternatives to it. Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As the Federal Circuit explained, “[t]he common denominator of these examples [(i.e., the reasons to exclude an element)] is disclosure of the element.” Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare, Inc., 38 F.4th 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2022). More particularly, “[s]ilence is generally not disclosure.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017; see also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, “the written description requirement cannot be met through simple disregard of the presence or absence of a limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017. Our reviewing court further notes that “it is possible that the written description requirement may be satisfied when a skilled artisan would understand the specification as inherently disclosing the negative limitation.” Novartis, 38 F.4th at 1017 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, “it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS RE47,842 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• Microchip Technology Inc. v. Aptiv Technologies AGAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00230 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Chang and Chang II; the Board did not reach the Chang, Chang II, and Chutorash ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner and find that “computer network protocols” is correct in light of the ’072 patent’s disclosure and claim 1. In particular, the ’072 patent teaches that it “generally relates to [USB] connectivity between, for example, mobile consumer devices and vehicle electronic systems.” Ex. 1009, 1:21–23. And the ’072 patent’s teachings focus on common network components (e.g., hub, bridge, ports) and common networking concepts (e.g., master/slave network architecture and bridging) which are used in the USB context, rather than detailed aspects (e.g., signal timing, signal levels, power levels) of the USB protocol. See generally Ex. 1009; see also Ex. 1084, 103:21–104:2, 104:24–105:4; Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1084,7 100:17–101:12 (acknowledging that Dr. Houh testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would know basic USB concepts like bridging, master/slave architecture, etc.”), 102:3–8, 103:21– 104:2, 104:24–105:4). Likewise, claim 1 repeatedly recites “USB,” but does so to identify that all of the components of the data system (i.e., USB ports, USB hub, USB bridge, USB host, USB multiplexing switches) employ the USB protocol. Ex. 1009, 9:15–10:18. As the ’072 patent teaches, “USB 7 Houh Deposition Tr. (2024/12/18, Day 1). technology . . . [wa]s commonly available, familiar to the end user, cost effective and ubiquitous.” Id. at 1:35–37. Thus, although the ’072 patent is taught in the USB context, “computer network protocols” concepts are the focus. For these same reasons, we find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been well-versed in USB standards (including the USB 2.0 and 3.0 Specifications and the OTG Supplement) and the design/deployment of USB hosts, USB devices, and USB hubs, including suitable environments for USB systems.” Pet. 26.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “Lastly, we give little weight to Mr. Welch’s testimony regarding the level of one of ordinary skill as he does not indicate what precisely constitutes the basis of his testimony on this issue. See Ex. 1013 ¶ 47.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Here, Petitioner argues that “embedded USB host” means “USB host physically embedded in a vehicle.” See Pet. 27–28. “Patent Owner does not contend that any claim construction is required.” PO Resp. 5. We agree with Patent Owner that we do not need to construe any term to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). And we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product that ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). In other words, “[a] presumption of nexus requires both that the product embodies the invention and is coextensive with it.” Id. at 1211 (citing Brown, 229 F.3d at 1130). Patent Owner fails to show either of these requirements. First, Patent Owner argues that in his Supplemental Declaration, Dr. Houh “provides on a per limitation basis how [Patent Owner]’s dual role hub meets all limitations of claim 1.” PO Resp. 73 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 136). Notably, Patent Owner cites to a single paragraph in this declaration, without providing any specific arguments in its Response that its product practices claim 1. Id. Rather, Patent Owner incorporates its arguments by reference, which is not permitted. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). Thus, we do not consider these arguments, and we are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s product practices claim 1. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019,8 35–36 (citing Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative)) (“[P]arties that incorporate expert testimony by reference in their petitions . . . without providing explanation of such testimony risk having the testimony not considered by the Board.”).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,176,072 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,176,072
• Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. NEC CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2023-01241 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 10–13, 19, 21, 23, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious over Ueda, the SIP Standard, and the SDP Standard, with Cohee added for claims 11, 13, 19, and 23.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, and 2–3 years of experience researching, designing, or developing content delivery systems and related hardware, software, and firmware, or equivalent experience.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 36–40). Patent Owner does not dispute this. See PO Resp. 3 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 22). Because it is uncontested, supported by testimonial evidence, and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’427 patent, we adopt the above articulation of the level of ordinary skill for this decision.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the term should be construed according to its ordinary and customary meaning, and that we need not construe the term explicitly because the meaning of the term is not relevant to the contested issues in the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “Having considered all the evidence of record relating to Mr. Taniguchi’s activities during the relevant time frame, we find that Patent Owner has not produced sufficient corroborating evidence to show that Mr. Taniguchi’s work on reducing to practice the claimed invention was reasonably continuous during the critical period between September 19, 2008 (the filing date of Ueda), and November 18, 2008 (the filing date of the Japanese patent application). Although there is corroborating evidence of diligence beginning on November 6, 2008, when Mr. Taniguchi transmitted a draft application to the Baba law firm, there is no evidence of any diligence prior to that date, other than Mr. Taniguchi’s own testimony. We do not agree with Patent Owner that the evidence of Mr. Taniguchi’s other activities for NEC, or research relating to IPTV, corroborate Mr. Taniguchi’s reduction to practice of the claimed invention. Although these activities may have something to do with the general subject matter of IPTV, Patent Owner has not shown any nexus between these activities and the challenged claims. See Naber, 567 F.2d at 385 (“It is well settled that, to satisfy the ‘reasonable diligence’ requirement . . . , the work relied on must ordinarily be directly related to reduction to practice of the invention . . . in issue.” (citing cases)). Although Mr. Taniguchi doubtlessly spent substantial time preparing the application he completed on November 6, 2008 (see Ex. 2017), there is no corroborating evidence that this work was reasonably continuous during the critical period. As far as the corroborating evidence attests, Mr. Taniguchi could have done no work on the draft until early November, or he could have worked on the draft briefly in August and put it aside until early November. Considering all the evidence as to Mr. Taniguchi’s activities, we find that Patent Owner has not met its burden of producing corroborating evidence that the named inventors of the ’427 patent exercised reasonably continuous diligence during the critical period when Ueda was filed until the constructive reduction to practice that occurred on November 18, 2008. Therefore, we determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ueda is prior art to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “In general, we disagree with Patent Owner that, in showing a reason to incorporate the SIP Standard’s teachings about proxy servers, Petitioner must necessarily show that Ueda’s system was deficient or inferior. A patent challenger “does not need to show that there was a known problem with the prior art system in order to articulate the required rational underpinning for the proposed combination.” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1002–03 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Also, “when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. For this reason and the specific reasons discussed below, we find Patent Owner’s arguments unpersuasive. The evidence of record suggests that it would have been within the ordinary skill in the art to modify Ueda’s system by replacing direct communication between content-providing device 150 and servers 191 or 192 with an indirect connection in the form of proxy servers using well-known, predictable techniques as described in the SIP Standard.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 9,769,427 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,769,427

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.