- Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00392 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its denial of institution on the obviousness ground over Slemmer and Vu, finding no abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 8. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 6–7. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,725,899 - Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00376 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and upheld denial of institution on the Slemmer and Vu obviousness ground because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.,, 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 9. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 7–8. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“construction for the term ‘TCP connection hand shake completion data,’ which resulted in an incorrect determination.” Req. Reh’g. 5. In particular, Petitioner now proposes a broadest reasonable construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data” to mean “two devices initiating a communication session by the first device sending information to a second device, and the second device then responding to the first device.” Req. Reh’g. 7. Based on this newly proposed construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data,” Petitioner argues that Vu discloses this feature. Req. Reh’g. 6–8. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner must “identify all matters [Petitioner] believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Petitioner did not present this proposed construction in the Petition. See generally Req. Reh’g.; see generally Pet. We could not have “misapprehended or overlooked” what was not presented.” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,266,266 - Apple Inc. v. Andrea Electronics Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 12, 2018 · IPR2017-00627 · APJ Jeremy M Plenzler · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 10–16, 21–23, 25, and 38–46 are unpatentable; claims 6–9, 17–20, 24, and 47 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Although the dictionary defines “periodically” as “from time to time” or “at regular intervals of time,” based on the record before us, we agree with Patent Owner that its proposed construction is how one skilled in the art would have understood that term in the context of the ’345 patent Specification. Turning first to the intrinsic evidence, the Specification explains that “[t]he future and current minimum values are calculated continuously and initiated periodically, for example, every 5 seconds.” Ex. 1001, 8:37–39. Although the Specification later notes that “[i]t will be appreciated that, while specific values are used as in the several equations and calculations employed in the present invention, these values may be different than those shown” (id. at 8:64–67), this passage does not mean that the Specification contemplates arrangements where “periodically” is simply “from time to time.” Rather, we determine that statement from the Specification indicates that the specific amount of time (i.e., every 5 seconds) may vary. Turning now to the extrinsic evidence, the testimony of Dr. Douglas supports our conclusion, explaining that “at regular intervals of time” is the “only . . . definition . . . consistent with the understanding of a person skilled in the art in light of the specification of the ’345 Patent and its use in the particular field of audio signal processing” because [l]ike the “period” of an audio signal itself, which is the amount of time it takes for a signal to repeat itself, “periodically” as recited in claims 6 and 9 and throughout the remainder of the specification of the ’345 Patent refers to actions that occur at regular intervals (e.g., every 5 seconds rather than merely “from time to time”). Ex. 2002 ¶ 48. Moreover, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Hochwald testifies that outside of the context of the ’345 patent Specification, “periodically” means “at regular time intervals” (Ex. 2005, 99:13–15), and when asked about that term’s meaning in the context of the ’345 patent Specification, Dr. Hochwald simply noted that “all I can do is read what it says,” which is that “[i]t’s doing something periodically, for example, every five seconds” (id. at 100:4–6). Accordingly, the testimony from Dr. Douglas, as well as that from Dr. Hochwald, supports Patent Owner’s construction. In summary, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction of “periodically,” requiring “at regular intervals of time,” because (1) this is consistent with how this term is used in the context of the ’345 Patent Specification; and (2) this is supported by the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Patent Owner responds that, because Helf uses average values (i.e., the average of eight consecutive values), it does not disclose using a minimum value. PO Resp. 17–23. Patent Owner acknowledges that the ’345 patent, itself, uses a “smoothing process [that] produces frequency bins with multiple smoothed magnitude values, ultimately finding the minimum of all of the values,” but contends that “Helf’s averaging process produces a single output representing one average of the original samples.” Id. at 20–21 (underlining omitted) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:14–28; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of the differences between Helf and the ’345 patent. While Helf may ultimately produce a single minimum value, as discussed above, that value is based on a minimum value of the averages calculated over the given time period. At oral hearing, Patent Owner acknowledged that Helf determines many averages values (i.e., the averages of the eight consecutive frames) and determines a minimum of those values. See, e.g., Tr. 22:2–6. The claim simply requires a “future minimum value,” and does not preclude that value from being a minimum value taken from a set of average values. Indeed, such an interpretation of the claim would be inconsistent with the ’345 patent’s use of smoothed values noted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1001, 8:14–28. The testimony of Dr. Douglas cited by Patent Owner does not convince us otherwise. See Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 52, 63–72 (effectively repeating Patent Owner’s contentions, which are unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above). Accordingly, we are persuaded that Helf’s minimum value (Mk) corresponds to the “future minimum value” recited in claims 4 and 39.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed
“With respect to its “running minimum estimator,” Helf explains that the “running minimum estimator” is used “when either the speech signal is never absent for more than a second or the background noise itself is never constant in spectral shape.” Ex. 1010, 8:11–15. Helf acknowledges that its “running minimum estimator” is “much less accura[te]” than its “stationary estimator,” which is typically used for background noise estimates. Id. at 8:15–17. As a result, Helf only uses its “running minimum estimator” if “[i]t has been more than 10 seconds since the last update of the background noise spectral estimate due to the Stationary Estimator,” and “[t]he difference, D, between the past background noise estimate, which may have resulted from the Stationary Estimator or the Running Minimum Estimator, and the current Running Minimum Estimator is great.” Id. at 8:32–42. We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We see no persuasive reason to set Helf’s current background noise estimate (Nk and Ck, considered the “current minimum” by Petitioner) to the minimum estimate (Mk) from the “running minimum estimator” (considered the “future minimum” by Petitioner). The testimony of Dr. Douglas supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 119, 120. Addressing the portions of Helf noted above, Dr. Douglas testifies that “Helf only relies on Mk in a ‘worst case’ scenario” and “disfavors the use of Mk, even where Bk is unavailable,” and concludes that “one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to force the use of the disfavored Mk every ten seconds even where the much more accurate Bk estimate is available.” Id. ¶ 119. Dr. Douglas further testifies that “one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to abandon[] the comparison of D to a threshold” because “one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Helf is a signal-dependent system, and it would not abandon its ability to adapt to varying signal conditions in favor of a blind periodic update using a disfavored estimate.” Id. ¶ 120. We credit the testimony of Dr. Douglas over that of Dr. Hochwald in this regard. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 157–159; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 115–120. The testimony from Dr. Douglas is consistent with the disclosure of Helf, while that of Dr. Hochwald is based on conclusory statements. For example, the only portions of Dr. Hochwald’s testimony cited in the Petition in connection with the rationale provided in this challenge are conclusory statements that “[a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify Helf to update the background noise estimate after every 10 second period based on the teachings of Martin,” and “[t]he skilled person would have recognized it was beneficial to periodically update the minimum noise value to ensure it accurately reflected the current noise level,” which are contrary to the disclosure of Helf noted above. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 158, 159.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 6,363,345 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,363,345 - SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 5, 2018 · IPR2017-00692 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1–14 as anticipated by Best and obvious over Best, and claim 15 as obvious over Best, Mills, and Bonella.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“construction “requires two layers of IC packages, in which a first IC package (the Board’s ‘carrier’) contains one or more second IC packages (the Board’s memory chips).” PO Resp. 39. Petitioner counters that “[t]he Board’s construction does no such thing.” Pet. Reply 18–19. We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner’s argument is predicated upon the erroneous assertion that “[e]ach memory chip in the Board’s ‘carrier’ requires a different IC package (i.e., a second IC package) that encloses at least one memory die.” PO Resp. 39. Each memory chip does not require its own integrated circuit package. On the contrary, it may be, as Best discloses, a die enclosed with another die in a single IC package. Having considered the arguments and evidence, we maintain our construction of “memory module” to mean “a carrier that contains one or more memory chips,” where “carrier” encompasses an integrated circuit package.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Otherwise, we determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary. Here, the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We have reviewed the arguments provided by Patent Owner and determine such arguments are insufficient to have Mr. Maltiel’s declaration excluded in its entirety. Rather, it is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to be accorded evidence. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); see also, e.g., Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); and Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In giving more weight to prior publications than to subsequent conclusory statements by experts, the Board acted well within [its] discretion.”). Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded that we should give the entirety of Mr. Maltiel’s declaration no weight.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“8–14. Pet. 30–37, 44–49. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we have considered and which we address below, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing, which we adopt as our own findings and conclusions, that claims 1–14 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Best.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 8,874,831 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,874,831 - Intel Corporation v. Alacritech, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 25, 2018 · IPR2017-01395 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Rehearing
The Board partly granted Intel’s rehearing request to recognize the Stansbury Declaration as a compliant sworn affidavit, but otherwise denied rehearing and left institution denied.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments. See id. An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). In the Decision, the Board determined that the record before it was insufficient to show that Stevens21 is a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 311(b) with respect to the ’948 patent. Stevens2 is one of the references relied upon in the sole asserted ground of unpatentability in the Petition. Accordingly, the Board concluded that Petitioner did not slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“Stevens2 was published no later than April 7, 1995 and is prior art under 102(b).” Pet. 45 n.9 (citing Ex. 1063 in support thereof (the “Stansbury Declaration”)). The Petition, per se, provides no other evidence or argument to establish a threshold showing that Stevens2 is a printed publication— publicly accessible by an interested person of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date. slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyOther
“attested that Stevens2 was ‘standard reference book on TCP/IP’ that was ‘widely cited and relied upon,’ ‘well known resources to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]’ (Petition at 15 (citing Ex.1003 at ¶¶21-88, including ¶¶27, 60, and FN3), 45 (citing Ex.1003 at ¶1212), FN9).” Req. 12. Initially we observe the Petition cites these paragraphs of Dr. Horst’s Declaration as part of the “Background Of Technology” discussion rather than as support for public accessibility of Stevens2. See Pet. 15–24. Furthermore, incorporating by reference such a substantial portion of Dr. Horst’s Declaration (paragraphs 21–88) is improper under our rules. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). Regardless, even if we consider Dr. Horst’s description of well-known background material (including Stevens2) as support for public accessibility of Stevens2, his testimony does not indicate” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,805,948 - SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2017 · IPR2017-00730 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–5, 12–14, and 19–20 over Saito and Swain, and claims 3 and 13–14 over Saito, Swain, and Kim.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Paragraph 101 describes Figure 7. See id. ¶¶ 100, 101. Recognizing that the timing of signals DQ-Pre (between memory controller and data buffer 300 on connectors 120) and the timing of signals DQ-Post (between data buffer 300 and memory chips 200 on data lines L1 or L2) is “off” because “data DQ is buffered by the data register buffer 300,” Saito teaches that “it is required to perform a timing adjustment between the memory chips 200 and the data register buffer 300 and a timing adjustment between the data register buffer 300 and the memory controller in a separate manner.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. This paragraph, therefore, does not teach that retiming from CL=5 to CL=6 is based on “time intervals from the leveling operations,” as Petitioner contends. Req. Reh’g 7. To the contrary, it explicitly teaches the necessity of a “separate manner” for adjusting timing between a data buffer and memory chip (i.e., for “signals received by the each respective buffer circuit during a memory write operation,” as recited in claim 1) and adjusting timing between a data buffer and a memory controller (i.e., for “transmission of a respective set of read data signals received from the respective group of memory devices,” as recited in claim 1).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We disagree. Neither paragraph teaches that the re-timing from CL=5 to CL=6 is “based on signals received by the each respective buffer circuit during a memory” read or write “operation,” as required by the claims. Paragraph 101 of Saito is reproduced below. Although the data DQ-Pre and the data DQ-Post have the same content, because the data DQ is buffered by the data register buffer 300, the timing is off between the data DQ-Pre and the data DQ-Post. The same is true for a relationship between the data strobe signal DQS-Pre and the data strobe signal DQS-Post. Therefore, in the present embodiment, it is required to perform a timing adjustment between the memory chips 200 and the data register buffer 300 and a timing adjustment between the data register buffer 300 and the memory controller in a separate manner. Details on the timing adjustments will be described later. Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Paragraph 101 describes Figure 7. See id. ¶¶ 100, 101. Recognizing that the timing of signals DQ-Pre (between memory controller and data buffer 300 on connectors 120) and the timing of signals DQ-Post (between data buffer 300 and memory chips 200 on data lines L1 or L2) is “off” because “data DQ is buffered by the data register buffer 300,” Saito teaches that “it is required to perform a timing adjustment between the memory chips 200 and the data register buffer 300 and a timing adjustment between the data register buffer 300 and the memory controller in a separate manner.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. This paragraph, therefore, does not teach that retiming from CL=5 to CL=6 is based on “time intervals from the leveling operations,” as Petitioner contends. Req. Reh’g 7. To the contrary, it explicitly teaches the necessity of a “separate manner” for adjusting timing between a data buffer and memory chip (i.e., for “signals received by the each respective buffer circuit during a memory write operation,” as recited in claim 1) and adjusting timing between a data buffer and a memory controller (i.e., for “transmission of a respective set of read data signals received from the respective group of memory devices,” as recited in claim 1).” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDenied
“These arguments were not in the Petition so we could not have misapprehended or overlooked them. To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that these paragraphs of our Decision indicate a misapprehension of what was argued in the Petition, we disagree. Specifically, we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Saito’s teaching to use time A to time reception of read data by “input buffer circuit INB and the like” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 149) teaches using that same interval “to time transmission” of read data, as claimed, merely because data is received by that input buffer circuit before, at some later point, being transmitted to the memory controller. Req. Reh’g. 8–9. We also are not persuaded that Saito’s use of “and the like” extends to the timing of the output of read data from buffer 300 in the manner argued. Req. Reh’g 9–11. This argument is particularly unpersuasive because, as our Decision points out (Dec. 13–14), Saito discloses an alternative to timing the output of read data from data buffer 300, which is a read leveling operation by the memory controller. Thus, although “Petitioner does not rely on those data buffer-memory controller operations for any of its arguments” (Req. Reh’g 13), they are nevertheless relevant because they corroborate that Saito does not teach its data buffer 300 using a time interval “based on signals received by [it]” for the purpose of “tim[ing] transmission of a respective set of read data signals.”” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,128,632 - Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00331 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11, 14–25, and 28–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Beser and RFC 2401.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s contentions are not persuasive. Patent Owner fails to explain sufficiently why the notion of “performing an additional evaluation” constitutes an implicit part of the claimed intercept clause. Addressing similar arguments by Patent Owner, a Board panel made a similar determination in the ’237 FWD relied upon by Petitioner. ’237 FWD 11 (“the record show[s] that the additional functionality urged by Patent Owner should not be imported into the intercepting phrase”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Under this standard, absent any special definitions, claim terms or phrases are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For the purposes of this Decision, only the claim terms or clauses below need express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only those terms in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“We find Dr. Tamassia’s testimony as to public accessibility of RFCs in general to be credible, especially given the independent support of RFC 2026 (Ex. 1036), the contents of which Patent Owner does not challenge.7 As part of routine discovery, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(ii), Patent Owner had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Tamassia, but does not point us to any discussion of this issue. Moreover, RFC 2401’s contents are consistent with the publication process described by RFC 2026 and Dr. Tamassia, including the inclusion of a date “November 1998” on the top right corner of the first page of the document. Ex. 1008, 1. In addition, this document—a request for suggestions and improvements for an Internet standards protocol, 7 As addressed below, Patent Owner objects and moves to dismiss a number of Exhibits based on hearsay and relevancy. See Paper 20 (Motion to Exclude). having no indication of being a mere draft or internal paper—is precisely the type of document whose very purpose is public disclosure, including on the Internet. Both of the magazine articles, Exhibits 1064 and 1065, further corroborate the indicia of availability on the face of RFC 2401, although they are not necessary to our finding of public accessibility. We do not rely on the testimony of Sandy Ginoza, Exhibits 1060 and 1063, which Patent Owner seeks to exclude as discussed further below.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not articulate a persuasive reason for giving Dr. Tamassia’s declaration, as a whole, little or no weight in our analysis. We agree with Petitioner that experts are not required to opine on every relevant factual and legal issue in order to be accorded substantial weight. The cases upon which Patent Owner relies do not show otherwise. For example, Patent Owner cites Schumer v. Laboratory Computer Systems, Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “[expert] testimony . . . ‘must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.’” PO Resp. 52–53. Patent Owner’s quotation, however, mischaracterizes Schumer by omitting introductory words necessary to the meaning of the quoted sentence. In its entirety, the quoted portion of Schumer states the following: Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference. The testimony is insufficient if it is merely conclusory. Schumer, 308 F.3d at 1315–16. The Federal Circuit then adds that it is not the task of the courts to “attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a case of invalidity has been made out” and “if the testimony relates to prior invention and is from an interested party, as here, it must be corroborated.” Id. at 1316. So, instead of laying out a specific, required format for the content of all testimony regarding invalidity, as asserted by Patent Owner, this portion of Schumer confirms the unremarkable proposition that conclusory, overly general, confusing, and self-interested testimony should not be relied upon. Id.; see also Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“General and conclusory testimony, such as that provided by Dr. Kazmer in this case, does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity.”). Patent Owner does not show that the whole of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony suffers from any of these failings. Under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), the preponderance of the evidence standard governs in determining whether Petitioner establishes unpatentability. We exercise discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord the evidence presented, including expert opinions, based on the underlying facts supporting the opinion. We accord relevant portions of Dr. Tamassia’s testimony the appropriate weight based on that particular testimony and supporting evidence.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,504,696 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,504,696 - PTAB · Feb 26, 2016 · IPR2015-01047 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution of IPR2016-00167 and its joinder with IPR2015-01047 in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“because “the ’167 IPR is entirely devoid of any supporting expert testimony” but expert testimony was supposedly submitted in IPR2015-01047. Req. Reh’g 3–4. As previously explained, however, the record reflects that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and Patent Owner fails to demonstrate sufficiently that the absence of expert testimony alone indicates the failure to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in proving unpatentability of a challenged claim. See, e.g., Decision 4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingOther
“(“Req. Reh’g” or “Request”), seeks reversal of the Board’s Decision granting institution in IPR2016-00167 and joining IPR2016-00167 with IPR2015-01047. See Req. Reh’g 1. The Board denies the requested relief.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,490,151 - Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 24, 2015 · IPR2014-00482 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 6, 10, 13–15, 17, 20, 22, 26, 29–31, 33, 35, and 37 are unpatentable; claims 12 and 28 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We previously determined that, under a broad but reasonable construction, one of skill in the art would have understood the term “virtual private network communication link,” in light of the Specification, to include “a transmission path between two devices that restricts access to data, addresses, or other information on the path, generally using obfuscation methods to hide information on the path, including, but not limited to, one or more of authentication, encryption, or address hopping.” Dec. on Inst. 6–7. 1 Patent Owner disputes this interpretation and argues that the term “virtual private network communication link” must be “a communication path between computers in a virtual private network” (PO Resp. 8), “requir[es] computers within a VPN to communicate directly” (PO Resp. 10), and requires a “network of computers,” which, according to Patent Owner must be “more than a ‘path between two devices.’” PO Resp. 14. We decline to modify our previous construction of this term in the manner suggested by Patent Owner because such a modification is immaterial in this proceeding for reasons set forth below. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the case).” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“understood that a “secure computer network address” must be “associated with a computer capable of virtual private network communications” because a claim recites “sending an access request message to the secure computer network address using a virtual private network communication link.” PO Resp. 16. We agree with Patent Owner that claim 1, for example, recites “sending an access request message to the secure computer network address using a virtual private network communication link.” However, Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently why an explicitly recited claim limitation must be incorporated into the construction of an associated claim term. Indeed, if one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that all secure computer network addresses must be associated with a computer capable of VPN communications and that any computer network address that is associated with computers that are incapable of VPN communications would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art not to be a “secure computer network address” (even if authorization for access is required), then any such recited claim limitation would be superfluous. Patent Owner also argues that “VirnetX’s proposed construction has been agreed to by its litigation adversaries and has been adopted by a district court.” PO Resp. 17. Even if Patent Owner’s proposed construction “has been agreed to by” parties in litigation and the district court, Patent Owner does not assert or demonstrate persuasively that one of ordinary skill in the art would have broadly but reasonably construed the term “secure computer network address” in light of the Specification to require association with a computer capable of virtual private network communications. In any event, Patent Owner does not appear to contend that the cited references fail to disclose a secure computer network address that is associated with a computer capable of VPN communications and, therefore, does not demonstrate sufficiently that the construction of “secure computer network address” will bear on the outcome of the issues in this inter partes review. We decline to modify our construction of this term.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“computer network address” of “the server-side proxy” (and not the “host”). PO Resp. 32 (emphasis omitted). In other words, Patent Owner argues that, in contrast to claim 1, which requires sending a query message requesting an address and receiving a response message containing the address requested in the query message, Kiuchi discloses sending a query message requesting an address of “the host” but receiving a response message containing an address of “the server-side proxy,” rather than “the host.” Based on this presumption that “the host” of Kiuchi differs from the “server-side proxy” of Kiuchi, Patent Owner argues that Kiuchi fails to disclose the claimed invention and also that “the Board has exceeded its statutory authority by instituting in part on rationales that were not before it.” PO Resp. 30. However, Patent Owner does not explain sufficiently a difference between “the host” and the “server-side proxy” of Kiuchi. Kiuchi discloses that a client-side proxy “asks the C-HTTP name server whether it can communicate with the host” and that, in response, the C-HTTP name server examines “the requested server-side proxy” and responds by sending the IP address of the server-side proxy. Ex. 1004, 65 (emphasis added). In other words, Kiuchi discloses that “the host” that is requested is the requested “server-side proxy.”” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableMixed
“of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Kiuchi with the other references.” PO Resp. 3. Petitioner provides reasons with supporting factual underpinnings to support the conclusion that the combination of Kiuchi and Bhatti (and/or Tavs) would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 34–35, 38–39. For example, Petitioner states that one of ordinary skill in the art would implement Kiuchi’s user agent such that the user agent sends an access request for content stored on the origin server, in the same manner that Bhatti describes sending an access request from a user terminal for content stored [on] a content server. Pet. 38. Petitioner also states that “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill at the time of the ’180 patent to modify the client-side proxy and server-side proxy described by Kiuchi to support the service-level categorization and differentiation described by Tavs in order to give priority to business-relevant traffic during peak network congestion.” Pet. 34. Patent Owner does not dispute the reasons provided by Petitioner as to why it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined teachings of Kiuchi and Bhatti (and/or Tavs) but argues that this obviousness ground “is critically flawed because the Petition relies solely on missing expert testimony for its rationale for combining” the references. PO Resp. 54, 56. However, Patent Owner does not explain why Petitioner is required to provide expert testimony in support of a proposed ground of unpatentability. Nor does Patent Owner explain the supposed flaws in the rationale provided by Petitioner.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,188,180 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,188,180 - Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00404 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17 under § 102 and § 103; claim 5 under § 103.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingOther
“seeking an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, and 18 of the ’274 patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319. On September 15, 2014, the Board instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 17 (IPR2014-00484) and joined IPR2014-00484 with IPR2014- 00404 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (IPR2014-00484, Paper 11 – Dec. on Inst.). On April 16, 2015, the present proceeding was terminated with respect to Microsoft Corporation only. Paper 38.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“domain service” requesting a secure network address and receiving “a response message from the secure domain name service containing the secure network address.” Claim 1 does not recite “recogniz[ing] that the query message is requesting a secure computer address.” “[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms” and “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). At least based on the context of the claim, we cannot agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “recogniz[ing]” is required by claim 1 in the absence of a recitation of this alleged requirement. Based on the context of the claim, the Specification, and the prosecution history, claim 1 does not require “recogniz[ing]” as argued by Patent Owner. The Specification describes an “SDNS 313” that “contains a cross-reference database of secure domain names and corresponding secure network addresses. That is, for each secure domain name, SDNS 3313 stores a computer network address corresponding to the secure domain name.” Ex. 1001, 47:15–18. This disclosure comes closest to aligning with the claim term, “secure domain service” (i.e., an SDNS as set forth in the disclosure). Patent Owner does not point the panel to a disclosure in the Specification that clearly supports the requirement of an SDNS to “recognize that the query message is requesting a secure computer address.” Hence, further based on the context of the Specification, we cannot agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “recogniz[ing]” is required by claim 1 in the absence of such a disclosure in the Specification of this alleged requirement.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the term “tunnel packeting” to mean “forming a packet to be transmitted that contains data structured in one protocol format within the format of another protocol.” PO Resp. 19. However, Patent Owner does not demonstrate sufficiently that the construction of “tunnel packeting” will bear on the outcome of the issues in this inter partes review. Hence, we decline to modify our construction of this term.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Claim 1 recites sending a message from a first network device for an address for a second network device and, in response, receiving at the first network device the address for the second network device. Kiuchi discloses that a client-side proxy “asks the C-HTTP name server whether it can communicate with the host” and that, in response, the C-HTTP name server examines “the requested server-side proxy.” In response to the request from the client-side proxy, the client-side proxy (i.e., “first network device”) receives “the IP address and public key of the server-side proxy.” Ex. 1004, 65. In other words, Kiuchi discloses a first network device (or a client-side proxy) sending a message to the C-HTTP name server (or secure domain service) to request a secure network address (e.g., an “IP address and public key”) for a second network device (i.e., server-side proxy) and then, in response, receiving at the client-side proxy the requested secure network address for the second network device (i.e., “the IP address and public key of the server-side proxy”). Patent Owner does not demonstrate persuasively a difference between Kiuchi and the claimed invention. Patent Owner argues that Kiuchi discloses that the client-side proxy sends a request for a network address for the “origin server” but not for the server-side proxy. However, Kiuchi discloses that in response to the request to communicate with “the host,” the name server examines “the requested server-side proxy” and returns “the IP address . . . of the server-side proxy.” Ex. 1004, 65 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, “the host” of Kiuchi corresponds to the “server-side proxy” (or second network device, as recited in claim 1).” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 7,987,274 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,987,274
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.