- Scentair Technologies, LLC v. Prolitec, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00013 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, finding its new arguments untimely and unpersuasive as to the aerosol outlet limitation for claims 1–19.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in a petition. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked matters or arguments that were not asserted in the Petition. We deny the Rehearing Request because it is based on new arguments that Petitioner did not present in the Petition. B. Petitioner’s Arguments Are Unpersuasive Alternatively, even if we consider the new arguments raised for the first time in the Rehearing Request, we find none persuasive to show reversible error in the Decision. The ’767 patent describes and claims “a cap assembly” that is characterized by three distinct structures, namely, “a cap, a venturi insert, and a base attached together without welds or separate fasteners to define . . . an air outlet chamber” that is “partitioned from the interior of the receptacle by the base.” Ex. 1001, 15:6–13 (claim 1) (emphasis added); see id. at 3:30–43, 9:45–62 (written description).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“The Petition advances three grounds, each of which is based on obviousness and asserts Benalikhoudja1 as a prior art reference. Pet. 5. We found in the Decision, and Petitioner does not dispute in the Rehearing Request, that each ground “depends on Petitioner’s assertion that Benalikhoudja discloses or suggests ‘an aerosol outlet chamber partitioned 1 We refer to US 2006/0237090 A1, published Oct. 26, 2006 (Ex. 1004). from the interior of the receptacle by the base.’” Dec. 5–6. As we did in the Decision, we refer herein to that feature of the claimed invention as “the aerosol outlet limitation.” Id. at 6. Based on the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determined Petitioner did not show sufficiently, for purposes of trial institution, that Benalikhoudja discloses the aerosol outlet limitation. Id. at 9–10. Petitioner argues we erred on that point. Req. Reh’g 1–6.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,480,767 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2021 · CBM2018-00040 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · CBM · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s second rehearing request and left in place its denial of institution because the patent’s CBM review eligibility was not subject to judicial review.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“rehearing of our denial of institution in this proceeding in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in SIPCO, LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 939 F.3d 1301, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Paper 19. We also authorized Patent Owner to file an opposition to Petitioner’s second request for rehearing. Paper 20. Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s first opinion in the SIPCO case, and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP,” 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020). On remand, the Federal Circuit determined that the issue of whether a patent qualifies for CBM review is not subject to judicial review. SIPCO, LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., 980 F.3d 865, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Accordingly, because the circumstances that warranted further reconsideration of our denial of institution no longer hold true, we hereby decline to consider the second request for rehearing. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s second request for rehearing is denied. Our original decision to deny institution based on lack of CBM review eligibility therefore stands.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,758,370 - Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00392 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its denial of institution on the obviousness ground over Slemmer and Vu, finding no abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 8. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 6–7. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,725,899 - Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00376 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and upheld denial of institution on the Slemmer and Vu obviousness ground because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.,, 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 9. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 7–8. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“construction for the term ‘TCP connection hand shake completion data,’ which resulted in an incorrect determination.” Req. Reh’g. 5. In particular, Petitioner now proposes a broadest reasonable construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data” to mean “two devices initiating a communication session by the first device sending information to a second device, and the second device then responding to the first device.” Req. Reh’g. 7. Based on this newly proposed construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data,” Petitioner argues that Vu discloses this feature. Req. Reh’g. 6–8. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner must “identify all matters [Petitioner] believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Petitioner did not present this proposed construction in the Petition. See generally Req. Reh’g.; see generally Pet. We could not have “misapprehended or overlooked” what was not presented.” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,266,266 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Red Rock Analytics, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 28, 2018 · IPR2017-01490 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that the Board misapprehended “calibration cycle” or abused its discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD OF REVIEW The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). III.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“calibration cycle.” E.g., Ex. 1001, 11:66–67 (emphasis added). We found that how the calibration cycle is referred to in this limitation (i.e., signal includes it) underscores that the calibration cycle is a feature of the calibration RF signal itself. Dec. 15–16. Rather than addressing this claim 1 U.S. Patent No. 6,940,916 B1 (issued Sept. 6, 2005) (Ex. 1003, “Warner”). 2 We do not address further Warner’s teachings because Petitioner’s arguments are predicated on our having misapprehended the meaning of “calibration cycle,” which we did not. In an inter partes review, the petitioner has the burden to show why the patent it challenges is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(citation omitted).” slip op. at 4
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“signal includes a calibration cycle.” Ex. 1001, 11:56–12:5 (claim 1), 12:22– 54 (claim 7), 13:18–49 (claim 16), 13:63–14:30 (claim 22), 14:65–15:32 (claim 32), 15:46–62 (claim 38), 16:12–44 (claim 44), 17:8–37 (claim 53), 17:52–18:19 (claim 59), 18:52–19:18 (claim 69) (emphasis added). In denying the Petition, we found that Petitioner did not establish that the prior art disclosed or rendered obvious this limitation. Dec. 8–19. More specifically, we found that the calibration cycle relates to a feature of the calibration radio frequency (“RF”) signal (i.e., the signal includes), rather than simply requiring having a calibration process occur, as Petitioner submitted. Id. at 15–19. Our reasoning underlying this finding related to (A) the language of the limitation, (B) the language of dependent claims, and (C) the ’313 Patent’s Specification. Id.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,346,313 - SK Hynix Inc. / SK Hynix America Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 30, 2017 · IPR2017-00730 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–5, 12–14, and 19–20 over Saito and Swain, and claims 3 and 13–14 over Saito, Swain, and Kim.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not reached
“Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Paragraph 101 describes Figure 7. See id. ¶¶ 100, 101. Recognizing that the timing of signals DQ-Pre (between memory controller and data buffer 300 on connectors 120) and the timing of signals DQ-Post (between data buffer 300 and memory chips 200 on data lines L1 or L2) is “off” because “data DQ is buffered by the data register buffer 300,” Saito teaches that “it is required to perform a timing adjustment between the memory chips 200 and the data register buffer 300 and a timing adjustment between the data register buffer 300 and the memory controller in a separate manner.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. This paragraph, therefore, does not teach that retiming from CL=5 to CL=6 is based on “time intervals from the leveling operations,” as Petitioner contends. Req. Reh’g 7. To the contrary, it explicitly teaches the necessity of a “separate manner” for adjusting timing between a data buffer and memory chip (i.e., for “signals received by the each respective buffer circuit during a memory write operation,” as recited in claim 1) and adjusting timing between a data buffer and a memory controller (i.e., for “transmission of a respective set of read data signals received from the respective group of memory devices,” as recited in claim 1).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We disagree. Neither paragraph teaches that the re-timing from CL=5 to CL=6 is “based on signals received by the each respective buffer circuit during a memory” read or write “operation,” as required by the claims. Paragraph 101 of Saito is reproduced below. Although the data DQ-Pre and the data DQ-Post have the same content, because the data DQ is buffered by the data register buffer 300, the timing is off between the data DQ-Pre and the data DQ-Post. The same is true for a relationship between the data strobe signal DQS-Pre and the data strobe signal DQS-Post. Therefore, in the present embodiment, it is required to perform a timing adjustment between the memory chips 200 and the data register buffer 300 and a timing adjustment between the data register buffer 300 and the memory controller in a separate manner. Details on the timing adjustments will be described later. Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Paragraph 101 describes Figure 7. See id. ¶¶ 100, 101. Recognizing that the timing of signals DQ-Pre (between memory controller and data buffer 300 on connectors 120) and the timing of signals DQ-Post (between data buffer 300 and memory chips 200 on data lines L1 or L2) is “off” because “data DQ is buffered by the data register buffer 300,” Saito teaches that “it is required to perform a timing adjustment between the memory chips 200 and the data register buffer 300 and a timing adjustment between the data register buffer 300 and the memory controller in a separate manner.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. This paragraph, therefore, does not teach that retiming from CL=5 to CL=6 is based on “time intervals from the leveling operations,” as Petitioner contends. Req. Reh’g 7. To the contrary, it explicitly teaches the necessity of a “separate manner” for adjusting timing between a data buffer and memory chip (i.e., for “signals received by the each respective buffer circuit during a memory write operation,” as recited in claim 1) and adjusting timing between a data buffer and a memory controller (i.e., for “transmission of a respective set of read data signals received from the respective group of memory devices,” as recited in claim 1).” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDenied
“These arguments were not in the Petition so we could not have misapprehended or overlooked them. To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that these paragraphs of our Decision indicate a misapprehension of what was argued in the Petition, we disagree. Specifically, we are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s contention that Saito’s teaching to use time A to time reception of read data by “input buffer circuit INB and the like” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 149) teaches using that same interval “to time transmission” of read data, as claimed, merely because data is received by that input buffer circuit before, at some later point, being transmitted to the memory controller. Req. Reh’g. 8–9. We also are not persuaded that Saito’s use of “and the like” extends to the timing of the output of read data from buffer 300 in the manner argued. Req. Reh’g 9–11. This argument is particularly unpersuasive because, as our Decision points out (Dec. 13–14), Saito discloses an alternative to timing the output of read data from data buffer 300, which is a read leveling operation by the memory controller. Thus, although “Petitioner does not rely on those data buffer-memory controller operations for any of its arguments” (Req. Reh’g 13), they are nevertheless relevant because they corroborate that Saito does not teach its data buffer 300 using a time interval “based on signals received by [it]” for the purpose of “tim[ing] transmission of a respective set of read data signals.”” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,128,632 - Black Swamp IP, LLC v. Virnetx Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00957 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied VirnetX’s rehearing request, leaving claims 27 and 51 unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,921,211 - Black Swamp IP, LLC v. Virnetx Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 24, 2017 · IPR2016-00693 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied VirnetX’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 27 and 51 are anticipated by Kiuchi.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“path to address the claimed ‘first location’” and relies on In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l., Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support Patent Owner’s implied contention that the Final Decision may not address new arguments raised by Patent Owner in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and/or Patent Owner’s Response. Req. Reh’g. 6. We disagree. In the present matter and in accordance with Magnum Oil, the ultimate burden of proof remained with Petitioner and was never shifted to Patent Owner at any time during the proceedings and, as discussed above, at no time was an “entirely new path to address the claimed ‘first location’” introduced in the Decision.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 7,418,504 - Nautilus Hyosung, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 31, 2017 · IPR2016-00580 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1, 5-8, 10, 16, 26, and 27 because the obviousness arguments were insufficient.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be indicated if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Applying these legal standards, we address the arguments presented by Petitioner.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“overlooked an explanation as to how and why it would have been obvious to modify Dickenson to have the service opening of Gussack. Petitioner provided multiple reason for why a “[person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been prompted to modify the device of Dickenson to have a bottom service opening as described in Gussack.” Pet. 16–18 (emphasis added). Yet, as explained in the Decision Denying Institution, Petitioner’s arguments for combining the cited art for very specific limitations are insufficient, because Petitioner failed to “explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine together the prior art teachings to arrive at the challenged claim as a whole.” Dec. 25. The Petition merely offers conclusory statements that someone of ordinary skill in the art could have modified Dickenson, yet fails to explain persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the gaming machine of Dickenson to use the removable bottom panel of Gussack in order to have a service opening as required by claim 1.6 Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374, n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (criticizing “a complete absence of any proof that one skilled in the art would find the particular claimed method obvious . . . for any reason”). Therefore, as our Decision Denying Institution states, Petitioner’s analysis is conclusory and fails to explain adequately how the evidence supports the contentions that Dickenson in view of Gussack would have rendered the limitations of challenged claim 1 obvious. See Dec. 17–22, 24–28. 6 We specifically address claim 1, because it was only for claim 1 where Petitioner provided the list of reasons for modifying Dickenson in view of Gussack. See Pet. 16–18. 5 Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked Petitioner’s argument that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Dickenson to use a removable bottom panel from Gussack’s drawer to teach the claimed “service opening.” Although we recognize that removable panels for servicing of components may have been known in the prior art, Petitioner does not explain what would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to choose to use Gussack’s removable panel to create a service opening in a wall in Dickenson’s rolling tray. Rather, as discussed in our Decision, we find Petitioner’s arguments fraught with hindsight bias. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious by merely demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[Smith & Nephew] never offered evidence articulating why a person having ordinary skill in the art would combine the primary references to obtain the disclosed inventions.”); Innogenetics, N.V., 512 F.3d at 1374, n. 3 (“We must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“overlooked an explanation as to how and why it would have been obvious to modify Dickenson to have the service opening of Gussack. Petitioner provided multiple reason for why a “[person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been prompted to modify the device of Dickenson to have a bottom service opening as described in Gussack.” Pet. 16–18 (emphasis added). Yet, as explained in the Decision Denying Institution, Petitioner’s arguments for combining the cited art for very specific limitations are insufficient, because Petitioner failed to “explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine together the prior art teachings to arrive at the challenged claim as a whole.” Dec. 25. The Petition merely offers conclusory statements that someone of ordinary skill in the art could have modified Dickenson, yet fails to explain persuasively why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the gaming machine of Dickenson to use the removable bottom panel of Gussack in order to have a service opening as required by claim 1.6 Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374, n. 3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (criticizing “a complete absence of any proof that one skilled in the art would find the particular claimed method obvious . . . for any reason”). Therefore, as our Decision Denying Institution states, Petitioner’s analysis is conclusory and fails to explain adequately how the evidence supports the contentions that Dickenson in view of Gussack would have rendered the limitations of challenged claim 1 obvious. See Dec. 17–22, 24–28. 6 We specifically address claim 1, because it was only for claim 1 where Petitioner provided the list of reasons for modifying Dickenson in view of Gussack. See Pet. 16–18. 5 Accordingly, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked Petitioner’s argument that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Dickenson to use a removable bottom panel from Gussack’s drawer to teach the claimed “service opening.” Although we recognize that removable panels for servicing of components may have been known in the prior art, Petitioner does not explain what would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to choose to use Gussack’s removable panel to create a service opening in a wall in Dickenson’s rolling tray. Rather, as discussed in our Decision, we find Petitioner’s arguments fraught with hindsight bias. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious by merely demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[Smith & Nephew] never offered evidence articulating why a person having ordinary skill in the art would combine the primary references to obtain the disclosed inventions.”); Innogenetics, N.V., 512 F.3d at 1374, n. 3 (“We must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“The Board could not have overlooked a detailed explanation or analysis not presented in the Petition. A rehearing request is not a supplemental petition. The petition, itself, must identify “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5). “The Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” Id. The Petitioner has the responsibility to identify and explain in the petition specific evidence that supports its arguments. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”).” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,082,616 - Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.Com Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 3, 2017 · IPR2016-01201 · APJ Stacy B Margolies · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place for claims 1, 7, 27, 28, 34, 54, 72–74, 92, 93, and 111.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id. Upon a request for rehearing, the decision on a petition will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“argument that the purported motivation to combine—that allowing users to place calls as if they were dialing from a standard PSTN phone would be desirable—is unsupported by substantial evidence. Reh’g Req. 7–12. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the Institution Decision relies on testimony from Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Houh, and that that declaration testimony “do[es] not rely upon any evidence for support.” Id. at 10. Patent Owner also argues that the Board overlooked Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Houh’s testimony should be entitled to little or no weight. Id. at 11–12.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“argument that the purported motivation to combine—that allowing users to place calls as if they were dialing from a standard PSTN phone would be desirable—is unsupported by substantial evidence. Reh’g Req. 7–12. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the Institution Decision relies on testimony from Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Houh, and that that declaration testimony “do[es] not rely upon any evidence for support.” Id. at 10. Patent Owner also argues that the Board overlooked Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Houh’s testimony should be entitled to little or no weight. Id. at 11–12.” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,542,815
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.