- PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - PTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01111 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 9 would be obvious over Gallagher and Schofield.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Texas litigation, but significant work still remains to be done. See Ex. 2004. Moreover, we agree that Petitioner filed the Petition expeditiously. See 2nd Prelim. Reply 4. Accordingly, the facts underlying this factor weigh strongly against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“h. Conclusion Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 9 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Gallaher and Schofield.” slip op. at 32
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party proposes a definition for any claim term. See Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 4–5. For purposes of this Decision, and based on the record before us, we determine that no construction of any term is necessary. We note that this determination does not preclude the parties from arguing their proposed constructions of the claims during trial. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that claim construction, in general, is an issue to be addressed at trial. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all of their claim construction arguments and evidence during the trial as permitted by our rules. slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner has not advanced persuasive evidence to put into dispute Petitioner’s identification of itself as the sole real party in interest. Patent Owner asserts that the two third parties it seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation produce products that incorporate components manufactured by Petitioner and that Patent Owner has asserted that these Petitioner products infringe the ’328 patent in the Texas Litigation. Prelim. Sur-reply 4–5. Patent Owner also asserts that these two third parties asserted an obligation to defend Petitioner and the other third party against Patent Owner’s infringement assertions. Id. at 5. However, Patent Owner does not assert or provide any evidence that Petitioner must indemnify any of the three third parties or that any of the third parties controls any aspect of this inter partes review proceeding. See id. Moreover, Petitioner stipulates that, if we institute inter partes review in this proceeding, it will not pursue in the Texas Litigation “‘any ground that [Petitioner] raised or reasonably could have raised’ during this proceeding.” Prelim. Reply 4 (alteration in original) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential in relevant part)). Furthermore, to the extent that the two parties Patent Owner seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation should be named as real parties in interest in this proceeding, those parties have also filed a stipulation here (see Ex. 1024), alleviating any concerns of conflict with district court litigation.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,671,328 - PTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01110 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claim 15 based on Gallagher and Lumia, finding a reasonable likelihood that the combination renders the claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“7. Holistic Assessment of the Fintiv Factors On this record, after weighing all of the factors and taking a holistic view, we determine that the facts in this case that weigh against exercising discretion outweigh the facts that favor exercising discretion. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances presented weigh against exercising our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review based on the Texas litigation.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“dispute Petitioner’s identification of itself as the sole real party in interest. Patent Owner asserts that the two third parties it seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation produce products that incorporate components manufactured by Petitioner and that Patent Owner has asserted that these Petitioner products infringe the ’255 patent in the Texas Litigation. Prelim. Sur-reply 4. Patent Owner also asserts that these two third parties asserted an obligation to defend Petitioner and the other third party against Patent Owner’s infringement assertions. Id. However, Patent Owner does not assert or provide any evidence that Petitioner must indemnify any of the three third parties or that any of the third parties controls any aspect of this inter partes review proceeding. See id. Moreover, Petitioner stipulates that, if we institute inter partes review in this proceeding, it will not pursue in the Texas Litigation “‘any ground that [Petitioner] raised or reasonably could have raised’ during this proceeding.” Prelim. Reply 4 (alteration in original) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential in relevant part)). Furthermore, to the extent that the two parties Patent Owner seeks to add as defendants in the Texas Litigation should be named as real parties in interest in this proceeding, those parties have also filed a stipulation here (see Ex. 1024), alleviating any concerns of conflict with district court litigation.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 15 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Gallagher and Lumia.” slip op. at 31
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Here, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 12–14 and 17–23. Prelim. Resp. 1; Ex. 2002. Based on our review of Exhibit 2002, we determine that a disclaimer of claims 12–14 and 17–23 of the ’255 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been filed with the Office as of December 9, 2024. Based on the information in the public record, we find that the disclaimer complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Because claims 12–14 and 17–23 have been disclaimed under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a), in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), we do not reach challenges to claims 12–14 and 17–23. As a result, the remaining challenged claim is claim 15 (“the challenged claim”).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,335,255 - PTAB · Jan 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00979 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–18 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Dolan renders at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“As set forth in the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022), at 7, available at https://www.uspto. gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_ parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1018) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel Eastern District of Texas Litigation.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“Electronics, America, Inc.; and Google LLC as real parties in interest. Pet. 57. Petitioner explains that “Google LLC is a subsidiary of XXVI Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc.” Id. at 57 n.10. Petitioner asserts that “XXVI Holdings Inc. and Alphabet Inc. are not real parties-in-interest to this proceeding.” Id. Patent Owner identifies Cerence Operating Co., a subsidiary of Cerence, Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 5, 1. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner, contending that Alphabet Inc. is also a real party in interest. Id. At this stage of the proceeding, we need not determine whether Alphabet Inc. is a real party in interest to Petitioner since neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner has identified any effect that determination would have on the outcome of this proceeding. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to maintain this contention, it should raise the issue in its Patent Owner response.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not currently take a position on the relevant level of ordinary skill in the art and believes that “the Board could assume Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for the purposes of deciding whether to institute.” Prelim. Resp. 3. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested, proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’993 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need to be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this time, neither party proposes a specific construction of any given claim term, instead requesting that the claims be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10–11; Prelim. Resp. 5.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,081,993 - PTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00935 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claim 14 over all three obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Tayloe and TI Datasheet ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“As set forth in the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022), at 7, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1041) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel Western District of Texas Litigation.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“h. Summary as to Claim 14 For the reasons discussed above, on the present record we find that Petitioner has established that the combination of Tayloe and TI Datasheet teaches each of the elements of claim 14 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these two references as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success in so doing. 3. Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness In the record presently before us, neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner has presented any evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. 4. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Tayloe and TI Datasheet would have rendered the subject matter of claim 14 of the ’177 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 35
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we need not construe the term expressly because, for the reasons discussed below, we find that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of showing that claim 14 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art under each construction, and because there is no present controversy as to the meaning of the term in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“A datasheet is a well-known resource for learning detailed information of the multiplexer/demultiplexer, and a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to consult the TI Datasheet for a more complete understanding of Tayloe’s express teachings of the SN74CBT3253 demultiplexer, the only matching multiplexer available at the time. [Ex. 1023; Ex. 1003] ¶¶ 100–109; see also Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 713 F.3d 1369, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (obvious to combine two prior art references where one reference “refers expressly” to the other). When viewing the detailed diagram of the SN74CBT3253 demultiplexer, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to apply four of the switches because the architecture of one switch on the demultiplexer is analogous to one of the four switching paths of Tayloe’s commutating switch 38. [Ex. 1003 ¶¶] 100–109. Thus, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have thought to implement the multiplexer switches from TI Datasheet in an analogous manner “by simple substitution of one known element for another.” Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–109; KSR, 550 U.S. at 401).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,865,177 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00635 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–14 on the asserted §103 ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that Fluidmaster would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“(1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (footnote omitted). The Becton, Dickinson factors provide useful insight into how to apply the framework under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Id. at 9 (referencing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph)).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the Petition and the Preliminary Response (including any authorized submissions) “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, and solely for the purposes of this Decision, we determine that Petitioner’s asserted ground satisfies the standard for institution.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d, 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Although this Decision might appear to indicate that certain Patent Owner arguments would not be persuasive, we do not shift the ultimate burden away from Petitioner.” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“A PHOSITA in the field to which the ’698 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or research experience in the design or development of toilet products, parts, and accessories. Prelim. Resp. 14. In view of the present record, we see no material difference between the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner and that proposed by Dr. Cameron. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSITA, as it appears to be consistent with the ’698 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,934,698 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00374 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all asserted grounds because the petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“petition for inter partes review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016). In determining whether to exercise that discretion on behalf of the Director, the Board considers an early trial date in related litigation, among other factors, as part of an assessment of all relevant circumstances of the case—including the merits—to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“(2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. If a condition in the first part of the framework is satisfied and the petitioner fails to make a showing of material error, the Director generally will exercise discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of industry experience in digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 10035 ¶¶ 76–78). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 21. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision. Pet. 3.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,090,025 - PTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00372 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2–4 and 11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would show them unpatentable as obvious over Phek, Segall, Martins, and He.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5. When the same prior art is submitted in district court and to the Board, there are “concerns of inefficiency and the possibility of conflicting decisions.” Id. at 12. Petitioner can mitigate those concerns by presenting a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the Board. Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential). Here, Petitioner has presented such a stipulation: if the Board grants institution, Petitioner “agrees not to pursue any grounds raised in the petition, or any grounds [Petitioner] could have reasonably raised in the petition, in [the] district court litigation or any parallel proceeding” Ex. 1028, 1. “Consistent with [Sotera], the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022).5 Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“present arguments specifically directed to the subject matter recited in the rest of the claim. See Prelim. Resp. Even so, Petitioner has the burden to show that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Thus, we have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence submitted in connection with the remaining limitations and find them to be sufficient at this stage and on this record. From the current record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 2 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“digital video processing, or a related field.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 10036 ¶¶ 123–125). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner uses the same skill level in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 13. We also apply Petitioner’s proposed skill level in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner’s arguments, however, are based on an implicit construction for the second resolution converter. See § II.D.5.c supra. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments and the implicit construction. See id. Apart from rejecting the implicit construction of the second resolution converter, we agree with the parties that no claim term needs to be construed in this Decision.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,218,995 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00269 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 17, and 18 based on both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Provisur proposes, and Weber does not dispute, that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’823 patent, at the time relevant for the analysis herein, would have possessed the following background and qualifications: (1) a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering (or a similar field) and at least two years of experience working as an engineer (or similar role) on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field); or (2) at least seven years of experience working as an engineer (or similar role) on food processing and/or packaging systems (or in a similar field). Pet. 13–14. Provisur’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the problems and solutions addressed in the ’823 patent and the prior art of 3 US 2016/0023370 A1, pub. Jan. 28, 2016 (Ex. 1004, “Müller”). 4 US 2019/0329438 A1, pub. Oct. 31, 2019 (Ex. 1005, “GEA438”). 5 US 2009/0159631 A1, pub. June 25, 2009 (Ex. 1006, “DePoi”). record. Therefore, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Provisur’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Weber’s Preliminary Response does not manifest any claim construction dispute that would bear upon this Decision. Therefore, we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this preliminary stage. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“[I]n evaluating the factors,” set forth in Fintiv, “the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Fintiv 6 (emphasis added). In view of the following discussion of these factors, under the circumstances as they appear from the present record, the efficiency and integrity concerns, referenced in Fintiv, are best served by not exercising our discretion to deny the Petition without considering the merits. slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, and solely for the purposes of this Decision, we determine that Grounds 1 and 2 of the Petition (as identified below) satisfy this standard.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,331,823 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00258 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 16–20, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 2, 17, and 19 are obvious over Müller and Waffner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Aside from operability, Weber does not further dispute Provisur’s showing as to how the asserted combination of Müller and Waffner renders obvious the subject matter of independent claims 2, 17, and 19. See Prelim. Resp. 14–24. After analyzing Provisur’s showing, including Provisur’s mapping of the claim elements to Müller and/or Waffner and its reasoning for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine their respective teachings (as discussed above), we find that Provisur demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least independent claims 2, 17, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Müller and Waffner. See Pet. 28–38 (claim 2), 38–42 (reason to combine), 47–52 (claim 17), 53 (claim 19). Thus, Provisur meets the threshold for institution. At this stage, Weber offers no response to Provisur’s challenge of dependent claims 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, and 20, except presumably to rely on its argument against Provisur’s challenge of their respective base claims 2, 17, and 19. See Prelim. Resp. 14–24. Because Provisur provides an obviousness challenge that satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” threshold with respect to at least the independent claims, we do not address the dependent claims in the absence of any rebuttal from Weber. Further analysis is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“C. Discretionary Denial Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Weber requests that we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution due to the advanced state of the parallel Missouri action. See Prelim. Resp. 3–13. Although Provisur argues that discretionary denial is not warranted (Pet. 73–77), it nonetheless submits a Sotera style stipulation (Ex. 1029) in an effort to resolve the issue.8 In light of Provisur’s Sotera stipulation, we will not discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a). See Director Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA-Post Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 21, 2022), at 3, 7.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“the art reasonably would have understood the advantage of incorporating Waffner’s air-permeable contact surface and vacuum chamber into Müller’s downstream buffer 12, as opposed to its upstream buffer 8, given that both prior art references emphasize the importance of controlling the infeed speed and tension of the interleaver material adjacent the cutting region where rapid acceleration and braking of the interleaver material may result in tearing and wrinkling. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26, 48; Ex. 1006, 2:58–3:4, 6:50–56; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 200–210 (addressing the teachings of Müller and Waffner in view of the existing knowledge in the art). Indeed, Provisur’s expert confirms that “[l]ike many interleaver devices known in the art, Müller discloses creating a buffer loop of web material upstream of the rollers that insert the web material into the cutting area,” and that “[i]t was known in the food slicing and interleaving industry that the tension of interleaver material fed to the cutting region from a loose loop must be controlled.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 199, 220. And, like Waffner, Müller describes buffer 12 in terms of being a “loop” buffer for controlling the infeed speed of the interleaver material into the cutting region. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 48 (“Provided downstream of the first buffer 8 is a further buffer 12, a loop here, which . . . preferably buffers only as much interleaver material as is needed for the ejection of an interleaver.”). In contrast, Müller’s buffer 8 is used only “in the event of a[n] emergency stop” for buffering “overrun of the reel.” Id. ¶ 33. Thus, based on the current record, we reject the notion that Provisur’s proposed modification of Müller’s buffer 12, which continuously controls the length of the loop near the cutting region, would have any effect on Müller’s buffer 8, which merely stops unraveling near the reel. Aside from operability, Weber does not further dispute Provisur’s showing as to how the asserted combination of Müller and Waffner renders obvious the subject matter of independent claims 2, 17, and 19. See Prelim. Resp. 14–24. After analyzing Provisur’s showing, including Provisur’s mapping of the claim elements to Müller and/or Waffner and its reasoning for why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to combine their respective teachings (as discussed above), we find that Provisur demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that at least independent claims 2, 17, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Müller and Waffner. See Pet. 28–38 (claim 2), 38–42 (reason to combine), 47–52 (claim 17), 53 (claim 19). Thus, Provisur meets the threshold for institution.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Provisur asserts that the claim terms should be construed “according to their plain and ordinary meanings as understood by [one of ordinary skill in the art] in view of the specification and prosecution history” and that “[n]o terms require an explicit construction to resolve the unpatentability controversy between the parties here.” Pet. 18. Weber appears to agree, stating in the parallel Missouri action that “most of [Weber’s] patent claims are plain and ordinary . . . [t]hey’re not difficult or complex claims or claim terms.” Ex. 1028, 5. There being no dispute, we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this stage of the proceeding, because we can decide the threshold question of institution without further construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where the construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,647,013
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.