- Luxottica Of America, Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
NonePatents in suitUS 11,971,612 - Fluidmaster, Inc. v. Danco, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 11, 2026 · IPR2024-00635 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Final written decision
The majority held claims 1–14 unpatentable under §103 over Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art; one judge dissented as to claims 8, 9, 12, and 13.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) with respect to the subject matter of the ’698 patent at the time of the priority date, March 11, 2004, would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, or other technical training in product design or equivalent work experience. This person would also possess at least one year of experience in developing and/or evaluating mechanical aspects of fluid systems. I consider myself a person of ordinary skill in the art under this definition. Ex. 1004 ¶ 28. Patent Owner argues: A POSITA in the field to which the ’698 Patent is directed would have had at least a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering or a related field or, as a substitute, at least two years of work or research experience in the design or development of toilet products, parts, and accessories. PO Resp. 6. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a POSITA, as it is consistent with the ’698 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, we see no material difference between the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner and that proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Cameron such that our determinations would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner asserts that, because each of the Flow Limitations relate to water flow through the bowl fill valve, these limitations require adjusting the flow rate of water exiting the flow valve. PO Resp. 15–17 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 97); See also PO Sur-Reply 7. Petitioner responds that “the claim language of the ’698 Patent discusses adjusting the water flow, not specifically the ‘flow rate.’” Pet. Reply 13. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner, and the conclusory testimony of Mr. Jobin (Ex. 2013 ¶ 97), that because the Flow Limitations “relate” to water flow through the bowl fill valve, that this necessarily means that the flow rate must be adjusted. As Petitioner points out, neither the term “flowrate” nor any similar term appears in any of the Flow Limitations. Thus, the plain language of the Flow Limitations requires that, contrary to Patent Owner’s position, the claim limitation should not be restricted to adjustments to “flow rate.”” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that Limitations 8B and 12B are directed to the configuration or structure of the bowl fill valve outlet port. Pet. Reply 2–4. According to Petitioner, because Limitations 8B and 12B do recite an overflow tube, the overflow tube is not separately claimed and is recited solely to define the function of the outlet port on the bowl fill valve. Id. at 3. Petitioner, thus, argues that an overflow tube is not separately claimed as a structural element, and that, to meet Limitations 8B and 12B, it is sufficient to show that the prior art discloses a bowl fill valve with an outlet port that is configured to attach directly to a tube that provides water from the outlet port to an overflow tube. Id. at 4. In contrast, Patent Owner argues that Limitations 8B and 12B separately claim the overflow tube, and that Petitioner must show that the prior art discloses a tube that transfers water from the bowl fill valve outlet port to the toilet tank overflow tube. PO Resp. 10–11; PO Sur-reply 2–3. We disagree with Patent Owner, because claims 8 and 12, on their face, require “bowl fill valve outlet port,” but do not require or recite an “overflow tube” as an element of the claimed “bowl fill valve.” When a structure is claimed as “configured to” perform a particular function, it generally requires a structure that is designed to perform the particular function claimed, i.e., it requires more than the mere capability of performing that function. See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (claim language including the phrase “adapted to” is to be construed consistent with “configured to” language and requires that the structure must be “designed or configured to accomplish the specified objective, not simply that [it] can be made to serve that purpose.”); see also In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The plain language of Limitations 8B and 12B is clearly directed to the configuration of the bowl fill valve outlet port, in that these limitations recite “a bowl fill valve outlet port configured to.”8 The recited function is “attach directly to a tube that provides water from the bowl fill valve outlet port to an overflow tube.” The overflow tube is recited as part of the function in a clause identifying the tube to which the bowl fill valve outlet port is configured to attached — “that provides water from the bowl fill valve outlet port to an overflow tube.” The overflow tube, thus, is recited as part of the function defining the required structure of the bowl fill outlet port and is not separately claimed.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Petitioner’s Contentions Petitioner contends that the combination of Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art teaches all of the limitations of claims 1–14 and provides a mapping showing where each claim limitation is found in the prior art. Pet. 21–59. We have reviewed the Petition’s mapping and determine that the Petition sufficiently shows that each limitation of claims 1–14 is disclosed by the combination of Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art. Further, we have reviewed Petitioner’s rationale for combining the prior art and determine that the Petition sufficiently shows that it would have been obvious to a POSITA to combine Guoxin, Ho, and the Quick Connection Art.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 10,934,698 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,934,698 - Ledup Manufacturing Group Ltd. v. Seasonal Specialties, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2026 · IPR2024-01259 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are unpatentable; claims 3 and 8 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the Petition lacked a sufficient motivation to combine Inoue and Smith.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because it advocates for the importation of functional limitations from the ’794 Patent Specification into the claims––namely the disclosure that the bypass circuit continues to conduct electricity, and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one or more individual lighting elements in the series are burned out, missing, or defective. See PO Resp. 7–9. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Moreover, the language that Patent Owner wishes to import into the claim from the Specification is functional language that describes the function of the resistor bypass circuit. As explained below in the section addressing the subsequent claim recitation “conducting current at all times across the light sources when current is flowing through the circuit regardless of whether the LED light source are conducting current therethrough,” functional language is evaluated in view of the applied prior art to determine whether it imparts additional structure to distinguish the claimed invention over the prior art. Accordingly, to the extent the preamble recitation is limiting, we need not provide an express construction for “[a] resistor bypass circuit for a series lighting circuit.”” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“We understand the term “inherent resistance” to mean the resistance at a particular operating current or voltage across the LED light source. Neither party disputes our understanding of the term “inherent resistance.” See Dec. on Inst. 9–10; PO Resp. 7–9; Pet. Reply.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and four years of practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or alternatively “would have had a master’s degree and three years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Ex. 1013, 31 ¶ 3; see also Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of institution. See PO Resp. 2. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’794 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because, as explained above in Section II.A., we decline to import functional language into the claim from the Specification to construe the preamble recitation as requiring the function of “continu[ing] to conduct electricity and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one more individual lighting elements in the series are out, loose, broken, missing/removed, or defective.” Having considered both parties’ arguments and corresponding cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Inoue discloses each of the limitations of claim 1. Based on the entire record, we determine Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Inoue. See Pet. 25–26.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 11,533,794 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,533,794 - Tommy John, Inc. v. Pakage Apparel, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01163 · APJ Robert J Silverman · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–13, 15, and 16 unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the identified combinations of Kitsch, Brocks, and Carrillo.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“21; 4:1:13–22. Accordingly, Kitsch and Brocks have similar goals, with respect to formation of a secure pouch for containing the genitals, for which each reference discloses a distinct technical solution. Thus, a POSITA would have regarded the application of Brocks’ familiar and effective gathering technique to Kitsch’s side panels as a viable approach for improving a supportive pouch, and would have expected such combination of teachings to achieve the structural benefit used in Brocks. See Pet. 25–27 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 68–72). In other words, a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation that the combination of Kitsch and Brocks, as discussed above, would result in what is recited in limitation 1[g].” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 10,834,974 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,834,974 - Aylo Freesites Ltd v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-00940 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over Leaning and over Leaning with Klemets; claims 12–20 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Houh, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree) and two years of experience in networking or streaming media, or a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its post-institution papers. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’234 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We determine that no construction of “virtual timeline” is necessary. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, as discussed below, the parties’ dispute appears to be about whether the “virtual timeline” identified by Petitioner is used to arrange the requested streamlets, as is also recited in claim 9. We address that argument below. See infra § II.D.10.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“On this record, we determine that the recitation “to achieve continuous presentation” is limiting and requires an amount of continuous (uninterrupted) playback/presentation after an upshift or downshift. The specification describes agent controller 702 determining whether to upshift based on a trigger threshold Θup, which itself is based on various factors including a current read ahead margin and a minimum safety margin. See Ex. 1001, 17:44–58. If agent controller 702 can sustain upshift quality, then it will upshift and request higher quality streams. See id. at 17:58–61. Conversely, when an upshift is not possible, agent controller 702 determines whether to downshift based a different threshold Θdown, which itself is based on the same sort of factors. See id. at 18:4–7. When the stream quality is not adequate, it downshifts. See id. at 18:7–14. These disclosures are similar to the language of claim 12, which recites “repeatedly generating a factor indicative of a current ability to receive the digital content at a rate sufficient for presenting the digital content as the digital content is received, . . . wherein the factor relates to a performance of the network” and “making the successive determinations whether to change the requested bit rate based on the factor to achieve continuous presentation of the digital content using the individually-requestable portions of the highest bit rate one of the copies determined receivable at that time.” Ex. 1001, 20:5–16 (emphasis added). That is, claim 12 refers to “achiev[ing] continuous presentation” based on what is “sufficient for presenting the digital content,” trading quality to ensure continuous playback.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“server comprises at least two servers and wherein at least one streamlet is requested from a first of the at least one server and at least one other streamlet is requested from a second server of the at least one server other than the first server.” Ex. 1001, 19:7–12. Petitioner references its mapping of the “at least one server” in claim 1 to Leaning’s server 1. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:15–16, 2:18–22, 2:31–32, 5:8–14, Fig. 1), 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:13–26, 9:3–7, 16:6–12), 37; see supra §§ II.D.2.b–c. Petitioner contends that, “[t]o the extent Leaning does not disclose at least two servers wherein one sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a first server and another sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a second server such an arrangement would have been obvious in view of the knowledge of a [an ordinarily skilled artisan].” Id. at 37. Citing the common nature of such an arrangement, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to provide multiple web servers containing the same sets of sub-files for streams in order to have redundancy in the system and allow for clients to establish connections with multiple servers and request a first sub-file from a first web server and, if the connection between the first web server becomes congested or the first web server otherwise fails or becomes unavailable, request a subsequent sub-file from the second web server. Id. at 37–38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85; Ex. 1012, 108,5 Fig. 4-11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis for claim 3. We are persuaded that it would have been obvious to implement Leaning’s server 1 as two servers that store different streamlets based on Dr. Houh’s uncontested testimony about system redundancy. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 85. His testimony is backed by a contemporaneous reference about HTTP that shows requests for different objects from different servers over parallel TCP connections. See, e.g., Ex. 1012, 108–09, Fig. 4-11. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claim 3 would have been obvious over Leaning.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,991,234 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,991,234 - Mobileye Global, Inc. / ZF Active Safety And Electronics US LLC v. Facet Technology Corp.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00749 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 8–13 are unpatentable as obvious over Gallagher and Schofield; claims 5–7 and 14–16 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“skilled artisan would have, with Petitioner contending four years and Patent Owner contending two years. Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, does not provide an explanation for his opinion or support his definition of the level of ordinary skill with citations to evidence. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 57 (“In my opinion, [Petitioner’s definition] is an excessive level of ordinary skill in the art, and I believe instead [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would more likely have two years of experience rather than four years.”). On the other hand, Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Thorpe, does provide an explanation for his opinion, explaining that his assertion that four years of experience is required is based on the state of the art, typical undergraduate curricula, and his supervision of doctoral students. Ex. 1030 ¶ 21. Based on the arguments presented and the cited references, we find Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill reasonable and for purposes of this Decision, adopt it as our own. We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As a general rule, unless the steps of a method claim actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Rsch. in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). “However, a claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” Id. (cleaned up). “[O]rdinarily in process claims steps taken concurrently are the equivalent of steps taken successively.” In re White, 39 F.2d 974, 975 (CCPA 1930); see also Cybersettle, 243 F. App’x. at 609 (finding “the step of calculating the differences between demands and offers can occur concurrently with the [next enumerated step of] receipt of multiple demands and offers” and “the testing step of ‘determining whether any of the differences fall within the predetermined settlement range’ may occur concurrently with the receipt and comparison of the bids” (citation modified)). This is especially true here, given that the recitations at issue are functional language in an apparatus (system) claim. We further agree with Petitioner that the ’328 patent discloses such concurrent performance of these steps: Either concurrent with or subsequent to the identification of road signs 30 and generation of asset management database 24, the computer processor 22 evaluates that portion 32 of each video frame or image that depicts a road sign 30 to determine a set of color values 40, 42 for each of a plurality of colors on the road sign 32. A retroreflectivity value is generated for each color portion 34, 36 on each frame of the tagged videostream 20 containing the road sign 30 that represents a different color value 40, 42. slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner is correct to the extent that it need not show that “the features of [Schofield] may be bodily incorporated into the structure of [Gallagher],” but Petitioner must prove that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention.” Allied Erecting, 825 F.3d at 1381. For claim 9, Petitioner proposes to modify Gallagher’s system to use “Schofield’s determination of a light source’s location within a field of view” in Gallagher’s system. Pet. 23. Thus, Petitioner’s combination does not require the combination of Gallagher’s and Schofield’s sensors into a single system, and Patent Owner’s “sensor fusion” argument is inapposite. See Tr. 48:8–49:6 (Patent Owner’s counsel confirming that the problem of “sensor fusion” stems from combining disparate sensors in a single system). As noted above, Schofield teaches considering the relative location of the light source in determining whether the light source is from headlights or taillights (that is, an object of interest). See Ex. 1006, 9:26–35. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would be motivated to use this teaching in Gallagher’s device to help distinguish between road markers that are arranged side-by-side and have a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77 (“[An ordinarily skilled artisan] would have seen Schofield’s determination of a light source’s location within the field of view as advantageous because it would have allowed Gallagher’s computer to associate the measured reflectance level with the appropriate road marker.”), 79 (“[I]mplementing this determination would have required [an ordinarily skilled artisan] to implement only conventional techniques of image processing (identifying a location of a particular pixel within an array), which was well known by [an ordinarily skilled artisan], to predictably yield the result of the location within a field of view indicating an intensity value associated with a road marker. Given that Schofield and Gallagher disclose similar types of arrays, this combination would have merely required the use of Schofield’s known technique to improve Gallagher’s similar device in the same way.”).” slip op. at 30
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable
“A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 9,671,328 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,671,328 - Fubotv Media Inc. / Yanka Industries, Inc. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00917 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 3–18 as obvious over Leaning, and claim 2 as obvious over Leaning and Ala-Honkola.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. “continuous playback” This term appears in independent claims 1 and 13. For example, limitation 1D of claim 1 recites “adapting the successive determinations to shift the playback quality based on the factor to achieve continuous playback of the video using the streamlets of the highest quality copy of the video that is determined to be sustainable at that time.” Claim 13 recites a similar limitation. Petitioner contends “[t]he claims’ plain language only requires that the shift in playback quality is made ‘to achieve continuous playback.’” Pet. Reply 1 (citing claim 1). According to Petitioner, “shifting quality ‘to achieve continuous playback’ is aspirational, not limiting, language.” Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner asserts that “[n]othing in the claims requires uninterrupted playback before, during, or after the shift in quality.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredMixed
“continuous playback.” We also do not rely on Exhibit 1045. Accordingly, we consider Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike in this regard to be moot. For these reasons, we do not strike Petitioner’s reply arguments or supporting evidence regarding claim construction. B. Leaning’s Clear Buffer Step Patent Owner alleges Petitioner has shifted its position on reply slip op. at 89
Patent outcomesUS 10,757,156 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,757,156 - Texas Instruments Incorprated v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over DeMaw and, separately, over Macnally.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,496,342 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,496,342 - Exotec Product France SAS / Exotec North America Inc. et al. v. Opex CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00850 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–12, 14, and 23–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Raizer and Hangzhou.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Hangzhou’s disclosure of driving its auto-guided trolleys 200 under shelves 100 would improve the operation of Raizer’s system in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Hangzhou’s auto-guided trolleys or operating software into Raizer’s system, is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,472,632 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,472,632 - PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00749 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 based on the petition’s grounds and granted ZF’s motion to join the Mobileye IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Mobileye IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Mobileye IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Mobileye IPR, Paper 14 (analyzing challenges in the Mobileye Petition).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“A motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 76 (Nov. 2019).2 Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 4–8. According to Petitioner, “the Petition involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art submitted in the Mobileye Petition” and “does not present any new grounds of unpatentability and is substantively identical to the Mobileye Petition.” Id. at 5. Petitioner argues that, “[b]ecause the Petition is substantively identical to the Mobileye Petition, with the same grounds challenging the same claims as instituted by the Board, there are no new issues for Patent Owner to address” and, therefore, joinder with the Mobileye IPR would “not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule in any meaningful way.” Id. at 6. Further, “Petitioner explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role in the joined proceeding” and “will assume the primary role only if Petitioner in the Mobileye IPR ceases to participate.” Id. at 7–8 (quoting Noven Pharms., Inc. v. Novartis AG, IPR2014-00550, Paper 38 at 5 (PTAB Apr. 10, 2015).” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 9,671,328
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.