- PTAB · Dec 3, 2025 · IPR2025-01016 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–13 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Jurik anticipates at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the Petition as well as all supporting evidence, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in its challenge of at least one claim of the ’373 patent as unpatentable. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’373 patent on the grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the assumed effective filing date (March 30, 2023), would have had at least a B.S. degree in mechanical or electrical engineering and would have had at least two years of practical experience designing lighting systems. Alternatively, a POSITA would have at least two years of undergraduate training in a physical science (e.g., engineering or physics) and at least four years of practical experience designing lighting systems. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 31–32). Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response. For the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s currently uncontested definition except for the term “at least” because it may cause ambiguity resulting in potentially encompassing those with more than ordinary skill in the art. With that qualification, Petitioner’s proposal appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’373 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response. We determine, at this stage of the proceeding, that we need not construe any claim terms to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). The parties are free to address the construction of any claim term in subsequent authorized briefing during trial. If either party chooses to present claim construction arguments, the arguments should be in a separately delineated portion of the brief labelled accordingly.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“To establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Each element of the challenged claim must be found, either expressly or inherently, in the single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). When evaluating a prior art reference in the context of anticipation, the reference must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,988,373 - Ford Motor Company / General Motors LLC et al. v. Neo Wireless LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00962 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7 and 11 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004 because the combination did not teach a mobile device as construed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Ford requested Director Review of the Institution Denial Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Ford Institution Denial Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”). In addition, the Director sua sponte granted Director Review of the GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision and, on March 22, 2024, vacated and remanded the GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision for the same reasons as those set forth in the Director’s Decision. GM and Nissan IPR, Papers 12, 16.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“On November 9, 2023, we denied institution under § 314(a), after considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Ford Institution Denial Decision”). General Motors LLC and Nissan North America Inc. (“GM and Nissan”) filed a petition requesting inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’450 Patent and a motion for joinder with this proceeding. IPR2023- 00962 (“GM and Nissan IPR”), Papers 3, 4. On December 6, 2023, we denied institution under § 314(a) based on the petition filed in the GM and Nissan IPR after consideration of the factors set forth in General Plastic and Valve and denied the Motion for Joinder as moot on the basis of the Ford Institution Denial Decision. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 11 (“GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Subsequently, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on September 11, 2024, as to all of the challenged claims and all of the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 30 (“Institution Decision,” “Dec. on Inst.”). We also instituted trial and granted the Motion for Joinder in IPR2023- 00962. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 18.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Subsequently, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on September 11, 2024, as to all of the challenged claims and all of the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 30 (“Institution Decision,” “Dec. on Inst.”). We also instituted trial and granted the Motion for Joinder in IPR2023- 00962. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 18.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 10,447,450 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - PTAB · Aug 27, 2025 · IPR2025-00574 · APJ Beth Z Shaw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–7 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on claim 1 over Choe and Workman.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For purposes of institution, we find sufficient Dr. Darrell’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Choe and Workman because Workman discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line (Ex. 1003 ¶ 146), and additionally, because using Workman’s model to identify the horizon line would have been combining known elements (CNNs and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way. Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 150). We find sufficient for institution Dr. Darrell’s testimony that because these models were well known, a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Choe and Workman to achieve the method of claim 1. Id. at 49 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 150). We have reviewed Mr. Andrews’s testimony to the contrary (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 71–80) but, at this stage, do not find it persuasive. For example, to the extent Patent Owner and Mr. Andrews assert that Choe does not identify any “shortcomings” that would motivate a POSITA to look for a better approach like that of Workman (see Prelim. Resp. 29; Ex. 2003 ¶ 74), we note that it is “not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option,’” and “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill,” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Thus, at this stage and on this record, we preliminarily agree that the combination of Choe and Workman teaches the subject matter of limitation [1B] sufficiently to meet Petitioner’s burden on institution.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“For purposes of institution, we find sufficient Dr. Darrell’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Choe and Workman because Workman discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line (Ex. 1003 ¶ 146), and additionally, because using Workman’s model to identify the horizon line would have been combining known elements (CNNs and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way. Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 150). We find sufficient for institution Dr. Darrell’s testimony that because these models were well known, a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Choe and Workman to achieve the method of claim 1. Id. at 49 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 150). We have reviewed Mr. Andrews’s testimony to the contrary (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 71–80) but, at this stage, do not find it persuasive. For example, to the extent Patent Owner and Mr. Andrews assert that Choe does not identify any “shortcomings” that would motivate a POSITA to look for a better approach like that of Workman (see Prelim. Resp. 29; Ex. 2003 ¶ 74), we note that it is “not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option,’” and “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill,” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Thus, at this stage and on this record, we preliminarily agree that the combination of Choe and Workman teaches the subject matter of limitation [1B] sufficiently to meet Petitioner’s burden on institution.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelOther
“would have had a Bachelor’s in Computer Science with a focus on computer/machine vision, and at least two years of experience with each of: (1) machine learning (including neural network) methods as applied to machine/computer vision and (2) classical machine/computer vision algorithms (e.g., edge detection, line identification, computation of camera parameters from horizon line, etc.)” and that additional education “could serve as a substitute for the experience requirement.” Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 77). Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s definition and asserts that a POSITA “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science with one- or two-years training and/or experience in design of software for camera/sensor systems in the automotive industry.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2003 (Declaration of Scott Andrews) ¶ 35). We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions based on the present record. Should the parties continue to disagree regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art during trial, we encourage the parties to explain how an automotive-focused definition, or the lack thereof, would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision. B. slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyOther
“For purposes of institution, we find sufficient Dr. Darrell’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Choe and Workman because Workman discloses predictive models to identify the horizon line (Ex. 1003 ¶ 146), and additionally, because using Workman’s model to identify the horizon line would have been combining known elements (CNNs and annotation for camera calibration) according to known methods to yield predictable results and used known techniques (CNNs) to improve similar devices in the same way. Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 150). We find sufficient for institution Dr. Darrell’s testimony that because these models were well known, a person of skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of Choe and Workman to achieve the method of claim 1. Id. at 49 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 150). We have reviewed Mr. Andrews’s testimony to the contrary (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 71–80) but, at this stage, do not find it persuasive. For example, to the extent Patent Owner and Mr. Andrews assert that Choe does not identify any “shortcomings” that would motivate a POSITA to look for a better approach like that of Workman (see Prelim. Resp. 29; Ex. 2003 ¶ 74), we note that it is “not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option,’” and “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill,” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,875,580 - PTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00404 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, 19, 26, 28–41, and 43–46 on both obviousness grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have been someone with at least (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related scientific field, and (2) either (a) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering/science, or a related field, or (b) two or more years of work or research experience in wireless networking and/or computing.” Pet. 13” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Petitioner identifies the term “client side modem functionality” in claim 5 for construction. Pet. 14. Patent Owner does not address the construction of this term. See Prelim. Resp. 4–6. We determine that we do not need to construe the term “client side modem functionality” for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that the terms “first communication technology,” “second communication technology,” and “third communication technology” should “be understood to have their plain meaning wherein each of these recited communication technologies is a different communication technology.” Prelim. Resp. 5. For purposes of this decision, we will apply Patent Owner’s understanding of these terms. However, we note that Patent Owner does not explain what it means by a “different” communication technology, or how to determine whether two communication technologies qualify as “different.” Id. at 5–6. The parties may wish to explore the meaning of this term further during the trial.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,413,502 - Google LLC v. Brodti Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10, and 19 are obvious over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Considering the subject matter of the ’898 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 9–12), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner submits that all terms in the Challenged Claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required to resolve this case. Pet. 6 (“Petitioner does not believe express claim construction is necessary to resolve this Petition.”). Patent Owner has not submitted a preliminary response, and thus does not propose any terms for construction at this stage. In determining that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least one Challenged Claim, we need not and do not construe expressly any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner argues the skilled artisan would have had various rational reasons for combining the teachings of these four references, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See, e.g., Pet. 18–21 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas and Laidlaw and expectation of success in doing so), 33–37 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas and Mayadas and expectation of success in doing so), 44–45 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error and expectation of success in doing so). Based on the record before us, we find Petitioner sufficiently shows that the combination of Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error would have taught or at least fairly suggested to the skilled artisan the limitations of claim 1.4 Thus, for the reasons stated in the Petition (Pet. 8–51), we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that independent claim 1 would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,416,898 - PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00426 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 11–15 over Jarvinen and Fox under § 103 and granted Samsung’s motion to join the T-Mobile IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in the instant Petition are identical to those in the T-Mobile IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the T-Mobile IPR. See IPR2024-01468, Paper 17.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–8. According to Petitioner, its “[P]etition challenges the validity of the same claims of the ’868 patent on identical grounds to those in the T-Mobile IPR,” “[t]here are no substantive differences between [Petitioner’s] and the T-Mobile IPR Petitioners’ Petition,” and “[Petitioner] also relies on the same supporting evidence.” Id. at 4–5. Petitioner argues that its “petition will not raise any new issues of unpatentability and will not impose any additional burden on the Board or Patent Owner, or add additional complexity to the case,” and that joinder will not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule. Id. at 6. Further, Petitioner agrees to take an “understudy” role, and “[u]nless and until the current Petitioners in [the T-Mobile IPR] cease to participate in the T-Mobile IPR, [Petitioner] will not assume an active role.” Id. at 7–8. Thus, according to Petitioner, Patent Owner will not suffer prejudice if the two proceedings are joined. Id. at 8. Patent Owner has not disputed the above contentions by Petitioner and does not point to any particular prejudice relating to joining the two proceedings. In light of these considerations, Petitioner has shown that joinder to the T-Mobile IPR is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 9,094,868 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Beth Z Shaw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–26 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id. Under the second Fintiv factor, the proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution because there is no trial date scheduled. Id. at 9; see Ex. 1031, 3. slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). For the reasons that follow, we grant institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). Petitioner further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition (see Prelim. Resp. 13–14), but states that a POSITA “would understand that . . . the subject of the patent is a software-based solution to broadcasting multimedia streams, and the skillset and expertise in hardware-based systems would not make one knowledgeable about software-based systems.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions based on the present record. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Claim 1 does not limit the “caching unit” in any way. With this in mind, we preliminarily agree that Farber discloses the subject matter of limitation 1a sufficiently to meet Petitioner’s burden on institution. b.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,140,441 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 for all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“After Patent Owner made these arguments, though, the district court in the Florida Litigation (1) stayed all deadlines indefinitely and (2) said that the October trial will not go forward as scheduled. Ex. 1028, 3. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Conclusion At this stage and on this record, it is reasonably likely that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Avellan. The Petition’s merits are compelling because Petitioner’s challenge plainly leads to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelOther
“B. Merits 1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to the Petition, Here, a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) at the time of the claimed invention would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols. . . . A person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could also meet the standard. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 68–69). Patent Owner provides a different definition: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the inventions in the ‘002 Patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience working in the field of software systems used in generating and broadcasting multimedia streams. An individual with less technical education but more experience, or vice versa, could also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 59) (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that the definition must include experience in software systems because the invention is a software-based solution. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 60). At this stage, our decision would be the same under either definition. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“There is no dispute that (1) Avellan’s user initiates the request and eventually receives the stream and (2) gateway server 134 receives a request for a media stream for playback on a broadcast channel. See id. at 32–39; Pet. 22. The issue here is whether claim 1 requires that the recited “content provider” originates the request. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 does not require this. Prelim. Reply 7. Apart from being received from the content provider, claim 1 does not limit the request’s origin in any way. Rather, claim 1 only requires that the request is received from the content provider. Ex. 1001, 14:51–54. Claim 1 recites “comprising” in the preamble of the method (id. at 14:50), which is a encompasses user-originated requests that are received from other entities. With this understanding of the claim, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a through its communication path from network 150 to user computers 1041–104n via gateway platforms 1301–130n. Pet. 22. That is, Avellan’s gateway platform 134 receives a request for at least one media stream, and claim 1 does not exclude user-originated requests. See id. We agree that the content can be video from CNN, BBC, ESPN, or other live-streaming television feeds. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:18–21). Thus, at this stage and on this record, we agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a. See id. at 22. ii. Remaining Limitations Apart from the arguments discussed above, Patent Owner does not present arguments specifically directed to the other limitations of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. We determine that Petitioner’s arguments made in connection with those limitations are sufficient at this stage and on this record. Pet. 24–32. We agree with Petitioner that Avellan teaches obtaining content from the networks 150 and 152, as recited in 1b; rendering a webpage by a browser at gateway 134, as recited in 1c; generating the screen captures at gateway 134, as recited in 1d; and assembling and providing the media stream when gateway server 134 compresses the image or video format and sends it to the browser 106, as recited in 1e and 1f. Id. at 24–29. Petitioner has provided a sufficient rationale at this stage why a method with the subject matter recited in lg and 1h would have been obvious. Id. at 29– 32. Conclusion At this stage and on this record, it is reasonably likely that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Avellan. The Petition’s merits are compelling because Petitioner’s challenge plainly leads to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 12
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,524,002 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00349 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Avellan anticipates claim 1.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id. slip op. at 6
- Skill levelOther
“B. Merits 1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to the Petition, A Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) at the time of the claimed invention would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols. Furthermore, a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 68). Patent Owner provides a different definition: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed inventions in the ‘074 Patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience working in the field of software systems used in generating and broadcasting multimedia streams. An individual with less technical education but more experience, or vice versa, could also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 58) (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that the definition must include experience in software systems because the invention is a software-based solution. Id. (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 59). Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Apart from being received from the content provider, claim 1 does not limit the request’s origin in any way. Rather, claim 1 only requires that the request is received from the content provider. Ex. 1001, 14:48–50. Claim 1 recites “comprising” in the preamble of the method (id. at 14:47), which is a term that does not exclude additional, unrecited steps. Thus, claim 1 encompasses user-originated requests that are received from other entities. With this understanding of the claim, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a through its communication path from network 150 to user computers 1041–104n via gateway platforms 1301–130n and broadcast device 102. Pet. 17–18. That is, Avellan’s gateway platform 134 receives a request from broadcast device 102 for at least one media stream, and claim 1 does not exclude user-originated requests. See id. We agree that the content can be video from CNN, BBC, ESPN, or other live-streaming television feeds. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:18–21). Thus, at this stage and on this record, we agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a. See id. at 17–19.” slip op. at 13
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,123,074 - PTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2024-01457 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–11 on all petition grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Huang for at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all Challenged Claims of the ’194 patent on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Considering the subject matter of the ’194 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan (Ex. 1003 ¶ 48), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner states that it “proposes that each claim term in the Challenged Claims be given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required because the prior art relied on in this Petition meets each of the claim terms under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner has not submitted a preliminary response, and thus does not propose any terms for construction at this stage. In determining that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least one Challenged Claim, we need not and do not construe expressly any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Pet. 34; see Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Based on the record before us, we find Petitioner sufficiently shows that Huang teaches or at least fairly suggests to the skilled artisan each of remaining limitations [1.1] through [1.6.2] for the reasons set forth by Petitioner, as outlined below with reference to annotated Figure 2.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,148,194
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.