- Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2026 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Brian D Range · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable based on obviousness; claims 1–17, 27, and 28 were not shown unpatentable. Patent Owner’s motion to terminate was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. Mesh Layer Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“5. Analysis On this complete record, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“form of nylon and some form of Teflon (and possible combinations thereof) having the specific coefficient of friction range given in limitation [1c] breaks down, because the building blocks of the obviousness argument are not sufficiently identified in Phillips alone, nor in the supporting testimony. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments and evidence fail to show that Phillips renders the challenged claims obvious. 6. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6, and 7 would have been anticipated by or obvious in view of Phillips.” slip op. at 33
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“2. Products and Nexus We first consider the issue of whether certain evidence relied upon by” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,998,854 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00611 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 12, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated Douglas–Mark and Hamilton-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that experience could substitute for a degree, and vice versa. Pet. 3; PO Resp. 10. The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill are substantially similar. For this decision, as in the Institution Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level, which is supported by credible testimonial evidence and is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’774 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:16–52. Our decision would be the same, however, if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner argues that we need to construe any claim terms explicitly. See Pet. 2–3; PO Resp. 10. However, the parties contest two material claim-construction issues which we address below. To the extent that the parties’ positions depend on interpreting other claim language in a particular way, we discuss the relevant claim language below in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that limitation 1.2 must be performed before limitations 1.3 or 1.4. See Ex. 1001, 35:21–24. See Interactive Gift Exp., Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.” (citing Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The evidence suggests that a “target printer” is any printer that is ultimately selected for fabricating the object, and such a printer could send its configuration information either before or after that determination is made in limitation 1.2. This interpretation does not render the word “target” meaningless. At some point, a printer must be determined to be the target printer, which is the one intended to ultimately fabricate the three-dimensional object. But the target printer still exists, and is capable of being queried, before that determination is made. We find the examples in the ’774 patent pertinent to this question. The ’774 patent states that “the target printer may include more than one printer.” Ex. 1001, 18:66–67. In discussing the step of “query target printer for properties 306” (Fig. 3A), the ’774 patent states that “[i]n one aspect, numerous queries are sent to numerous printers, e.g., for use in selecting one or more of the printers as the target printer.” Id. at 19:8–10. Alternatively, “the query is sent to a printer that is not necessarily the target printer as described herein, e.g., when the query or information received from a response to the query is used for the selection of the target printer.” Id. at 19:11–14. Importantly, the second embodiment states that the queried printer “is not necessarily the target printer,” suggesting that the queried printer could be the target printer even before it is determined to be such. Id. at 19:11–12 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence of record, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the “target printer” can be determined after the query recited in limitation 1.3 or the reception of configuration information recited in limitation 1.4. Thus, the evidence does not impose an ordering between limitations 1.2 and 1.3 or between limitations 1.2 and 1.4. The evidence also does not support Patent Owner’s argument that the two reverse-order examples in the ’774 patent are unclaimed embodiments.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Petitioner’s arguments are based on impermissible hindsight, because they are based on the disclosures in Douglas and Mark, and Petitioner has articulated a persuasive reason to combine those references without referring to the ’774 patent itself, as we discuss below. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (an obvious rationale is not improper hindsight if it “takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,886,774 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,886,774 - Aptiv Services US, LLC v. Microchip Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 20, 2026 · IPR2024-00646 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Al-Shyoukh, Ivanov, and Stanescu; the Board did not reach the alternative ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s proposal is most like Petitioner’s alternative proposal which would include a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience. However, Patent Owner does not provide a specific number of years of industry experience and Patent Owner would include mixed-signal IC design as an alternative to analog circuit design. We consider analog circuit design to be most pertinent to the problems and solution discussed in the ’074 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:44. In addition, we find credible Petitioner’s argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan with a bachelor’s degree would have had two years of experience, whereas Patent Owner’s proposal does not provide a specific number of years. Thus, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience in analog circuit design. Nevertheless, the outcome of our decision would be the same under either of the party’s proposals.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Because neither party has argued that the district-court constructions should be modified or elaborated for this proceeding, and the constructions appear reasonable, we adopt these constructions for this decision. We also take judicial notice of the district court’s Memorandum supporting the claim construction order. Ex. 3001.9” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that “gm boosting” is the only gm enhancement referred to in the ’074 patent, that the ’074 patent uses the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” synonymously, and that Patent Owner has failed to point to any credible intrinsic evidence of this alleged distinction. Although, “[i]n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings, CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in this case there is evidence to the contrary. In particular, the ’074 patent never refers to “gm enhancement” as a function separate from “gm boosting.” Indeed, the transistors (368, 370, and 382) that Patent Owner identifies as performing the function of “gm enhancement” are disclosed as part of a “gm-boost stage.” Ex. 1001, 5:8–24. Patent Owner’s alleged separation of Figure 3B into distinct “gm boosting” and “gm enhancement” is not consistent with the intrinsic evidence and is based on the conclusory testimony of Dr. Taylor. Thus, based on the evidence of record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction distinguishing the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” in claim 1. Rather, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded these terms to be synonymous. We need not otherwise construe these two terms to resolve the contested issues in this proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to follow Ivanov’s teachings to include an enable/disable function in Al-Shyoukh’s biasing circuit to limit that circuit’s standby current for reasons of power-efficiency. Pet. 25–26; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68. The evidence of record also suggests that an enable/disable function was well known in the art and that it would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art to add such a function to a biasing circuit, taking into consideration any known tradeoffs. Pet. Reply 17–18; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60, 67–68; PO Resp. 13–14 (acknowledging that “any [person of ordinary skill in the art” would attest[ that] engineering is full of tradeoffs” and listing some of the known tradeoffs that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would need to consider”). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Al-Shyoukh, Rincon-Mora, or other references teach away from adding an enable/disable function to Al-Shyoukh. Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the prior art that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages investigation into the claimed invention. Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d at 1382.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 9,471,074 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,471,074 - Caption Health, Inc v. University Of British ColumbiaInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01066 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable, including failure to show the claimed image-receiving quality-assessment neural network.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’591 patent. Thus, we do not institute this inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Because Petitioner’s formulation is supported by declaratory testimony and appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art and the ’591 patent, and because Patent Owner does not provide any supporting evidence, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–33. Our decision would be the same regardless of the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s formulations.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not propose any express claim construction. Pet. 11– 12; Prelim Resp. 17. We also determine that no express claim construction is necessary for our Decision, apart from that discussed in our below analysis. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner also fails to provide sufficient rationale and a reasonable expectation of success in combining Krishnan and Lee to arrive at a quality assessment neural network configured to receive an image. See Pet. 34–37. For example, the Petition lacks an explanation of why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Krishnan’s quality assessment neural network to be configured to receive an image, instead of extracted features, in view of Lee’s image-receiving category classifying neural network. Id. Without such further explanation, Petitioner’s challenge falls short. Petitioner’s argument that neural networks for image quality assessment were “well-known” is not persuasive—it does not address the particular scope of limitation 1i, which also requires that the neural network is configured to receive images. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 47–51, 118; Exs. 1017, 1023, 1024, 1026). Petitioner’s argument that combining Krishnan and Lee “would merely amount to applying known work from the field . . . to yield predictable results” is not persuasive because the Petition ties this reasoning to modifying Krishnan with Lee’s view-category-specific assessment parameters, not modifying Krishnan’s quality assessment neural network to receive images instead of extracted features. Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 126). Lastly, we note Petitioner’s expert’s discussion regarding neural networks for image quality assessments. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 43–53 (citing Exs. 1010, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1023, 1024, 1026). However, the Petition does not explain how this evidence demonstrates that the proposed combination teaches or suggests a quality assessment neural network configured to receive images, or that such would have been obvious in the context of the claimed invention. See Pet. 32–37.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,129,591 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,574,894 - Nokia Of America Corporation / AT&T Services, Inc. v. Iarnach Technologies LimitedSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00899 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 10, 11, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4, 12, 13, and 15 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not contest this proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 5. Also, neither party argues that the precise level of ordinary skill would be dispositive in this proceeding. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is undisputed, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’892 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:19–2:8.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. The evidence of record, including the ’892 patent and its prosecution history,9 indicates that the ordinary and customary meaning of “transitioning . . . from . . . to” encompasses both direct and indirect transitions. Looking first to the claim language itself, the word “directly” appears in claims 1, 6, and 10, but not claim 14, presumptively suggesting that claim 14 was intended to more broadly capture systems with either direct or indirect transitions. See CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Holding otherwise would fail to give any effect to the word “direct” as it appears in claims 1, 6, and 10. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions methodologies that render phrases in claims superfluous).” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“predictable and well-motivated variation of G.987.3, at the time of the claimed invention, to include a direct transition between the ONU’s two low-power states. See KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, . . . . If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). We credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to reduce power consumption and would have looked to ways of modifying G.987.3 to further that design goal. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; see also Ex. 1007, 97 (“For a variety of reasons, it is desirable to reduce the power consumed by an ONU as much as possible . . . .”). We also credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that there were only a small number of ways to modify the state transitions in G.987.3’s ONU, and that it would have been obvious to consider those possibilities. Ex. 1003 ¶ 70. Patent Owner does not contest this. Dr. Litvin concedes, for Patent Owner, that “there is no conceivable way the [ITU] did not consider the proposed transition” between the ONU’s two low-power states when drafting G.987.3, although he contends the standards body prohibited such direct transitions as “a conscious and reasoned design choice.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 108; see also id. ¶ 109 (opining that there were only four possible choices for transitions in the ONU, and the ITU “undoubtedly considered all of them, including the direct transition from . . . Listen and . . . Asleep”); PO Resp 24 (conceding that “G.987 explicitly considered the very direct transitions that Petitioner say would be used”). We also find persuasive Petitioner’s additional or alternative argument that Röger would have motivated modifying G.987.3 by allowing the ONU, while in sleep mode, to periodically turn on its receiver and check for messages from the OLT, which would have been direct transitions between “first” and “second” states as recited in claim 1. Pet. 20–22 & n.4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 82–84. The evidence suggests that modifying G.987 as Petitioner proposes would have been within the abilities of a person of the ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention—either to add a direct transition between Listen and Asleep states or to allow the ONU, while in its sleep (both transmitter and receiver off) mode, to periodically turn on its receiver temporarily to listen for polling messages from the OLT, as Röger teaches. Pet. 11–12, 14–15, 19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70, 74. We also agree with Petitioner that there would have been motivation” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that it would have been a predictable and well-motivated variation of G.987.3, at the time of the claimed invention, to include a direct transition between the ONU’s two low-power states. See KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, . . . . If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). We credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to reduce power consumption and would have looked to ways of modifying G.987.3 to further that design goal. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; see also Ex. 1007, 97 (“For a variety of reasons, it is desirable to reduce the power consumed by an ONU as much as possible . . . .”). We also credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that there were only a small number of ways to modify the state transitions in G.987.3’s ONU, and that it would have been obvious to consider those possibilities. Ex. 1003 ¶ 70. Patent Owner does not contest this. Dr. Litvin concedes, for Patent Owner, that “there is no conceivable way the [ITU] did not consider the proposed transition” between the ONU’s two low-power states when drafting G.987.3, although he contends the standards body prohibited such direct transitions as “a conscious and reasoned design choice.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 108; see also id. ¶ 109 (opining that there were only four possible choices for transitions in the ONU, and the ITU “undoubtedly considered all of them, including the direct transition from . . . Listen and . . . Asleep”); PO Resp 24 (conceding that “G.987 explicitly considered the very direct transitions that Petitioner say would be used”). We also find persuasive Petitioner’s additional or alternative argument that Röger would have motivated modifying G.987.3 by allowing the ONU, while in sleep mode, to periodically turn on its receiver and check for messages from the OLT, which would have been direct transitions between “first” and “second” states as recited in claim 1. Pet. 20–22 & n.4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 82–84. The evidence suggests that modifying G.987 as Petitioner proposes would have been within the abilities of a person of the ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention—either to add a direct transition between Listen and Asleep states or to allow the ONU, while in its sleep (both transmitter and receiver off) mode, to periodically turn on its receiver temporarily to listen for polling messages from the OLT, as Röger teaches. Pet. 11–12, 14–15, 19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70, 74.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,806,892 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,806,892 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00984 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable as obvious over Meulen and Chao; claim 1 was not shown unpatentable because Meulen does not disclose transforming an image captured by its camera.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field “would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras,” or alternatively “would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras.” Pet. 6. Petitioner further argues that an “advanced graduate degree” may “make up for the work experience.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 33–34). “Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 19–20). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’413 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“From the outset we note that the words of the claim recite “non- uniformly shift[ing] the pixels” and do not recite a “non-linear” transformation. This favors Petitioner’s position, which is based directly off the definition of “non-uniform,” over Patent Owner’s position, which substitutes “non-linear” for “non-uniform.” Generally, then, we would determine the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term in the context of the entire Specification. Here, however, the ʼ413 patent does not mention “uniform” or “non-uniform” shifting of pixels anywhere except in the claims. The Specification, therefore, provides limited guidance, by itself, as to the ordinary and customary meaning of the term. Nonetheless, even reviewing the portions of the Specification cited by the parties, we see no clear or unambiguous effort to limit the challenged claims to require only non-linear transformations in which the pixels to which a transformation is applied do not have the same amount of shift. is not non-linear. Pet. Reply 1. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the center circle of Figure 2B maintains the original circular shape after the transformation is applied to the image which contradicts Patent Owner’s argument that no two pixels will have the same amount of shift. Pet. Reply 1–2. We agree. In Figure 2B of the ʼ413 patent, the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest. Ex. 1001, 4:19–21. After the input image goes through linear scaling (step 204) and then non-linear warping (step 206) the circles become more vertically compressed as they approach the top and bottom edges and more horizontally stretched as they approach the left and right edges. Id. at 4:22–30. But “the center circle is fully corrected so that it maintains the original circular shape of the corresponding circle in the input image 212.” Id. at 4:23–25. This means that at least some pixels, such as those of the center circle, undergo the same amount of shift after being transformed.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“readable instructions” of claims 1 and 2 must occur in a particular order. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that the step of “determine a portion within the input image” must occur after “obtain[ing] an image” and before “apply[ing] a transformation to the input image.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the specification does not require such an order and, in fact, describes an embodiment where such an order is not followed. Pet. 3. We determine that the “determine a portion within the input image” step does not need to occur after the “obtain an image” step and before the “apply a transformation to the input image” step. As Patent Owner itself points out, claims 1 and 2 are apparatus and system claims respectively, and an ordering of the limitations of such claims is not necessary. PO Resp. 17. Even if we were to treat the apparatus and system claims as reciting the steps of a method, “as a general rule the claim is not limited to performance of the steps in the order recited, unless the claim explicitly or implicitly requires a specific order.” Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). We see nothing in the claims that would cause us to break this general rule. Patent Owner argues that the claims imply a “specific order because the ‘determine a portion’ requirement operates on ‘the [obtained] input image’ and defines the ‘portion’ that is necessary for the 23; Ex. 2027 ¶ 59). Although the steps are recited in a specific order in the claim, as they necessarily must be, the claim does not expressly specify that the certain steps must occur before or after other instructions, nor does logic imply such a requirement. For example, if certain characteristics of the image are known before the image is obtained (e.g. the size, dimensions, resolution, aspect ratio, or content etc.) the determination of the portion of the image could be made before the image is obtained. These characteristics may be based on the specific device taking the image or the subject matter of the image, both of which may be known before the image is captured or obtained. It is, therefore, not necessary that the image be obtained in order for a portion of the image to be determined. Similarly, we do not find the written description to expressly or implicitly specify an order the claimed step of “determine a portion of the input image.” For example, the written description of the ʼ413 patent states that in Figure 2B “the center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction as the frame boundary is approached.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–22. Patent Owner emphasizes that this disclosure implies that an input image is obtained before the center portion is chosen. PO Resp. 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:63–64, 4:19–22). But the description of this embodiment does not expressly recite an order. For example, the description of Figure 2A explains that “an input image is obtained” in step 202, “the image is then scaled” in step 204, and a “non-linear warping is then applied” in step 206. Ex. 1001, 3:63–4:3. This description does not mention “determin[ing] of a portion of the image” as a separate step or as part of the listed steps, and therefore, does not specify an order in which this step must occur. is configured so that some areas of the image are fully corrected geometrically, while some other areas are distorted. . . . [T]he center of the image is chosen to be the region of interest that is most fully corrected and the distortion increases in each direction.” Id. at 4:17–19. This excerpt from the ʼ413 patent, which the Patent Owner specifically relies on (PO Resp. 19), also does not specify an order in which the determination step (choosing of the region of interest) takes place. Moreover, because the ʼ413 patent states that the warp module is configured so that some areas are fully corrected while others are not, the determination step could take place at the time the warp module was configured, presumably before the image was obtained. Finally, the ʼ413 patent states that “in the case, of video, the area may dynamically change between images (e.g. to follow a moving object).” Ex. 1001, 4:34–36. Patent Owner argues that this description “requires first obtaining the image in order to locate the object that is being followed.” PO Resp. 19–20. This embodiment is related to the case of video or a moving object, which the challenged claims do not mention. We, therefore, decline to limit the scope of the claim based on this embodiment. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and cited evidence we determine Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Meulen and Chao. For example, Petitioner argues that “[i]t would have been obvious that when performing image scaling, pixels from the input to output positions are shifted based on a scaling factor.” Pet. 91. Meulen teaches scaling but does not provide the details regarding scaling. E.g., Ex. 1007, 1:55–56, 4:37–49. We agree that in light of Meulen’s disclosure of scaling, a POSITA would have looked to other references, such as Chao, for further details on how to perform scaling. Dr. Katsaggelos provides credible support, testifying that “Meulen mentions ‘compression and/or scaling,’ and provides details on how to perform compression. But Meulen does not disclose the details of how to perform scaling. A POSITA when faced with Meulen and having the knowledge about scaling would have been motivated to turn to a prior art reference that discloses the details of scaling.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 262. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner provides no motivation to combine other than asserting that it involves combining prior art elements. PO Resp. 35 (quoting Pet. 92). As explained above, however, Petitioner does more than just assert that the motivation involves combining prior art elements. Instead, Petitioner explains that Meulen discusses both compression and scaling, and provides details regarding compression but does not provide details on how to scale. Pet. 91–92; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–262. Thus, Meulen teaches that scaling was a known technique. See Hybritech, (“a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”). Dr. Katsaggelos testifies that, in this situation, a POSITA would have looked to Chao for details regarding scaling. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 262–263. We determine this establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a POSITA would have had reason to combine Meulen’s teachings with Chao. Patent Owner draws a distinction between Meulen and Chao, arguing that “Meulen is concerned with modifying content from a media source to be displayed on a device’s screen while Chao, by contrast, is directed to changing the aspect ratio of a document intended for printing.” Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 89–90). Patent Owner’s argument is contradicted, however, by Chao’s disclosure which states that “after all the background and foreground elements in the image have been resized . . . [t]he image may be output by displaying the image on or as part of: a display screen such as a computer monitor, camera screen, printer screen, printed page, projected image, or the like.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 32. Patent Owner argues that Meulen’s system avoids distortion near the middle where the user’s focus is more likely to be, while Chao, on the other hand, is directed to avoiding distortion of stylized borders on differently sized pages. PO Resp. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1006, 1:26–29; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 25; Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 91–92). This argument reads the prior art too narrowly and does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner does not rely on Chao for its teaching of avoiding distortion near the borders of the image, but rather on its teaching of scaling the image while maintaining the design intent of the original image. Ex. 1008 ¶ 22; Ex. 1014 ¶ 67. Thus, Petitioner is applying Chao’s techniques of scaling (regardless of where the area of 92. Finally, Patent Owner argues that Chao’s approach of stretching/shrinking only the background and uniformly scaling entire foreground objects is suitable for graphic design but incompatible with Meulen which is concerned with adapting externally derived media source content for display on a fixed size screen. PO Resp. 37–38 (citing Ex. 2027 ¶ 93). We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because it does not address Petitioner’s combination. Petitioner relies on Chao’s teaching of stretching/shrinking of background elements and applies that stretching/shrinking to Meulen’s images displayed on its screen. Pet. 91–92 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 28, 63; Ex. 1002 ¶ 263). The fact that Chao applies its teaching to graphic design does not prevent a POSITA from applying those teachings to Meulen’s media content displayed on its screen.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 10,015,413 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,015,413 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01165 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Zhou does not teach the claimed low-light high-pass or stickiness parameter limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable
“4. Conclusion for the Prior Art Analysis In sum, we find that Zhou does not disclose the low-light high-pass parameter or the stickiness parameter. Petitioner’s grounds for both independent claims 1 and 16 rely on Zhou for teaching a low-light high-pass parameter or a stickiness parameter. Pet. 23–28, 64. Because we find Zhou does not teach these limitations, all of Petitioner’s grounds fall for this reason. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any claim of the ’840 patent would have been obvious in view of the prior art cited.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) in the field of the ’840 patent would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. Alternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. An advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies the same standard. PO Resp. 26–27. We use this agreed-upon standard for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We review this testimony based on the strength of the underlying factual basis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value . . ..”). Here, the underlying factual basis is not very strong for either witness. That said, we find that Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more logically sound and consistent with the ’840 patent disclosure. Based on our reading of the specification, we find a clear indication that “stickiness” has to do with the past. In order to control “the extent by which preceding portion(s) . . . impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory” (emphasis added), one must control the degree by which the past frames impact determination. And to control the degree of the past’s influence, one must, as a consequence, favor the past over the future. That is, the frame of reference of the stickiness parameter is the past. The specification could have used a time-agnostic term, like a “nearness” or “adjacency” parameter, but it did not. Thus, the fact that “stickiness” is used in conjunction with “preceding” indicates that it deals with a preference for preceding frames. On this basis, we find Dr. Katsaggelos’s testimony less persuasive than Dr. Foroosh’s.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“That said, we do not construe a stickiness parameter as prohibiting consideration of future frames. Instead, we determine that the stickiness parameter’s value determines the impact of the preceding portions, versus the following portions. The ’840 patent recognizes this, when it says that a stickiness parameter value of “1,” representing a “lazy” stabilizer that maximally favors the past, would not override a violation of the margin constraint based on the look-ahead (i.e., would not allow the viewing window to fall out of bounds in the event of large future motion). See Ex. 1001, 22:26–30; see also id. at 12:61–13:29 (acknowledging that favoring the past may lead to a conflict with the viewing window determination), 15:39–60 (adjusting the viewing window to ensure it does not violate a margin constraint). Thus, while a past-favoring parameter by necessity favors the past over the future, it does not prohibit consideration of the future. In view of the above, we construe the claimed “stickiness parameter” as a parameter that controls the extent by which preceding portions of the trajectory impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory, with an understanding that in order to favor preceding portions, to some extent, the parameter must relatively disfavor following portions.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,958,840 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00820 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–11 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–11 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Both parties indicate that no claim terms need to be expressly construed. Pet. 29–30; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 30–49. For example, regarding whether of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’090 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164. The ’090 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164). For example, Dr. Osswald explains that “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 146. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s contrary attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 144–164; Prelim. Resp. 1, 9–10, 18–21.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,648,090 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00821 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Tadros, Porter, Kalili, and Texin 990R.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–23, 25, and 26 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’090 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party indicates that we need to construe expressly any claim terms. Pet. 27–28; Prelim. Resp. 5. Consistent with that, we determine that we need not construe any claim terms expressly in order to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“arguments and evidence sufficient at this stage to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Pet. 8–17, 53–71. For example, regarding whether Porter is analogous art, Petitioner sufficiently shows reasonable pertinence of Porter’s disclosure to the problem faced by inventor of the ’091 patent. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165. The ’091 patent illustrates that its inventor faced the problem of selecting desirable materials for an aligner, including selecting a desirable material for an aligner’s hard layer. Ex. 1001, 5:44–59. Petitioner and Dr. Osswald provide significant evidence and reasoning tending to show that Porter’s discussion of Tritan logically would have commended itself to the attention of an inventor facing the problem of selecting an aligner hard layer. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1007 “because Tritan copolyesters are BPA-free, Rafih specifically discloses Tritan EX401 as an exemplary material” for its oral appliance. Id. ¶ 99 (citing Ex. 1104, 5:4–64, claims 2, 9, 10). In view of this, Dr. Osswald testifies that “Rafih would inform a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that Porter’s guidance regarding replacing polycarbonate with Tritan applies to dental appliances.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 147. At this stage, weighing Petitioner’s evidence against Patent Owner’s countervailing attorney argument that Porter focuses on dishware, we determine Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Porter is analogous art. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 98–108, 125–127, 146–165; Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 9–10, 34–36.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,648,091
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.