• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 24, 2026 · IPR2024-01256 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 10–14, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable because Ahn and Chaudhri did not teach or suggest the claimed movement of an object during the gesture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “interface objects and, more specifically, the display of user interfaces on applications, in accordance with contacts on the touch-sensitive surface of a display. Ex. 1001, (54), Abstr. Consistent with the scope of the ’727 patent, we find that the level of skill in the art is reflected in a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience working with graphical user interfaces, human-computer interfaces, or equivalents.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Because there is no dispute as to the scope and meaning of these terms, and for consistency with the Decision on Institution, we apply the meaning of the terms “blur” and “distance magnitude” as stated above where applicable. However, we note that our determination does not hinge on the meaning of these terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “it was “known to utilize ‘cues’ to help the user know what gesture to utilize and whether they are correctly performing the gesture (e.g., graphics such as movable images that help the user visualize the correct gesture and how to complete it successfully).” Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1005, Abstract, ¶¶ 54, 62, 73). This sentence does not cure the deficiency noted above regarding Petitioner’s reliance on Ahn’s graphic shadow moving with a gesture. Chaudhri is relied on for the proposition that, Ahn’s graphic shadow is “[i]ndeed” a movable image known to give a user a visual cue. Id. But no such “cue” is provided in Ahn by the graphical shadow alone, because there is no movement of that object. The Petition does not present argument that a Chaudhri object is the movable object or how any of Chaudhri’s teachings of movable objects would have suggested to modify Ahn “to thereby move” the graphical shadow.” slip op. at 18

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “the theory that Ahn’s graphic shadow moves. Reply 3−4. Petitioner interprets the sentences in Ahn we have analyzed above in conjunction with testimony of Dr. Terveen to argue that temporal descriptions in Ahn make it obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the art to drag in the right direction while continuing to press the graphic 1800. Id. (citing Exs. 1004 ¶¶ 117−119, Ex. 1023 ¶ 10). The Petition, however, relies on an Ahn disclosing a moving graphic shadow according to the embodiment of Figure 18(a), as described in paragraph 118. Petitioner now changes its theory of how Ahn’s graphic shadow would move according to paragraph 119, i.e., that although the graphic shadow is merely pressed (in the embodiment shown in Figure 18(b)) it would also be dragged while pressed. Reply 3. Not only is this a shift from the theory Petitioner presents in the Petition, it is not persuasive. As Patent Owner argues, and we agree, there is no cogent explanation for modifying the graphic shadow embodiment of Figure 18(b), especially in light of Ahn’s disclosure that the graphic shadow disappears when pressed and the menu list is displayed as emerging. Sur-reply 2−3. In other words, Petitioner’s new argument does not account for Ahn’s teaching that the objective of the graphic shadow is merely to notify the user of the start of the gesture, and once that start of the gesture is detected (the press on the graphic shadow), paragraph 119 informs us that there is no longer a need for the graphic shadow—it disappears from the display. Ex. 1004 ¶ 119. The Petition does not offer any argument for a theory in which the gesture of paragraph 119 (the press, not a touch and drag operation) results in graphic 1800 disappearing, while also moving during the disappearance. We are mindful that “[i]t is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests to one skilled in the art.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind / Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Consequently, we determine that Petitioner’s argument in Reply belatedly relying on the different embodiment of paragraph 119 is improper new argument, and that even if considered it is not persuasive.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 11,740,727 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,740,727
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 31, 2025 · IPR2024-01085 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–10, 17, 19, 22–26, 28–30, 32, 33, 36, 41, 48, 58–62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73, 77, 82, and 83 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “The difference between the parties’ positions is solely that Petitioner includes “human-computer interaction” as a relevant degree and “human computer interfaces” as relevant working experience. We need not resolve that difference, because no matter which stated level of ordinary skill is applied, all of our findings and conclusions would be the same and because neither party asserts the other party’s expert is not qualified as an expert. In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 9. We continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.5 C.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner asserts that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner agrees that “no formal constructions of any claim terms are necessary.” PO Resp. 4. We agree with the parties that no express construction of any claim term is necessary. D.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner (PO Resp. 13) that when Ording refers to user interfaces that are “intuitive and transparent,” “transparent” in that context does not mean optically transparent but something readily understandable, like the preceding word “intuitive.” That makes more sense in context. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Mahon, explains that Ording’s paragraph 28, where the phrase “intuitive and transparent” is found, is not concerned with optical transparency, but with increasing user satisfaction with portable devices by offering multifunctional operations on user interfaces based on finger input. Ex. 2012 ¶ 54. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Cockburn explains why “transparent” in that context should mean optically transparent. We credit the testimony of Dr. Mahon, and reproduce paragraph 28 of Ording below: The various applications that may be executed on the device may use at least one common physical user interface device, such as the touch screen. One or more functions of the touch screen as well as corresponding information displayed on the device may be adjusted and/or varied from one application to the next and/or within a respective application. In this way, a common physical architecture (such as the touch screen) of the device may support the variety of applications with user interfaces that are intuitive and transparent. Ex. 1006 ¶ 28. We credit Dr. Mahon’s testimony that “Ording is addressing [in paragraph 28] user interfaces that are user-friendly and intuitive to navigate and operate.” Ex. 2012 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 33

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The Zlider widget already is the least intrusive in the form as disclosed in the Ramos Paper/Ramos Video, placed off to the side of image content, not above and overlapping with image content. Petitioner’s semitransparency solution is for a self-created problem that otherwise does not exist, i.e., blocking the image by placing the Zlider widget directly over image content in Ording’s device. This is not reasoning with rational underpinning for making the Zlider widget partially semitransparent. Even assuming that the Zlider widget is properly placed directly over a camera image, making the Zlider widget semitransparent does not solve the intrusion problem, because the image and the Zlider widget may obscure each other, as shown in these illustrations provided by Patent Owner: [The illustrations show interference between a semitransparent Zlider widget and an underlying image] In its Reply, Petitioner asserts that it would have been well within the skill level of one of ordinary skill in the art to make adjustments to address a problem caused by such obscuring, such as by making the Zlider widget more visible as shown below: [The illustration shows one way Petitioner asserts one of ordinary skill in the art may apply to solve the obscuring issue (Reply 5–6)] Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. Although there may be graphic display techniques one of ordinary skill in the art may adopt to reduce the visibility problem if the Zlider widget were moved to directly above the image content as Petitioner proposes, that does not cure the problem of lacking a reasonable motivation to place the Zlider widget of the Ramos Paper/Ramos Video directly over image content. Still, there is the least obscuring and the least intrusion with the Zlider widget remaining where it is shown to be in the Ramos Paper/Ramos Video, side-by-side relative to the image content. It is irrational to make a modification that creates a problem, solely on the basis that a solution may be available to reduce the severity of the problem. Indeed, such a strained rationale shows that hindsight has played a part on Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have put the Zlider widget over content as required by the claims.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,649,580 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,649,580
• Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,023,203
• Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00625 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 13, 14, and 17–27 were not shown unpatentable because Tennant did not establish that Wikey or Davies inherently disclosed the claimed microbubbles and nanobubbles.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11. On September 19, 2024, we authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing, stating also that the “parties are not authorized to present new factual assertions, provide additional exhibits, or raise new arguments beyond those directed to the issues raised in the remand.” Ex. 3001. Pursuant to this authorization, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 61; “Pet. Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Patent Owner filed a Lead Brief on Remand (Paper 62; “PO Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 66; “Pet. Reply Br. Rem.”). Patent Owner filed a Responsive Brief on Remand (Paper 65; “PO Resp. Br. Rem.”).” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, and in line with our previous determination that “Wikey appears to disclose each limitation of claim 13 except ‘microbubbles and nanobubbles having a bubble diameter of less than 50 microns’” (Final Dec. 20), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey inherently discloses microbubbles or nanobubbles. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey discloses every limitation of claim 13.” slip op. at 56

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11.” slip op. at 3

  Patent outcomesUS RE45,415 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01197 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 were not shown unpatentable because the Petition did not explain how the Jiang and Chen combination met limitations 1(d) and 1(e), or establish motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “algorithm on Chen’s plurality of clusters of processors, the Petition contends that Jiang alone teaches limitations 1(d) and 1(e) in disclosing assigning an initial score to each of the initial nodes of a prefix tree, then using these initial scores to determine, via pruning, whether to continue processing branches connected to the nodes. Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1004, 8–64); see id. at 31–44. We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not explain how Jiang’s pruning would be implemented in Chen’s multiple clusters of processors to generate an initial score for an audio sample, and to use the initial score “to determine whether to continue processing” as required by limitations 1(d) and 1(e). In contending that Jiang alone teaches limitations 1(d) and 1(e), the Petition quotes from Jiang’s description of its pruning technique: scores assigned to that node with the largest score on any of the other nodes corresponding to the frame being considered. If the score at a particular node is sufficiently low compared to the maximum score for other corresponding nodes in tree 77, it is assumed that the branches leading to the node under consideration (the node with the lower score) will not likely be part of the completed most likely phoneme sequence (i.e., the phonemes in that sequence will not likely be part of the final word recognized by the system). Thus, that branch is dropped (or pruned) from tree 77 and is no longer considered in further processing. Pet. 38–39 (quoting Ex. 1004, 8:52–64) (emphasis in original). Petitioner concludes that “[p]er Mr. Schmandt, Jiang thus teaches an initial score . . . used to determine whether to continue processing to determine a final score . . . . Dec., 90–91. As such, Jiang teaches claim 1(e).” Pet. 43–44. The Petition explains how Jiang’s pruning algorithm generates an initial score and uses the initial score to prune, or “determine whether to continue processing” as recited in claim 1, but does not explain how Jiang’s pruning algorithm would be implemented on Chen’s four clusters of processors shown in Figure 4, as required by the Petition. That is, the Petition does not explain how each of the processors in the four clusters of Chen, after generating a score for one of the initial nodes, would compare the score with the maximum score of all corresponding initial nodes in tree 77. In fact, the Petition, in relying on Jiang alone to teach this limitation, does not even contend that Jiang’s pruning technique would be performed by any of Chen’s clusters of processors, let alone explain how pruning would have been performed by Chen’s parallel processing computer system.” slip op. at 20

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s Reply theory was not set forth in the Petition, and is therefore untimely. PO Sur-Reply 4. We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition relies on Jiang alone to teach limitations 1(d) and 1(e), as discussed above. Petitioner’s contention that Jiang’s algorithm would have been replicated across Chen’s processors for performing limitations 1(d) and 1(e) is not found in the Petition. Rather, as discussed above, the Petition describes how Jiang’s algorithm would have been replicated for performing limitations 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c). Petitioner’s new theory in Reply is untimely. A “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) 73;2 see also Intelligent Bio- 2 Available at www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. 2016) (holding that the Board did not err in refusing the reply brief as improper under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) because petitioner relied on an entirely new rationale to explain why one of skill in the art would have combined the references at issue); 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); Apple Inc. v. e-Watch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the position originally taken in the Petition. Accepting such belatedly presented new arguments would be unjust to the Patent Owner and we decline to do so.”). Petitioner contends that Mr. Schmandt explained during his deposition that, even though paragraphs 83–87 of his Declaration do not mention Chen, other parts of his Declaration explain how the combination of Jiang and Chen would have operated. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 2017, 44:2–11, 45:10– 46:10, 71:6–23, 73:12–17, 79:11–23, 81:8–22, 83:15–18, 86:25–87:23, 93:7–94:10, 94:16–23, 95:19–96:10, 97:8–17, 99:17–102:12). We disagree. During his deposition, Mr. Schmandt did not identify where his Declaration explains how the combination of Jiang and Chen teaches the limitations of claim 1(d) and 1(e). Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Schmandt identifies any paragraph of Mr. Schmandt’s Declaration that explains how the processors in Chen’s cluster of processors would have performed Jiang’s pruning technique in order to meet limitations 1(d) and 1(e). Rather, both the Petition and Mr. Schmandt’s Declaration rely on Jiang alone to teach limitations 1(d) and 1(e). See Pet. 38–44; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–91; Ex. 2017, 68:17–25, 79:11–23, 81:8–22, 83:10–18.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We disagree with Petitioner’s contention that to perform speech recognition, the processors in each cluster would not need to access the memories of the other clusters. See Reply 26. Petitioner’s contention is inconsistent with Petitioner’s contention that “[o]nce the cumulative probability score is calculated, inter-cluster processing of the results for each tree search would be communicated.” Reply 4; see id. at 16. Petitioner’s contention is inconsistent with the intrinsic evidence, which discloses that parallel implementation of a search algorithm for speech recognition requires a significant amount of communication and synchronization. Ex. 1001, 1:47–52. Petitioner’s contention is inconsistent with Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that if we’re going to be doing pruning based on thresholds, then we have to know the scores that we got on each of the trees, so I think that’s a safe assumption, that that’s in there. So when each of the processors has performed its task on its set of trees, it can produce a set of numbers, and looking at the numbers across all of the processors, across all of the results, we can choose a pruning threshold just like Jiang chooses a pruning threshold after it performs all these operations in serial as opposed to parallel. inconsistent with Jiang’s teaching that pruning is performed by comparing a score at a particular node to the maximum score for other corresponding nodes in the prefix tree. Ex. 1004, 8:55–64. We rely on Dr. Anderson’s testimony, that a parallel implementation of Jiang’s algorithm “requires extensive communication between computational components” and that “all four memories 104(a)-(d) would contain necessary information” to perform limitations 1(d) and 1(e), in finding that performing Jiang’s algorithm using Chen’s clusters of processors would have required the processors to access data in all of the cluster memories 104a-d in order to determine the scores of the corresponding nodes of the tree. Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 29, 51. We disagree with Petitioner’s contention that performing Jiang’s algorithm using the processors of Chen would have resulted in the benefit of an increase in speed. Pet. 10. We credit Dr. Anderson’s testimony that Mr. Schmandt’s assumptions that the clustered processor and memory arrangement of Chen would have necessarily improved the speed and power of Jiang’s speech recognition are incorrect. Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67, 74), 36 (citing Ex. 2021, 11). Petitioner contends that Dr. Anderson’s testimony is conclusory and that Patent Owner does not provide evidence other than Mathew I to support its contention that the combination would have a high synchronization overhead. Reply 20–21. We disagree, and find that Dr. Anderson’s testimony is sufficiently supported by evidence, including Jiang, Chen, and Mr. Schmandt’s Declaration. For example, Dr. Anderson testifies that the Viterbi algorithm compares most likely outcomes from the previous frame. Ex. 2020 ¶ 29 (citing Ex. 1004, 1:19–39, 2:1–26). Dr. Anderson testifies that to perform these comparisons requires extensive communication between computational components that can have a drastic impact on system performance. Id. ¶¶ 29, 43. Dr. Anderson testifies that as a result, performing Viterbi decoding when the information needed may be in a cluster that is not directly accessible, as in Chen, is not likely to be successful in a practical speech recognition system. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 95; Ex. 1005, 9:10–39); see id. ¶ 43. Thus, Dr. Anderson further supports his testimony with citations to Jiang, Chen, and Mr. Schmandt’s Declaration. In addition, Mr. Schmandt does not support with objective evidence his testimony that using Chen’s clusters of processors would have increased the computing power for implementing Jiang’s speech recognition techniques to desirably result in improved processing speed and power. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67, 74. Although Mr. Schmandt mentions Hon (Ex. 1006), Tremblay (Ex. 1027), Erman (Ex. 1025), Wulf (Ex. 1024), Garde (Ex. 1028), and Deo (Ex. 1026) in his testimony, Mr. Schmandt does not persuasively explain how these background references would have taught a person of ordinary skill in the art that Chen’s parallel processing computer system, which includes an extended shared memory model and a distributed memory model, would have increased the speed of Jiang’s speech recognition algorithm over Jiang’s shared memory model.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,971,140 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,971,140
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00037 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish that the asserted combinations taught the claimed limitations or provide a persuasive reason to combine Jiang and Chen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “algorithm on Chen’s plurality of clusters of processors, the Petition contends that Jiang alone teaches limitations 1(d) and 1(e) in disclosing assigning an initial score to each of the initial nodes of a prefix tree, then using these initial scores to determine, via pruning, whether to continue processing branches connected to the nodes. Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1004, 8–64); see id. at 31–44. We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition does not explain how Jiang’s pruning would be implemented in Chen’s multiple clusters of processors to generate an initial score for an audio sample, and to use the initial score “to determine whether to continue processing” as required by limitations 1(d) and 1(e). In contending that Jiang alone teaches limitations 1(d) and 1(e), the Petition quotes from Jiang’s description of its pruning technique:” slip op. at 20

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “in the Petition, and is therefore untimely. PO Sur-Reply 4. We agree with Patent Owner. The Petition relies on Jiang alone to teach limitations 1(d) and 1(e), as discussed above. Petitioner’s contention that Jiang’s algorithm would have been replicated across Chen’s processors for performing limitations 1(d) and 1(e) is not found in the Petition. Rather, as discussed above, the Petition describes how Jiang’s algorithm would have been replicated for performing limitations 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c). Petitioner’s new theory in Reply is untimely. A “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) 73;2 see also Intelligent Bio-” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “inconsistent with Jiang’s teaching that pruning is performed by comparing a score at a particular node to the maximum score for other corresponding nodes in the prefix tree. Ex. 1004, 8:55–64. We rely on Dr. Anderson’s testimony, that a parallel implementation of Jiang’s algorithm “requires extensive communication between computational components” and that “all four memories 104(a)-(d) would contain necessary information” to perform limitations 1(d) and 1(e), in finding that performing Jiang’s algorithm using Chen’s clusters of processors would have required the processors to access data in all of the cluster memories 104a-d in order to determine the scores of the corresponding nodes of the tree. Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 29, 51.” slip op. at 32

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “We do not need to resolve this dispute, because even under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill, Petitioner has not shown that the challenged claims are unpatentable. We apply Petitioner’s definition that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with four years of experience in the field of speech recognition, and that additional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 10,971,140 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,971,140
• Markforged Inc. v. Continuous Composites, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 26, 2023 · IPR2022-00679 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12, 20, and 21 were not proven unpatentable; the asserted obviousness grounds failed for insufficient motivation to combine, teaching away, or missing claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claims 13–19 on July 25, 2023, rendering Petitioner’s Grounds 4, 9, and 10 moot. Ex. 2008. Thus, our Final Written Decision does not address Petitioner’s Grounds 4, 9, and 10. The Board heard oral arguments in an in-person hearing conducted on July 27, 2023. See Paper 23.” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) would have had a master’s or bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, materials science, or a related degree, and either at least 3–5 years of experience (with a master’s degree), or at least 5–6 years of experience (with a bachelor’s degree), in composite materials or additive manufacturing. Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 36). Patent Owner states that it “does not agree that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art accurately reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the priority date . . . [, but r]egardless [of] the level of skill, . . . the Petition does not show the challenged claims are unpatentable.” Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner does not propose a different level of skill in the art. See id. at 15 (“Patent Owner reserves the right to propose a level of ordinary skill in the art later in this proceeding, or in other proceedings.”). On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Although a more specific definition is not necessary, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition because, on this record, it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references. Neither party, however, advances information explaining how or why the result in this case would change based on the level of ordinary skill determined by the Board.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner advances no specific construction of any claim term, but rather proposes that “claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 14. Patent Owner asserts that the term “anchor” should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning, which, according to Patent Owner, is “contact to which the path of composite material is adhered to enable pulling of the path.” Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2006, 2, 53). Petitioner responds that “[i]n the parallel litigation, the Court has construed ‘anchor point’ and ‘anchor’ as ‘a contact point to which the path is affixed and that serves as an origin point for the formation of the path.’” Reply 3. On the complete record, we determine that no claim term needs an express construction to resolve the controversy. C. GROUND 1 – ALLEGED OBVIOUSNESS OF CLAIMS 20 AND 21 OVER LIPSKER” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “combining multiple embodiments from a single prior art reference (Resp. 31), i.e., “there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.” In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017). On this record, Petitioner fails to provide any such motivation to combine the embodiment in Lipsker’s Figure 2 with those of Figures 4A, 4B, 4C, and 5 to arrive at the subject matter of claim 20. Pet. 23–31. Rather, Petitioner merely points to the disparate embodiments of Figures 2, 4A, 4B, 4C, and 5 and portions of Lipsker’s disclosure pertaining to those embodiments, and asserts that Lipsker “discloses” the individual limitations recited in claim 20. See, e.g., id. at 25 (Petitioner, relying on Figure 2, asserting that “Lipsker discloses the preamble of Claim 20”), 27 (Petitioner, relying on Figure 5, asserting that “Lipsker discloses Element 20[a]”), 28 (quoting Lipsker’s descriptions of wire and adhesive dispensed separately as depicted in Figure 2, and asserting “Lipsker discloses Element 20 [c]”), 29 (pointing to Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C and asserting “Lipsker discloses Element 20[d]”). Pointing to disparate embodiments without providing a sufficient motivation to combine them is not enough to establish the obviousness of claim 20 as a whole. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (holding that a claim “composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art”).” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,744,708 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,744,708
• Apple Inc. v. Logantree, LPNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00037 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30–32, 36, 39–42, 45–51, 61–65, 144, and 147 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 8. In proposing a different level of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner does not explain why its proposed skill level is more appropriate.12 PO Resp. 16. In addition, the parties’ proposed definitions are materially similar. 12 Petitioner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Reply. definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe “movement sensor” to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs, 200 F.3d at 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent the parties raise claim construction issues in addressing the asserted grounds, we address such issues below.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Also, the Petition merely states that “Ono supports instances where the user stops the step-counting mode operation using switch S2 after the processor detects that” the target distance or the target number of steps has been reached and notifies the user by generating an alarm sound. Pet. 53 (emphasis added). In this case, supporting the notion of the user stopping the step-counting mode operation in response to the alarm is not the same as teaching or suggesting the notion to one of ordinary skill in the art. The possibility that a user could stop the step-counting operation in response the alarm is insufficient to render claims 1 and 20 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Facebook, Inc., 743 F. App’x. 998, 1001–02 (Fed Cir. 2018) (deciding that an example in a prior art reference showing that it is possible for image elements to be contiguous is not sufficient to teach a LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”). Petitioner’s reliance on the Hewlett-Packard and Unwired Planet cases (Pet. 56) is unavailing, as the facts in those cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present proceeding. Namely, both of those cases involved prior art references that disclosed operations that satisfied a claimed feature some, but not all, of the time. Hewlett-Packard, 340 F.3d at 1326; Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1002. Here, Ono does not disclose the user stopping the step-counting mode operation in response to the alarm even some of the time. In view of the above, we determine, based on the full record, that the combination of Ono and Hutchings does not disclose limitations [1f] or [20f]. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claims 1 and 20 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono and Hutchings.” slip op. at 28

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “We have determined incorporated Grounds 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 4, as well as Ground 5A, deficient for the reasons discussed above. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner contends that any of these combinations somehow adds something to supplement or strengthen the patentability analysis of the incorporated grounds, we note that neither the Petition nor Dr. Kenny provides sufficient particularity to support such a position. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3))). Accordingly, we are not persuaded on the complete record before us that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) claims 48, 50, and 51 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, Conlan, Kaufman, and Hickman (Ground 5B); (2) claims 1–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30, 31, 36, 39–42, 45–47, 49, and 61–65 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, and Conlan (Ground 6A); (3) claims 48, 50, and 51 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, Conlan, and Hickman (Ground 6B); (4) claims 1, 3–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30, 36, 39–42, 61–65, 144, and 147 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, and Kaufman (Ground 7); (5) claims 1–5, 8, 10, 20, 25, 30, 31, 39, 41, 42, 45–47, 49, 61–65, 144, and 147 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Conlan, and Kaufman (Ground 8A); and (6) claims 48, 50, and 51 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Conlan, Kaufman, and Hickman (Ground 8B).” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 6,059,576 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,059,576

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.