- Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 5 is unpatentable over Gao-2 and over Gao-2 with Goubet; claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–8 were not shown unpatentable on any ground, and substitute claim 17 was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; PO Resp. 5–6. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited 11 This refers to the recitation in clauses 1F and 5F that the “diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber.” discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 3 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s opinion that the prior art does not render the claims obvious is premised on an interpretation of certain claim limitations that are inconsistent with both parties’ constructions” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“referring to the same direction as the separation of the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” (vertically in both Figure 6 of the challenged patent and Figure 1 of Goubet), we turn back now to Petitioner’s discussion of clause 1F, which includes the limitation at issue. There, Petitioner does not discuss why the “diffusion assembly” is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” but instead, Petitioner discusses why a component of the “diffusion assembly”—the “atomizer assembly”—is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber”: Pet. 39. In the end, we need not assess whether the “atomizer assembly” identified by Petitioner is “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” under the proper construction of that term (which, again, we need not and do not determine here) because the “disposed between” limitation does not involve the “atomizer assembly.” Instead, we find that, by failing to address why the identified “diffusion assembly” is “disposed between” the identified “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” Petitioner has failed to provide persuasive evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation. Pet. 38–39 (discussing the claim language “said diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber” but only discussing the location of the “atomizer assembly”); see 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review . . . , the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). For the reasons above, we find, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,092,918 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,092,918 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–9 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet; proposed substitute claim 21 is denied as indefinite.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“The record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration, as asserted in Petitioner’s overall argument. See Pet. Reply 1–2. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited general discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 2 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s declaration is premised on understandings of claim scope that are inconsistent with the constructions advanced by both of the parties” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read the cited portions of Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also Pet. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1046, 112:4–12, 113:13–20, 115:15–18). Next, we turn to each of the four specific claim terms that Petitioner highlights in its further arguments.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 5. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Florida Litigation a Joint Claim Construction statement that included stipulated claim constructions and disputed claim constructions for terms in the challenged patent as well as the ’449 patent and the ’918 patent. See Ex. 1018, Exhibit A (Stipulated Claim Constructions), Exhibit B (Disputed Claim Constructions). The parties stipulated to the construction of the terms “fluid dispersion” and “baffle” as recited in the challenged claim. See id., Exhibit A.10 10 When staying the Florida Litigation, the District Court cancelled the scheduled claim construction hearing. See ECF No. 67 (April 8, 2025) (granting joint motion to stay); ECF No. 68 (April 8, 2025) (cancelling the The stipulated construction of “fluid dispersion” merely restates the express definition of “fluid dispersion” from the challenged patent (although the definition is not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 3:8–20. Similarly, the stipulated construction of “baffle” essentially parrots one sentence in the challenged patent (again, not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 7:57–59. To the extent necessary, we determine that the complete record supports the parties’ stipulated constructions of “fluid dispersion” and “baffle,” and we apply those constructions below.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 9,527,094 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 9,527,094 - Tesla, Inc. v. Charge Fusion Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00153 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Tesla submits that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering (or an equivalent field) and at least two years of work experience involving automotive systems, including electric vehicle power management. . . . Additional industry 1 US 2009/0313034 A1, pub. Dec. 17, 2009 (Ex. 1004, “Ferro”). 2 EP 1,920,968 A1, pub. May 14, 2008 (Ex. 1005, “Oyobe”). 3 US 7,124,691 B2, iss. Oct. 24, 2006 (Ex. 1006, “Donnelly”). 4 Steven E. Letendre, The V2G Concept: A New Model for Power? PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 15, 2002, at 16 (Ex. 1007, “Letendre”). 5 US 5,654,621, iss. Aug. 5, 1997 (Ex. 1078, “Seelig”). 6 US 6,662,083 B1, iss. Sep. 16, 2003 (Ex. 1010, “Knockeart”). experience or technical training may offset less formal education, while advanced degrees or additional formal education may offset lesser levels of industry experience. Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–15). Charge Fusion “takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 17. For purposes of our analysis, we apply Tesla’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which we find to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’987 patent and the prior art. B. Claim Interpretation” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“1. “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider” In the Petition, Tesla proposes that we construe “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” as recited in every independent claim, to mean “a changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price) of electricity for purchase from an electric charge provider.” Pet. 4–5. Charge Fusion responds that Tesla improperly narrows the meaning of this claim limitation. PO Resp. 15 (arguing this claim term “is not just limited to ‘changing or otherwise fluctuating cost (or price)’ as alleged by the Petition” (emphasis added)). Although we consider Tesla’s proposed construction to identify an exemplary “dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider,” we see no need to limit the meaning of this limitation as proposed by Tesla. Indeed, Tesla agrees. See Pet. Reply. 7 (arguing only that this claim limitation “at least includes” such an example). And Charge Fusion does not contend otherwise. See PO Resp 15 (arguing only that this limitation “is not just limited to” cost fluctuations). As such, we see no need to further construe this claim limitation. 2. “determine . . . a charging schedule for the vehicle” Limitation 1[g] recites “determine, based at least on the one or more charging preferences and at least one current value of a dynamic attribute of an electric charge provider, a charging schedule for the vehicle.” Independent claim 8, 15, and 22 recite a materially identical limitation. Tesla submits that this limitation should not be construed as a means-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). See Pet. 5. Charge Fusion agrees that “nothing in the claim invokes [§] 112(6).” PO Resp. 16. As such, we discern no dispute regarding the meaning of this claim limitation.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that, as claimed, there is no express restriction on the manner in which the “amount” or “charge” is specified or otherwise expressed. Indeed, the Specification uses both “desired charge percent level” and “desired charge range level” as alternative ways for a user to specify an “amount of charge.” Ex. 1001, 14:53–15:8 (emphases added). The Specification defines “desired charge range level” as meaning “a desired distance to travel.” Id. at 15:3–8. Elsewhere, the Specification describes that a user may specify the amount of charge as follows: “the user may indicate a desired charging level (and/or a desired charging level may be automatically calculated) based on a desired distance of travel.” Id. at 19:49–57 (emphasis added). More specifically, annotated Figure 7 of the ’987 patent, reproduced below, demonstrates how a user may select “amount of charge” in terms of a desired mileage range 720 or a percentage level 718. See Pet. Reply 2. As shown in red, annotated Figure 7 illustrates that a user selects “desired charge level 720” on “vehicle charge indicator 714” by moving a slider to a value specified in “miles” (e.g., 110 miles). The Specification, after discussing selecting a desired charge percent level 718, explains: The user may also or alternatively view and/or change the desired charge range level 720. An estimate of how far the vehicle can travel on a given charge amount (which may be a general average and/or may be computed based on a specific itinerary and/or past driving habits) can be determined, for example, and utilized to express the desired charge level in terms of distance capable of being traveled. In such a manner, for example, a user may determine a desired distance to travel (e.g., how far it is from home to work or vice versa) and may set the desired charge range level 720 to match the desired distance. Ex. 1001, 14:65–15:8. Thus, the Specification confirms that “amount of charge” may be expressed in terms of a desired mileage as well as a desired percentage level.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. Charge Fusion’s reliance on Wonderland is misplaced and does not support the proposition for which it is cited. In Wonderland, the district court denied the accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, in part, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there was sufficient motivation to combine the prior art. Wonderland, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 511. As such, the district court’s Wonderland decision does not constitute a final ruling on the motivation to combine issue, and the Federal Circuit’s summary affirmance of the district court’s ruling neither addresses the issue nor reflects how the issue was resolved at trial. See Wonderland NurseryGoods Co. v. Thorley Indus., LLC, 644 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Moreover, contrary to Charge Fusion’s assertion, Tesla correctly notes that although Ferro refers to wireless charging, it provides no implementation details. Ex. 1004 ¶ 36; Ex. 2006, 54:8–55:9. Nonetheless, Ferro does describe manual options for initiating charging, and Tesla’s expert credibly testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to apply Oyobe’s vehicle sensor to allow a user to initiate Ferro’s charging methods more easily without having to leave the vehicle. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146, 151, 152 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 109). Accordingly, we find that Tesla establishes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Oyobe’s use of a sensor to establish presence of a vehicle near a charging station into Ferro’s system.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 11,631,987 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,631,987 - GD Energy Products, LLC v. Kerr Machine CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · PGR2025-00031 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable as obvious under each of four asserted grounds: Kerr; Aplex and Stanton; Blume, Stanton, and Wilkinson; and the sale of the Kerr Pump.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The person of ordinary skill in the art would have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or petrochemical engineering, or a comparable engineering discipline, and a minimum of 3-5 years of work experience in the design and/or manufacturing of reciprocating pumps and valves, including fluid ends and/or comparable high pressure fluid components, for industrial applications, including for use in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., EX1003, ¶32.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We decline to expressly construe any claim language. slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Regarding the combining of Aplex and Stanton, Petitioner asserts that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that providing a packing/stuffing arrangement, as taught by Stanton, within a fluid end housing, as taught by Aplex, would improve pressure and fluid isolation compared with an arrangement where the packing was bolted to the outside of the fluid end as in Aplex unmodified. Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 236). Patent Owner does not dispute this rationale. We find this to be a reason, with rationale underpinning, why the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29
- Adverse judgmentOther
“The record indicates that Patent Owner has statutorily disclaimed claim 15 as of April 28, 2025. Ex. 2206.” slip op. at 8
Patent outcomesUS 12,152,582 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,152,582 - Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC / Solaris Oilfield Site Services Personnel, LLC v. Masaba, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01179 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Waldner, Dynatek, and additional references; the Board cancelled all challenged claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Also, to the extent Masaba relies on extrinsic expert testimony, we note that Masaba’s expert cites absolutely no support for his understanding of the claims, much less explains why we should adopt his understanding over the plain and ordinary meaning of “conveying aggregate” and “moving aggregate.” See Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Absent supporting citations, such extrinsic testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. As such, we reject the notion that Waldner’s discharge chute member 242 is not a conveyor “for conveying aggregate” or “for moving aggregate,” as required by claim elements 1[h] and 1[i].” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Dr. Durham does not possess the necessary level of skill in the art to qualify as an expert in this case. Looking at the specification of the ’689 patent and the prior art of record, we think Masaba sets the bar too high. We acknowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art should have some education and/or experience in the mechanical art of conveying aggregate materials, but we do not think opining on the ’689 patent and asserted prior art necessarily requires that person to have the amount of education and experience that Masaba advocates. The ’689 patent relates generally to an “aggregate transferring system for receiving aggregate from a vehicle and elevating the aggregate to a higher vertical level for deposit into, for example, a silo.” Ex. 1001, 1:15– 18. And, as described in the ’689 patent and discussed later, the transferring system is an assembly of known types of conveyors, such as a belly-dump truck conveyor, a bucket elevator, and an articulated belt conveyor, for transferring the aggregate horizontally and vertically from a belly-dump truck to the discharge point, such as a silo. Without doubt, Dr. Durham has enough education and experience to reliably opine on the combination of known parts.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed
“We reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere does the plain language of the claims specify how the aggregate is conveyed or moved from the conveyor extension assembly’s inlet to its outlet, be it passively by means of gravity or actively by means of a conveyor belt. Instead, the claims simply use those verbs according to their plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to transfer or deliver” or “to cause to go or pass” from one place to another. See Ex. 3001, 253 (defining “convey”), 760 (defining “move”).10 Second, the specification of the ’689 patent similarly uses these terms in a plain and ordinary sense, without ever attributing to them some sort of special meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:9–12 (“The apparatus 10 is suitable for performing the transfer of aggregate from 10 We reference the original pagination of the dictionary in which these definitions appear. one location to another, such as, for example, from a vehicle carrying the aggregate to a silo 1 for storing the aggregate.”). The ’689 patent specification also makes clear that active conveyance of the aggregate is an option and not a requirement of the claimed invention, stating that the conveyor extension assembly “may further include a conveyor belt 150.” Ex. 1001, 10:60–66 (emphasis added). Limiting claim elements 1[h] and 1[i] to a device “for actively conveying” or “for actively moving aggregate” would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claims. Thus, based on the intrinsic evidence, we determine that claim elements 1h and 1k are properly construed to encompass passive and/or active movement of the aggregate via the conveyor extension assembly.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached
“Owner asserts” that two claim terms—“unloader structure” and “trailer structure”—should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Solaris submits an express construction detailing the corresponding structure in the specification for performing the recited function of the claimed unloader and trailer structures. See id. at 24–25. Only in disputing Solaris’s Ground 3 does Masaba advocate that the claim term “trailer structure” should be construed under § 112(f), and then only in conjunction with dependent claims 3 and 21. See PO Resp. 58. As such, we address Masaba’s proposed construction in our analysis of Ground 3. We now turn to Solaris’s grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 11,780,689 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,780,689 - PTAB · Nov 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00878 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3 and 11 after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Cleveland or obvious over Nakagawa.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“contentions, the cited portions of Cleveland, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Cleveland discloses each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as anticipated by Cleveland.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“5 Clearwater argues that Cleveland qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(1) “based on both its provisional and non-provisional filing dates.” Pet. 17. In support, Clearwater asserts that Cleveland’s provisional (Ex. 1006) is “virtually identical” to Cleveland itself (id. at 18) and submits claim charts to demonstrate that the Cleveland provisional provides written support for: (1) at least claim 1 of Cleveland (id. at 18–21); and (2) the subject matter relied upon in Cleveland (id. at 21–40 (citing Ex. 1006 throughout)). Based on our review of the Cleveland provisional, as well as Clearwater’s claim charts, we are persuaded that the current record demonstrates that Cleveland is prior art to the challenged patent. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“satisfies each claim element as identified above in Section I.D, i.e., elements [1.pre]–[1.6]. See id. at 22–40. Clearwater also submits annotated Figure 3 of Cleveland, reproduced below, to further illustrate the specific laminate structure of Cleveland’s coffee cup. See id. at 39.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“protective layers have “a coat weight of from 5 to 30 lbs/3000 ft2,” Clearwater submits the declaration of its expert, who explains that, because Nakagawa identifies the specific polymers and the thickness of the coat used for the plastic layers and one skilled in the art “would recognize that the disclosed polymers have a given density,” then “[w]ith these known parameters, the coat weight is easily calculated to be 23.04 lbs./ 3000 ft2 — falling squarely within the claimed range.” Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–133; Ex. 1008 ¶ 24; Ex. 1024, at 4). At this stage, we find that testimony credible and supported by the evidence presently of record. After reviewing the preliminary record (including Clearwater’s contentions, the cited portions of Nakagawa, and the testimony of Clearwater’s expert), we find, preliminarily, that Nakagawa discloses or otherwise suggests each claim element in the manner recited by claim 1. Thus, on the current record, Clearwater demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that challenged claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Nakagawa. We need not decide Clearwater’s challenge of the dependent claims based on Nakagawa alone nor its challenge of claims 1–3 based on Nakagawa and Tanner. Our analysis of these challenges, in our view, is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,637,126 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00858 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 5–7 and 16–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 102 or § 103 because the cited references failed to disclose the claimed closure retention mechanism.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. “closure retention mechanism” Trove proposes that “closure retention mechanism” should be construed as a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Pet. 18–19; Pet. Reply 1. CamelBak agrees. See PO Resp. 8. Indeed, subsequent to our institution decision, the district court in the parallel action held that the “closure retention mechanism” is a means-plus-function term governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Ex. 2010, at 5–6. We see no reason to depart from that holding and adopt the district court’s reasoning in that regard as our own. See id. at 6–8.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with CamelBak that the plain language of the claim imposes a temporal condition on when the closure is received by the closure retention mechanism, namely, only after it is removed from the drink spout. In other words, the closure cannot be in engagement with, i.e., “received by,” the closure retention mechanism while it remains on the drink spout. This interpretation is consistent with the specification, which repeatedly states that spaced-apart tabs 56 “engage” the closure when it is removed from the spout and moved to the stowed position. Ex. 1001, 8:58–60 (“tabs 56 . . . are configured to selectively engage and retain, or otherwise grip, the closure in the stowed position”); 9:32–39 (“when the closure is positioned between and/or otherwise in engagement with the tabs, the tabs engage the closure across the maximum width, such as with the tabs resiliently deflecting, bending, or compressing to accommodate the greater width of the closure”); 11:36–39 (“the closure retention mechanism 54 may be configured to engage . . . the closure to operatively retain the closure in its stowed configuration.”); 13:26–31 (“When the closure is operatively positioned within the closed perimeter of the handle into its stowed position . . . such closure is compressed slightly.”) (emphases added). Moreover, the specification describes this engagement as occurring by means of a “friction-fit” or “snap-fit” arrangement (id. at 8:50–52, 14:33– 36), which confirms that the closure is not permanently engaged with the tabs, but rather moved into engagement with the tabs, i.e., “received by the closure retention mechanism” per the plain language of the claim. Thus, the intrinsic evidence—the claim language and the specification—supports a construction that imposes a temporal condition on the recited function of the claimed “closure retention mechanism” such that it receives the closure only after the closure has been removed from the drink spout, meaning the closure is not engaged with the closure retention mechanism before it is selectively removed from the drink spout.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“3. “retain the closure in a stowed position” CamelBak contends that this limitation should be construed to mean “to hold or keep the closure in a position removed from the drink spout.” PO Resp. 13–14; PO Sur-Reply 4. Although Trove contends that CamelBak’s construction “impermissibly rewrites” the claim language, Trove nonetheless “does not disagree that it encompasses ‘hold or keep the Indeed, the claim language itself already contemplates just such a construction by expressly reciting that the closure retention mechanism “selectively retain[s] the closure in a stowed position relative to the handle when the closure is selectively removed from the drink spout.” Ex. 1001, 18:63–66 (emphasis added). As such, we determine that further construction of this limitation is not necessary to resolve the present dispute.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Trove proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had— an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products . . . [and that] [m]ore work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–30). 2 US 9,272,822 B2, issued Mar. 1, 2016 (Ex. 1004, “Samartgis”). 3 EP 2 177 447 A1, published Apr. 21, 2010 (Ex. 1011, “Gorskey”). 4 US 2006/0006578 A1, published Jan. 12, 2006 (Ex. 1012, “Johnson”). 5 US 7,753,240 B2, issued July 13, 2010 (Ex. 1005, “Leoncavallo”). 6 US D586,184 S, issued Feb. 10, 2009 (Ex. 1006, “Miller”). A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. See PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 61–68). Because CamelBak simply paraphrases Trove’s slightly more detailed definition of the level of skill in the art, we adopt Trove’s definition, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’252 patent.” slip op. at 6
Patent outcomesUS 8,905,252 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,905,252 - Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00636 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; the Board did not reach the four other instituted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’786 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Based on the full record, we maintain that it is unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various slopes of the sole that provide “athletic positioning” of the foot. See Ex. 1001, 44:2–14. The recitations of a “first slope,” “second slope,” “third slope,” and “reference slope” translate into the relative heights proposed in adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it incorporates the specification’s consistent descriptions of “athletic positioning” in terms of relative heights and slopes. For example, one embodiment of an “athletic positioning shape” is where “the heel platform may be 10 to 30 mm higher” than “the toe cup and/or the ball of foot cup.” [Ex. 1001], 13:38–45. Another embodiment discloses “an athletic positioning sole that includes an overall geometric shape” including “the heel of the sole [at] a particular height (e.g., h1, which may be 1’s to 10’s of mm) that slopes at an angle (e.g., Ø1) to the toe on the inside edge of the sole” which “may have a height of zero to a few millimeters.” Id., 17:54–62. PO Resp. 29. However, we find Patent Owner’s contention regarding particular heights and specific angles attempts to import limitations from the Specification into claims. Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). Based on the full record, we determine that express claim construction of “athletic positioning” is not necessary to resolve the present dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“8. Conclusion for Ground 1 We have considered all of the arguments and evidence adduced at trial. For the reasons explained, we find Petitioner has persuasively demonstrated that Kim teaches or suggests all limitations of claims 1–8. We also find that the value of Patent Owner’s objective evidence of non-obviousness is weak in comparison to the evidence regarding the prior art under the first three Graham factors. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–8 of the ’786 patent would have been obvious over Kim.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that Patent Owner fails to show nexus between the claimed invention and the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 70–78; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Other than asserting that “the requisite nexus exists here” (PO Resp. 71), and citing to the Declaration testimony of Mr. Markison (id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 322)), the Patent Owner response does not provide an analysis of Patent Owner’s product with respect to the claims of the ’768 patent, and thus does not demonstrate nexus. To the extent Patent Owner references Mr. Markison’s testimony, Mr. Markison’s testimony consists solely of the statement that Patent Owner “sells and markets golf and baseball shoes that embody the claims of the ’786 patent” with reference to an exhibit from district court litigation. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 322 (citing Ex. 2014). We find Patent Owner’s reliance on Mr. Markison’s testimony to be insufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Thus, Patent Owner is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus, because Patent Owner has not shown that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product that is the disclosed and claimed invention. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner also does not provide any evidence that the asserted” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 10,674,786 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,674,786 - Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00638 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 6–8, and 11 as obvious over Kim, and claims 4, 5, 9, and 10 as obvious over Kim and De Obaldia.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Petitioner adds, however, that “the claims are obvious in view of any reasonable definition of a POSITA [(Person of Skill in the Art)].” Id. Patent Owner responds that “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 23 (citing Pet. 15). Patent Owner adds that Mr. Markison’s “knowledge and experience, which includes 13 years of designing and developing athletic shoes that embody the patent at issue here, far exceeds the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 43–44). Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’760 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“In the Institution Decision, we declined to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because we determined it was unnecessary in view of the claim language. Inst. Dec. 8. More particularly, we stated “independent claim 1 already appears to itself define the term ‘athletic positioning.’ In particular, the claim recites that the big toe area is at a lower position than the heel area and the small toe area.” Id. Based on the full record, we maintain that it is unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various slopes of the sole that provide “athletic positioning” of the foot. See Ex. 1001, 43:17–27, 43:30–40. The recitations setting forth a relationship between a “big toe area,” a “heel area,” and a “small toe area” translate into the relative heights proposed in Patent Owner’s construction. Patent Owner contends that the Board should adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it:” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We have considered Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and Patent Owner’s counterarguments and find, on the complete trial record, that Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kim teaches or suggests “a foot platform that provides an athletic positioning of a big toe area at a lower position than a heel area,” as called for by claim 1. In this regard, we credit Mr. Delgatty’s Declaration testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that, when worn, the toe area would be on the ground, and thus lower than the heel, and based on the sloped forefoot, the big toe would be lower than the small toe.” Pet. Reply 10 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 16). We also credit Mr. Delgatty’s opinion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “that the shape and orientation of the sole (i.e., the platform on which an athlete stands) in relation to the ground is what determines if the foot is placed in an athletic position when in use.” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 23). We find Mr. Delgatty’s opinion to be reasonable and supported by Kim’s disclosure. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 37, 43, 44. Here, as Petitioner points out, “the ’760 patent distinguishes between the ‘sole’ and ‘cleats’ as separate components of the shoe” (Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:62–64)), and claim 1 only “requires that the forefoot platform of the sole provide the big toe area at a lower position than the heel area and the small toe area” (id. (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 20)). When asked during deposition, Mr. Markison confirmed that “cleats” or “sport-specific bottom 190” may be “different item[s] in the shoe than the athletic-positioning sole.” Ex. 1023, 85:18–22. specific bottom,” it is not limited to a spike or cleat pattern, but also recites that it may be a “sport specific tread pattern.” Ex. 1001, 44:13–19. Based on the full record, we agree with Petitioner that “[w]hether or not a shoe has cleats, an athlete’s foot will be positioned the same with respect to the surface of the ground when in use, and thus obtain the same positioning benefits the ’760 patent purports to provide.” Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 22). Accordingly, upon review of the information in the Petition and” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that Patent Owner fails to show nexus between the claimed invention and the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 69–77; PO Sur-reply 26–29. Other than asserting that “the requisite nexus exists here” (PO Resp. 70), and citing to the Declaration testimony of Mr. Markison (id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 285)), Patent Owner’s response does not provide an analysis of Patent Owner’s product with respect to the claims of the ’760 patent, and thus does not demonstrate nexus. To the extent Patent Owner references Mr. Markison’s testimony, Mr. Markison’s testimony consists solely of the statement that Patent Owner “sells and markets golf and baseball shoes that embody the claims of the ’760 patent” with reference to an exhibit from district court litigation. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 285 (citing Ex. 2014). We find Patent Owner’s reliance on Mr. Markison’s testimony to be insufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Thus, Patent Owner is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus, because Patent Owner has not shown that claimed invention. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner also does not provide any evidence that the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness is the direct result of unique characteristics of the claimed invention. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75; PO Resp. 69–77; PO Sur-reply 26–29. At best, Patent Owner merely implies that they are the result of unique characteristics of the claimed shoe. For our analysis below, even if nexus were shown, we identify additional reasons why we would give little weight to the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,064,760 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,064,760
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.