- Emnos USA Corp. v. Dunnhumby LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 30, 2015 · CBM2015-00162 · APJ Timothy J Goodson · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the Petition did not establish that the ’246 patent qualifies as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), the Director may not authorize a covered business method patent review unless the information in the petition, if unrebutted, “would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” As explained below, we do not institute a covered business method patent review because the Petition does not establish that the ’246 patent qualifies as a covered business method patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“remains deficient. The Petition relies on the Oracle Pro*C reference as disclosing the script template limitations of the independent claims, but as Patent Owner points out, the Petition does not present evidence establishing that Oracle Pro*C qualifies as a prior art printed publication. See Pet. 32– 34; Prelim. Resp. 50–53. Petitioner asserts that Oracle Pro*C “was published in 2002” but does not point to any specific evidence of its publication or public availability in 2002. Id. at 33. If Petitioner’s assertion is based on the “March 2002” statement that appears on the cover of the Oracle Pro*C reference, that statement is hearsay, and Petitioner does not argue that any hearsay exception or exclusion applies. See Ex. 1041, 1; see also ServiceNow, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., Case IPR2015-00716, slip op. at 16 (PTAB Aug. 26, 2015) (Paper 13) (“To the extent that Petitioner relies on the date on the face of each exhibit and the indications of availability of these references for download . . . for the truth of that information, and considering that Petitioner has not established that any hearsay exception or exclusion applies, we agree [that the statements are inadmissible hearsay].”). Petitioner also argues, with citation to the testimony of Dr. Smyth, that Oracle Pro*C is a reference used by programmers who develop applications in Oracle database environments. Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶ 57). However, neither the Petition nor Dr. Smyth explains how or when the specific Programmer’s Guide, Release 9.2 that Petitioner relies on as the Oracle Pro*C reference (Ex. 1041) was made available to skilled artisans. Because the Petition does not establish that Oracle Pro*C qualifies as prior art, Section VIII.B. of the Petition does not remedy the deficient showing in Section III.D. of the Petition on the first consideration of the technological” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,214,246 - Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 14, 2015 · IPR2014-00970 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 14, 15, 19–25, and 27–34 are unpatentable; the Board found other challenged claims not shown unpatentable on the grounds decided.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The difference in the opinions of the two experts is that Dr. Sechen believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have an additional four years of experience, education, or a combination of the two, beyond that proposed by Dr. Alpert. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 7. According to Dr. Alpert, the difference in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art is not material to any dispute over claim construction or patentability in this inter partes review. Id. We accord greater weight to Dr. Alpert’s opinion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art because he has experience in both teaching students and working with engineers in the industry, while Dr. Sechen’s experience is primarily in teaching. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 7, 21 with Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 3, 5. Moreover, based on our review of the ’434 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’434 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Dr. Alpert’s opinion on the level of ordinary skill. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’434 patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The above disclosure uses the term “operable independently” to describe the data handlers as being discrete and functioning without being physically or logically connected to each other. Based on our review of the ’434 patent, the specification and claim 27 both use the term “operable independently” in the same manner, i.e., to describe a feature of the data handler that is distinct from its data generation feature. We agree with Petitioner, therefore, that when interpreted in the context of the ’434 patent in its entirety, the claim term “operable independently” “merely means that each data handler can operate without influence or control by any of the other data handlers.” Reply 5. The ’434 patent specification uses the term “operable independently” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and we find no basis for applying the narrower construction advanced by Patent Owner to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we interpret “operable independently” as “operable without influence or control by another.” See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1278–79.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Based on the above description in Averbuj, we agree with Patent Owner that Averbuj describes memory interfaces (the alleged data handlers) that are configured to produce address and control signals, and that Averbuj describes producing address and control signals in certain circumstances, e.g., when Averbuj’s sequencer (the alleged control module) specifies writing data in a particular pattern that requires transformation to conform to a particular configuration of a memory module. See PO Resp. 33. We also agree with Petitioner, however, that Averbuj’s memory interfaces are further configured to apply to the memory modules the same address and control signals received from, and produced by, the sequencers for testing (see Reply 15), e.g., when the sequencer sends signals that can be applied, without modification or transformation (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 56), directly to a memory module irrespective of its physical configuration. Thus, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Averbuj’s sequencer meets the limitation of “a control module configured to generate address and control signals for testing the memory devices” as recited in challenged independent claims 1, 20, and 29 of the ’434 patent.” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed in Section IV.B.2.e., a petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent” (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)), and “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response” (37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). We agree with Patent Owner that the Reply does more than merely respond to or rebut arguments made in Patent Owner’s Response; rather, it sets forth a theory that was not presented clearly in the Petition. Patent Owner’s position is supported by the fact that Dr. Sechen, whose skill level is at least (and appears to exceed) that of the ordinary artisan, apparently was unable to envision how Huang and Averbuj could be combined. Further, Dr. Alpert’s second declaration includes, at a minimum, opinions as to the understanding of the ordinary artisan with respect to the teachings of Huang and Averbuj that were not presented in his first declaration. In our judgment, consideration by the Board of the above-noted arguments in the Reply and evidence presented in Dr. Alpert’s second declaration in support thereof would be improper under 37 CFR § 42.23 and unfair to Patent Owner. We have, however, reviewed and considered the arguments in the Petition and evidence therein, and are in agreement with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not provided adequate explanation or evidence to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Huang and Averbuj. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 7–12, 17, 18, 20–25, 27, 28, and 30–35 would have been unpatentable over Huang and Averbuj.” slip op. at 59
Patent outcomesUS 8,001,434 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,001,434 - NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01316 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that VESA P&D and VESA Flat Panel were publicly accessible printed publications, so claims 6–10 could not rely on them.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately whether or how the VESA documents were made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Lister, 583 F.3d at 1311. Instead, Petitioner merely asserts that “VESA is a well-known standards setting organization that promulgates standards relating to video in electronics.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58); id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 75). As such, we determine that Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the VESA documents are printed publications under § 102(b). See Lister, 583 F.3d at 1317 (burden is on the proponent to show the purported reference was publicly available). Therefore, based on the record before us, we conclude Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that either VESA P&D or VESA Flat Panel may be relied upon as prior art with respect to claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent.” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,804,724 - NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01315 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Lai qualified as prior art, defeating both asserted grounds for claims 1, 3, and 26–29.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“Lai issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 10/236,794, which was filed on September 6, 2002 and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/328,284, filed on October 9, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “the Lai Provisional”). Ex. 1003, [21], [22], [60], 1:8–12. Because Lai’s filing date postdates the effective filing date of the ’602 patent, Lai must be entitled to the benefit of the Lai Provisional filing date to qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Lai is entitled to the benefit of the Lai Provisional filing date if the disclosure of the Lai Provisional supports the claimed subject matter of Lai in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.1 See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with § 112, ¶ 1.”).” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“In a conference call with the parties, the panel authorized Petitioner to submit a five-page, non-argumentative claim chart showing how the claims of a reference patent asserted by Petitioner are supported by a provisional application. Paper 9, 3. The panel also authorized Patent Owner to file a five-page response to Petitioner’s claim chart. Id. at 4. Petitioner filed a claim chart. Paper 8. Paper 8 included two pages of text in addition to the five-page claim chart. Because these two additional pages are not in compliance with our Order (see Paper 9), we have considered the claim chart only and none of the arguments presented in the additional two pages. Patent Owner subsequently filed a response to Petitioner’s claim chart. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2
§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,819,602 - Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2015 · IPR2014-00787 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–22 and 24–30 are unpatentable as anticipated by Gough; claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, 12–14, and 21 are not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. Although Figures 4 and 5 of the ’960 patent show keys that are partially surrounded by shadowing or shading, there is no suggestion in the Specification that the “blended shadow” recited in the claims should be limited to only this shadowing. The claim language itself, referring to a blended shadow of the representation of at least one key and the main image (see claim 24), indicates explicitly that the blended shadow incorporates both the key image and the main image and, thus, should not be limited to the shadowing surrounding the keys. Accordingly, based on the full record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of “blended shadow” as “a portion of a composite image in which the main image is visible through the overlaid image as a result of combining the data from corresponding pixels from the main and overlaid images” for the purpose of this Final Written Decision. B.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner does not explain adequately where the detailed analysis set forth in the Reply is made in the Petition, and, in any event, we do not find the arguments persuasive. “A patent claim is anticipated if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently discloses every limitation of the claim.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, Petitioner does not describe sufficiently how Gough expressly discloses using logical operators to accomplish the blending process.6 We do not agree that either Gough’s description of the blending process depicted in Figures 10a–10f (Ex. 1007, 10:23–41) or Gough’s description of using the color look-up table (id. at 14:9–19) expressly discloses using logical operators, and such express disclosure is required for anticipation. At best, Petitioner’s arguments suggest how Gough could be envisioned as using logical operators, but do not explain adequately where or how Gough expressly discloses using logical operators to carry out the blending process. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14 depending therefrom, are anticipated by Gough.” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“3. Harrison Petitioner also argues Harrison teaches certain limitations. Pet. 44, 48, 52–55. Petitioner does not explain what Harrison adds to what is taught by Buxton. See id. at 48 (“[t]o the extent that these features may not be fully disclosed in Buxton, they are clearly disclosed in Harrison”). For purposes of this Final Written Decision, we determine the teachings of Harrison are cumulative to the teachings of Buxton, and therefore, do not address Harrison further.7 4. Claims 1–3, 5, 7–10, and 12–14 Petitioner argues that “Buxton discloses nearly all of the elements and limitations” of the challenged claims. Pet. 42. With respect to claim 1, Petitioner argues that Buxton discloses using alpha blending in accordance with the equation I = αI1 + (1-α)I2, where I is the resulting color intensity, I1 is the color intensity of the foreground image pixel, I2 is the color intensity of the background image pixel, and α is the specified transparency level between 0 and 1. Id. at 43–44 (citing Ex. 1009, 17:17–28). Petitioner argues that Buxton’s alpha blending “permits pixels to be ‘dedicated simultaneously’ to both images in order to produce a composite image” and is an “example of an operation using logical operators to provide different blending effects.” Id. at 44 (citing Ex. 1009, 16:63–17:4). Petitioner contends that although “Buxton may lack explicit disclosure of . . . a touchactivated device (required in claims 1 and 26),” Bier discloses that a touch screen is interchangeable with a mouse. Id. at 44–45. Petitioner also contends that Bier discloses a keyboard superimposed over a display. Id. at 7 Because the asserted ground includes Harrison, we continue to include it as part of our overall analysis.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“After considering all evidence and arguments, we agree with Patent Owner. In particular, we determine that Petitioner’s arguments do not persuade us that Buxton’s alpha blending equation uses operators that manipulate binary values at the bit level, consistent with our construction of “logical operators.” The alpha blending equation unquestionably involves arithmetic operations, which we find differ from logical operations. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown persuasively whether any logical operations overlap with any arithmetic operations. Therefore, we agree with Patent Owner’s contention that Buxton’s alpha blending equation does not use logical operators.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 6,121,960 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,121,960 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00134 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed 3 AAA also is listed as a real party-in-interest. Pet. 3. Petitioner, however, provides no argument or evidence as to why it believes that AAA is a real party-ininterest of Petitioner. Thus, we have no basis to ascertain whether Petitioner may above, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show what services, if any, Petitioner provides to Gerber. Therefore, Petitioner does not provide us with evidence sufficient to show that Gerber is a real party-in-interest of Petitioner. Also, the heavily redacted Agreement does not provide us with sufficient evidence regarding the relationship between these entities to show that Gerber is a privy of Petitioner sufficient to support Petitioner’s argument for standing. Thus, we do not have sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner has proper standing to bring this Petition. Therefore, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute a covered business method review of the challenged claims. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,709 (Aug. 14, 2012) (Response to Comment 102) (“Facially improper standing is a basis for denying the petition without proceeding to the merits of the decision.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,234,184 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00137 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing to seek covered business method review; it did not reach the merits of the challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“their real parties-in-interest or privies that have been sued or charged with infringement of a “covered business method patent,” which does not include patents for “technological inventions.” AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302. Of key importance in this case is the requirement that “a person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphases added); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Regarding this requirement, Petitioner does not allege that it has been charged with or sued for infringement, but instead contends that its” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,890,366 - Acxiom And Gerber v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00139 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not show it had standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,860,744 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00138 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed” slip op. at 5
- ExcludeDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,738,435 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00136 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not establish standing to seek covered business method review, failing to show it was a real party-in-interest or privy of a sued entity.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,856,375
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.